THE  HISTORY 


OF   THE 


FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 


THE    HISTOKY 


OF    THE 


FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 


BY 


MONTAGU    BURROWS 

CHICHELE   PROFESSOR  OF  MODERN   HISTORY   IN  THE   UNIVERSITY 
OF  OXFORD,    AND   FELLOW  OF  ALL  SOULS J 

CAPTAIN   R.N.  J    F.S.A.,    ETC.  ; 
"OFFICIER  DE   L'lNSTRUCTION   PUBLIQUE,"   FRANCE 


NEW  YORK:  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 

EDINBURGH  AND  LONDON:   W.   BLACKWOOD  &  SONS 

1895 


AIL  Rights  reserved 


MORS 


PREFACE. 


THE  field  of  English  history  has  been  of  late  so 
vastly  enlarged  that  it  has  become  necessary  to 
supply  the  public  with  numerous  supplementary 
works  dealing  with  its  special  departments.  The 
present  volume,  commenced  some  years  ago,  at- 
tempts to  trace  one  of  these  continuous  threads 
in  the  warp  of  the  history,  and  to  draw  it  out,  as 
far  as  possible,  distinct  from  the  general  story  of 
the  nation.  This,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  can 
only  be  an  imperfect  process.  While  presupposing 
on  the  part  of  the  reader  a  considerable  knowledge 
of  history,  it  was  yet  found  impossible  to  elucidate 
the  continuous  progress  of  British  policy  without 
reviewing  the  course  and  connection  of  many  events 
which  surrounded  and  shaped  that  progress,  and 
which  lie  within  the  provinces  of  Domestic  or 


508007 


vi  PREFACE. 

Foreign  History.  If,  then,  certain  chapters  should 
seem  to  suggest  the  more  fitting  title  of  a  '  History 
of  England  with  special  relation  to  its  foreign 
policy,'  it  cannot  be  helped.  But  the  method  has 
its  advantages.  To  quote  treaties,  protocols,  and 
despatches  except  by  way  of  the  briefest  refer- 
ence, to  discuss  technical  rules  of  the  law  and 
comity  of  nations,  would  be  to  invade  the  frontiers 
of  International  Law  and  Diplomatics.  By  the 
general  reader  the  march  of  Foreign  Policy  will  be 
more  clearly  discerned  in  the  light  of  the  history 
which  he  knows  than  in  the  darkness  of  the  sciences 
of  which  he  is  ignorant. 

The  main  purpose  of  this  work  has  been  to  show 
the  continuity,  the  continuous  development,  of 
British  Foreign  Policy.  Now  and  again  distorted, 
or  even  reversed,  by  dynastic  interests,  by  careless 
diplomacy,  by  erratic  statesmanship,  by  ecclesias- 
tical dissensions,  by  foreign  rivalry,  by  stress  of 
circumstance,  it  has  always  reverted — as  it  ever 
will  revert  —  to  the  course  prescribed  by  nature 
and  approved  by  experience.  England,  this  "  pre- 
cious gem  set  in  the  silver  sea,"  held  a  post  of 
vantage  unparalleled  among  the  nations.  "True 
to  herself"  and  to  her  natural  destinies,  she  has 


PREFACE.  Vll 

endured  and  prospered.  This  fortress  -  isle  of 
Britain,  safely  intrenched  by  stormy  seas,  con- 
fronting the  broadest  face  of  the  Continent,  and, 
later  on,  almost  surrounding  it  with  her  fleets, 
was,  and  was  not,  a  part  of  Europe  according  as 
she  willed.  First  appearing  in  the  dawn  of  history 
as  the  mysterious  Ultima  Thule,  planted  some- 
where out  in  the  Western  Ocean,  she  grew  to  ob- 
serve more  and  more  closely  from  her  watch-tower 
the  strife  of  the  Continent,  and,  as  her  expanding 
interests  dictated,  to  interfere  as  a  belligerent,  an 
ally,  or  an  arbiter.  Yet  deeply  implicated  as  she 
became  in  the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe,  she 
never  lost  sight  of  her  strong  position  as  an 
extra  -  Continental  Power, — a  position  which,  as 
her  navy,  her  commerce,  and  her  colonies  grew, 
expanded  into  that  of  a  world  -  wide  maritime 
empire.  The  development,  the  oscillation,  and 
the  reconciliation  of  these  two  principles  of  na- 
tional policy  form  the  chief  elements  of  the 
present  work. 

On  certain  points  the  author  has  necessarily 
repeated  views  already  published  in  his  '  Com- 
mentaries on  the  History  of  England.'  Moreover, 
a  few  pages  have  been  transferred  from  two  of 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

the  author's  books  :  from  '  Imperial  England/  which 
has  long  been  out  of  print,  and  from  the  '  Life  of 
Admiral  Lord  Hawke,'  which  is  about  to  appear 
in  a  cheaper  edition,  without  the  introductory 
matter  from  which  the  extracts  are  made. 


ERRATA. 

P.  56,  1.  1 7,  for  «  Britian  "  read  "  Britain. 
P.  86,  note  1,  for  "  160  "  read  "  560." 
P.  87,  note,  for  "  Memoirs  "  read  "  Vol." 
P.  89,  1.  4,  for  «  Keen  "  read  "  Keene." 


CONTENTS. 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.    THE    PRINCIPLES    OF    BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    BEFORE 

AND    DURING    THE    REIGN    OF    ELIZABETH  ...  1 

Early  foundations  —  The  four  invasions  —  An  indelible 
mark — Necessity  of  a  standing  Navy  and  of  Continental  alli- 
ances—  Early  kings  were  Continental  potentates — English 
Navy  best  of  the  ,time  —  The  Flemish  Alliance  —  Rise  of 
"  Balance  of  Power  " — England  the  first  consolidated  State- 
Cause  of  the  adoption  of  the  system  by  Henry  VII. — Henry 
VIII.  and  Elizabeth  extend  it — For  her  a  necessary  policy — 
Her  motives  and  means  of  action — The  effects  of  her  Foreign 
Policy. 

II.    BRITISH     FOREIGN     POLICY     UNDER     THE     STUARTS     AND 

CROMWELL    ........  18 

The  Stuarts  reverse  Elizabeth's  policy — The  causes  of  this 
reversal — The  ideas  of  Henri  II.  and  Sully — Balance  held 
by  France — Charles  I.  adopts  his  father's  errors — Cromwell 
supports  France  instead  of  Spain — The  Dutch  wars — "  The 
Honour  of  the  Flag" — The  Barbary  Pirates — The  restored 
Stuarts  pensioned  by  France — French  attempt  to  ruin  both 
Dutch  and  British — Holland  ceases  to  be  a  Great  Power. 

III.    BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    UNDER    WILLIAM    III.        .  .  32 

Tudor  Balance  resumed  by  William  III. —  The  national 
service  done  by  the  Whigs  —  The  "Deliverer" — Fine  con- 
duct of  the  English  people — Unity  of  the  British  Isles  re- 
covered— Ireland — Scotland — William  secures  the  Channel — 


X  CONTENTS. 

His  headship  of  the  Allies— The  Partition  Treaties  and  the 
Mediterranean— Louis  XIV.  grasps  at  the  Spanish,  and  then 
at  the  British,  Empire  — And  so  ruined  France  —  Great 
Britain  accepts  the  challenge— The  state  of 'the  Continent 
at  William's  death — The  Balance  loses  its  dominant  religious 
character— The  German  States  near  the  Rhine — The  Allies  of 
Great  Britain — The  Balance  had  proved  its  usefulness. 

IV.    BRITISH     FOREIGN     POLICY     IN     THE     EARLIER     PART     OF 

THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY      ....  53 

Marlborough  at  the  head  of  the  Allies — Tranquillity  of 
Ireland — Union  with  Scotland — The  Dutch  portion  of  the 
Allies — Success  of  Maryborough's  early  campaigns — War  of 
the  Spanish  Succession — Systematic  defence  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean— Failure  of  the  Allies  in  Spain — Capture  of  Gibraltar 
— Its  importance  compared  with  that  of  the  battle  of  Blen- 
heim— Effect  of  capture  on  France  and  Spain  —  George  I. 
undervalued  it :  the  English  people  never  did  —  Spanish 
siege  of  Gibraltar — British  control  of  the  Mediterranean — 
Spain  and  Great  Britain  in  the  West  Indies — The  British 
colonies  in  America — Their  relations  to  the  mother  country 
— Treaties  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain — Spain  exercises 
the  "  Right  of  Search  "  —  A  highly  complicated  history — 
"Jenkins'  Ear"  no  fable. 

V.    THE    EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    THE    WAR    WITH    SPAIN     IN 

1739 73 

Walpole's  peace-policy  —  Blockade  of  Portobello  —  Catas- 
trophe of  Hosier's  fleet — Secret  Treaty  between  France  and 
Spain — France  under  Cardinal  Fleury — Great  Britain  with- 
draws from  Continental  affairs — High  spirit  of  the  British 
Colonists — Wai  pole  takes  no  notice  of  the  Spanish  "  Right 
of  Search  " — Systematic  smuggling — Change  from  quasi-free 
to  restricted  trade — The  Assiento — Working  of  the  new 
system — Hopelessness  of  improving  the  system — Incessant 
insults  from  Spain — War  becomes  necessary — The  "Patriots  " 
in  Parliament — Petitions — Walpole  begins  to  give  way — His 
disgraceful  conduct — Attacked  on  all  sides — Address  to  the 
Crown — Walpole's  final  blunders — The  statesmen  and  poets 
who  roused  the  country  —  He  declares  war — Is  forced  to 
resign — Burke's  statements  accounted  for — Gloom  of  the 
succeeding  period— Provocation  on  the  part  of  France— The 
war  was  just  and  necessary. 


CONTENTS.  XI 

VI.    BRITISH     FOREIGN     POLICY    DURING     THE     WARS    WHICH 

FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE 1739-1763  .  .  .  108 

Recapitulation  of  previous  history  of  subject— Ships,  col- 
onies, and  commerce— Dangers  besetting  Great  Britain  and 
her  Colonies — Deplorable  state  of  the  Royal  Navy— Efficiency 
of  the  Navy  the  key-stone  of  the  national  success — The 
Army  could  not  as  yet  keep  step  with  the  Navy — George 
II.  and  Hawke— Alliance  with  the  Low  Countries— Hanover 
and  Holland — Melancholy  prospects — The  Rebellion  of  1745 
— Ireland  under  Lord  Chesterfield — Militia  organised  at  last 
— Pitt  and  George  II.  at  the  crisis — Anson  and  Hawke — 
Pitt's  failures  at  first — Prussia  and  Frederick  the  Great — 
Pitt's  relation  to  the  officers  in  command — A  "nation  of 
shopkeepers" — The  Treaties  of  the  period — International 
law— British  American  Colonies  first  object  of  attack — Con- 
tinued during  the  Peace  after  1748— Also  upon  India,  Africa, 
and  the  West  Indies — A  French  America — Nova  Scotia — 
British  outwitted  by  France  and  Spain — Who  attempt  to 
close  the  Mediterranean — British  government  of  her  Colonies 
—The  Seven  Years'  war  and  its  effects. 

VII.  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY   FROM    THE    CLOSE   OF   THE 

SEVEN    YEARS'    WAR    TO    THE    OPENING    OF    THE 
FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR 1763-1789  .          .          .         142 

The  Peace  of  Paris  in  1763 — Changed  relations  with  the 
American  Colonies  — Principles  involved — Revolt  of  the 
Colonies  —  European  allies  of  the  Colonists  —  Views  of 
George  III.— Peace  of  Versailles  in  1783— Effects  of  the 
war — The  Armed  Neutrality — The  rise  of  Russia — Relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  Turkey — Plots  of  the  Empress 
Catherine  and  the  Emperor  Joseph  II. — Frederick  the  Great 
interposes — Turkey  saved  by  Pitt— Pitt's  Foreign  Policy — 
Portugal— Position  of  Britain  before  the  great  war — Ex- 
plicit call  to  resume  the  old  position  in  Europe — Modern 
attacks  on  this  policy  —  History  coloured  by  Reform-Bill 
politics. 

VIII.  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    DURING    THE    FRENCH-REVOL- 

UTION WAR — 1793-1800        ...  168 

Pitt's  views  on  the  French  Revolution — War  forced  by 
the  French— Pitt  forced  to  accept— It  could  not  be  evaded 
—  The  old  Foreign  Policy  renewed  —  Naval  Supremacy — 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

Descents  on  French  coasts  —  Foreign  subsidies  —  British 
Credit — Law  was  king — Efficiency  of  Navy- — French  Navy 
demoralised  —  The  Armed  Neutrality  again  —  Failures  in 
Holland  —  Military  superiority  of  France  —  British  army 
slowly  improved — Pitt's  war-policy  unfairly  treated — Condi- 
tion of  Ireland— Torn  by  factions— Rebellion  of  1798— The 
Union — India — The  Colonies — Patriotism  of  the  Old  Whigs 
— Scotland — The  British  Allies — The  policy  of  Subsidies — 
Condition  of  the  European  States — War  a  question  of  fin- 
ance —  Posterity  was  to  pay  the  balance  —  Pitt's  futile 
attempts  to  make  peace — British  Allies  conquered — Mutinies 
in  Royal  Navy — Battle  of  Camperdown — Napoleon  in  Egypt 
— Nelson  and  Sidney  Smith — Napoleon's  coup  d'&at — He 
turns  on  Austria  and  Russia  —  British  refuse  peace  —  The 
Netherlands. 

IX.    BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   DURING  THE   NAPOLEONIC  WAR 

—1798-1807 204 

Napoleon  as  First  Consul — His  reforms — His  fresh  vic- 
tories— The  Armed  Neutrality  again — Acceptance  of  some 
of  its  principles — Peace  of  Amiens — Napoleon's  acts  during 
the  Peace — Prepares  to  invade  England — The  "  Detenus  " — 
Rupture  of  the  Peace  —  Europe  required  some  lessons — 
British  preparations  for  defence  —  Efficiency  of  the  naval 
defence — Pitt  resumes  office — Napoleon's  strategy — British 
resume  their  old  strategy — Napoleon's  first  plan — Disposi- 
tion of  the  British  fleets  —  Nelson's  defective  blockade  of 
Toulon — Napoleon's  second  plan — His  third  plan — His  final 
plan — French  and  British  strategy  compared — Villeneuve 
escapes — Nelson  in  pursuit — His  foresight — Calder's  action 
— Villeneuve  loses  his  chance — Nelson's  strategy — Trafalgar 
— A  new  era  in  the  war — Motives  of  Napoleon's  policy — 
Austerlitz  and  Pitt — British  commerce — Mahan's  treatment 
of  the  subject — Hard  but  necessary  fate  of  neutrals — Depots 
for  British  goods — Growth  of  British  resources — They  desire 
peace— But  resolve  to  fight  it  out— Struggle  was  not  with 
French  people,  but  with  Napoleon. 

X.    BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   DURING  THE   NAPOLEONIC  WAR 

(continued) — 1807-1808 245 

System  of  Subsidies  broken  up — How  to  supply  its  place  ? 
— Failure  of  Pitt's  successors — Abolition  of  the  Slave-trade 
— English  responsibilities  for  slavery  —  Canning's  training 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

under  Pitt — His  special  merit — Napoleon  and  Spain — The 
"  Spanish  ulcer  " — Canning's  Peninsular  policy  the  outcome 
of  his  popular  sympathies  —  Seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet — 
Defence  of  that  act— The  state  of  the  Baltic— The  "  Contin- 
ental System  " — French  seizure  of  Portugal — British  "Orders 
in  Council " — Their  concentration  of  trade — Effect  of  French 
policy  on  the  Continent — Seizure  of  Spain — Canning  accepts 
the  challenge — His  reasons — The  secret  of  his  power. 

XI.    BRITISH      FOREIGN      POLICY      DURING      THE      NAPOLEONIC 

WAR  (continued) — 1808-1814        ....         272 

Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  succeeds  Canning  as  represent- 
ative of  Great  Britain,  after  a  period  of  discontent — Torres 
Vedras — Revival  of  European  spirit — Gloomy  prospects  of 
the  French — The  resistance  of  Russia,  which  suffers  under 
Continental  System — Tempted  by  the  war  in  Spain — Austria 
and  Prussia  —  Invasion  of  Russia — Wellington's  advance — 
The  Russian  strategy — The  catastrophe — Rising  of  Europe 
— The  War  of  Liberation — The  Truce  fatal  to  Napoleon — 
Allies  defeated  at  Dresden — Napoleon  defeated  at  Leipsic — 
Rising  of  the  West  Germans — Diplomatic  difficulties — Allies 
press  on — Wellington  at  Vittoria  and  in  France — The  Allies 
cross  the  Rhine. 

XII.    BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    FROM    1814    TO    1827       .  .  297 

Napoleon's  Abdication — The  Bourbons— The  new  Charter 
— Talleyrand — The  Czar  Alexander  I. — Dismemberment  of 
France  prevented — Napoleon's  escape— Advances  to  Paris — 
His  strategy — Disadvantages  on  both  sides — British  made 
fewest  mistakes— Battle  of  Waterloo— The  final  Abdication 
— St  Helena — Estimate  of  the  two  generals — The  Congress 
of  Vienna — Moderation  of  the  Allies — The  Kingdom  of  the 
Netherlands — The  Treaty  of  Vienna— Continuity  of  British 
Foreign  Policy — Its  course  inevitable — The  American  War  of 
1812  —  Its  causes  —  Foresight  of  the  American  Government 
— Results — The  "  Holy  Alliance  " — Canning's  return  to  office 
—  Oppression  of  Spain,  Greece,  Italy,  and  Poland — Reac- 
tionary Congresses — Canning  deals  with  Spain  and  Portugal 
— And  then  with  Greece — Congress  of  Verona — Battle  of 
Navarino. 


xiv  CONTENTS. 

XIII.    BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    AFTER    1827  .  325 

The  Turks  in  Europe — Virtual  Protectorate  of  Great 
Britain— The  "Eastern  Question" — Troubles  in  the  Pen- 
insula—Separation of  Belgium  and  Holland— Final  services 
of  Talleyrand  —  Palmerston  pursues  Canning's  policy — 
Question  of  Intervention  —  The  "  Spanish  Legion  "- 
Triumph  of  Constitutionalism — The  Slave-trade  abolished 
— The  state  of  Italy — Austrian  influence — Secret  Societies 
— Pio  Nono  and  Garibaldi — Victor  Emmanuel — Louis  Na- 
poleon —  Palmerston  and  Cavour  —  French  intervene — 
Annex  Savoy  and  Nice — Garibaldi  in  Sicily  and  Naples — 
Victor  Emmanuel  "King  of  Italy — Palmerston's  policy  truly 
British — Defence  of  it — Poland,  Switzerland,  Portugal — 
Egyptian  invasion  of  Turkey  —  Action  of  French  and 
British — Crimean  War  —  Beaconsfield  and  the  "Eastern 
Question  " — Kussia  and  Great  Britain  in  the  East — Pacific 
rivalry  of  the  Powers  in  Africa — British  Colonies — The 
British  in  Egypt — Conclusion. 


INDEX  359 


THE   HISTOKY 


OF   THE 


FOKEIGN  POLICY  OF  GEEAT  BEITAIN, 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE   PRINCIPLES   OF   BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY  BEFORE   AND 
DURING   THE  REIGN   OF   ELIZABETH. 

THE  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  has  no  doubt 
become  more  plainly  visible,  less  interrupted, 
more  easy  to  follow,  since  the  Middle  Ages,  but 
we  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  it  has 
been  substantially  the  same  ever  since  the  Norman 
Conquest.  We  forget  that  it  was  adopted  not  Early 

founda- 

from  any  accidental  circumstance,   such    as    the  turns, 
ambition   of  particular   dynasties   or  sovereigns, 
the  incitement  of  ministers,  the  passions  of  the 
people,  or  the  growth  of  colonies,  but  from  neces- 
sity.     Every  part  of  British   Foreign  Policy  is 


2  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

reducible  to  the  one  fundamental  fact  that  Great 
Britain  is  an  island,  and  we  may  add,  an  island 
which  lies  so  close  to  Ireland  that  it  has  been 
proved  impossible  to  consider  them  as  separate 
countries. 

An  unfortunate  delusion  prevails  that  the 
modern  attitude  of  Great  Britain  towards  other 
nations  is  a  thing  of  yesterday.  That  is  the  con- 
sequence of  too  narrow  a  view  of  English  history. 
The  reigns  of  the  four  Stuart  kings  form  such  a 
contrast  to  the  reigns  which  followed  that  we 
are  apt  to  forget  the  policy  of  their  predecessors. 
It  is  not  till  we  have  learnt  to  regard  the  conduct 
of  the  Stuarts  as  exceptional,  as  a  contrast  to 
what  went  before  as  well  as  to  what  followed 
after,  as  a  gran  rifiuto,  an  apostasy  from  the 
British  traditions,  that  we  can  take  in  the  whole 
sweep  of  history.  Henry  VIII.  and  Elizabeth, 
under  the  new  circumstances  of  their  times,  fairly 
represent  those  traditions,  those  laws,  those  un- 
written laws  from  wThich  the  Stuarts  diverged. 
But  this  introductory  sketch  requires  that  we 
should  ascend  higher  still,  to  the  Normans  and 
Plantagenets. 

The  problem  which  presented  itself  as  primary 
and  elementary  to  the  conquerors  from  beyond 
the  sea,  and  all  the  more  when  they  began  to 
amalgamate  with  the  already  mixed  race  which 
they  had  conquered,  was  how  to  prevent  any  such 


BEFORE    AND    DURING    ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.         3 

catastrophe  from  occurring  again.  Four  invasions  The  four 
of  Britain  had  been  successful.  The  Romans  had 
conquered  the  original  Celtic  settlers ;  the  Anglo- 
Saxons  had  conquered  the  Romanised  Britons ; 
the  Danes  the  Anglo-Saxons ;  the  Normans  the 
Danes  and  English.  For  more  than  a  thousand 
years  the  British  Isles  had  been  a  prey  to  one 
invader  after  another.  The  dividing  sea  formed 
rather  an  advantage  to  the  attack  than  to  the 
defence.  With  a  sparse  population  and  often  a 
feeble  government,  no  one  could  tell  where  the 
enemy  would  make  the  assault,  and  the  organisa- 
tion of  a  navy  sufficient  for  the  patrol  of  the  seas 
was  rare  indeed.  The  resistance  of  the  islanders 
was  always  stubborn  and  generally  heroic,  but  in 
each  of  the  four  cases  the  defenders  were  over- 
borne. 

These  conquests  had  left  in  the  mind  of  every  An  indeii- 
man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  island  an  indelible 
mark ;  for  the  misery  which  had  ensued  in  each 
case  was  terrible — terrible  not  only  from  indi- 
vidual suffering,  but  from  the  changes  in  laws, 
language,  and  land-tenure  which  accompanied  it. 
Hence,  after  the  Norman  Conquest,  we  see  that 
a  common  danger  to  conquerors  and  conquered 
alike  united  them  in  measures  of  defence  and 
political  order  much  more  quickly  than  might 
have  been  expected ;  and  the  main  principles  of 
national  defence  which  have  been  handed  down 


4  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

from  those  times  became  a  fixed  policy.  They 
Necessity  were  two  in  number.  A  standing  naval  force 
ing  navy  must  be  organised  under  the  Crown  ;  and  alliances 

and  Con-  .          .  -11  •  r\ 

tinentai      must  be  maintained  with  the  neighbouring  Gon- 

alliances.  m 

tinentai  Powers  which  were  opposed  to  the  ene- 
mies of  England.  The  last  of  these  two  political 
doctrines  resolved  itself  for  many  centuries  into 
the  requirement  that  the  coasts  extending  oppo- 
site to  the  south-eastern  shores  of  England  should 
be,  if  not  in  the  hands  of  the  English  sovereign, 
at  least  in  the  hands  of  friends. 

Early  These  are  still  fundamental   principles.      The 

Conti-        Norman  and  Plantagenet  monarchs  represented 

nental  .  .  ,      .  _, 

potentates,  the  last  requirement  in  their  own  persons.  Ihe 
territories  they  possessed  in  the  land  of  the 
Franks,  which  was  then  a  congeries  of  practically 
independent  States,  added  to  their  insular  pos- 
sessions, gave  them  at  first  a  decided  superiority 
over  the  French  kings,  but  of  course  forced  them 
into  almost  incessant  hostility  with  them.  Thus 
the  kings  of  France  came  to  be  the  hereditary 
enemies  of  the  English  ;  and,  as  they  incorporated 
more  and  more  of  their  own  feudal  States,  de- 
veloped in  their  turn  a  superiority  which  at  last 
settled  the  question.  But  it  was  a  long  process. 
For  three  centuries  an  almost  independent  Aqui- 
taine  and  a  scarcely  less  independent  Brittany 
grievously  blocked  the  way  of  the  French  mon- 
archs. 


BEFORE   AND    DURING   ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.        5 

The  English  left  the  matter  to  their  kings,  who 
were  overweighted  in  the  conflict,  till  parliament- 
ary government  brought  the  people  generally  to 
a  different  view  of  their  obligations.  Periods  of 
fluctuation,  owing  very  much  to  the  varying  char- 
acter of  the  kings  on  both  sides,  marked  these 
centuries ;  but  the  above  principles  of  defence, 
though  now  and  then  sorely  tried,  answered 
their  purpose.  The  expedition  of  Louis  VIII. 
was  rather  the  effect  of  a  political  alliance  with 
an  English  party  than  a  national  invasion ;  and 
though  in  Richard  II. 's  feeble  reign  sundry 
coast  towns  were  burnt,  no  invasion  of  Eng- 
land took  place  either  then  or  ever  since.  The 
navy  may  seem  to  us  to  have  been  insignificant,  English 

.  navy  best 

but  it  was  better  than  that  01  other  nations,  of  its  time. 
The  "Royal  Navy  of  the  Cinque  Ports"  was 
permanently  at  the  disposal  of  the  Crown  ;  and 
when  need  arose  it  was  supplemented  by  the 
king's  ships.  And  the  intimate  English  rela- 
tions with  Flanders  which  had  begun  before  the 
Conquest,  as  well  as  the  far  less  intimate  rela- 
tions with  Brittany,  supplied  the  want  of  direct 
power  which  the  earlier  hold  upon  Normandy  had 
given.  For  neither  Normandy  nor  Picardy  had 
sufficiently  good  ports  or  length  of  seaboard  to 
be  very  dangerous  enemies,  while  the  Low  Coun- 
tries were  inhabited  by  races  of  much  the  same 
nationality  as  the  English,  and  were  closely 


6  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

united  by  the  bonds  of  trade  and  commerce. 
The  Fiem-  The  customers  of  the  English  occupied  the  great 
ance.  Flemish  towns,  and  were  generally  superior  to 
their  feudal  lords,  who  were  supported  by  the 
French.  So  the  basis  of  a  very  useful  alliance 
was  always  at  hand.  The  French  were  pecu- 
liarly vulnerable  on  the  Flemish  frontier,  and 
when  Edward  III.  asserted  his  right  to  the 
Sovereignty  of  the  Seas,  his  claim  was  acknow- 
ledged as  a  matter  of  course  by  the  people  of  the 
Low  Countries  and  of  Brittany. 

Thus,  as  the  centuries  rolled  on,  whatever  alli- 
ances were  made  with  the  Emperor,  with  Spain, 
or  with  other  Continental  Powers,  were  made 
against  France.  This  was  a  very  simple  Foreign 
Policy.  It  was  dictated  by  the  necessity  of  keep- 
ing England  free  from  invasion,  and  by  the  diffi- 
culties involved  in  the  retention  of  the  provinces 
Else  of  which  came  to  England  with  the  Normans  and 

Balance  of  5 

Power.  Plantagenets.  By  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth 
century  these  provinces  had  been  torn  away 
from  England  and  united  to  France.  The  Plan- 
tagenet  dynasty  was  worn  out ;  and  it  was  re- 
served for  a  stronger  family  to  formulate  the  sys- 
tem of  Balance  of  Power,  which  was  to  place  the 
protection  of  England  on  a  more  civilised  basis. 

The  new  system  could  not  of  course  be  formed 
until  its  materials  had  come  into  existence.  The 
fifteenth  century  witnessed  the  arrival  of  France, 


BEFORE   AND    DURING   ELIZABETHS    REIGN.        7 

Spain,  and  Germany  at  the  position  of  unity  to 
which  England  had  herself  attained  somewhat 
previously.  The  conquest  of  Wales,  the  lordship 
of  Ireland,  and  the  diplomatic  management  of 
Scotland,  due  to  the  sense  of  the  Edwardian 
failures  to  conquer  that  country,  had  given  a 
certain  solidarity  to  the  Island  -  State,  which  England 
Spain  did  not  achieve  till  the  union  of  Castile  consoiidat- 

ed  State. 

and  Aragon,  nor  France  till  Gascony,  Provence, 
and  Brittany  were  absorbed,  nor  Germany  till 
the  time  of  Maximilian.  Each  of  these  con- 
solidated States  now  started  on  a  fresh  career, 
and  the  Foreign  Policy  of  England  came  to 
be  summed  up  in  the  doctrine  that  it  was  her 
business  to  balance  them  one  against  the  other, 
and  so  provide  for  her  defence  by  diplomacy  in- 
stead of  war.  For  this  purpose  she  must  be  united 
at  home  and  strong  on  the  sea.  Hence  the  de- 
velopment of  the  Royal  Navy. 

We  need  not  stop  here  to  register  the  part 
played  by  the  principle  of  Balance  in  the  earlier 
history  of  the  world,  the  remarkable  exemplifi- 
cation of  it  in  the  ancient  States  of  Greece, 
the  necessary  abeyance  of  it  during  the  many 
centuries  of  the  Roman  Empire,  or  the  smaller 
adumbrations  of  the  principle  in  the  Middle 
Ages  by  the  policy  of  the  Popes,  who  learnt  to 
look  for  the  safety  of  the  Papal  States  in  bal- 
ancing their  German  enemy  by  the  Sicilian  Nor- 


8  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

mans,  or  other  Italian  States,  or  France.  Nor 
in  mentioning  the  adoption  of  the  principle  by 
Henry  VII.  and  his  son,  must  we  for  a  moment 
compare  the  steady  scientific  application  of  it  by 
Elizabeth  with  the  tentative  and  shifting  policy 
of  her  father  and  grandfather.  Nevertheless  that 
policy  led  the  way  to  Elizabeth's  successful  diplo- 
macy ;  and  we  must  notice  the  work  of  each  before 
we  come  to  the  Stuarts,  who  broke  through  the 
Tudor  traditions. 

The  chief  difference  between  her  combinations 
and  those  of  her  predecessors  is  to  be  found 
in  the  changes  made  by  the  Continental  He- 
formation,  which  were  only  beginning  to  show 
themselves  towards  the  end  of  Henry  VIII. 's 
Cause  of  reign ;  but  the  real  cause  of  the  system  attain- 

theadop-      .      3  .  _.  .  .        _ 

tionofthe  mg  its  extraordinary  development  in  Europe  is 
to  be  found  in  the  advent  of  the  Emperor 
Charles  V.  to  power.  Universal  empire  could 
only  be  warded  off  by  State- combinations,  and 
these  generated  International  Law.  The  mean- 
ing of  the  term  Balance  of  Power  is  really 
Self-Defence.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  it 
has  been  the  saving  of  Europe.  When  it  had 
done  its  work  the  term  fell  into  disrepute.  It 
was  open  to  abuse,  and  was  abused  ;  but  it  has 
been  succeeded  by  an  international  system  of 
much  the  same  sort  under  a  different  name,  by 
the  "  Concert  of  Europe,"  by  arrangements  made 


BEFORE    AND    DURING   ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.         9 

at  Congresses  for  the  smaller  by  the  greater 
Powers,  and  to  some  extent,  though  still  but 
feebly,  by  arbitration. 

Henry  VII. 's  experiences  before  he  came  to  the 
throne  had  taught  him  the  necessary  statesman- 
ship for  the  work  which  lay  before  him  at  the 
very  time  when  the  consolidation  of  States  was 
achieved  or  being  achieved,  and  was  producing  its 
national  effects.  To  his  training  in  exile,  to  his 
long  residence  in  France,  and  to  his  wise  choice 
of  ministers  must  be  attributed  his  adoption  of  Henry vn. 
the  policy  of  balance  which  had  indeed  been  opportun- 

...  .  ity. 

initiated  by  France  and  Spain.  The  collapse  of 
Brittany  about  that  time,  and  the  Yorkist  hos- 
tility of  Flanders  to  Henry  as  a  Lancastrian, 
had  broken  up  the  ancient,  well- accustomed  bar- 
riers of  England  against  France ;  for  by  the 
aid  afforded  on  either  side  of  Calais  the  inva- 
sion of  France  by  that  route  had  been,  and  was 
part  of,  the  political  defence  of  England.  Very 
soon  afterwards  however  came  the  diversion  of 
French  enterprise  (1494)  in  the  direction  of  Italy, 
and  the  struggle  in  that  peninsula  between  the 
three  consolidated  nations,  Spain,  France,  and 
Germany.  Henry  VII.  seized  the  opportunity, 
and  definitely  commenced  the  Balance  of  Power, 
which  Elizabeth  advanced  to  the  dignity  of  a 
scientific  system. 

A  few  words  on  the  method  of  working  that 


10  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

system  under  the  Tudors  will  display  the  gradu- 
ally unfolding  Foreign  Policy  of  England  before 
the  Stuarts  departed  from  it,  and  by  so  doing 
helped  to  destroy  their  family.  Henry  VII. 's 
Foreign  Policy  is  often  described  as  a  mere  out- 
come of  his  ambition  to  secure  his  dynasty  by 
forming  the  closest  possible  alliance  with  Spain, 
which  was  the  rising  Power  of  the  world.  No 
doubt  that  country  was  alive  from  head  to 
foot ;  the  expulsion  of  the  Moors  and  the  dis- 
covery of  America  seemed  to  point  her  out  as 
the  leader  of  the  nations ;  and  her  conquest 
of  South  Italy  gave  her  the  command  of  the 
Mediterranean.  This  is  quite  true  as  far  as  it 
goes,  but  it  is  much  more  important  to  note  that 
Henry  regarded  this  great  Power  as  the  best 
means  of  making  up  for  the  loss  which  England 
had  sustained  by  the  unification  of  France.  This 
was  the  efficient  cause  of  his  policy.  The  ances- 
tral enemy  which  had  expelled  the  English  from 
their  hereditary  possessions  in  Aquitaine,  and 
now  exhibited  itself  as  a  compact  France,  was  to 
be  kept  in  check  by  Spain  on  the  south  ;  and  the 
Flemish  coasts  which  were  now  divided  between 
Germany  and  France  were  to  be  kept  secure  by 
balancing  these  Powers  against  each  other  in 
the  north. 

The  union  of  Spanish  and   German   interests 
which    came    to    exist    in    the    Low    Countries, 


BEFOKE    AND    DURING    ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.       11 

through  the  marriages  of  Maximilian  and  his 
son  greatly  added  to  the  weight  of  Spain,  and 
forced  France  itself,  when  Charles  Y.'s  imperial 
position  became  more  and  more  alarming,  to 
seek  her  safety  in  occasional  alliances  with 
England.  Thus,  before  religious  considerations  Henry 

.         .  .  -IT     VIII.  and 

began  to  exercise  influence  on  international  poll-  Elizabeth 

.  fc  f  extended 

tics,  the  Balance  of  Power,  though  definitely  **•  , 
formed,  was  almost  as  simple  as  in  earlier  times, 
and  only  required  sovereigns  of  sufficient  ability 
in  England  and  France  to  substitute  its  principles 
for  an  endless  war  of  revenge  and  mutual  injury 
between  the  two  countries  which  bordered  the 
English  Channel.  These  sovereigns  were  found 
in  the  English  Henry  VII.,  Henry  VIII. ,  and 
Elizabeth.  But  the  French  were  not  much 
behind  the  English  ;  for  to  them,  under  the  im- 
pending weight  of  Charles  V.'s  position,  the  art 
of  Balance  became  a  matter  of  life  and  death. 
Nor  was  Francis  I.  afraid  to  apply  the  idea  in 
a  way  which  was  then  thought  scandalous,  an 
alliance  with  the  Turks  ;  it  had  become  a  ne- 
cessity. It  should  also  be  observed  that  the  sys- 
tem was  synchronous  with  the  Renaissance,  with 
scientific  diplomacy,  and  with  international  law, 
of  which  Venice  was  the  first  exponent.  Thus 
it  took  root. 

In  all  the  Tudor  reigns,  then,  we  trace  the  same 
outlines  of  Foreign  Policy,  the  religious  question 


12  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

coming  forward  as  a  chief  ingredient  in  the  last 
part  of  Henry  VIII. 's  reign  and  the  whole  of 
Elizabeth's.  We  do  not,  of  course,  enter  here  into 
the  details  of  Henry  VIII.  's  fluctuating  alliances- 
first  with  Spain  against  France,  then  with  France 
against  the  powerful  Emperor  Charles  V.  (who 
had  come  to  hold  the  greatest  empire  known  since 
the  days  of  Charlemagne),  and  then  with  the  Em- 
peror against  France.  It  is,  however,  necessary 
to  observe  that  the  balance  which  he  and  Wolsey 
effected  gave  a  time  of  rest  and  progress  to  Eng- 
land which  exercised  a  vast  influence  in  the  spread 
of  the  Reformation,  and  made  the  system  accept- 
able to  the  English  people.  The  great  increase 
of  intercourse  between  the  German  and  the  Eng- 
lish reformers,  just  at  the  moment  when  such  in- 
tercourse was  required,  is  not  often  noticed  as  it 
deserves  to  be.  The  translations  of,  and  com- 
mentaries on,  the  Bible  made  abroad  thus  found 
an  entrance  into  English  towns  and  seats  of  com- 
merce, and  paved  the  way  for  the  anti  -  Papal 
movement  which  accompanied  Henry's  growing 
quarrel  with  Rome  over  the  question  of  his  di- 
vorce from  Catherine  of  Aragon. 

Passing  over  the  exceptional  but  happily  short 
reigns  of  Edward  VI.  and  Mary,  during  which 
France  recovered  all  that  England  had  gained 
under  Henry  VIII.,  we  come  to  the  policy  of 
Elizabeth,  which  exemplified  the  doctrine  on  a 


BEFORE    AND    DURING   ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.       13 

large  scale  and  in  a  complete  manner.  She  found 
herself  in  an  infinitely  more  dangerous  position 
than  that  of  her  father  and  grandfather.  Mary's 
marriage  with  Philip  II.  of  Spain,  and  his  suc- 
cession soon  afterwards  to  his  father's  enormous 
empire — still  enormous,  even  though  the  Empire 
properly  so  called  had  been  assigned  to  his  uncle 
Ferdinand, — had  been  followed  by  Mary  Stuart's 
marriage  to  Francis,  who  almost  immediately 
afterwards  became  King  of  France.  Thus  both  of 
the  great  Roman  Catholic  Powers  which  Elizabeth 
had  to  fear  stood  at  her  very  doors  in  a  position 
hostile  to  her  government.  Philip  having  madeJAneces- 
an  offer  of  his  hand  to  Elizabeth,  and  been  firmly  for  Eiiza- 

J    beth. 

refused,  became  her  enemy  for  the  rest  of  his  life, 
and  turned  to  Ireland  as  the  best  entrance  to 
England.  The  French  king  and  his  beautiful 
Scoto- French  wife  actually  quartered  the  arms  of 
England  with  their  own.  Elizabeth's  policy  was 
then  settled  for  her  at  once,  by  necessity  ;  for 
England  was  as  yet  no  match  for  these  two 
Powers  united ;  and  the  doctrine  of  Balance  was 
ready  to  her  hand.  They  must  be  played  off 
against  one  another ;  and  this  she  contrived  to 
do  by  every  device  in  her  power,  aided  by  the 
ablest  ministers  a  Crown  ever  commanded,  for 
the  rest  of  her  life. 

A  reign  of  forty-five  years  by  such  a  consum- 
mate sovereign  did  much  more  for  the  Balance 


14  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

of  Power  than  the  rudimentary  efforts  of  Henry 
VII.  and  Henry  VIII. ,  both  of  whom  were  con- 
stantly baffled  by  the  mistakes  of  their  Ministers, 
and  by  the  astuteness  of  the  Continental  sov- 
ereigns. Elizabeth's  rigid  economy  and  careful 
administration  enabled  her  to  shun  the  rocks  on 
which  they  had  run,  to  satisfy  her  people  that 
she  would  not  tax  them  more  than  she  could 
possibly  help,  and  to  rise  triumphant  over  every 
obstacle.  The  struggling  Protestants  of  Europe 
wanted  a  head,  and  though  she  took  care  never 
to  help  them  except  in  extremity,  they  knew  well 
that  they  could  trust  her  if  affairs  became  des- 
perate. And  this  new  element  of  the  Balance, 
religion,  which  weighed  but  little  under  her 
father,  now  became  a  leading  factor  in  the  neces- 
sary combinations.  Both  in  France  and  Ger- 
many the  Reforming  party  rose  in  arms  against 
their  Papist  persecutors,  and  the  religious  wars 
which  took  place  in  both  countries  were  the  sal- 
vation of  England  while  it  remained  in  Elizabeth's 
hands.  Her  policy  of  declining  to  give  any  fur- 
ther assistance  than  was  absolutely  necessary  has 
been  severely  attacked  by  various  writers,  but  it 
was  in  reality  due  to  the  penetration  of  a  highly 
educated  mind,  trained  in  critical  times,  which 
taught  her  the  wide  difference  between  the 
Anglican  Reformation,  based  on  the  practice  of 


BEFORE    AND    DURING   ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.       15 

the  Primitive  Church  and  the  Bible,  and  the  new 
Protestant  departure  of  Calvin  which  broke  al- 
together with  antiquity,  and  which  recognised 
the  Bible  not  only  as  the  ultimate  reference,  but 
as  the  sole  guide  of  religion  and  politics. 

Elizabeth   knew   also    the    importance   of   not  Hermo- 

T»  /^  tives  and 

exasperating     the     moderate     Roman    Catholics  means  of 

x    m  °  action. 

both  in  Court  and  country,  who  were,  as  the 
saying  goes,  Englishmen  first  and  Papists  after- 
wards. Nor  did  she  forget  that,  being  a  woman, 
she  had  resources  which  gave  her  a  peculiar 
advantage  ;  and  by  encouraging  different  suitors 
at  different  times,  as  policy  dictated,  she  accom- 
plished what  armies  and  navies  would  have  failed 
at  that  time  to  do.  These  were  her  chief  motives 
and  means  of  action.  They  were  so  satisfactory 
to  her  people  that  it  was  dangerous  for  any  suc- 
cessor to  pursue  a  different  course.  Englishmen 
had  learnt  to  feel  that  they  were  an  integral  and 
necessary  part  of  the  Continental  system  :  they 
were  proud  of  holding  the  balance  of  Europe,  and 
of  holding  it  so  cheaply.  Their  commerce  was 
rapidly  growing,  and  the  nations  which,  would 
have  checked  it  found  themselves  incapable  of 
hostile  action.  The  closely  guarded  New  World 
of  Spain  was  pierced  again  and  again  by  Hawkins, 
Drake,  and  the  nautical  chivalry  of  England ; 
the  Armada  had  called  forth  the  whole  skill  and 


16  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

energy  of  the  seafaring  population,  and  by  the 
end  of  the  reign  this  imposing  Spanish  empire, 
which  had  sprung  up  like  Jonah's  gourd,  had 
shrunk  and  withered  in  premature  decay. 

Henri  IY.  of  France  had  been  saved  from  de- 
struction by  Elizabeth's  aid ;  and  though  she 
detested  and  despised  both  his  apostasy  and  his 
debauchery,  she  had  established  a  lasting  politi- 
cal friendship  with  her  diligent  pupil.  He  was 
still  reckoning  on  her  patronage  to  form  his  own 
Balance  of  Power  when  she  died.  Further,  the 
reformed  people  of  the  Low  Countries  had  been 
saved  from  Spain,  and  yet  prevented  from  falling 
iinto  the  hands  of  France  ;  and  thus  the  safety  of 
The  effects 'the  Channel  was  firmly  established.  Who  could 

of  her  For-  .  .  . 

eigu Policy,  wonder  that  all  this  sank  deep  into  the  minds 
of  the  English  people,  that  they  bore  with  their 
queen's  occasional  imperiousness  and  the  frequent 
narrow  escapes  of  the  nation  caused  by  her  parsi- 
mony and  the  over-refinements  of  her  statecraft, 
and  that  at  her  death  they  considered  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  the  country  to  have  been  fixed  for  the 
future  beyond  recall  by  the  successful  Tudor  policy 
of  more  than  a  century  ?  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  point  out  that  this  Foreign  Policy  was  guarded 
and  accompanied  by  the  equally  definite  home 
policy  of  keeping  the  British  Isles  united,  or  at 
least  as  closely  united  as  circumstances  permitted. 


BEFORE    AND    DURING    ELIZABETH'S    REIGN.       17 

Whatever  else  happened,  the  foreigner  was  to 
find  it  as  difficult  to  gain  a  footing  in  Scotland 
or  Ireland  as  in  England  itself.  The  French  were 
driven  out  of  Scotland  almost  as  soon  as  they 
landed,  and  the  Spaniards  in  Ireland  received  no 
quarter. 


18 


CHAPTER    II. 

BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY    UNDER   THE    STUARTS 
AND    CROMWELL. 

The  stuarts  THE  country  had  no  choice  but  to  place  James  VI. 
Elizabeth's  of  Scotland  on  the  throne  vacated  by  Elizabeth. 

policy. 

The  Foreign  Policy  of  England,  which  now  be- 
came "  Great  Britain,"  may  be  summed  up  as  a 
reversal  of  that  of  Elizabeth  ;  and  the  conviction 
of  the  nation  to  that  effect  had  much  to  do  with 
bringing  on  the  Great  Rebellion  and  the  subse- 
quent Revolution.  The  Stuart  policy  was  an 
embodiment  of  James's  favourite  motto,  "  Beati 
Pacifici,"  accompanied  by  a  criminal  defiance  of  the 
British  Constitution  in  the  matter  of  parliaments, 
and  a  leniency  towards  Romanism  which  ignored 
the  hostility  of  the  Papacy.  It  paved  the  way  for 
the  adoption  of  his  system  by  the  Stuart  family 
to  the  third  generation.  The  best  ideas,  if  ap- 
plied under  circumstances  which  do  not  admit 
of  them,  become  the  worst  possible.  Toleration 
was  excellent  in  itself;  but  the  removal  of 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          19 

those  restrictions  on  the  free  exercise  of  Papal 
power,  which  had  been  found  necessary  in  order 
to  preserve  the  Reformation,  was  at  that  time, 
and  for  long  afterwards,  fatal.  To  assert  the 
power  of  the  Crown  was  a  duty,  if  the  corres- 
ponding duty  of  holding  free  parliaments  and 
protecting  their  privileges  had  been  combined 
with  it.  Peace  was  the  greatest  blessing  to 
humankind — "  peace  on  earth,  goodwill  towards 
men " ;  but  such  is  human  nature  that  peace 
can  never  be  assured  except  by  preparedness  for 
war.  If  a  nation  is  unwilling  to  fight  for  peace, 
other  nations  which  desire  to  profit  at  its  expense 
are  sure  to  combine  against  it. 

It  was  James's  peculiar  education  and  habits  of  The  causes 

.      ,  ,  .    .  of  this  re- 

mind which  prevented  him  from  perceiving  these  versai. 

obvious  propositions.  Learned  and  thoughtful, 
he  was  pedantic  and  obstinate  to  the  last  de- 
gree. He  was  one  of  the  best  talkers  in  the 
world,  and  courtiers  knew  better  than  to  con- 
tradict him ;  but  when  it  came  to  action  the 
motives  which  swayed  him  were  fear,  prejudice, 
and  private  affection.  Thus  he  was  fooled  by 
Spain  throughout  the  whole  of  his  reign.  He 
never  found  out  that  his  ministers  were  bribed 
till  it  was  too  late,  and  consequently  he  was 
made  a  mere  tool  or  instrument  on  which  that 
Power  could  play  as  it  pleased.  Never  was  any 
foreign  minister  more  completely  in  command  of 


20  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

the  English  Court  and  policy  than  Gondomar. 
He  reported  that  the  English  were  a  nation  of 
shopkeepers,  ready  to  be  bought  and  sold  like 
goods  over  the  counter.  So  low  had  the  great 
England  of  Elizabeth  already  fallen. 

And  yet   this  was  a  period  when  the  Eliza- 
bethan policy  was  most  especially  needed.    With- 
out  the    patronage   which    she    had   granted   to 
the  German  and  French   Protestants  they  were 
no  match  for  the  concentrated  energy  and  power 
of  the  Popes   supported  by  Spain,  Austria,  and 
Bavaria.     We  can  best  perhaps  understand  how 
The  ideas    pressing    the    need  was    by   studying    in    Sully's 
iv.  and      <  Memoirs '  the  position  of  Henri  IY.  towards  the 

Sully. 

Balance  of  Power.  Sully  acknowledges  that 
Elizabeth  had  been  the  instructress  of  his 
master  and  himself  in  that  policy,  and  quotes 
her  saying  that  "  nothing  could  resist  the  union 
of  France,  England,  Sweden,  and  Denmark,  when 
in  strict  alliance  with  each  other."  It  is  remark- 
able that  she  did  not  mention  Holland,  which 
made  in  her  reign  its  immortal  struggle  against 
Philip ;  but  in  Sully's  list  of  the  two  European 
factions,  as  he  calls  them,  it  appears.  On  the  one 
side,  he  says,  were  ranged  the  Pope,  the  Emperor, 
Spain,  Spanish  Flanders,  parts  of  Germany  and 
Switzerland,  Savoy,  and  almost  all  Italy ;  on  the 
other  were  France  (a  Eoman  Catholic  Power),  the 
British  Isles,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Venice,  the 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          21 

United  Provinces  (as  Holland  was  then  called), 
and  the  other  parts  of  Germany  and  Switzer- 
land. The  great  Powers  of  western  and  northern 
Europe  were  to  work  towards  a  system  which 
should  put  an  end  to  this  state  of  things,  and 
form  a  sort  of  Amphictyonic  Council  for  the  gen- 
eral welfare.  Each  must  be  powerful  enough  to 
be  respected  by  its  neighbours,  and  each  inti- 
mately concerned  with  the  external  policy  of 
every  other. 

For  this  purpose  each  State  must  be  internally 
strong  and  well-ordered,  or  independence  would 
be  impossible.  Thus  each  was  to  have  an  in- 
terest in  the  prosperity  of  the  rest.  Together 
they  were  to  impose  peace  and  harmony  on  the 
smaller  States,  to  impose  it  by  force.  The  corol- 
lary from  this  proposition  was  that  war  must 
necessarily  take  place  if  any  one  of  the  greater 
Powers  became  too  powerful  to  be  bound  by 
the  public  opinion  of  the  rest,  and  proceeded  to 
absorb  neighbouring  States  in  contempt  of  the 
Public  Law.  War  and  violence  ought  never  to 
be  resorted  to  without  an  absolute  necessity. 
Sully  excluded  the  eastern  portion  of  Europe 
from  consideration.  "Poland,  Prussia,  Livonia, 
Muscovy,  and  Transylvania  I  do  not  take  in." 

What  James  I.,  in  obedience  to  his  misapplied  Balance  of 
motto,  failed  to  do,  what  Henri  IV.  died  before  he  by  France. 
was  able  to  do,  and  what  Sully  formulated  for  pos- 


22  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

terity,  Richelieu  effectively  did  for  Europe  as  it 
then  was.  He  saved  the  Protestant  princes  of 
Germany,  and  established  France  for  the  first  time, 
and  not  England,  as  the  holder  of  the  Balance. 
England  dropped  out  of  consideration ;  and  the 
comprehensive  Peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648  made 
no  mention  of  her  whatever.  That  famous  treaty 
did  however  imply  the  principle  of  Balance,  and 
the  Peace  of  Utrecht  placed  the  very  words  in 
the  forefront  as  part  of  its  preamble. 

The  absence  of  England  from  her  proper  place 
as  one  of  the  Treaty  Powers  had  a  terrible  signifi- 
cance. It  was  within  a  few  months  of  Charles  I.'s 
execution.  No  one  knew  whether  the  nation 
which  had  been  the  holder  of  the  Balance  would 
ever  raise  her  head  again  ;  all  respect  for  her  Gov- 
ernment had  disappeared.  She  had  become  the 
laughing-stock  of  Europe.  James  had,  under  the 
influence  of  his  own  mean  spirit  and  Gondomar's 
dexterous  diplomacy,  declined  to  help,  either  with 
men  or  money,  the  Elector  and  Electress  Palatine, 
though  their  cause  was  not  only  that  of  fainting 
Protestantism  against  the  crushing  powers  of  the 
Papacy  and  its  satellite  monarchs,  but  was  big  with 
the  most  pressing  danger  to  Great  Britain,  her 
safety,  her  commerce,  and  her  prosperity.  Lectures 
of  advice  perpetually  read  alternately  to  his  chil- 
dren of  the  Palatinate  and  to  their  destroyers,  but 
followed  up  in  no  single  instance  by  action,  were 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          23 

the  derision  of  all  men.     In  vain  the  more  gallant  Charles  i 


gentlemen  of  England  and  Scotland  rushed  abroad,  father's 

mistakes. 

and  heroically  attempted  to  stem  the  tide.  What 
could  individuals  do  ?  But  their  labours  bore  fruit. 
As  soon  as  James  died  a  Protestant  leader  ap- 
peared in  Christian  IV.  of  Denmark,  and  soon 
afterwards  in  Gustavus  Adolphus  ;  and  the  Eng- 
lish and  Scotch  soldiers  became  in  no  small  degree 
the  leading  spirits  of  the  victorious  Protestant 
forces.  What  sort  of  respect  could  these  men 
entertain  for  the  Stuarts,  and  how  could  they 
but  join  their  enemies,  or  at  least  stand  aside, 
when  the  Great  Rebellion  broke  out  ? 

But  it  may  perhaps  be  rejoined  that  James  did 
go  to  war  at  last,  just  before  he  died.  But  on 
what  account  ?  A  mere  personal  affair  of  Charles 
and  Buckingham,  who  persuaded  his  father  to 
take  up  the  quarrel  which  they  had  brought  on 
themselves  by  their  absurd  conduct  in  Spain.  It 
was  a  miserable  joke,  which  came  to  nothing  ;  and 
Charles,  on  his  accession,  contrived  to  add  a  war 
with  France  to  the  existing  one  with  Spain,  so  that 
he  was  at  war  with  the  two  greatest  Powers  of 
Europe  at  once,  without  army  or  navy  at  his 
back.  What  could  be  worse  than  his  and 
Buckingham's  treatment  of  Rochelle  and  the 
French  Huguenots  ? 

We  need  not  enlarge  further  on  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  Great  Britain  during  the  reigns  of  the 


24  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Cromwell    first  two  Stuarts.     But  how  was  it  that  Crom- 
France       well    did    not    perceive    that    the    true    Balance 

instead  of 

Spain.  had  changed,  that  the  policy  of  Richelieu  had 
elevated  France  far  above  its  old  position,  and 
that  Spain  should  rather  have  been  the  Power 
to  receive  support  in  order  to  redress  the  Balance  ? 
This  has  often  been  asked  ;  nor  can  it  be  ac- 
counted for  on  any  grounds  of  reason,  but  rather 
from  a  desire  to  obtain  popularity  by  attacking 
the  old  enemy  of  Elizabeth's  time.  But  in  fact 
Spain  had  never  recovered  from  the  disastrous 
war  she  had  waged  in  those  days  against  Eng- 
land and  Holland ;  Austria  instead  of  Spain  had 
taken  the  lead  in  the  aggressive  movements  which 
precipitated  the  Thirty  Years'  War ;  and  France 
had  come  out  of  that  war  so  triumphantly  that 
the  tyrannical  grandeur  of  Louis  XIV.  was  the 
direct  outcome  of  Richelieu's  position.  To  Crom- 
well it  was  of  course  a  temptation  to  share  the 
spoils  of  Dunkirk,  and  to  appropriate  the  West 
Indian  possessions  of  Spain,  a  convenient  but 
short-sighted  policy,  laden  with  future  troubles. 
The  Balance  of  Power  was  lost ;  Spain  never 
regained  her  place  ;  while  France  became,  for  a 
century  and  a  half,  the  one  great  threatening 
champion  of  the  Papal  system  of  Continental 
tyranny,  and  of  rivalry  with  England  in  colonies 
and  commerce.  The  old  chronic  state  of  almost 
continuous  war  between  England  and  France  re- 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          25 

sumed  its  terrible  monotony.  One  or  other  of 
them  would  have  to  go  down,  and  Cromwell's 
memory  must  bear  its  full  share  of  the  blame. 
As  if  to  burn  the  lesson  of  a  true  English  For- 
eign Policy  more  deeply  into  the  English  mind 
the  Restoration  only  added  to  the  disgraces  which 
the  earlier  Stuarts  had  inflicted  on  the  country, 
and  which  Cromwell's  success  against  the  Dutch 
had  brought  out  into  full  relief. 

The  three  Dutch  wars  in  the  times  of  the  Com-  The  Dutch 

wars  an. 

monwealth  and  of  Charles  II.  form  an  episode  in  episode. 
the  history  of  English  Foreign  Policy.  They 
could  hardly  have  been  avoided,  or  at  any  rate 
not  the  first  or  second.  The  Dutch  had  made 
rapid  strides  in  nautical  power  since  their  revolt 
from  Spain,  and  their  commercial  interests  had 
prospered  at  the  expense  of  Spain  and  Portugal 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  wrould  brook  no 
rivalry.  The  claim  of  England  to  the  Sovereignty 
of  the  Narrow  Seas  was  the  occasion  of  the  quarrel 
which  the  Dutch  themselves  sought,  with  a  full 
determination  to  fight  it  out.  This  ancient  claim 
had  sprung  from  the  circumstances  of  the  Norman 
Conquest,  and  had  been  asserted  and  defended  by 
the  Plantagenets  and  Tudors,  while  even  in  the 
miserable  reign  of  James  I.  the  ships  of  England, 
still  governed  by  Elizabethan  traditions,  fired  on 
the  French  ambassador's  own  ship  for  not  salut- 
ing the  flag.  Of  course  it  was  not  relinquished 


26  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

by  Cromwell,  and  the  Dutch  knew  that  the 
refusal  to  salute  would  be  made  a  cause  of  war. 
Behind  this,  however,  were  the  rivalries  in 
commerce,  proceeding  to  serious  issues  at  Am- 
boyiia,  and  increasingly  exhibited  in  all  parts 
of  the  world.  The  Dutch  and  English  were  the 
only  two  people  who  could  be  called  nations  of 
seamen ;  they  were  also  equal  in  courage  and 
capacity  ;  they  had  each  passed  through  a  despe- 
rate war  in  which  they  had  gained  military  train- 
ing and  high  military  ideals.  It  was  clear  to  both 
sides  that  the  sooner  the  struggle  was  over  the 
better.  But  the  Dutch  did  not  reckon  on  the 
extraordinary  reserve  of  strength  England  pos- 
sessed in  the  tried  generals  and  colonels,  who 
turned  into  admirals  of  the  first  capacity  almost  at 
a  moment's  notice.  Excellent  as  the  Van  Tromps 
and  De  Ruyters  were,  they  were  overmatched  by 
Blake,  Monk,  Montagu,  and  their  comrades,  and 
the  English  ships  were  for  once  the  superior  war- 
vessels.  This  was  partly  owing  to  the  fleets 
raised  by  Charles  I.'s  ship-money,  and  partly  to 
the  talents  of  the  family  of  Pett,  who  were  born 
shipbuilders,  and  set  the  fashion  for  Europe. 
Later  on,  the  superiority  in  ships  went  over 
to  France  and  Spain. 
"The ton-  Never  were  fiercer  battles  fought  than  in  those 

our  of  the  _~ 

flag."         three  Dutch  wars.     In  the  end  the  English  re- 
tained the  "  honour  of  the  flag,"  as  it  was  called, 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS   AND    CROMWELL.          27 

the  emblem  of  their  dearly  bought  Sovereignty  of 
the  Seas.  But  the  two  later  wars  in  Charles  II. 's 
reign  were  more  concerned  with  the  Balance  of 
Power  than  the  first,  which  was  a  mere  bull- 
dog fight  for  superiority,  carrying  in  its  train 
imperial  issues.  However  short-sighted  Crom- 
well's policy,  his  success  in  that  war,  as  in  every 
other  warlike  operation  undertaken  during  his 
headship  of  affairs,  had,  it  must  be  admitted, 
the  effect  of  re-establishing  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland  as  one  united  Power — a  Power  which  was 
no  longer  to  be  trifled  with,  as  it  had  been  for  two 
generations.  Now  for  the  first  time  the  Mediter-  The  British 

and  the 

ranean   Powers  were  given  to  understand    that  Barbary 

pirates. 

Great  Britain  was  resolved  to  open  out  her 
commerce  in  that  sea,  and  that  if  they  could 
not  suppress  the  piracy  of  the  Barbary  States, 
there  was  one  country  which  intended  to  do  so. 

It  requires  an  effort  of  imagination  to  realise 
the  immunity  enjoyed  in  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries  by  these  barbarians,  whose  cor- 
sairs, during  periods  of  British  feebleness,  made 
even  the  British  Channel  unsafe  for  traders. 
Even  in  the  time  of  the  early  Hanoverian  mon- 
archy the  prolonged  peace  made  it  impossible  for 
British  officers  to  obtain  any  distinction  in  their 
profession  save  by  successful  battles  with  these 
pests  of  mankind.  The  lessons  taught  them  by 
Blake  and  Narborough  were  soon  forgotten ;  the 


28  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

profits  were  enormous,  the  price  of  European 
slaves  continuously  remunerative.  Neither  France, 
Spain,  nor  Italy  could  afford  the  fleets  which 
were  necessary  to  engage  the  strong  fortifications 
and  well -equipped  squadrons  of  Algiers,  Tunis, 
and  Tripoli ;  and  the  Knights  of  Malta,  once  the 
salvation  of  Europe,  had  sunk  into  imbecility. 
Thus  Great  Britain  honourably  commenced  her 
career  in  the  Mediterranean,  which,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  struggle  with  Louis  XIV., 
developed  into  a  policy  of  supremacy  in  that  sea. 
The  Ee-  The  Restoration  gave  the  Stuarts  back  to  Eng- 
stuarts  land,  but  only  to  act,  like  the  first  two  monarch s 

pensioned 

by  France,  of  that  dynasty,  as  beacons  to  denote  the  fatal 
shoals  of  politics.  Nothing  could  have  been  more 
unfortunate  for  the  generation  over  which  they 
ruled,  however  useful  to  their  country  in  the  end, 
than  their  enforced  education  in  France.  Their 
banishment  from  England  during  the  impression- 
able period  of  youth  had  produced  much  the  same 
effect  upon  them  as  it  had  upon  their  ancestor, 
Mary  Queen  of  Scots.  They  had  learned  to  re- 
gard the  world  from  a  French  point  of  view,  and 
were  prepared  to  accept  Louis  XIY.  not  only  as 
a  mighty  protector,  attracting  by  the  force  of 
personal  dignity,  despotic  power,  and  a  brilliant 
Court,  but  as  the  dispenser  of  funds  available 
for  guilty  pleasures  or  political  bribery.  Still 
more  had  the  religious  question  now  come  to  be 


UNDER   THE    STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          29 

the  leading  factor  in  affairs ;  and  the  bigotry  of 
their  mother,  like  that  of  the  Guise  family  in  the 
case  of  Mary,  left  an  impression  which  no  efforts 
of  the  English  tutors  and  companions  placed 
around  them  by  Clarendon  were  able  to  combat. 
Charles  II.  and  James  II.  came  back  to  their 
country,  neither  English  nor  Scotch,  but  French ; 
neither  Churchmen  nor  Presbyterians,  but  Roman 
Catholics  at  heart ;  and,  what  neither  their  father 
nor  grandfather  had  been,  debauchees  of  the 
French  type. 

Remembering  these  results  of  their  sojourn  in 
France,  our  surprise  is  not  so  much  excited  by 
the  entire  absence  of  the  principles  of  Foreign 
Policy  laid  down  by  the  Tudors,  as  by  the  fact 
that  the  restored  princes  remained  so  long  upon 
the  throne  as  they  did.  Instead  of  any  notion  of 
protecting  the  weaker  Protestant  States  from  the 
growing  tyranny  of  Louis  XIV.,  both  princes 
became  his  pensioners,  and  both  kept  down  the 
freedom  and  Protestantism  of  their  subjects  by  all 
the  means  in  their  power.  Parliaments  became 
as  corrupt  as  themselves — one  even  obtained  the 
name  of  the  "  Pension  Parliament,"  pensioned  like 
the  king  by  Louis, — and  the  only  wars  in  which  The  French 
they  engaged  were  instigated  by  Louis  as  a  means  to  ruin  the 

t*         -        T  •       ill  Dutch  and 

of  crippling  the  only  rival  he  had  to  fear,  the  the  British. 
gallant   Dutch.     These   he   vainly  attempted  to 
conquer  by  land,  and  now  resolved  to  conquer,  by 


30  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

means  of  the  pensioned  English,  at  sea.  Not 
indeed  that  the  Dutch  were  unwilling  to  renew 
the  contest  with  the  English,  which  was  by  no 
means  conclusively  fought  out  by  Cromwell.  In 
this  second  furious  war  Monk,  Montagu,  Prince 
Rupert,  and  James,  the  future  king,  inflicted 
such  losses  on  the  Dutch  that  Louis  XIV.,  fearing 
his  enemy  would  cease  to  exist,  and  so  no  longer 
be  able  to  balance  Great  Britain  and  her  navy 
if  Charles  should  resist  his  influence,  declared 
war  with  England  to  encourage  the  Dutch.  His 
officers  were  however  instructed  not  to  interfere 
with  effect ;  and  both  the  combatants  soon  per- 
ceiving that  the  policy  of  the  French  was  the 
simple  one  of  letting  the  sea-rivals  destroy  one 
another,  patched  up  a  peace. 

The  third  war  was  waged  on  much  the  same 
principles.  Louis  in  1674  directed  his  pensioned 
vassal  Charles  II.  to  finish  the  struggle  with  his 
obstinate  neighbours,  and  sent  a  French  fleet  to 
support  the  British ;  but  he  took  care  to  do  no 
more  for  them  than  he  had  previously  done  for  the 
Dutch  ;  and  after  more  battles  the  last  peace  was 
made,  which  again  mulcted  the  Dutch  in  a  large 
sum  and  found  them  willing  to  relinquish  the 
dispute  as  to  the  flag.  Of  these  three  serious 
wars  it  may  not  unfairly  be  said  that  in  spite  of 
French  intrigues  and  English  false  pretences, 
there  was  no  prospect  of  the  growth  in  ships, 


UNDER   THE   STUARTS    AND    CROMWELL.          31 

colonies,  and  commerce,  on  which  the  English  had 
long  set  their  hearts,  till  the  Dutch  were  out  of 
the  way.      These   gallant  seamen  now  ]ost  the  Holland 
great   position   which    they,    like    the    Spaniards  be  a  Great 
previously,  had  held  for  nearly  a  century ;   and 
the  field  was  left  clear  for  the  rivalry  of  England 
and  France  by  land  and  sea. 


32 


CHAPTER  III. 

BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY   UNDER   WILLIAM   III. 

Tudor        HAPPILY  for  the  world  the  alliance  between  Wil- 
resumed     liam  of  Orange  and  Mary,  James  II. 's  daughter. 

by  William  .  ° 

commenced  a  new  era  of  amity  between  the  lately 
enraged  combatants,  and  led  to  the  united  action 
of  the  two  peoples,  English  and  Dutch,  under 
William  III.  In  other  words,  the  Revolution  of 
1688  once  more  opened  up  the  way  to  the  resump- 
tion of  the  Tudor  Foreign  Policy.  The  British 
Isles  were  to  be  strongly  compacted  under  one 
Government ;  France,  the  disturber  of  the  peace, 
was  to  be  opposed  by  alliance  with  the  oppressed 
States  of  the  Continent ;  the  British  Channel  to 
be  secured  by  close  union  with  Holland  and  the 
Austrian  Netherlands.  The  fleet  was  to  be  in- 
creased to  an  extent  which  should  make  it  more 
than  a  match  for  the  revived,  or  rather  new,  navy 
of  France  ;  and  England  was  to  be  the  central 
figure  in  the  array  of  the  European  resistance  to 
Louis  XIV.  This  Foreign  Policy  was  to  be  sus- 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  33 

tained  by  Free  Parliaments,  from  which  supplies 
were  to  be  obtained,  and  by  the  alliance  of  the 
Royal  power  with  whichever  of  the  two  great 
parties,  Whig  and  Tory,  would  join  heartily  with 
the  Crown  in  the  revival  of  the  old  policy. 

These  parties  were  sometimes  united  in  that 
cause,  but  much  oftener  opposed.  The  Whigs 
alone,  on  motives  sometimes  elevated,  sometimes 
corrupt,  threw  their  weight  continuously  and  con- 
sistently into  the  scale  of  war,  in  the.  reigns  of 
both  William  and  Anne.  It  was  they  who  had  The  service 
led  the  van  in  the  deposition  of  James  II.  :  it  was 
they  who  determined  to  run  any  risks  rather  than 
allow  him,  or  his  family  after  him,  to  endanger 
the  policy  which  they  represented  :  it  was  they 
who,  having  earned  a  true  and  real  right  to  the 
gratitude  of  the  nation,  kept  their  position  for 
three  generations,  long  after  they  had  ceased  to 
be  necessary  or  even  useful ;  and  after  breaking 
up  into  many  feeble  and  discordant  parties,  had 
to  give  way  at  last,  under  the  wholesome  influence 
of  the  two  Pitts  in  succession,  at  the  foundation 
and  subsequent  defence  of  the  modern  British 
empire. 

By  the  time  of  the  English  Revolution  in  1688 
Louis  XIV.  had  come  to  the  end  of  the  first,  the 
longest,  and  the  only  victorious  period  of  his 
career.  The  League  of  Augsburg,  nad  just  been 
formed  with  some  trembling^Kope  of  at  least 

c 


34  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

checking  his  terrible  march  to  universal  empire. 
Europe  had  long  cowered  before  him ;  one  man, 
and  only  one,  seemed  capable  of  leading  the 
Alliance,  and  he  was  overmatched.  William  saw 
plainly  that  his  only  chance  of  taking  up  the 
championship  of  Europe  effectively  was  to  do  so 
The"De-  as  King  of  England.  Nothing  is  more  worthy  of 
study  than  the  processes  by  which  the  old  Foreign 
Policy  was  revived, — the  headlong  self-destruc- 
tion of  James  II.,  the  patient  prudence  of  his 
nephew,  the  disappearance  of  Monmouth  as  if  to 
make  way  for  William,  the  incapacity  of  the  Irish 
Romanists,  the  fatal  errors  of  the  Grand  Mon- 
arque,  who  allowed  a  transient  offence  taken  by 
James  to  throw  out  all  his  military  strategy,  and 
leave  the  way  open  for  William  to  effect  a  blood- 
less invasion. 

Not  one  word  too  much  has  been  said  in  praise 
of  the  benefit  conferred  upon  England  and  the 
world  by  the  Revolution.  From  the  5th  of 
November  1688  dates  the  return  of  England  to 
her  old  place, — the  place  assigned  by  Burke  in 
the  following  words :  "  The  Balance  of  Power 
has  been  ever  assumed  as  the  known  common 
law  of  Europe  at  all  times  and  by  all  Powers. 
In  all  those  systems  of  Balance  England  was 
the  Power  to  whose  custody  it  was  thought  it 
might  be  most  safely  committed."  1  This  is  indeed 

1  Third  Letter  on  a  Regicide  Peace,  p.  196. 


UNDER   WILLIAM    III. 

a  little  too  sweeping  and  rhetorical.  Our  survey  England 
of  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  in  the  theeRevoiu- 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  has  shown 
plainly  enough  that  England  suffered  an  eclipse 
under  the  government  of  the  four  Stuart  kings. 
To  retrieve  their  errors,  no  matter  at  what  cost 
of  blood  and  treasure,  became  an  imperative 
duty.  How  otherwise  could  the  British  laffes 
have  escaped  when  all  their  allies  were  destroyed, 
or  become  the  slaves  of  a  tyrant,  himself  the 
slave  of  the  Pope  and  the  Jesuits  ?  There 
were,  and  always  have  been,  vulnerable  points 
enough  in  the  circumference  of  the  British 
Isles.  To  turn  the  long  line  of  coasts^  into"  a 
perpetual  encampment,  instead  of  warding  off 
the  enemy  by  sufficient  fleets  and -by  assisting 
Continental  allies,  was  a  policy  .only  worthy  of 
a  child.  The  nation  had  long  Jbecome  aware  of  - ... 
the  evils  of  a  departure  from  the  principles  en- 
twined with  its  whole  earlier  history,  and  ex- 
emplified tan  chief  by  the  great  Elizabeth.  It 
remembered'  also  only  too  well  what  it...  had 
suffered  from  the  military  tyrants  of  the*  Com- 
monwealth who  had  achieved  the  liberty  of  the 
land,  but  substituted  a  slavery  of  their  own. 

Seldom  have  the  English  people  presented  a  Fine  con- 

r         *  duct  of  the 

finer  spectacle  than   at  the  .Revolution.       I  hey  English 

J    people. 

would    bear,    not    without    frequent    and   sullen 
resistance,    the    wrongs   they   suffered   from   the 


36  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

restored  Stuarts  up  to  a  certain  point,  but 
when  added  to  their  ignoble  Foreign  Policy, 
and  to  the  open  breaches  of  the  Constitution 
shamefully  committed  by  Charles  and  James, 
the  people  found  themselves  exposed  to  an 
open  undoing  of  the  Reformation,  they  arose, 
we  might  say,  as  one  man.  But  even  yet 
they  remembered  their  history  in  past  times. 
They  were  most  unwilling  to  proceed  to  ex- 
tremities. If  they  could  shuffle  off  the  incor- 
rigible James,  and  lodge  him  with  his  French 
relatives,  it  would  be  enough.  They  would 
brave  the  danger  to  which  they  would  be 
exposed  by  his  league  with  the  enemies  of 
England.  Ashamed  of  the  personal  ill-treatment 
to  which  he  had  been  exposed  by  the  rough  sea- 
men of  Faversham,  they  acknowledged  William's 
treatment  of  him  as  befitting  the  circumstances. 
It  was  enough  to  disarm  the  royal  traitor ;  they 
would  go  no  further. 

Again,  they  were  quite  aware  that  they  must 
run  many  risks,  suffer  many  indignities,  pay  vast 
sums  of  money,  shed  the  blood  of  their  best  and 
bravest,  in  the  cause  which  they  deliberately 
adopted ;  but  this  was  somewhat  in  the  nature 
of  sacrifice.  They  must  give  up  something  to 
secure  the  whole,  and  it  was  better  to  do  so 
before  the  whole  was  lost.  The  Reformation 
had  been  founded  in  blood  and  martyrdom. 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  37 

Time  had  healed  the  wounds  it  had  left.  The 
spread  of  education  and  literature,  small  as  it 
seems  to  us  in  these  days,  had  convinced  the 
people  that  they  could  not  have  done  better  ;  and 
the  bitter  fruits  of  even  a  reformed  Romanism 
were  only  too  patent  to  their  eyes  and  hearts. 
And  so  the  old  Foreign  Policy,  the  old  processes 
of  Elizabeth's  reign  were  once  more  repeated.  It 
seemed  natural  and  glorious.  It  would  be  the 
safest  course'  in  the  end. 

The    first   thing — by  far  the    most   important  unity  of 

,,   .  ,  .          ,         the  British 

thing — was  to  create  once  more  the  unity  be-  isiesre- 
tween  the  two  British  Isles  which  James  II. 
had  broken  up.  All  the  kings  of  England  had 
perfectly  understood  that  the  separation  of  the 
two  islands  must  mean  the  destruction  of  the 
larger.  The  smaller  one  was  so  close  that  it  Ireland, 
could  not  be  neglected,  and  it  was  so  small  that 
it  could  only  succeed  in  obtaining  independence 
by  the  help  of  other  Powers.  Thus  it  had  come 
to  pass  that  as  soon  as  Henry  II.  was  free  to 
act  he  settled  it  upon  the  political  system  of 
the  day,  under  the  feudal  lordship  of  his  Eng- 
lish and  Norman  subjects.  Thus  also  his  Plan- 
tagenet  successors  used  such  limited  forces  as 
were  at  their  disposal  to  govern  the  native  Irish 
from  the  Pale  as  a  centre,  the  only  portion  they 
could  call  their  own. 

During  those  times  the  earliest  intruders  from 


38  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

outside  the  limits  of  Ireland  were  the  Bruces  from 
Scotland,  and  the  mischief  they  caused  was  a  les- 
son for  the  generations  which  followed.  The  Civil 
Wars  of  the  fifteenth  century  were  Ireland's  oppor- 
tunity ;  hence  the  troubles  which  the  Lancastrians 
experienced  from  Ireland,  the  stronghold  of  the 
House  of  York,  of  which  the  countenance  given  to 
Perkin  Warbeck  in  Henry  YII.'s  time  was  the 
latest  fruit.  The  Tudors  with  their  keen  vision  of 
politics,  and  their  resolution  to  secure  England 
by  ranking  her  with  the  Continental  Powers, 
saw  that  Ireland  was  their  vulnerable  side ;  and 
under  painful  experiences  of  the  use  which  Spain 
could  make  of  the  island  as  a  means  of  attacking 
England,  subdued  the  whole  of  the  native  tribes, 
and  brought  them  under  the  direct  government 
of  the  Crown"  James  I.  took  the  further  step  of 
providing  for  the  defence  and  safety  of  the  island 
by  planting  colonies  from  Scotland  and  England 
in  the  northern  counties ;  and  Cromwell  found 
himself  obliged,  when  he  began  to  establish  order 
after  his  victories,  to  carry  further  the  same 
process,  known  as  the  "  Cromwellian  Settlement." 
Lastly,  James  II.,  the  Roman  Catholic  pensioner 
of  France,  made  no  scruple  of  attempting  to  estab- 
lish the  French  as  the  military  defenders  of  the 
island  against  England.  William's  victories  once 
more  established  English  supremacy. 

This  sketch,   simple   and   undeniable   as   it   is, 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  39 

contains  the  alphabet  of  English  relations  with 
Ireland  throughout  the  five  centuries  which  ended 
with  the  Revolution.  When  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  the  French  were  once  more 
called  in  by  the  Irish  rebels  of  1798,  the  time 
had  plainly  come  for  a  more  complete  incorpora- 
tion of  the  two  islands  than  had  previously 
existed.  The  so-called  Grattan's  Parliament  had 
now  of  course  to  be  dissolved,  and  a  single  Parlia- 
ment in  the  greater  island  to  be  the  one  Parlia- 
ment of  both.  Divided  counsels  had  grievously 
endangered  England,  and  constantly  attracted 
her  mortal  enemies  to  Irish  shores.  It  had  been 
so  for  more  than  five  centuries  :  it  could  be  so 
no  longer.  Self- preservation  was  the  one  all- 
powerful  argument,  all-powerful  over  every  other 
consideration  of  race  or  sentiment. 

Like  his  predecessors,  William  had  also  to  Scotland, 
establish  a  practical  unity  with  Scotland  before 
he  could  deal  with  Foreign  Policy  from  a  secure 
basis.  The  personal  union  of  the  two  crowns 
under  James  the  Sixth  of  Scotland  and  First 
of  England  was  the  direct  consequence  of  the 
Tudor  policy  under  which  Henry  VII. 's  daughter 
Margaret  was  married  to  James  IV.  of  Scotland  ; 
and  that  marriage  made  it  more  easy  than  it 
had  previously  been  to  establish  during  the  next 
century,  in  a  country  which  refused  to  be  con- 
quered, the  necessary  diplomatic  influence.  But 


40  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

a  mere  personal  union,  though  a  great  step  in 
advance,  was  very  far  short  of  an  incorporate 
union ;  and  the  Great  Rebellion,  in  which  the 
outraged  religious  passions  of  the  mass  of  the 
Scotch  people,  fostered  and  led  hy  the  soldiers 
who  were  set  free  from  the  Swedish  service  by  the 
Peace  of  Westphalia,  placed  the  Scotch  on  the 
side  of  the  Parliament.  This  gave  them  a  posi- 
tion such  as  they  had  not  held  since  the  battle  of 
Flodden  Field.  But  Cromwell's  victory  of  Dun- 
bar  over  Leslie  in  1653,  and  Monk's  remarkable 
government  which  succeeded  it,  had  done  much 
to  restore  the  united  action  of  both  countries, 
and  the  death  of  Claverhouse,  who  represented 
the  Stuart  persecutions,  removed  the  only  impedi- 
ment to  the  peaceful  government  of  these  fierce 
and  warlike  Presbyterians.  William  established 
his  position  by  removing  all  the  obstacles  which 
had  been  placed  in  the  way  of  a  free  exercise  of 
the  favourite  form  of  religion  ;  and  Anne  had  no 
choice,  when  she  formed  the  Union  of  1706-7,  but 
to  establish  and  protect  it  from  future  assaults 
on  the  part  of  the  English. 

William  Thus  William's  base  was  secured  on  the  same 
channel,  principles  as  those  of  Elizabeth,  but  far  more 
firmly  than  she  had  found  possible.  Like  her, 
he  then  collected  all  the  Continental  allies  who 
were  available,  with  himself  as  King  of  England 
at  their  head,  and  confronted,  by  land  and  sea, 


UNDER    WILLIAM    III.  41 

the  Autocrat  of  Europe.  Louis  had  played  into 
his  hands.  He  had  lost  his  .  opportunity  of 
attacking  William  on  his  passage  to  England  in 
1688  ;  and  not  only  so,  he  was  fatally  ill-advised 
in  allowing  Ireland  to  be  conquered  without 
making  effective  use  of  his  own  fine  fleet  and 
finer  admiral.  When  he  perceived  his  error,  he 
was  still  more  mistaken  in  not  leaving  the 
admiral  to  his  'own  judgment ;  for  it  can  hardly 
be  disputed  that  Tourville  might  have  turned  the 
affair  of  Beachy  Head  into  a  decisive  victory. 
Admiral  Herbert  has  been  defended  by  one  or 
two  recent  writers  from  the  previous  animad- 
versions of  Macaulay  and  almost  all  other  authors, 
including  Captain  Mahan,  but  it  is  tolerably 
clear  that  Herbert  was  unequal  to  the  situation 
in  which  his  courageous  exploits  and  political 
courage  had  placed  him  as  William's  first  avail- 
able admiral.  Admiral  Russell,  though  a  no  less 
unsatisfactory  representative  of  the  British  Navy, 
did  succeed  in  beating  Tourville  who  had  only 
half  his  force,  and  who  fought  because  Louis  had 
ordered  him  to  do  so.  Under  the  circumstances 
of  the  Revolution  it  was  at  first  extremely 
difficult  to  find  the  right  men  for  naval  com- 
mand. The  seamen  were  distinctly  with  the 
Revolution,  but  the  higher  officers  parted  most 
reluctantly  with  the  old  regime. 

However,  by  the  efficient  help  of  the  Dutch 


42  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

fleet,    William    was    at    least    able    to    keep    the 

Channel  clear  of  the   French   and  transport  his 

troops   to   Holland.     This   also  was   an   essential 

condition  of  the  renewed  British  Foreign  Policy. 

The   security  of  the   Channel   along   the   Dutch 

and  Flemish  coast  was  now  provided  for  by  the 

advantages    of  William's    position  ;    and    at    the 

head   of   the    Protestant    German   principalities, 

assisted  by   the  Danes,   he    fought    battle    after 

battle  for  the  freedom   of   an    enslaved    Europe. 

Defeat  made  no  difference  to  a  man  of  William's 

His  mill-     cool  resolution,  leading  troops   like  the   English 

ship  of  the  and  Dutch,   who  were    as   obstinate  as   himself. 

Thus  after  the  great   struggles   of  Landen  and 

Steinkirk,  the  victory  of  Namur   convinced  the 

French   that    the    odds    against    them   were    too 

great ;  and  the  Peace  of  Ryswick  in  1697  marked 

the  resumption  of  the  old  doctrine  of  Balance  of 

Power,  so  long  in  abeyance  (1603-1697),  and  of 

England's  old  place  as  its  champion  and  director. 

The  Parti-        Perhaps  the  best  index  of  the  revived  Foreign 

ies  madea     Policy  of  Great  Britain  is  to  be  found,  later  on  in 

sake  of  the  William's  reign,  in  the  Partition  Treaties,  in  their 

Mediter-  to.  . 

ranean       subsequent  failure,  and  in  the  violent  revolutions 

policy. 

of  English  sentiment.  The  Partition  Treaties 
exhibit  the  system  in  its  most  mature  form  ;  but 
though  natural  enough  to  attempt,  they  repre- 
sent an  overstrained  application  of  a  good  thing. 
Louis's  position  had  been  assaulted  with  such 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  43 

difficulty  that  the  prospect  of  his  adding"  Spain 
to  his  dominions  on  the  death  of  the  imbecile 
monarch  of  that  country  was  intolerable.  The 
Continent  was  to  be  cut  about  and  arranged 
under  different  sovereigns  so  that  the  catastrophe 
might  be  averted.  This  hazardous  policy,  con- 
tingent upon  secret  treaties,  was  of  so  delicate  a 
nature  that  we  may  fairly  assume  that  it  would 
never  have  been  entertained  for  the  mere  purpose 
of  Balance.  At  the  bottom  of  it  lay  the  deter- 
mination of  the  British  Government  not  to  allow 
their  people  or  those  of  other  northern  nations  to 
be  excluded  from  the  Mediterranean.  Spain  at 
that  time  carried  Italy  ;  the  Levant  trade  would 
be  ruined,  and  the  maritime  influence  of  other 
naval  Powers  would  be  crippled,  perhaps  de- 
stroyed, by  the  colonial  preponderance  which 
would  be  acquired  by  France.  The  first  Partition 
Treaty  was  too  decidedly  against  the  interest  of 
France  to  be  permanent.  She  was  only  to  have 
South  Italy  and  the  province  of  Guipuscoa,— 
which  did  indeed  give  her  the  means  of  coercing 
Spain, — while  Spain,  the  Netherlands,  and  the 
Indies  were  to  go  to  the  Electoral  Prince  of 
Bavaria,  a  youth  who  was  supposed  to  be  less 
dangerous  than  the  great  kings ;  Lombardy  was 
to  go  to  the  Archduke  Charles.  The  death  of  the 
young  Electoral  Prince  broke  up  the  treaty.  The 
second  Partition  Treaty  gave  Spain  to  the  Arch- 


44  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

duke,  who  was  to  give  up  Lombardy  to  the  Duke 
of  Lorraine. 

Both  of  these  treaties,  when  discovered  by  the 
English  people,  not  only  found  no  favour  for  their 
attempt  to  secure  English  interests,  but  were  be- 
lieved to  be  entirely  to  the  advantage  of  Holland 
and  Germany.  The  Spaniards  were  still  more  dis- 
gusted at  the  way  in  which  their  country  had  been 
disposed  of  by  these  secret  arrangements,  and  in 
spite  of  the  obvious  danger  of  Spain  becoming  a 
province  of  France,  the  dying  king  was  persuaded 
to  leave  his  vast  empire  to  Louis's  grandson 
Philip,  who  was  indeed  the  nearest  heir.  No 
Louis  xiv.  scruples  stood  in  the  way  of  Louis.  The  treaties 

grasps  at 

the  Span-    went  for  nothing  in  his  mind,  and  he  accepted  the 

ish  empire, 

bequest  at  once,  thus  regaining  for  his  House 
more  than  he  had  lost  in  the  late  wars.  William's 
unpopularity  in  England  at  the  time  was  such 
that  he  had  to  accept  this  entire  failure  of  the 
plans  of  his  whole  lifetime,  and  retired  to  Holland 
apparently  to  die,  a  victim  to  his  patriotic  schemes 
and  lifelong  struggles  for  the  Balance  of  Power. 
He  had  placed  Great  Britain  once  more  on  her 
true  standpoint  of  Foreign  Policy,  at  the  head  of 
the  European  confederation,  as  the  custodian  of 
the  Balance ;  he  had  healed  the  breach  between 
the  two  great  maritime  nations  of  the  same 
blood  and  temper,  so  long  furious  rivals,  and 
thus  provided  for  the  future  redress  of  the 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  45 

Balance ;  he  had  set  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
upon  a  course  of  united  action  ;  he  had  started  at 
least  the  former  upon  a  career  of  liberty,  internal 
peace,  and  financial  prosperity,  and  he  had 
latterly  recognised  a  great  man,  capable  of  fulfill- 
ing the  destiny  of  the  British  people,  in  Marl- 
borough,  from  whom  he  had  been  separated  by  the 
intrigues  of  the  wife  and  evil  genius  of  that  prince 
of  generals.  Such  must  have  been  the  consolatory 
retrospect  of  the  hero  ;  and  it  might  have  formed 
some  compensation  for  the  otherwise  overwhelm- 
ing sense  of  failure,  even  though  he  must  have 
been  well  aware  that  the  bitter  feeling  of  the 
English  had  some  justification  in  his  immoral  life, 
his  shameless  grants,  and  his  morose  attitude"  to- 
wards the  islanders  whom  it  was  clear  that  he 
only  valued  from  political  motives. 

But  what  a  marvellous  change  do  we  witness  and  at  the 

n  i         -n  i     British 

in  the  very  next  year  following  upon  the  Jbrench  empire, 
acquisition  of  Spain  for  Philip.  The  de^th  of 
James  in  1701,  and  the  immediate  Attempt  to 
snatch  the  hoped-for  prize  of  England  itself  by 
the  recognition  of  the  youthful  Pretender  as  king, 
turned  the  English  suddenly  round  to  their  old 
alarm  and  distress  at  the  aggrandisement  of  the 
French,  and  revived  their  old  sense  of  gratitude 
to  their  Deliverer.  The  adoption  of  the  cause  of 
James's  son  by  Louis  acted  as  if  by  magic.  Its 
effect  was  surely  a  great  compliment  to  the  grand 


46  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

position  which  William  had  obtained.  His  death 
could  not  be  long  delayed  ;  Marlborough's  genius 
was  little  known,  or  even  suspected ;  and  the 
influence  of  the  Jacobites  in  England  and  Scot- 
land was  believed  to  be  far  stronger  than  it 
really  was. 
by  wMch  The  insatiable  ambition  of  Louis  was  greatly 

he  ruined  .  .  .  .  J 

France.  reinforced  by  the  increasing  bigotry  of  his  old 
age,  and  the  low  level  of  statesmanship  at  the 
Court,  where  servility  had  long  been  the  passport 
to  power  and  employment.  If  he  could  have  used 
his  long  experience  with  any  portion  of  his  earlier 
vigour,  he  would  have  seen  that  his  declaration  of 
renewed  hostilities  could  only  have  the  effect  of 
establishing  Great  Britain  in  the  career  upon 
which  she  had  been  set  by  William,  and  of 
destroying  the  fabric  which  he  had  himself  so 
persistently  reared  on  the  ruin  of  his  neighbours. 
He  gave  way  to  the  temptation,  and  ruined 
France.  Certainly  that  great  nation  has  suffered 
enough  from  kings  and  emperors. 

As  Louis  knew  the  value  of  time  he  began  at 
once  by  driving  the  Dutch  garrisons  out  of  the 

Great  Bri-   frontier  towns,  so  that  England   had  no  choice. 

ceptsthe     She  rushed  to  war,  to  the  renewal  of  the  war 

challenge. 

which  had  already  cost  her  so  many  millions  of 
money  and  thousands  of  men.  But  she  had 
seldom  entered  upon  a  conflict  with  her  people 
more  closely  united.  Whigs  and  Tories,  com- 


UNDER   WILLIAM    III.  47 

bined  under  their  heroic  king,  now  at  last  repaid 
him  for  all  his  labours.  He  hastened  to  place 
Marlborough  in  command  of  the  allied  forces  in 
Holland,  not  only  as  the  one  capable  man  at  his 
disposal,  but  as  the  friend  of  the  Princess  Anne, 
to  whose  one  surviving  son  he  had  been  gover- 
nor. Thus  every  circumstance  combined  to  make 
available  the  great  man  who  was  able  to  sus- 
tain the  Balance  of  Power,  and  who  was  also  the 
natural  person  to  place  in  that  position  with- 
out exciting  any  reasonable  jealousy.  Faction 
was  silenced  by  the  acts  of  the  common  enemy. 
The  processes  of  war  and  the  support  of  war  were 
still  familiar  and  accustomed.  Officers,  men,  and 
munitions  were  still  at  hand,  tried  and  prepared. 
Again,  as  the  young  Duke  of  Gloucester  died  just 
at  this  time,  it  was  of  the  last  importance  that 
William  should  live  long  enough  to  unite  all 
parties  in  that  great  Act  of  Settlement  which 
established  the  present  Royal  House  on  the 
throne,  "  the  seal  of  our  Constitutional  Law." 
The  choice  of  George  I.  as  Anne's  successor  was 
of  itself  a  decisive  step  towards  securing  the  per- 
sistency of  Foreign  Policy  which  we  have  traced 
through  preceding  ages. 

The  termination  of  William's  reign,  in  March 
1702,  suggests  that  we  should  pause  for  a  moment 
to  review  the  condition  of  the  Continent  at  the 
opening  of  the  eighteenth  century.  We  saw  how 


48  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

the  Elizabethan  custodianship  of  the  Balance  of 
European  States,  formed,  after  a  long  and  check- 
ered struggle  of  forty -five  years,  an  established 
system  which  grew  both  out  of  former  precedents 
and  out  of  the  immediate  dangers  which  pressed 
so  terribly  and  so  visibly  upon  England  that  they 
The  state  could  be  surmounted  in  no  other  way.  We  saw 

of  the  Con-  .        . 

tinentat     now  the  Kelormation,   bringing  not  peace   but  a 

William's  '      .  .       *• 

death.  sword,  had  caused  religious  questions  to  assume 
an  importance  before  unknown  in  the  strife  of 
politics.  It  was  only  the  imminence  of  danger 
at  the  hands  of  Louis  XIV.  which  stopped  the 
tendency  to  make  these  religious  questions  the 
one  cause  of  conflict  throughout  Europe.  They 
still  kept  a  great  and  important  place,  but  only 
amongst  other  troubles.  By  degrees  the  default 
of  England  under  the  Stuart  sovereigns  convinced 
the  Roman  Catholic  Powers,  such  as  Austria,  that 
if  they  were  to  retain  any  independence,  they 
must  stifle  the  religious  sympathies  which  the 
Jesuits  had  revived,  and  join  the  Protestant 
Powers  in  the  common  cause  against  Erance. 
We  trace  the  principle  to  France  itself.  France 
had  never  shown  a  scrupulous  disposition  on  this 
point.  Her  long-descended  "  Gallican  Liberties" 
had  implanted  a  certain  independence  of  the 
Papacy,  and  even  a  habit  of  defiance.  In  this 
respect  Venice  went  along  with  her ;  and  the 
influence  of  the  great  Venetian  writer,  Fra  Sarpi, 


UNDER   WILLIAM   III.  49 

extended  those  sentiments  over  a  large  part  of 
Europe.  Francis  I.  had  gone  so  far  as  to  ally 
himself  even  with  the  Ottoman  Turks,  as  well  as 
with  the  Protestant  Powers  of  Germany,  against 
Austria,  and  the  Huguenots,  forming  a  great 
political  power  within  the  kingdom  itself,  seemed, 
under  the  leadership  of  Henri  IV.,  to  be  about  to 
turn  France  into  a  Protestant  State. 

That,  indeed,  was  found  impossible  ;  but  Henri 
IV.,  though  he  changed  his  faith  to  keep  his 
crown,  adopted,  as  we  have  seen,  a  policy  of 
Balance  which  was  to  place  France  as  well  as 
England  at  the  head  of  the  Protestant  States 
against  Spain,  Austria,  and  the  other  Papal 
Powers.  His  acceptance  of  the  principle  that 
the  Balance  was  not  to  be  exclusively  Protestant  The  Bai- 

-n  11  -ri  •          ance  l°ses 

as  against  Home,   but  that   even  r  ranee,  which  itsdomi- 

'  nantreli- 

would  not  accept  a  Protestant  king,  might  lead 
it,  was  soon  afterwards  adopted  by  Richelieu,  who 
placed  the  Protestant  kings  of  Denmark  and 
Sweden  at  the  head  of  new  combinations  along 
with  France,  and  by  their  help  succeeded  in 
bridling  the  Roman  Catholic  Powers  of  Spain 
and  Austria.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  France 
was  prepared  to  mount  to  the  headship  of  Europe 
under  Louis  XIV.,  who  contrived  to  neutralise 
both  Dutch  and  English  until  the  Revolution  of 
1688.  By  this  time,  however,  Austria  also  had 
learned  the  lesson.  Bavaria,  which  had  always 

D 


50  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

kept  steadily  to  the  Papal  side,  had  become 
formidable  by  erecting  herself  upon  the  ruins 
of  the  Palatinate,  and  threatened  Austria  by  her 
frequent  alliances  with  France. 

The  Ger-         None  of  the  German  Powers  in  the  neighbour- 
near  the      hood  of  the  Rhine  had   ever  been  really  incor- 

Rhine.  .  ~. 

porated  with  the  empire ;  the  system  ol  Circles 
was  too  loose  to  hold  them  together ;  and  the 
division  effected  by  the  Reformation  exposed  them 
to  intrigues  from  both  the  Imperialist  and  the 
French  side.  In  fact,  this  system  of  facing  both 
ways  was  ancient  enough  in  Germany.  It  had 
always  been  so  more  or  less  since  the  break-up  of 
the  Roman  empire.  The  Rhine  might  seem  to 
have  formed  a  natural  boundary  between  the 
Gallo-Franks  and  the  central  parts  of  the  Ger- 
man empire ;  but,  in  fact,  it  promoted  the  forma- 
tion of  independent  States  stretching  from  the 
North  Sea  to  Italy ;  and  the  wars  of  Europe  have 
to  a  great  extent  proceeded  from  the  contentions 
to  which  this  circumstance  has  given  rise.  We 
trace  it  all  through  the  Carlovingian  period. 
Lotharingia  or  Lorraine  was  but  the  shrunken 
remains  of  a  mighty  though  ill-compacted  State, 
the  Regnum  Medium  which  so  long  haunted  the 
fancy  of  diplomatists. 

Once  in  later  medieval  history  there  seemed  a 
probability  of  these  provinces  being  moulded  into 
a  single  middle  kingdom  between  France  and 


UNDER   WILLIAM    III.  51 

Germany  under  Charles  the  Bold,  who  brought 
Flanders  and  Burgundy  to  a  threatening  headship 
over  the  coveted  remainder  ;  but  with  the  victories 
of  the  Swiss  and  Lorrainers  over  their  rash  invader 
ended  all  these  projects,  leaving  the  growing 
strength  of  France,  Austria,  and  afterwards 
Prussia,  to  acquire  such  of  the  provinces  as  each 
could  compass  at  the  end  of  wars  and  treaties. 
The  last  revival  of  these  ideas  associates  itself 
with  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  France,  when, 
under  the  name  of  the  "  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,"  was  disguised  the  annexation  by  France 
of  all  the  countries  which  lay  between  that  Power 
and  the  great  German  States.  How  long  it  lasted 
we  all  know ;  and  we  have  ourselves  witnessed 
the  success  of  the  counter  -  move  of  Germany, 
which  by  the  incorporation  of  a  part  of  Lorraine 
and  Alsace  has  settled  the  question  of  possession 
for  this  century  at  least.  But  the  idea  still 
survives  in  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land, Luxemburg  and  Switzerland. 

Thus  when  William  III.  died  the  British  allies  The  Ames 
included  Austria,  thoroughly  alarmed  for  her  ex-  Britain, 
istence,   along  with  Holland,   Flanders,  and  the 
Western  German  Powers.      Russia  and  Prussia 
had  not  yet  come  on  the  stage,  though  they  were 
about  to  do  so.     Peter  the  Great  was  already  pre- 
paring to  place  himself  amongst  the  Great  Powers 
of  Europe,  and  Prussia  was  bursting  the  shell  of 


52  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

a  mere  Electorate  of  Brandenburg,  and  intent  on 
appearing  as  a  principal  in  the  struggle  which 
was  impending.  The  Poles  had  hitherto  played 
too  great  a  part  in  Northern  Europe  to  allow  of 
any  rapid  expansion  of  these  States ;  while  the 
yoke  of  the  Tartars  had  scarcely  been  as  yet 
thrown  off  in  the  south  and  centre  of  Eastern 
Europe.  But  the  Ottoman  empire,  though  used 
by  Francis  I.  to  form  his  system  of  Balance  in 
the  west,  had,  owing  to  the  growing  strength  of 
Persia,  gradually  withdrawn  from  the  system,  and 
for  a  time  could  only  pretend  to  a  sort  of  balan- 
cing position  in  Eastern  Europe,  of  which  the  Poles, 
Livonians,  Prussians,  and  Russians  formed  a  part. 
We  shall  not  be  able  to  notice  the  merits  and  de- 
merits, the  use  and  abuse,  of  the  Balance  in  the 
west  of  Europe  till  we  arrive  at  the  Peace  of 
Usefulness  Utrecht.  But  we  may  at  this  break  in  our  his- 
Baiance  tory  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  system 

of  Power.  J  .      .  . 

with  which  Great  Britain  was  so  intimately  con- 
cerned was  no  artificial  product  of  a  corrupt  age, 
bad  in  initiation,  futile  in  execution,  and  fatal  in 
its  legacy  to  subsequent  ages, — and  this  has  been 
in  recent  years  the  way  in  which  it  was  described, 
—but  the  result  of  self-sacrificing  and  far-seeing 
public  spirit,  honourable  to  those  nations  and 
sovereigns  who  threw  themselves  into  the  ranks 
of  its  supporters,  and  in  the  long  run  beneficial 
to  all  their  best  interests. 


53 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY   IN   THE   EARLIER   PART 
OF   THE   EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY. 

WE  enter  upon  the  more  modern  portion  of  our  Mari- 
survey,  with  the  path  made  clear  before  us  by  at  the  head 
the  action  of  William  III.  In  the  very  year  of  Allies- 
his  death  all  the  threads  of  his  alliances  were 
gathered  up  in  the  masterly  hands  of  Marl- 
borough,  a  Foreign  Policy  then  considered  by  the 
nation  as  entirely  their  own.  It  was  no  longer 
-  at  any  rate  for  a  time  —  regarded  as  that  of 
William  and  the  Dutch,  a  policy  which  the 
English  felt  they  ought  to  pursue  as  a  duty,  but 
which  they  feared  would  produce  no  immediate  ad- 
vantage to  England  itself.  With  a  popular  queen, 
"entirely  English,"  they  believed  that  affairs 
would  wear  a  different  aspect  ;  and  they  were 
right.  The  clouds  which  had  hung  over  Marl- 
borough  were  soon,  under  the  blaze  of  his  great 
achievements,  dispersed. 

We  see  again  the  Home  Policy,  which  was  the 


54  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

necessary  basis  of  the  Foreign  Policy,  carried  to  a 
prosperous  issue  of  a  superior  kind  to  that  of  the 
Tudor,   or   the    Cromwellian,   or    the   Revolution 
Tranquil-    eras.     Ireland  was    tranquil,   though    under    the 
Ireland.      Penal  Laws  and  the  "  Protestant  Ascendancy,"- 
a  painful  system   to   contemplate,  but   a  system 
which  the  recent  Civil  War  between  James  II., 
the  Pope,  and  the  French  on  one  side,  and  Eng- 
land on  the  other,  had  rendered  necessary. 

In  Scotland  William's  government  had  left 
some  rankling  sores  unhealed,  especially  his  dis- 
couragement of  the  Darien  expedition,  and  his 
refusal,  when  it  failed,  to  right  the  sufferers. 
The  injured  sentiment  of  the  Scotch  found  ex- 
pression in  various  ways,  and  convinced  Anne 
and  her  ministers  that  divided  and  independent 
national  politics  could  no  longer  be  permitted, 
union  with  The  Union  of  1706,  concluded  in  1707,  was  the 

Scotland. 

result  of  English  pressure  put  upon  Scotland,  a 
severe  though  pacific  pressure  which  the  Scotch 
were  unable  to  resist,  and  yet  marked  by  a  spirit 
of  mutual  accommodation  which  made  it  a  model 
for  the  Irish  Union  under  George  III.  It  was  a 
great  step  in  the  onward  course  of  Great  Britain, 
and  required  only  to  be  supplemented  by  the 
resources  of  genius  at  the  hands  of  Chatham. 
All  three  portions  of  the  British  Isles  now  con- 
tributed to  the  enterprises  undertaken  for  the 
whole,  and  Marlborough  felt  his  rear  secured, 


EARLIER   PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       55 

not  only  by  land  but  by  sea,  —  for  the  French 
made  no  attempt  upon  England  such  as  those 
which  failed  in  the  time  of  William. 

Marlborough's  allied  forces  were  gathered  to- 
gether in  the  Netherlands,  "the  cock-pit  of 
Europe."  While  he  placed  his  main  reliance  on 
the  English  and  Dutch,  he  commanded,  like 
William,  the  troops  of  Hanover,  Hesse,  Prussia, 
and  Denmark ;  and  the  Imperial  troops  under 
Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy,  as  soon  as  they  had 
secured  their  frontier  on  the  side  of  Hungary  and 
Italy,  were  preparing  to  operate  on  the  Danube 
with  the  allied  forces.  Marlborough,  in  spite  of 
the  enormous  difficulties  attending  upon  the  con- 
trol of  the  alliance,  established  his  superiority 
sooner  than  was  expected.  The  troubles  pro- 
ceeded chiefly  from  the  Dutch,  who  were  no 
longer  fighting  under  the  Stadth older- King  who 
had  formerly  led  them  to  battle.  Crippled  at 
last  by  the  two  tremendous  wars  for  existence 
which  they  had  waged  against  Philip  II.  and 
Louis  XIV.,  this  small  but  invincible  nation  had  The  Dutch 

portion  of 

seen  the  commerce,  by  which  they  had  been  en-  the  Allies. 
abled  to  hold  out,  absorbed  by  the  English,  and 
not  unnaturally  declined  to  be  for  ever  the  cat's- 
paw  of  other  countries.  It  would  be  enough  for 
them  to  protect  their  own  frontiers,  and  give  a 
reasonable  assistance  to  the  allied  forces  which 
stood  between  them  and  destruction. 


56  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

The  dilatory  measures  and  feeble  instructions 
which  now  hampered  the  alliance  would  certainly 
have  broken  down  the  combinations  of  any  one 
but  Marlborough.  He  had,  however,  carried  his 
point  of  making  England  a  principal  in  the  war, 
and  not  a  mere  auxiliary,  as  the  Tory  party 
desired ;  and  thus,  with  his  Whig  friends  in  the 
war  offices,  he  obtained  supplies,  and  triumphed 
over  his  enemies  at  home  and  abroad.  Nothing 
short  of  this  could  have  resisted  the  French, 
though  their  best  marshals  were  no  longer  avail- 
able, and  Louis's  great  ministers  had  passed  away. 
It  was  well  that  William  had  laid  the  foundation 
of  a  European  resistance  to  the  disturber  of  the 
'Balance,  and  that  a  Marlborough  was  at  hand  to 
raise  it  to  a  still  higher  level  under  the  headship 
Success  of  Great  Britian.  The  capture  of  Yenloo,  Rure- 
borough's  monde,  and  Liege  in  1702,  of  Bonn,  Huy,  and 

campaigns. 

Limbourg  in  1703,  convinced  Europe  that  im- 
portant events  were  at  hand ;  and  happily  the 
great  Captain  who  never  lost  a  battle  or  failed 
to  take  a  fortress,  had  contrived  to  shroud  in 
secrecy  the  concerted  movements  which  led  to 
the  battle  of  Blenheim.  The  result  of  that  splen- 
did victory  was  to  save  Germany  from  the  hands 
of  France,  of  the  subsequent  victories  to  drive 
her  out  of  Flanders.  Nothing  prevented  the 
conclusion  of  the  war  at  the  gates  of  Paris  but 
the  party  strife  which  prevailed  in  England,  and 


EARLIER   PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       57 

the  errors  into  which  Marlborough  was  betrayed 
by  the  influence  of  his  wife. 

The  effect  of  these  unrivalled  campaigns  was 
to  destroy  the  position  which  Louis  XIV.  had 
attained,  to  restore  the  European  Balance,  and 
to  change  the  war  with  France  into  an  ex- 
ternal peace,  during  which  the  latter  country 
secured  her  ends  by  statecraft  much  more  fully 
than  she  had  done  by  war.  The  actual  gains 
of  Great  Britain  derived  from  the  successful 
campaigns  of  William  III.  and  Marlborough  sink 
into  insignificance  when  compared  with  what 
might  seem  their  legitimate  reward ;  but  we 
have  to  look  further,  and  must  notice  the 
evidence  of  British  Foreign  Policy  afforded  by 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  It  is  there 
that  we  shall  find  some  compensation  for  diplo- 
matic and  political  failures. 

To  forestall  invasion,  to  redress  for  that  purpose 
the   European   Balance,   and  to   provide   such  a 
superior  naval   force   as  might  keep  the  British 
Channel  clear  and  protect   British   commerce,— 
these  were  the  primary  objects  of  the  great  war. 
The  course   of  events  had  led  up  to  a  distinct 
policy  of  a  further  kind.     Spain  had  become  after  War  of  the 
the  accession  of  Philip  V.  all  but  a  province  of  Succession. 
France  ;  and  the  Germans  had  a  common  interest 
with    the    English    in    breaking   up    this    union. 
The  English  commerce  in  the  Mediterranean  had 


58  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

grown  during  the  previous  century  to  a  great 
height  in  spite  of  the  pirate  squadrons  of  North 
Africa,  to  whom  Blake,  Narborough,  and  Shovel 
at  the  head  of  fleets,  and  Benbow  in  a  private 
capacity,  had  read  some  impressive  lessons.  Tur- 
key and  Persia  had  discovered  the  benefits  of  the 
Western  trade,  and  while  Spain  was  independent, 
her  energies,  enfeebled  by  the  Elizabethan  vic- 
tories, were  concentrated  on  the  preservation  of 
her  American  empire.  Portugal,  indeed,  taught 
by  her  period  of  enslavement  under  Philip  II. ,  had 
formed  quite  recently  a  closer  commercial  union 
with  Great  Britain  by  means  of  the  Methuen 
Treaty  ;  but  the  policy  of  William  IIL's  Partition 
Treaties  was  as  urgent  as  ever,  and  demanded  the 
measures  which  were  now  taken  in  the  Peninsula. 
The  Austrian  Succession  in  Spain,  was  at  once 
proclaimed  as  the  pivot  round  which  the  English 
fleets  and  armies  would  revolve,  supported  by 
such  limited  forces  as  Austria  could  spare  to  the 
aid  of  her  Archduke  Charles  (now  to  be  styled 
Charles  III.  of  Spain) ;  and  advantage  was  to  be 
taken  of  the  ancient  and  only  half-healed  feud 
between  Castile  and  Aragon  to  establish  the 
Allies  on  the  Aragonese  side  of  Spain  and  in 
the  Balearic  Isles.  The  Germans  once  settled 
in  force  upon  the  land,  the  sea  would  be  safe 
for  British  navies ;  and  between  them  the  French 
hold  on  Italy  might  be  paralysed.  In  short, 


EARLIER   PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       59 

British    Foreign    Policy,    after    the    year    1700, 
added   the    systematic    defence    of  the   Mediter-  Systematic 
ranean,  for  the  advantage  of  British  commerce,  the  Medi- 

,  ,.  ,  terranean. 

to  the  earlier  elements  of  the  system. 

This  branch  of  the  war  ran  parallel  with  the 
greater  one   which   Marlborough   waged    on    the 
Rhine   and  Danube,  and  it  only  wanted  a  mas- 
ter-hand on  the  spot  to  have  been  equally  suc- 
cessful.      Lisbon    gave    a    ready    entrance    into 
Western    Spain,    and    Barcelona,    taken    by    the 
fortunate    audacity    of  Lord    Peterborough,   still 
more  facilitated  entrance  by  the  east,  since,  as 
the  ancient  capital   of  the    Catalans,   it  formed 
a  centre   for    the   old  racial  rivalry  of  the    two 
great  divisions  of  Spain.     Here  the  British  fleets 
might    be    expected    to    play  a   part  which   was 
denied  them  in   the  greater   campaign,  and   the 
Mediterranean    might    become    a    British    lake. 
These   hopes   were   destined    to   disappointment. 
Perhaps  the  chief  cause  of  the  failure,  or  rather 
the  want  of  immediate  success  in  the  pursuit  of 
these  objects,  was  the  starving  of  the  Spanish 
War  both  by  Great  Britain  and  Austria  under  the 
pressure  of  the   chief  campaign.      The   Catalans  General 
had  been  too  completely  incorporated  by  Castile  the  Ames 
during  several  generations  to  lend  any  import- 
ant aid ;  and  neither  of  the  two  foreign  Powers, 
Britain  or  Austria,  obtained  any  real  popularity. 
Catalonia  rebelled  in  order  to  obtain  its  own  laws, 


60  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

or  fueros,  of  which  the  union  with  Castile  had 
deprived  it ;  but  these  people  had  made  a  good 
exchange  when  Spain  became  a  united  kingdom ; 
and  their  sentiment  was  an  anachronism. 

The  circumstance  which   rendered  the  success 

of  France    in    the    Spanish    Peninsula    of   little 

Capture  of  importance   to   Britain  was   the   capture  of  Gib- 

Gibraltar. 

raltar  in  1704.  It  was  scarcely  noticed  amidst 
the  tumultuous  rejoicings  over  the  battle  of  Blen- 
heim, which  took  place  in  the  same  year ;  but 
great  as  the  results  of  that  victory  were,  the 
capture  of  the  Rock  may  be  considered  a  more 
important  event,  for  it  turned  out  to  be  one  of 
the  main  steps  which  carried  Great  Britain  to  the 
headship  of  Europe.  As  the  justice  and  expedi- 
ency of  its  retention  were,  soon  after  the  Treaty 
of  Utrecht,  much  disputed,  and  the  policy  of  it, 
even  in  recent  times,  deliberately  attacked,  this 
may  be  the  place  for  putting  that  event  into  its 
proper  place  as  a  part  of  British  Foreign  Policy ; 
and  we  may  so  far  forestall  the  Peace  of  Utrecht 
by  which  its  seizure  was  ratified. 

import-  The  Rock  of  Gibraltar,  taken,  as  it  was  said, 
Gibraltar,  almost  in  a  frolic,  by  Sir  George  Rooke,  and  the 
island  of  Minorca  with  its  fine  harbour  of  Port 
Mahon,  occupied  by  Sir  John  Leake,  were  the  sole 
acquisitions  made  by  Great  Britain  in  Europe 
which  appeared  to  her  credit  after  the  enor- 
mous efforts  she  had  made  to  avert  "  the  great 


EARLIER   PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       61 

clanger  which  threatened  the  liberties  and  safety 
of  all  Europe  from  the  too  close  conjunction  of 
the  kingdoms  of  Spain  and  France."  This  is  the 
expression  used  in  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht.  They 
appeared  to  bystanders  to  be  a  mere  barren  and 
inadequate  return  for  the  vast  expenditure  of  men 
and  money  which  had  issued  in  the  victories  of 
Marlborough  and  Eugene,  to  say  nothing  of  those 
of  Peterborough,  Stanhope,  and  Gal  way,  which 
might  be  supposed  to  have  been  neutralised  by 
the  successes  of  Berwick  and  Vendome.  But 
Queen  Anne  and  Bolingbroke  were  not  so  far 
wrong  as  people  supposed.  At  the  moment  the 
French  and  their  allies  could  hardly  believe  in 
the  good  news  that,  after  having  been  humbled 
in  the  dust,  they  had  got  off  so  cheaply  ;  and  the 
French  as  principals  were  not  moved  to  any  great 
distress  at  the  loss  having  fallen  upon  Spain  :  but 
as  the  memory  of  the  conditions  on  which  these 
places  had  been  conceded  and  of  the  British  sacri- 
fices which  they  represented  became  dim  in  the 
eyes  of  Spanish  patriotism,  the  position  of  the 
victors  on  the  impregnable  Rock  grew  to  be  in- 
tolerable ;  nor,  though  France  put  a  better  face 
on  it,  could  she  digest  the  painful  fact  any  better 
than  Spain. 

With  France  it  was  not  indeed,  as  with  Spain,  Seriously 
a  matter  of  wounded  pride,  but  it  was  a  standing  France, 
injury   to  her  strategical    position ;    and   all  the 


62  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

more  distressing  since  one  of  the  few  abiding 
advantages  of  Louis  XIV/s  grand  but  unfor- 
tunate policy  had  been  to  establish  Toulon  as 
a  powerfully  fortified  naval  arsenal.  These  two 
British  acquisitions,  but  especially  Gibraltar,  were 
thus  felt  by  France,  as  soon  as  she  began  to  re- 
cover from  the  war,  a  most  palpable  grievance. 
They  were  the  sure  guarantee  of  an  independent 
British  commerce  with  Italy,  Africa,  and  the 
Levant,  and  an  efficient  means  of  protecting 
that  commerce  against  what  were  then  its  most 
terrible  enemies,  the  Algerine  and  other  pirates. 
Thus  they  became  the  regular  stations  for  men- 
of-war,  unwelcome  intruders  into  those  inland 
waters.  They  were  of  still  greater  importance, 
inasmuch  as  Gibraltar,  with  Port  Mahon  as  its 
support,  was  in  the  exact  position  to  cut  off, 
whenever  war  broke  out,  all  communication  by 
sea  between  the  southern  ports  of  France  and 
her  western  seaboard, 
and  by  Spain  was  equally  cloven  in  two.  Gibraltar, 

Spain.  .         f  . 

jutting  out  into  the  sea,  at  her  southernmost  point, 
barred  the  way  between  her  eastern  and  western 
ports,  and  stood  sentinel  over  queenly  Cadiz,  the 
emporium  of  all  the  wealth  of  Spanish  America. 
With  such  a  station  for  her  ships  Great  Britain 
was  in  a  position  to  suck  away  the  sole  remaining 
nourishment  of  the  old  imperial  trunk.  Spain, 
however,  being  already  in  decay,  was  willing  at 


EARLIER    PART    OF    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       63 

times,  under  the  pressure  of  adverse  circum- 
stances, to  forget  the  affront;  but  her  more 
powerful  neighbour,  still  keenly  reckoning  on  a 
glorious  maritime  future,  would  never  allow  her 
to  forget  it.  France  was  ever  standing  by,  re- 
minding her  of  the  disgrace  she  had  suffered,  and 
offering  by  secret  treaties  to  support  her  in  her 
efforts  to  recover  her  lost  possessions.  In  vain 
was  Spain  forced  by  Great  Britain  to  confirm  the 
tenure  of  the  obnoxious  intruders  by  repeated 
treaties.  The  same  causes  continued  to  act  ;  the 
same  fretful  disgust  betrayed  itself  over  and  over 
again.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  feeling  was 
perfectly  natural.  Gibraltar  was  the  visible  forfeit 
paid  for  irreparable  errors. 

But  it  is  not  easy  to  comprehend  at  first  sight 
how  it  was  that  the  British  Government  could 
forget  or  make  light  of  conquests  of  such  vital 
importance  to  British  commerce  and  influence ; 
for  as  a  matter  of  fact  both  George  I.  and  his 
ministers  did  beyond  question  commit  themselves 
more  than  once  to  a  policy  of  restitution.  The 
excuse  for  them  is  that  they  knew  better  than  any 
one  else  the  perils  which  beset  the  Hanoverian 
Succession  in  England,  and  the  delicate  relations 
in  which  Hanover  stood  to  the  nations  by  which 
it  was  surrounded.  These  were  the  dangerous 
and  irremediable  conditions  of  the  case.  During, 
for  instance,  the  panic  of  1715,  George  I.,  little 


64 


BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 


George  i.    understanding  at  that  time  what  he  was  doing, 
mistake      went  so  far  as  to  offer  of  his  own  accord  to  restore 

on  this 

point;  Gibraltar.  His  Prime  Minister,  Lord  Stanhope, 
in  1718,  urged  it  as  a  means  of  making  an 
arrangement  with  Alberoni,  the  aggressive  Prime 
Minister  of  Spain.  The  short  war  of  the  latter 
year,  caused  by  the  enterprise  of  that  rash 
Cardinal,  did  indeed  annul  what  had  passed,  and 
the  Quadruple  Treaty  confirmed  the  British 
tenure  ;  yet  after  all  this  we  find  George  I.  in 
1721  actually  promising  once  again  to  restore  it 
"  at  the  first  favourable  opportunity,  with  the 
consent  of  my  Parliament,  upon  the  footing  of 
an  equivalent." 

Happily  that  equivalent  was  never  settled  ; 
still  less  did  "  my  Parliament  "  ever  dream  of 
giving  its  consent.  The  people  of  Britain,  what- 
ever  their  Government  might  devise  for  them, 
had  never  for  a  moment  lost  sight  of  their  true 
rights  and  interests.  It  was  the  representative 
of  Marlborough's  great  services.  They  were 
clearly  right.  The  Spaniards  forgot  that  it  was 
as  a  virtual  portion  of  France  that  they  had 
suffered.  The  general  and  violent  indignation 
of  the  British  people,  as  soon  as  ever  these 
secret  proposals  became  known,  made  of  course 
the  consent  of  Parliament  impossible.  The  most 
insulting  language  was  used  by  the  Queen  of 
Spain,  the  virtual  sovereign  of  the  country. 


British 


EARLIER    PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       65 

"  Either  give  up  Gibraltar,  or  relinquish  your 
trade  to  Spain  and  the  [West]  Indies."  The 
British  had  no  idea  of  giving  up  either  the 
Rock  or  the  trade.  Both  rights  had  been  hon- 
ourably won ;  both  had  been  secured  by  repeated 
treaties ;  they  knew  the  value  of  both.  The 
expense  of  keeping  up  Gibraltar,  reckoned  at 
£50,000  a -year,  was  insignificant.  They  felt  Spanish 
the  insult  still  more  when,  in  1726,  Spain,  with-  Gibraltar. 
out  any  Declaration  of  War,  actually  laid  siege 
to  the  English  stronghold.  This  at  last  put  an 
end  to  any  notion  of  compromise.  The  Spanish 
attack  of  that  day  failed,  and  all  subsequent 
attempts  have  shared  the  same  fate.  Long 
afterwards,  in  1757,  the  elder  Pitt  in  a  moment 
of  depression  offered  to  exchange  Gibraltar  for 
Minorca  as  the  price  of  the  Spanish  alliance,  but 
happily  Spain  declined.  The  idea  has  never  since 
found  any  serious  expression. 

Here,    then,    we   fix    a   distinct    landmark   of 
British  Foreign  Policy.     The  Mediterranean  was  Control  of 

theMedi- 

to  be  kept  open  not  only  by  such  alliances  terranean. 
as  were  possible  with  the  holders  of  the  two 
peninsulas  which  jutted  out  into  the  midst  of 
it  from  the  Continental  base,  but  by  British 
stations  which  should  guard  its  fleets  at  the 
entrance.  It  should  henceforward  be  in  the 
power  of  Great  Britain  to  control  the  com- 
merce of  the  inland  sea,  and  to  provide  for 

E 


66  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

that    purpose    fleets    which    might    rest   upon    a 
secure  basis. 

And  this  brings  us  to  another  great  factor  in 
British  Foreign  Policy  which  sprang  into  a  new 
phase  of  existence  during  the  early  part  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  requires  a  much  more 
Spain  and  minute  notice.  Like  the  growth  of  control  in  the 
tain  in  Mediterranean,  an  almost  unperceived  movement 
indies.  had  been  going  on  for  some  generations  in  West 
Indian  waters.  The  progress  of  English  com- 
merce and  nautical  power  in  those  seas  dated  in 
practice  from  Elizabeth's  triumphant  struggle 
with  Philip  II.;  but  its  foundation  was  laid  in 
the  patronage  of  the  two  Cabots,  father  and  son, 
by  Henry  VII.  and  Henry  VIII.  It  extended 
over  many  years ;  for  the  son,  Sebastian  Cabot, 
was  the  -  chief  adviser  in  nautical  affairs  of 
Edward  VI. 's  ministers ;  and  their  position  is  of 
importance  in  this  survey.  Under  their  auspices 
the  English  learnt  to  consider  themselves  the 
arbiters  of  English  interests  in  North  America 
just  as  much  as  Spain  and  Portugal  considered 
themselves  the  controllers  of  the  South.  But  the 
central  portion,  including  the  Mexican  Gulf,  lying 
between  North  and  South  America,  with  the 
Pacific  on  one  side  of  it  and  the  West  Indian 
Islands  on  the  other,  could  not  in  the  nature  of 
things  be  treated  as  exclusively  Spanish, — not  at 
least  after  the  North  American  colonies,  planted 


EARLIER    PART    OF    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY.       67 

by  Elizabeth  and  James,  had  risen  into  important 
and  populous  communities. 

And  here  we  should  remember  that  there  was  a  The  Bri- 
fundamental  difference  between  the  colonies  ofn?esin° 
the  two  European  races.  The  Spanish — for  the 
Portuguese  colonies,  which  were  of  the  same 
kind,  need  not  be  considered  here — were  either 
mining  settlements,  of  the  greatest  value  in  that 
age  when  the  supply  of  gold  and  silver  was  scarce, 
or  else  the  mere  administrative  government  of 
enfeebled  native  States  which  had  been  con- 
quered by  a  Cortes  or  a  Pizarro.  There  was  no 
thought  of  emigration  on  any  large  scale  from  the 
mother  country.  The  administration  of  these 
native  States  might  be  compared  to  the  old 
English  administration  of  Gascony,  or  the  modern 
English  government  of  India.  But  the  English 
colonies  in  North  America  were  like  the  settle- 
ments of  Greece  and  Rome  in  ancient  times,  like 
those  of  the  Jutes,  Saxons,  and  Angles  in  Roman 
Britain,  and  like  those  in  Canada,  Australia,  and 
South  Africa,  which  we  now  call  "  The  Greater 
Britain."  They  were  real  emigrations ;  and  in 
New  England  they  were  even  migrations  of 
whole  bodies  of  people,  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren, agricultural,  and  for  life,  perfectly  Eng- 
lish in  their  municipal,  their  commercial,  and 
their  religious  type.  What  was  still  more  im- 
portant, they  brought  with  them  all  the  nautical 


68  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

habits  and  traditions  of  the  parent  race,  and  they 
possessed  immense  lines  of  coast  and  frequent 
harbours  for  their  development.  They  were  the 
children  of  Raleigh  and  his  paladins.  How  could 
it  be  expected  that  they  would  submit  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  adjacent  waters  of  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  the  West  India  Islands  ? 
Their  re-  Further,  their  English  parents  had  conferred 

latious  to  ••ill  i 

the  mother  on  them  inestimable  advantages  by  governing 
and  keeping  order  in  the  different  colonies, 
though  not  always  by  the  best  men, — but  where 
has  that  not  been  a  cause  of  complaint  ? — in  pro- 
tecting the  interests  of  the  colonies  when  they 
could  not  yet  stand  alone,  in  guarding  and  foster- 
ing their  trade,  in  sharing  with  them  the  literary, 
political,  and  domestic  improvements  of  the  times. 
We  are  not  accustomed  to  measure  the  condition ' 
of  the  American  colonies  of  England  before  the 
war  which  issued  in  their  independence,  but  we 
must  set  ourselves  to  the  task  if  we  are  to  under- 
stand the  growth  of  British  Foreign  Policy. 
What  we  have  to  do  at  present  is  to  observe  the 
impossibility  of  preventing  the  colonists  from 
taking  advantage  of  the  lax  relations  which  had 
long  existed  between  themselves  and  the  Spanish 
colonists  planted  at  different  ports  along  the 
shore  of  the  Mexican  Gulf.  And  though  the 
prevalence  of  the  buccaneers  during  the  Restora- 
tion and  Revolution  periods  had  eo  nomine  come 


EARLIER   PART    OF   EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY.       69 

to  an  end,  the  enterprising  spirit  on  which 
smuggling  processes  are  based  could  not  but 
survive  in  all  these  seas. 

Let  us,  then,  trace  the  circumstances  which 
brought  on  the  conflict  between  the  two  mother- 
countries,  Britain  and  Spain,  first  while  peace 
was  still  supposed  to  exist,  and  then  when  the 
war  of  1739  broke  out. 

The  victories  of  Elizabeth's  reign  had  been 
forgotten  ;  and  the  Peace  of  1604,  made  by  James 
I.,  had  allowed  Spain  to  pursue  her  American 
policy  undisturbed.  She  on  her  part  took  no 
notice  of  the  growth  of  the  English  colonies  in 
America,  and  seemed  to  hope  that  no  future 
Drakes  or  Hawkinses  would  ever  appear  in  those 
vast  seas  which  she  called  her  own.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact  all  through  the  reigns  of  James  I. 
and  Charles  I.,  British  and  Dutch  vessels  were 
in  the  full  career  of  what  the  Spaniards  called 
"  depredations,"  and  during  Cromwell's  Spanish 
war  not  only  was  Jamaica  captured  by  the 
English,  but  Spanish  commerce  and  the  safe  Attitude  of 

..•-«•  •  i       •        Spain  as 

carriage  of  Spanish  treasure  were  grievously  in-  to  British 

O  JL  •/  ,./ ,-t .  n.  i  ,,>-,... 

terrupted  by  Blake  at  Teneriffe,  and  by  others. 
Not  however  till  1667  did  Spain  condescend, 
even  tacitly,  to  recognise  the  existence  of  those 
who  had  been  so  long  forcing  their  way  into  her 
strongholds.  In  the  treaties  of  that  year  and  of 
1670  were  laid  the  bases  of  the  subsequent  inter- 


commerce. 


70  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

course.  It  was  the  reign  of  Charles  II.,  and  the 
attitude  of  the  two  nations  had  changed  since 
Cromwell's  war.  The  ambitious  hostility  of 
Louis  XIV.,  coinciding  with  the  recent  evidence 
of  a  serious  power  for  mischief  in  the  British 
American  colonies,  was  drawing  Spain  into  un- 
wonted alliance  with  Britain.  Hence  favourable 
conditions  of  trade,  and  especially  of  West  Indian 
trade,  were  at  last  granted  by  Spain  to  England, 
and  expressions  used  which,  whether  intentionally 
or  not,  were  open  to  more  than  one  construction. 
It  is  necessary  to  examine  these  treaties. 
Favourable  The  first  treaty  (1667)  began  by  referring  to 
the  seven-  the  Treaty  of  Munster  in  1648,  by  which  the 

teenth  J  .    . 

century.  Dutch — thus  long  before  the  British,  and  no 
doubt  owing  to  the  profound  depression  of  the 
latter  at  that  time — had  been  admitted  to  com- 
mercial privileges.  These  were  now  extended  to 
the  British  ;  but  there  is  nothing  whatever  here 
which  throws  light  on  any  claim  to  the  Right  of 
Search.  Indeed  it  was  by  no  means  clear  that  the 
privileges  of  trade  conceded  to  the  British,  which 
the  Spaniard  afterwards  held  to  apply  to  Euro- 
pean ports  alone,  did  not  by  the  very  terms  of 
this  treaty  apply  to  their  colonies.  In  the  second 
treaty  (1670)  the  restrictions  which  provided  that 
there  should  be  no  mutual  trade  between  the 
colonies  of  each  Power  without  special  licence, 
were  not  far  separated  from  the  fifteenth  Article, 


EARLIER  PART  OF  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY.   71 

which  declares  that  "liberty  of  navigation  ought 
in  no  manner  to  be  disturbed  where  nothing  is 
committed  against  the  genuine  sense  and  meaning 
of  these  Articles."  A  clause  concerning  the  Right 
of  Search  is  here  for  the  first  time  inserted;  but  it 
is  carefully  guarded  from  abuse,  and  specifically 
stated  to  apply  only  to  a  search  for  arms,  am- 
munition, and  soldiers.  Even  this  was,  it  seems, 
intended  to  apply  principally  to  the  prohibition 
of  British  ships  from  supplying  the  States  of 
Barbary  with  military  stores.  Yet — and  this 
shows  why  a  close  examination  of  the  treaties 
is  necessary — it  was  the  Spanish  interpretation 
of  this  one  article,  in  the  times  of  which  we  are 
now  speaking  (1720-1739),  which  formed  the  casus 
belli  in  1739.  Spain  interpreted  it  to  mean  the 
Right  of  Search  for  contraband  merchandise  in 
American  waters,  and  there,  not  only  when  "  close 
to  the  ports,"  but  out  of  sight  of  land,  in  the  open 
sea. 

This   illegal    system  of  search,   exercised,  not  Right  of 

.    .  '  .  Search. 

under  the  supervision  of  captains  or  admirals  of 
a  superior  class  of  men-of-war,  but  by  a  low  class 
of  officers  in  guardacostas,  was  carried  out  in  the 
most  barbarous  manner.  Year  after  year  merchant 
ships  were  taken  at  sea,  laden  not  with  "arms, 
ammunition,  or  soldiers,"  but  with  the  British 
goods  which  the  Spanish  colonists  were  eager  to 
buy  at  highly  remunerative  prices.  The  captains 


ear. 


72  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

were  often  sent  to  Spain,  where  they  were 
immured  in  the  proverbially  vile  prisons  of  that 
country,  and  no  doubt  often,  like  Captain  Jenkins, 
mutilated.  It  is  remarkable  that  this,  perhaps 
the  most  famous  of  all  mutilations  of  the  human 
body,  has  for  much  more  than  a  century  been 
Jenkins'  stigmatised  as  a  "  fable."  It  was  called  so  by 
Burke,  using  it  as  an  illustration  of  his  argu- 
ment for  another  war,  on  the  idea  that  though 
the  old  war,  based  on  this  "  fable,"  was  one  of 
"  plunder  and  extreme  injustice,"  the  Revolution- 
War  with  France  was  justified  on  every  ground  of 
justice  and  expediency. 

No  one  thought  of  disputing  that  great  man's 
statements,  especially  when  he  declared  that  he 
had  made  an  accurate  study  of  the  subject, 
and  had  based  his  epithets  on  the  "  candid  con- 
fessions of  many  of  the  principal  actors  against 
Sir  Robert  Walpole,  and  of  those  who  principally 
excited  the  clamour  which  brought  on  the  war." 
He  has  been  followed  by  every  subsequent  writer 
and  compiler.  And  yet  the  story  had  not 
originally  been  considered  a  fable,  nor  indeed  till 
a  generation  had  passed  away.  However,  quite 
recently,  Professor  Laugh  ton,  turning  over  some 
documents  in  the  Record  Office,  discovered  one 
which  proved  that  the  "  fable  of  Jenkins'  ear  " 
was  no  fable  at  all,  but  actual  fact. 


73 


CHAPTER    V. 

THE    EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO   THE   WAR   WITH 
SPAIN   IN    1739. 

THE  special  instance  of  Jenkins  and  his  ear — with 
his  dramatic  exhibition  of  the  well-preserved  mem- 
ber, wrapped  up  in  cotton,  before  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  his  reply  to  a  question  from  the 
House,  "  I  commended  my  soul  to  my  God,  and 
my  cause  to  my  country  " — was  only  one  out  of  a 
thousand  incidents  which  brought  on  the  famous 
war  of  1739,  and  settled  the  Foreign  Policy  of 
Great  Britain  very  much  as  it  has  remained  ever 
since.  It  was  the  secret  treaty  with  France  in 
1733  which  encouraged  Spain  to  make  a  mock  at 
the  remonstrances  of  the  British.  To  this  we 
must  add  the  error  of  Walpole's  later  administra-  Waipoie's 
tion,  which  had  degenerated  into  a  base  and  un-  policy. 
English  system  of  staving  off  war  by  absurd  de-  I  , 
vices,  and  buying  peace  at  any  price.  Let  us 
deal  first  with  the  encouragement  given  by  France 
to  Spain. 


74  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

We  have  noticed  the  unprovoked  attack  made 

on  Gibraltar  by  Spain  in   1726  and  its   failure. 

Walpole's  plan  of  dealing  with  it  was  to  treat  it 

as  a  childish  act  of  spleen,  not  the  least  to  be 

considered  an  act  of  war,  but  as  requiring  that  a 

Hosier's      fine  should  be  levied  on  the  offender.     The  har- 

of  Porto      bour  and  fortress  of  Porto  Bello,  where  the  gal- 

Bello. 

leons  met  after  having  received  the  annual  supply 
of  gold  and  silver  from  the  miners,  was  blockaded 
by  a  considerable  fleet  under  Admiral  Hosier. 
Not  that  the  orders  given  to  this  officer  were 
made  known  to  the  people,  who  were  appeased 
for  the  moment  by  the  demonstration  of  force ; 
but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Admiral  had  orders 
not  to  attack  the  forts,  which  however  were 
captured  by  Vernon  in  1739  with  only  six  large 
ships.  This  blockade  was  very  disagreeable  to 
Spain,  but  it  was  also  very  costly  to  Great  Britain. 
It  was  galling  to  the  Spanish  Government  to  find 
that  its  supplies  could  be  stopped,  and  that  it 
had  no  fleet  ready  to  prevent  the  stoppage  ;  but 
it  was  also  gratifying  to  feel  that  this  was  the 
worst  the  supposed  mistress  of  the  seas  could  do, 
and  that  it  was  only  a  temporary  infliction. 

But  how  about  the  cost  and  humiliation  to 
those  who  inflicted  the  punishment  ?  The  sad 
story  has  left  an  indelible  mark  on  English  his- 
tory, and  it  need  not  be  repeated  in  detail. 
Never  was  such  a  blunder  made  bv  even  the 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED   TO    WAR    WITH    SPAIN.       75 

most  incompetent  Government.  The  fleet  of  old 
ships,  worn  out  during  a  long  peace,  might  have 
performed  their  service  well  enough  had  they 
been  despatched  straight  against  the  enemy.  As 
it  was,  kept  cruising  for  months  off  this  petty  Catastro- 
fortress  in  the  deadly  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  ships  Hosier's 
rotted  to  pieces,  and  the  entire  armament  dis- 
solved away  :  twice  over  were  nearly  the  whole 
of  the  crews  destroyed  by  fever — for  the  ships  had 
been  manned  afresh  at  Jamaica ;  the  fine  old  ad- 
miral, as  well  as  his  successor,  had  succumbed ; 
and  along  with  them  ten  captains,  fifty  lieu- 
tenants, and  between  3000  and  4000  inferior 
officers  and  seamen.  The  cost  of  men  and  money 
was  equal  to  that  of  at  least  three  general  actions 
such  as  were  in  those  days  fought  at  sea.  The 
catastrophe  sank  deep  into  the  souls  of  English- 
men, and  was  never  forgotten.  Twelve  years  later 
Glover's  celebrated  ballad  of  "Hosier's  Ghost" 
sounded  the  knell  of  Walpole's  administration. 

Walpole  found  the  difficulty  of  dealing  with  the 
so-called   Right   of  Search    increase    enormously 
after  the   secret   treaty  in  1733   between  Spain  Secret 
and  France  of  which  we  have  spoken.     It  ran  as  between 

France  and 

follows:  "Whenever  it  seems  good  to  both  na-  sPain- 
tions   alike,   the   abuses   which    have   crept   into 
commerce,  especially  through   the  English,  shall 
be  abolished  ;  and  if  the  English  make  objection, 
France  will    ward   off  its    hostility  with   all    its 


76  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

strength  by  land  and  sea."  This  treaty  was  not 
known  to  the  world  before  it  was  discovered  and 
published  by  Ranke  in  quite  recent  times  ;  but 
its  fruits  were  visible  enough  in  both  continents. 
The  very  year  after  it  was  formed  the  tran- 
quillity of  Europe  was  broken  by  the  union  of 
France,  Spain,  and  Sardinia  against  the  Emperor, 
and  their  success  in  placing  the  Spanish  Charles 
upon  the  throne  of  Naples  and  Sicily.  Great 
Britain,  still  entirely  in  Walpole's  hands,  looked 
helplessly  on  while  a  friendly  Power,  the  Empire, 
was  overpowered.  The  House  of  Bourbon  now 
reigned  supreme  over  the  whole  west  of  con- 
tinental Europe,  and  the  two  great  peninsulas 
of  Spain  and  Italy,  which  commanded  the  Medi- 
terranean, were  mainly  in  the  same  hands.  The 
continued  tenure  of  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  wore 
now,  of  course,  year  by  year,  a  still  more  intoler- 
able aspect  in  the  eyes  of  these  Powers  ;  and  the 
resolute  policy  of  France  to  use  the  Spanish 
alliance  for.  the  purpose  of  pushing  forward  the 
colonial  empire  which  she  was  bent  on  acquiring, 
began  to  show  itself  in  the  formation  of  forts  and 
settlements  along  the  rear  of  the  English  colonies 
in  North  America,  and  in  fresh  enterprises  which 
threatened  the  British  position  in  India. 
France  The  next  year,  1735,  placed  France  on  a  still 

under  . 

Cardmai     higher  pedestal.     With  remarkable  sagacity  the 
aged  Cardmai  Fleury,  then  at  the  head  of  affairs 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       7*7 

in  France,  contrived  to  complete  by  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna  the  crowning  achievement  of  his  country's 
ambition.  By  securing  the  reversion  of  Lorraine 
and  Bar,  which  soon  fell  in,  France  at  last  ren- 
dered herself  secure  on  her  eastern  frontier.  She 
was  now  —  it  might  almost  be  said  without  a  war 
—at  a  summit  of  power  which  Louis  XIV.  had 
beggared  the  resources  of  his  nation  in  the  vain 
attempt  to  reach  by  means  of  wars  which  had 
lasted,  almost  without  intermission,  throughout  his 
prolonged  reign.  This  success  had  been  obtained 
by  the  neutralisation  of  Great  Britain  and  Holland. 
But  Holland  had  far  the  best  excuse  for  non-inter- 
ference :  she  had  been  quite  exhausted  by  the 
gigantic  wars  in  which  she  had  saved  Europe,  and 
from  which  her  people  have  never  since  recovered. 
Have  they  not  gained  for  ever  the  respect  of  man- 
kind for  their  past  services  in  the  cause  of  freedom  ? 
It  was  this  threatening  attitude  of  France, 
standing  behind  Spain,  which  daunted  Walpole, 
to  whom  the  secret  treaty  seems  to  have  been 
known,  and  inspired  the  timid  policy  which  we 
are  now  to  trace  as  regards  the  West  Indies. 
The  diplomatic  successes  of  the  Prime  Minister 
had  indeed  procured  the  blessing  of  peace  for  the 
moment  ;  but  they  had  laid  a  sure  foundation  for 
an  inevitable  war.  By  withdrawing  his  country  Great  Bri- 


in?-        taiu        ' 

from  her  accustomed  place  in  Continental  atiairs,  drawn  from 

•  m  Continen- 

—  that  is,  from  the  place  obtained  in  the  ludor 


78  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

and  later  Stuart  reigns  of  William  and  Anne,— 
and  by  allowing  her  to  be  insulted  and  betrayed 
in  both  hemispheres,  he  had  encouraged  a  weak 
nation  like  Spain,  which  must  have  collapsed  had 
she  been  treated  from  the  first  with  becoming 
spirit,  to  carry  insult  and  defiance  still  further. 
In  the  complicated  relations  of  the  trade  between 
the  two  countries  in  the  West  Indies  and  Spanish 
America  there  was  a  rich  abundance  of  occasions 
for  the  display  of  the  bitter  hostility  which  rapidly 
developed  in  both  nations.  Let  us  also  observe 
here  that  not  only  was  the  commerce  of  the  Lon- 
don, Bristol,  and  other  merchants  largely  engaged 
in  pushing  its  way  to  these  regions,  but  also  that 
of  the  hardy  settlers  of  the  North  American  coasts, 
men  who  earned  their  bread  by  the  sweat  of  their 
brows,  or  covered  the  sea  with  their  trading  ves- 
sels. It  was  these  men  who  gave  the  tone  to  all 
the  English  of  the  New  World,  and  suffered  with 
rugged  impatience  the  insults  and  trade  restric- 
tions of  a  people  for  whom  they  could  entertain 
but  little  respect. 

Nor    should    it   be   forgotten,    in    tracing    the 

quarrels  of  the  eighteenth  century,  that  even  in 

the  West  Indies  the  English  had  already  had  to 

bear  their  part  in  connection  with  the  European 

High  spirit  wars   of  the   previous  age.      Men  like  the  two 

British       Christopher    Codringtons,    lords    of    rich    sugar 

colonists.       m  r  p 

islands,    and    each    in    succession  placed   by  the 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED   TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       79 

British  Government  as  "Governor-General  of  the 
Caribbean  Seas,"  had  in  the  reigns  of  William 
and  Anne  led  great  expeditions  against  the 
French,  and  cultivated  with  some  success  a 
military  spirit  among  the  planters ;  while  the 
undaunted  Benbow  had,  so  late  as  1698,  taught 
the  enemies  of  the  English  that  they  might 
easily  try  the  temper  of  his  people  too  far.  We 
should  also  remember  that  the  theory  of  maritime 
freedom  was  steadily  advancing  along  with  the 
civilisation  of  the  age ;  and  however  the  English 
might  resist  at  home  the  claims  of  Grotius  for 
the  Dutch  in  the  Narrow  Seas,  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  the  doctrines  of  the  Mare  Liberum 
were  unheeded  in  their  application  to  Spain  and 
the  distant  American  waters,  where  no  claim  to 
exclusive  rights  had  been  acknowledged  like  that 
which  had  been  conceded  to  the  English  as  their 
domestic  inheritance  for  seven  centuries. 

Add  to  these  considerations  that  not  only  the 
English  but  the  French  and  Dutch  had  settled  in 
the  seventeenth  century  on  the  West  Indian 
Islands  and  the  adjacent  coasts.  Thus  it  is  quite 
intelligible  that  any  practical  operation  resulting 
from  the  old  Spanish  theory  that  the  American 
coasts  and  seas  extending  south  and  west  from 
the  northern  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  were 
exclusively  their  own,  must  have  appeared  to 
the  British  people  and  their  colonists  an  absurd, 


80  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

insane,  and  most  injurious  anachronism.  The 
nations  of  Europe  were  inextricably  mixed  up 
together  within  distant  narrow  seas ;  and  each 
of  these  nations,  as  yet  in  the  infancy  of  the 
colonising  process,  looked  with  more  than  a 
parental  eye  on  its  promising  offspring.  How 
could  constant  smuggling  and  everlasting  disputes 
fail  to  arise  in  such  circumstances  between  Spain 
and  the  new-comers  ?  Nothing  but  the  most 
liberal  policy  between  contiguous  colonies,  and 
between  the  States  to  which  they  belonged, 
could  possibly  have  kept  the  peace.  But  the 
condition  of  Europe  during  Walpole's  so-called 
pacific  administration  was  very  far  from  pacific. 
Spanish  It  was  with  these  English  colonists,  numerous, 


exercise  of 


"Eight of  active,  and  self-reliant,  quite  as  much  as  with  the 

Search."  .  \  ^ 

English  themselves ;  it  was  with  that  English 
flag, — the  honour  of  which  had  been  carried  so 
high  that  the  claim  for  an  ancient  mode  of 
paying  it  respect  in  the  Narrow  Seas  had  led 
to  sanguinary  combats  and  terrible  wars, — that 
Spain,  a  Power  no  longer  of  first-rate  rank,  re- 
solved to  deal  as  if  she  were  undisputed  mis- 
tress of  the  ocean.  What  must  have  been  the 
feelings  of  the  English,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
when  they  found  the  Spanish  guardacostas  pre- 
suming to  exercise  the  so-called  "  Right  of 
Search  "  on  the  high  seas — i.e.,  out  of  sight  of 
land  —  upon  British  vessels  proceeding  on  their 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       81 

legitimate  traffic  from  one  English  colony  to 
another  ?  What  must  they  have  felt  when  they 
were  perfectly  aware  that  no  such  right  existed 
by  treaty  ?  What  when  they  found  this  practice 
become  customary  without  their  own  Government 
interfering  to  prevent  it  ? 

It  was  even  stated  over  and  over  again,  though 
perhaps  never  proved,  that  the  Spanish  guarda- 
costas  had  actually  sailed  into  English  ports  and 
carried  off  English  merchant  vessels  under  the 
eyes  of  English  men-of-war.  At  any  rate  the 
instances  of  their  barbarous  treatment  of  English- 
men caught  smuggling  were  numerous  and  un- 
doubted. The  number  of  those  who  died  in 
Spanish  prisons,  which  were  worse  still  on  the 
Spanish  "  Plantations "  than  in  Spain  itself,  was 
frightful.  No  doubt  there  were  many  cases 
not  very  different  from  that  of  Captain  Jenkins ; 
but  in  spite  of  cruelty  and  losses,  the  English  and 
their  American  colonists  found  the  profits  too 
great  to  be  relinquished,  and  the  struggle  went 
on  year  after  year  ;  while  Walpole,  upon  each 
occasion  of  complaint,  minimised  the  affront,  and 
provoked  fresh  insolence  by  exhibiting  a  pusillani- 
mous dread  of  giving  offence.  People  asked  if  Waipoie 

takes  no 

this  was    the  way   to   secure  peace.       Did   any  notice, 
nation   ever   yet   succeed  in   retaining  its  inde- 
pendence by  allowing  injury  and  insult  to  pass 
unnoticed  ?     By  degrees  these  just  and  natural 


82  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

sentiments  extended  to  the  whole  nation,  and  at 
last  forced  Walpole  himself  to  demand  redress. 
There  was  something  to  be  said  for  Spain  in  her 
attempt  to  prevent  the  British  from  trading  with 
her  colonists,  but  her  mode  of  operation  was  in- 
tolerable. The  war  which  she  provoked  could 
hardly  be  called  "  a  war  of  plunder  and  extreme 
injustice." 

Here  then  we  have  before  us  the  grounds  of 
the  war  which  led  to  such  immense  issues,  and 
which  have  been  so  obscured  during  the  last 
century  and  a  half.  We  have  discussed  the 
validity  of  the  Spanish  claim  to  the  Right 
of  Search  in  the  open  sea,  and  shown  that  it 
was  not  grounded  on  treaties.  We  have  seen, 
Systematic  further,  that  the  system  of  "  smuggling,"  on 
which  the  claim  was  justified,  had  itself  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  moral  justification.  It  may 
be  well  to  carry  this  explanation  a  little  further. 
During  the  whole  reign  of  Charles  II. ,  and  even 
to  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  same 
spirit  which  had  dictated  the  unwonted  liberality 
of  the  Spanish  Treaties  of  1667  and  1670,  de- 
rived from  the  dread  of  France  and  the  conse- 
quent friendly  approach  towards  Britain,  brought 
about  an  entire  relaxation  of  those  treaties,  a  re- 
laxation which  grew  into  a  custom,  and  of  course 
became  associated  with  the  idea  of  right.  "  A 
flourishing  although  illicit  trade  was,  by  the  con- 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       83 

nivance  and  indulgence  of  Spain,  carried  on  be- 
tween the  English  and  Spanish  Plantations  "  ; l 
nor  was  it  till  the  accession  of  Philip  of  Bourbon 
to  the  Spanish  throne,  as  Philip  V.,  in  1700,  that 
any  change  took  place,  nor  scarcely  even  then, — 
for  Spain  was  torn  to  pieces  by  the  Succession 
War, — till  the  Peace  of  Utrecht  in  1713. 

The  truth  is  that  a  state  of  things  had  arisen 
which  could  not  possibly  continue  without  an  ex- 
plosion.    A  new  system  of  relations  was  adopted 
by  Spain  and  accepted  by  Great  Britain  at  the 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  a  system  of  definite  and  ab- 
solute restriction  of  trade,  which,  after  the  lapse 
of  three  generations  of  mutual  intercourse,  virtu- 
ally amounting  to   free   trade,  was  unworkable,  change 
Let   any  one   consider  what  that  lapse  of  time  freeto re-1 
meant,  the  number  of  families  and  communities  trade, 
which   had   grown  rich    in  this    trade,   and   had 
handed    it    down    from    one    generation    to    an- 
other ;  the  money  sunk  in  the  trade,  the  many 
channels  by  which  the  British  colonies  and  the 
mother  country  had  communicated  with  one  an- 
other in  this  connection.     That  the  absolute  re- 
striction of  this  trade,   with   the  one  exception 
of  the  Assiento,   forming  part  of  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht,  should  have  been  acceded  to  by  Queen 
Anne    and    her    Tory    ministers    is    not    usually 
(though     it     might     well     be)     charged     among 
1  Coxe's  Walpole,  i.  558. 


84  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

their  faults.  They  might  be  excused  on  the 
ground  of  a  sanguine  hope  that  the  new  plan 
would  be  suffered  to  bear  as  lax  an  interpre- 
tation as  the  old.  The  sequel  proved  them  to 
be  entirely  in  error.  Philip  V.  was  not  only  a 
hostile  Frenchman,  but  he  became  a  thoroughly 
hostile  Spaniard  as  well.  His  sympathies  flowed 
from  both  sides  in  the  anti-English  direction,  and 
it  was  no  wonder.  The  former  friendliness  be- 
tween Spain  and  Britain  had  been  extinguished 
in  the  late  war,  with  its  disastrous  result  to  Spain 
in  the  capture  of  Gibraltar  and  Minorca. 

Here  was  Philip's  opportunity.  By  the  Peace 
of  Utrecht  the  old  permission  to  trade  by 
TheAssi-  licence  had  been  annulled.  What  was  the 
famous  Assiento  which  had  taken  its  place  ?  It- 
was  a  contract  for  supplying  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies with  a  certain  number  of  African  negroes, 
a  contract  made  with  Spain  by  the  English 
South  Sea  Company.  To  it  was  attached  the 
privilege  of  annually  sending  a  single  ship  of  a 
certain  burden,  laden  with  European  merchan- 
dise, to  Spanish  America.  Was  this  privilege 
to  be  literally  interpreted?  The  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment would  have  been  wise  had  they  reflected 
upon  the  impossibility  of  undoing  the  work  of 
their  predecessors,  and,  by  a  mere  edict  from  the 
mother  country,  attempting  to  force  backwards 
the  stream  which  had  so  long  been  running  in 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED   TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       85 

the  direction  of  freedom  and  mutual  advantage ; 
but  under  the  circumstances  it  was  natural  that 
such  reflections  should  find  no  place.  The  effect 
is  described  by  the  excellent  historian  Coxe  in 
the  following  words  :— 

"  The  letter  of  the  American  Treaty  was  now 
followed,  and  the  spirit  by  which  it  was  dictated 
abandoned.  Although  the  English  still  enjoyed  Working 
the  liberty  of  putting  into  Spanish  harbours  for  system. 
the  purpose  of  refitting  and  provisioning,  yet  they 
were  far  from  enjoying  the  same  advantages  [as 
before]  of  carrying  on  a  friendly  and  commercial 
intercourse.  They  were  now  watched  with  a 
scrupulous  jealousy,  strictly  visited  by  guarda- 
costas,  and  every  efficient  means  adopted  to 
prevent  any  commerce  with  the  colonies  except 
what  was  allowed  by  the  annual  ship." 

It  was  not  therefore  surprising  that  British 
merchants  and  colonists  refused  to  be  bound  by 
the  letter  of  the  treaty.  Considering  the  trade 
as  already  theirs  by  long  prescriptive  right,  and 
not  a  mere  matter  of  indulgence,  they  adopted, 
in  concert  with  the  Spanish  colonists,  all  sorts 
of  petty  methods  of  evasion.  They  "  continually 
put  into  the  Spanish  harbours,  under  pretence 
of  refitting  and  refreshing,  and  in  many  places 
almost  publicly  disposed  of  European  merchan- 
'  dise  in  exchange  for  gold  and  silver.  Other 

1  Coxe's  Walpote,  i.  559. 


86  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

vessels  sailing  near  their  ports  and  harbours 
were  repaired  to  by  smugglers,  or  sent  their 
long  -  boats  towards  the  shore  and  dealt  with 
the  natives.  The  Spaniards  declared  that  the 
'  Assiento  annual  ship '  was  followed  by  sev- 
eral other  vessels  which  moored  at  a  distance, 
and,  as  it  disposed  of  its  cargo,  continually 
supplied  it  with  fresh  goods ;  that  by  these 
means  and  by  the  clandestine  trade  which  the 
English  carried  on  they  almost  supplied  the  col- 
onies ;*  and  the  Fair  of  Panama,  one  of  the  richest 
of  the  world,  where  the  Spaniards  were  accus- 
tomed to  exchange  gold  and  silver  for  European 
merchandise,  had  considerably  fallen ;  they  mon- 
opolised the  commerce  of  America."  1 

It  is  obvious  that  as  there  were  two  parties  to 
these  transactions,  the  attempt  to  interfere  with 
what  both  people  were  alike  resolved  to  have 
was  as  hopeless  as  to  fill  the  cask  of  the  Dan- 
aids.  The  confusion  into  which  matters  fell  is 
Hopeless-  well  described  by  Lord  Hervey.  "The  Spaniards 

ness  of  im-  J  J  . 

proving  the  had  often  seized  ships  which  were  not  smuggling  ; 

system.  L 

and  many  of  the  Spanish  governors  connived  at 
the  English  smugglers  for  money.  Thus  mer- 
chants were  often  secure  in  ports  where  they 
ought  not  to  have  found  any  [security],  and  in- 
secure on  the  seas."  2  The  Spanish  -  American 
coast  was  open  for  hundreds  of  miles ;  there  were 

1  Coxe's  Walpole,  i.  160.  *  2  Memoirs,  ii.  485. 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       87 

but  few  settlements  ;  the  hope  of  profit,  the  sense 
of  danger,  the  love  of  adventure,  and  the  belief 
that  right  was  substantially  on  their  side,  pro- 
duced of  course  the  effect  of  stimulating  this 
illicit  commerce  in  exact  proportion  to  the 
severity  of  the  means  adopted  for  putting  it 
down.  It  must  also  be  noticed  here  that  there 
had  been  more  than  one  short  interval,  even 
since  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  when  Spanish 
quarrels  with  France  had  for  a  time  again 
produced  a  relaxation  of  the  restrictions  im- 
posed by  that  Peace,  and  given  rise  to  a 
variety  of  misconstructions  of  the  same  nature 
as  those  already  mentioned. 

Thus  failure  after  failure,  especially  dating  incessant 
from  the  year  1727,  when  the  blockade  of  Porto  insults. 
Bello  had  exasperated  both  nations,  only  made 
Spain  more  obstinate,  and  blinded  her  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  means  to  which  she  now  resorted. 
The  'Craftsman '  in  1729  by  no  means  exaggerated 
the  English  sentiment  when  it  said,  "  It  looks  in- 
deed as  if  all  the  Powers  of  Europe,  both  friends 
and  foes,  were  confederated  against  us  and  resolved 
to  unite  their  endeavours  to  deprive  us  of  all  our 
trade  at  once."  1  As  the  English  placed  their 
own  interpretation  on  past  treaties,  on  the  recent 
numerous  and  intermittent  relaxations,  and  on 
their  own  "customary  rights,"  so  also  did  their 

1  Memoirs,  iv.  196. 


88  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

opponents  on  the  Treaty-right  of  Search.  It  was 
indeed,  as  now  applied,  a  pure  invention.  The 
able  minister,  Carteret,  Lord  Granville,  justly 
remarked  that  "  in  all  the  negotiations  which 
preceded  the  Convention  our  Ministers  never 
found  out  that  there  was  no  ground  or  subject 
for  any  negotiations ;  that  the  Spaniards  had  not 
a  right  to  search  our  ships  ;  and  when  they  at- 
tempted to  regulate  them  by  treaty,  they  were 
regulating  a  thing  which  did  not  exist."  l 

So  matters  went  drifting  on.  At  length  it 
became  clear  that  nothing  short  of  an  entire 
concession  of  the  trade  on  the  part  of  Spain,  or  at 
least  an  absolute  relinquishment  of  search  upon 
the  high  seas,  could  avert  war.  "  The  English 
traders  regarded  the  extension  of  their  business, 
as  hitherto  allowed,  a  possession  honestly  won, 
looked  upon  all  interference  with  it  as  an  unjus- 
tifiable act  of  violence,  and  claimed  the  assist- 
ance of  Government  against  it." 2  Nor  can  it 
be  reckoned  as  any  fault  on  the  part  of  the 
British  that  they  made  no  attempt  to  stop  the 
smuggling  which  went  on  upon  shore.  That 
was  not  their  business,  but  the  sole  concern  of 
the  Spaniards,  —  a  difficult  task  indeed,  for  the 
line  of  coast  was  long,  the  expense  of  a  proper 
naval  coastguard  considerable,  the  great  value  of 

1  Quoted  by  Lord  Chatham,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1770. 

2  Ranke's  History  of  England,  Oxfd.  ed.,  v.  398. 


EVENTS   WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       89 

the  mutual  exchange  to  both  parties  suggestive 
of  every  sort  of  collusion.  The  case,  on  its 
technical  aspect,  could  hardly  be  put  better  than 
it  was  in  1737  by  Mr  Benjamin  Keen,  the  British 
ambassador  in  Spain  :  "  Upon  the  whole  the  state 
of  our  dispute  seems  to  be  that  the  commanders 
of  our  vessels  always  think  that  they  are  unjustly 
taken  if  they  are  not  taken  in  actual  illicit  com- 
merce, even  though  proofs  of  their  having  loaded 
in  that  manner  be  found  on  board  of  them  ;  and 
the  Spaniards,  on  the  other  hand,  presume  that 
they  have  a  right  of  seizing  not  only  the  ships 
that  were  continually  trading  in  their  ports,  but 
likewise  of  examining  and  visiting  them  on  the 
high  seas  in  order  to  search  for  proofs  of  fraud 
which  they  have  committed ;  and  till  a  medium 
be  found  out  between  these  two  notions  the 
Government  will  always  be  embarrassed  with 
complaints,  and  we  shall  be  continuing  to  negoti- 
ate in  this  country  [Spain]  for  redress  without 
ever  being  able  to  obtain  it." 

In  other  words,  each  nation  considered  itself  War  be- 

comes  ne 

injured,  and  neither  would  stir  a  finger  to  remove  cessary. 
the  cause  of  complaint.  Each  adhered  to  its  own 
notion  of  its  obligations.  The  British  were  satis- 
fied with  the  formal  execution  of  the  Treaty  of 
Utrecht ;  the  Spaniards  asserted  a  right  to  which 
they  had  no  claim  by  treaty  or  otherwise.  The 
bellicose  policy  of  the  Spaniards  in  searching 


90  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

British  ships  on  the  high  seas,  instead  of  con- 
trolling and  punishing  their  own  colonists  and 
the  British  smugglers  on  or  near  the  shore,  must 
therefore  be  considered  the  cause  of  the  war. 
It  was  a  plain  issue,  and  no  room  should  have 
been  permitted  for  any  confusion  of  claims.  War 
should  have  been  declared  on  the  first  occasion 
when  the  capture  of  a  British  vessel  was  made 
on  the  high  seas  and  reparation  refused. 

The  state  of  things  produced  by  these  opposite 
views  of  the  case  was  aggravated  by  the  action  of 
the  Spaniards  in  a  matter  which  admitted  of  no 
doubt.  The  British  had  a  double  right  of  trade 
in  another  part  of  the  West  Indies  altogether 
independent  of  the  disputed  trade  on  the  Mexican 
coast.  The  right  to  cut  logwood  in  the  Bay  of 
Campeachy  and  to  collect  salt  at  the  island  of 
Sal  Tortugas  had  been  always  taken  as  implied  in 
the  various  treaties,  and  rested  upon  precisely  the 
same  ground  as  that  by  which  the  British  held  the 
island  of  Jamaica  or  any  other  settlement  in  those 
seas.  Presuming  on  impunity,  this  right  was  now 
not  only  questioned,  but  the  British  salt-fleet  had 
been  actually  attacked  by  two  Spanish  ships  of 
the  line,  and  only  saved  by  the  courage  and  con- 
duct of  Captain  Thomas  Durell,  captain  of  the 
Scarborough  of  twenty  guns,  in  charge  of  the 
convoy.  This  fine  officer  gallantly  employed  his 
two  colossal  enemies  so  long  that  thirty-two  out 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED   TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       91 

of  thirty-six  vessels  made  their  escape ;  as,  after 
seeing  his  convoy  in  safety,  he  did  himself. 

In  short  for  some  time  not  a  year  had  passed  The"Pa- 

J  .      r  triots "  in 

without  a  series  of  the  most  bitter  complaints  from  Parliament 

1  take  up  the 

the  British  merchants,  often,  no  doubt,  exagger-  subject. 
ated,  but  in  the  main  well  founded,  and  em- 
phasised in  Parliament  by  Walpole's  opponents, 
the  "  Patriots,"  after  the  bitterest  fashion.  This 
furious  spirit  by  degrees  extended  itself  to  the 
country  generally.  The  feeling  that  there  was 
something  behind  the  audacious  action  of  Spain 
became  rooted,  and  the  timidity  of  Walpole  was 
felt  to  be  intolerable.  A  careful  study  of  the 
Parliamentary  Debates  of  the  years  1737  and 
1738  reveals  the  Minister  in  the  un-English  atti- 
tude of  an  apologist  for  the  grievous  wrongs 
which  he  himself  admits  his  country  to  have  sus- 
tained, on  the  avowed  ground  that  it  would  not 
be  safe  to  resent  these  wrongs.  And  yet  such 
was  his  command  of  Parliament — we  know  only 
too  well  how  it  was  maintained — that  it  took  two 
whole  years  after  he  had  confessed  his  disgraceful 
position  to  oblige  him  to  recognise,  in  the  only 
way  now  left,  the  outraged  dignity  of  the  people 
of  England. 

Thus  the  scene  of  the  last  Act  shifts  to  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  it  is  worth  our  while  to 
follow  it,  for  we  are  dealing  with  the  events  out 
of  which  sprang  the  modern  British  empire.  Not 


92  BRITISH    FOKEIGN   POLICY. 

that  the  complaints  against  the  Spaniards  had  been 
hitherto  unheard  in  Parliament,  for  a  continuous 
dropping  fire  had  been  long  levelled  at  Walpole. 
They  culminated  in  1737  under  the  form  of  a 
Petitions  Petition  of  West  India  Merchants  to  the  House 
ment.  of  Commons.  This  famous  document  insisted  that 
"  for  years  past  their  ships  have  not  only  been 
frequently  stopped  and  searched,  but  also  forcibly 
and  arbitrarily  seized  upon  the  high  seas  by 
Spanish  ships  fitted  out  to  cruise  under  the  plaus- 
ible pretence  of  guarding  their  own  coasts ;  that 
the  commanders  thereof,  with  their  crews,  have 
been  inhumanly  treated,  and  their  ships  carried 
into  some  of  the  Spanish  ports  and  there  con- 
demned with  their  cargoes,  in  manifest  violation 
of  the  treaties  subsisting  between  the  two  Crowns  ; 
that  the  remonstrances  of  his  Majesty's  ministers 
receive  no  attention  at  Madrid,  and  that  insults 
and  plunder  must  soon  destroy  their  trade."  It 
concluded  by  demanding  full  satisfaction,  and 
insisted  that  no  British  vessel  should  be  detained 
in  the  future,  nor  seized  upon  the  high  seas  by 
any  nation  on  any  pretext  whatever. 

Next  year  (1738)  still  stronger  petitions  formed 
the  basis  of  the  debates  in  Parliament.  The 
principal  one  took  an  historical  survey  of  the 
subject,  reminding  the  House  of  its  own  futile 
proceedings,  since  it  had  frequently  acknowledged 
the  justice  of  the  British  complaints  ;  and  it 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       93 

"  addressed  the  Crown  "  for  satisfaction.  It  con- 
tained the  following  remarkable  passage  :  "  The 
Spaniards  have  paid  so  little  regard  to  His 
Majesty's  most  gracious  endeavours  that  they 
have  continued  their  depredations  almost  ever 
since  the  Treaty  of  Seville  (1727),  and  more  par- 
ticularly last  year  have  carried  them  to  a  greater 
height  than  ever,  they  having  arbitrarily  seized 
several  ships  with  their  effects  belonging  to  His 
Majesty's  subjects  on  the  high  seas  in  the  destined 
course  of  their  voyages  to  and  from  the  British 
colonies,  amounting  to  a  very  considerable  value ; 
and  that  the  captains  or  masters  of  some  of  the 
said  ships  were,  according  to  the  last  advices  of 
the  petitioners,  and  are  (as  the  petitioners  believe) 
at  this  time,  confined  by  the  Spaniards  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  the  crews  are  now  in  slavery 
in  old  Spain,  where  they  are  most  inhumanly 
treated." 

In  spite  of  his  well-drilled  majority  it  was  im- 
possible for  Walpole  to  prevent  the  House  from 
coming,  under  the  influence  of  Barnard,  Wynd- 
ham,  and  Pulteney,  to  Eesolutions  which  endorsed 
the  petitions.  In  this  memorable  debate  the  Prime 
Minister  was  forced  to  admit :  "  That  our  mer-  Waipoie 

begins  to 

chants  have  fully  proved  their  losses,  and  that  the  give  way. 
depredations  which  have  been  committed  are  con- 
trary to  the  law  of  nations,  contrary  to  the  treaties 
subsisting  between  the  two  Crowns, — in   short, 


94  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

that   they  are   everything  bad  and  without  the 
least  pretence  or  colour  of  justice." 

The  Resolution  which  he  proposed  and  carried 
ran  as  follows  :  "  That  the  freedom  of  navigation 
and  commerce  which  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain 
have  an  undoubted  right  to  by  the  law  of  nations, 
and  which  is  not  in  the  least  restrained  by  virtue 
of  any  of  the  treaties  subsisting  between  the 
Crowns  of  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  had  been 
greatly  interrupted  by  the  Spaniards  by  pre- 
tences altogether  groundless  and  unjust.  But 
before  and  since  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of 
Seville  and  the  declaration  made  by  the  Crown 
of  Spain  pursuant  thereunto  for  the  satisfaction 
and  security  of  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain, 
many  unjust  seizures  and  captures  have  been 
made  and  great  depredations  committed  by  the 
Spaniards  which  have  been  attended  with  many 
instances  of  unheard-of  cruelty  and  barbarity. 
That  the  frequent  applications  to  the  Court  of 
Spain  for  procuring  justice  and  satisfaction  to  his 
Majesty's  injured  subjects,  for  bringing  offenders 
to  condign  punishment,  and  for  preventing  like 
abuses  for  the  future,  have  proved  vain  and  in- 
effectual, and  the  several  orders  or  gedulas  granted 
by  the  King  of  Spain  for  restitution  and  repara- 
tion of  great  losses  sustained  by  the  unlawful  and 
unwarrantable  seizures  and  captures  made  by  the 
Spaniards  have  been  disobeyed  by  the  Spanish 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       95 

governors  or  totally  evaded  and  eluded.  And 
that  these  violences  and  depredations  have  been 
carried  on  to  the  great  loss  and  damage  of  the 
subjects  of  Great  Britain  trading  to  America,  and 
in  direct  violation  of  the  treaties  subsisting 
between  the  two  Crowns." 

It  has  been  necessary  to  wade  through  this 
long  but  weighty  Resolution  in  order  to  make 
the  British  case  clear  beyond  dispute.  That  it  is 
necessary  may  be  gathered  from  the  difficulty 
which  foreign  authors  have  found  in  admitting 
the  justice  of  the  war  which  was  by  this  time 
inevitable.  Not  that  it  is  surprising  to  find  the 
unpatriotic  verdict  of  our  own  historians  accepted 
abroad  ;  but  it  is  high  time  that  the  policy  which 
issued  in  the  formation  of  the  modern  British 
empire  should  be  vindicated  by  reference  to  the 
original  documents  and  Parliamentary  Debates  of 
the  time.  This  must  be  the  apology  for  dwelling 
at  such  length  on  the  particular  series  of  events 
which  determined  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great 
Britain. 

Perhaps  in  the  whole  range  of  British  history  waipoie's 
there  will  not  be  found  an  instance  of  the  repre-  conduct 
sentative  of  the  Government  lowering  the  dignity 
of  the  nation  to  a  more  disgraceful  level  than 
Walpole  with    his   servile   majority  did   on  this 
occasion.     It  seems  incredible  that  the  mover  of 
such  a  Resolution  should  recommend  a  continu- 


96  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

ance  of  the  timid  forbearance  which  had  been 
hitherto  displayed.  It  was  no  longer  a  question 
of  fact.  The  House  had  examined  the  witnesses 
of  the  petitioners,  and  reported  that  they  had 
proved  their  case.  Yet  Walpole  still  harped  011 
the  same  string.  He  was  still  bent  on  "  obtain- 
ing satisfaction  and  full  reparation  by  peaceable 
means,"  and  declared  that  "  we  ought  not  to 

involve  the  nation  in  a  war  from   the  event  of 
W 

which  we    had    a   great   deal    to  fear."     "  Some 

branches  of  our  Spanish  and  Mediterranean  trade 
might,  if  the  war  should  be  of  any  duration,  be 
irrecoverably  lost," — a  doctrine  he  had  still  more 
unblushingly  expressed  in  a  former  speech,  when 
he  told  the  House  that  "  it  may  sometimes  be  for 
the  interest  of  a  nation  to  pocket  an  affront,"  and 
when  he  shadowed  forth  the  dangers  which  a  war 
with  Spain  would  bring  on  from  other  potentates 
of  Europe,  "  since  if  the  Spaniards  had  not  private 
encouragement  from  Powers  more  considerable 
than  themselves  they  would  never  have  ventured 
on  these  insults  and  injuries  which  have  been 
proved  at  your  bar." 
attacked  Sir  William  Wyndham  had  no  difficulty  in 

on  all  sides.          _       .  T  nr»     ' 

deducing  a  dinerent  moral  from  the  Prime 
Minister's  "long  account  of  the  late  treaties 
between  Spain  and  us,  whence  it  appeared  that 
we  had  been  for  above  twenty  years  not  only 
negotiating  but  concluding  treaties  in  vain,  and 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH   SPAIN.       97 

without  the  least  effect,"  and  scornfully  denounced 
the  system  of  "fitting  out  formidable  squadrons 
without  proper  instructions  for  enabling  them  to 
follow  words  with  blows."  Sir  John  Barnard 
refuted  the  argument  that  a  nation  could  rely  on 
her  former  achievements  if  at  the  same  time  she 
declined  to  enforce  respect.  Pulteney,  with  all 
the  thunder  of  his  eloquence,  insisted  that  "  the 
time  for  reparation  had  long  passed  away,"  and 
that  "  the  suffering  our  American  trade  to  be 
ruined  was  not  the  way  to  protect  our  Spanish, 
Italian,  and  Turkish  merchants";  which  argument 
Mr  Plumer  followed  up  by  insisting  that  "  the 
more  our  trade  decays  the  less  will  be  our  power 
to  assist  ourselves,  and  the  less  ready  will  our 
neighbours  be  to  assist  us  ;  and  that  every  British 
subject  ought  to  choose  to  live  upon  bread  and 
onions  rather  than  see  the  House  of  Bourbon  give 
law  to  Europe  ;  for  an  open  and  declared  war  was 
better  than  a  cruel  and  contemptuous  peace." 
Wyndham  had  previously  laid  down  the  only 
safe  law  for  an  independent  nation  in  these 
words  :  "  When  the  insult  or  attack  appears  from 
the  very  nature  of  it  to  have  been  committed  by 
public  authority,  satisfaction  ought  not  to  be  sued 
for  by  ambassadors  :  it  ought  to  be  immediately 
taken  by  fleets  and  armies,  properly  instructed  for 
that  purpose."  Equally  significant  passages  might 
be  quoted  from  the  Debates  in  the  House  of  Lords. 

G 


98  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

A  "gracious  answer"  from  the  Crown  was  an 
echo  of  the  Addresses  from  both  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment. It  will  however  be  scarcely  believed  by 
those  who  have  not  read  the  Debates  that  even 
in  May  of  this  year  (1738),  when  the  subject  came 
once  more  before  Parliament,  Walpole  announced 
his  intention  to  oppose  any  Bill  "  which  may  tend 
to  plunge  this  nation  into  a  ruinous  and  perhaps 
doubtful  war,"  and  frankly  propounded  it  as  his 
opinion  that  "we  were  not  a  match  for  the 
Spaniards  and  French  too."  To  which  Pulteney 
replied  that  he  hoped  that  the  time  had  not 
arrived  when  it  might  be  said  :  "  Your  seamen 
are  to  be  enslaved,  your  merchants  plundered, 
and  your  trade  ruined,  because  if  you  take  one 
step  to  prevent  it  France  would  interpose." 
"  We  have  already  been  insulted  by  our  ene- 
mies ;  we  shall  soon  be  despised  by  our  allies ; 
we  shall  be  considered  as  a  nation  without 
rights,  or  what  is  the  same,  without  power  to 
assert  them."  The  people  of  Great  Britain  did 
not  believe  that  they  were  unable  to  confront 
united  France  and  Spain ;  and  they  turned  out 
to  be  right. 
Address  to  Again  the  House  "addressed  the  Crown"  in 

the  Crown.  . 

becoming  terms,  and  the  words  used  on  the  occa- 
sion by  the  famous  Speaker  Onslow  are  worth 
noting.  "  To  encourage  the  Spaniards,"  said 
this  truly  representative  Whig  statesman,  "to 


EVENTS   WHICH   LED    TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       99 

rummage  our  ships  is  to  give  them  a  right  to  the 
Sovereignty  of  the  Seas,  as  it  was  always  deemed 
by  Great  Britain ;  and  it  was  never  allowed  by 
any  of  your  Majesty's  predecessors."  Again  a 
"  gracious  answer  "-  —in  precisely  the  same  terms 
as  the  Address  —  issued  from  the  Crown,  and 
again  one  of  those  expedients  on  which  the  min- 
ister seemed  to  live  from  year  to  year,  a  com- 
promise with  Spain  called  (from  the  king's  pal- 
ace) the  Convention  of  Pardo.  In  this  document 
the  honour  of  Great  Britain  is  disgracefully  sacri- 
ficed to  suit  Spain  ;  the  word  "  satisfaction "  for 
the  wrongs  done  is  studiously  omitted,  the  pay- 
ment which  had  been  previously  agreed  upon  by 
way  of  compensation  for  Spanish  depredations 
is  juggled  away,  and  the  vital  question  of  the 
"  Right  of  Search "  wholly  evaded.  Spain,  as 
was  observed  in  the  House,  instead  of  giving 
reparation,  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  general 
release. 

This  final  blunder  settled  the  fate  of  the  min- 

-i  -I  •  r^  •          i  . 

istry  and  their  policy.  Convicted  out  01  his  own  cier 
mouth,  the  whole  country  turned  against  Wai- 
pole.  It  was  no  personal  question,  no  division  of 
Whig  and  Tory.  Nor  is  there  much  solid  ground 
for  attributing,  as  Burke  has  attributed,  the  uni- 
versal sentiment  of  the  nation  to  the  literary 
skill  of  certain  writers  of  prose  and  poetry. 
They  expressed  what  was  already  a  deep  and 


100  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

wide-felt   national   grievance ;    the    people   were 

thankful  for  any    spokesman.       They    welcomed 

The  states-  the  prose  of  Bolingbroke  and  the  verses  of  Pope 

men  and 

poets  who   and  Thomson.  Johnson  and  Glover,  iust  as  they 

aroused  the 

country,  did  the  oratory  of  Pulteney,  Carteret,  Wynd- 
ham,  and  Barnard,  and  even  the  rough  sea- 
manlike  harangues  of  Vernon,  as  the  language 
of  Englishmen.  It  was  Walpole's  obvious  duty 
to  retire,  but  he  failed  to  perceive  it.  On  the 
contrary,  he  took  the  fatal  course  of  attempting 
to  put  in  practice  the  policy  forced  on  him  by 
his  opponents. 

The  best  proof  that  Burke  was  wrong  in  at- 
tributing so  large  a  share  in  producing  war  to 
the  poets  of  the  day  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  only  men  who  really  made  their  mark, 
Pope  and  Dr  Johnson,  did  not  publish  till  1738, 
the  year  after  the  whole  country  had  been  aroused 
by  the  West  Indian  Petition  and  the  debates  in 
Parliament.  Glover's  "  Hosier's  Ghost  "  did  not 
of  course  appear  till  after  Porto  Bello  was  taken. 
The  passages  from  Pope  and  Johnson  are  here 
transcribed.  The  other  minor  poets  are  Glover 
in  his  "  Leonidas,"  not  a  very  likely  poem  to 
arouse  enthusiasm  ;  Nugent  in  his  "  Odes  to  Man- 
kind and  to  Lord  Pulteney "  ;  Thomson  in  his 
"Britannia,"  his  "Liberty,"  and  his  tragedy  of 
"  Agamemnon  "  ;  Mallet  in  his  "  Mustapha  "  ;  and 
Brooke  in  his  "  Gustavus  Vasa." 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO    WAR   WITH    SPAlX.       l(Jf 

Pope's   lines  occur  in  his   "  Satires   and  Epi- 
logue "  :— 

"  And  own  the  Spaniards  did  a  waggish  thing 
Who  cropt  our  ears  and  sent  them  to  the  king." 

Again  : — 

"j^ay,  hints  'tis  by  suggestion  of  the  Court 
That  Spain  robs  on,  and  Dunkirk  's  still  a  port." 

Johnson's  lines  occur  in  his  "London"  :— 

"  Struck  with  the  seat  that  gave  Eliza  birth 
We  kneel  and  kiss  the  consecrated  earth, 
In  pleasing  dreams  the  blissful  age  renew 
And  call  Britannia's  glories  back  to  view, 
Behold  her  cross  triumphant  on  the  main, 
The  guard  of  commerce  and  the  dread  of  Spain, 
Ere  masquerades  debauched,  excise  opprest, 
Or  English  honour  grew  a  standing  jest." 

Again  :— 

"  Here  let  those  reign  whom  pensions  can  incite 
To  vote  a  patriot  black,  a  courtier  white, 
Explain  their  country's  dear-bought  rights  away, 
And  plead  for  pirates  in  the  face  of  day." 

Again  : — 

"  But  lost  in  thoughtless  ease  and  empty  show, 
Behold  the  warrior  dwindled  to  a  beau, 
Sense,  freedom,  piety  refined  away, 
Of  France  the  mimic  and  of  Spain  the  prey." 

Again  :— 

"  Has  Heaven  reserved,  in  pity  to  the  poor, 
Xo  pathless  waste  or  undiscovered  shore, 
Xo  secret  island  in  the  boundless  main, 
Xo  peaceful  deserts  yet  unclaimed  by  Spain." 


-102  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

But  none  of  these  found  so  much  favour  with 
the  vulgar  as  the  famous  line,  ascribed  to  Atter- 
bury,  and  at  this  time  reproduced  : — 

"The  cur-dog  of  Britain  and  spaniel  of  Spain." 

Walpole's  fate  still  pursued  him.  Even  when 
he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  lower  himself  so  far 
as  to  become  the  mere  agent  of  the  Opposition, 
he  showed  to  the  last  his  entire  misapprehension 
of  the  true  state  of  affairs.  The  Spanish  Govern- 
ment having  most  unwillingly  signed  the  Con- 
vention, proved  at  once  that  it  had  no  intention 
of  keeping  it ;  but  no  Declaration  of  War  came 
from  England.  An  order  for  reprisals  was 
thought  sufficient.  This,  however,  was  soon  seen 
to  be  a  wholly  untenable  position ;  and  at  last 
the  momentous  document,  so  long  delayed,  went 
waipoie  forth  to  the  world.  That  Declaration  of  War, 
war.  issued  by  Walpole  on  October  15,  1738,  con- 
tains the  best  commentary  on  his  own  repeated 
defence  of  the  policy  of  peace.  It  pronounced 
that  the  treaties  had  been  "  habitually  violated"  ; 
the  claim  of  Spain  to  the  Right  of  Search  is 
stated  to  be  "  unwarrantable,  groundless,  danger- 
ous, and  destructive  to  England  and  her  colonies." 
British  subjects  had  been  treated  with  great  cruelty 
and  barbarity ;  exorbitant  duties  and  impositions 
had  been  laid  on  trade ;  ancient  and  established 
privileges  had  been  broken  ;  and  the  late  conven- 


EVENTS   WHICH    LED   TO    WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       103 

tion  manifestly  violated.  War  was  declared  to 
"  vindicate  our  undoubted  rights  and  secure  to 
our  loving  subjects  the  privileges  of  navigation 
and  commerce  to  which  they  are  justly  entitled." 

After  such  an  exhibition  of  the  absence  of 
self-respect,  it  was  impossible  that  the  country 
could  for  any  length  of  time  confide  the  conduct 
of  the  war  to  its  long-accustomed  chief.  The 
painful  process  by  which  Walpole  was  at  last 
hurled  from  power  need  not  detain  us.  We  are  resign, 
only  concerned  with  the  defence  of  the  British 
people  from  the  charge  made  by  Burke  that  the 
war  which  had  such  immense  issues  was  a  war  of 
"plunder  and  extreme  injustice."  We  have  seen 
that  there  were  at  least  two  sides  of  the  ques- 
tion. His  error  seems  to  be  due  to  his  having 
fixed  his  attention  on  one  cause  only  of  the 
quarrel  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  the 
struggle  for  the  West  Indian  trade ;  whereas  we 
have  seen  that  the  issues,  as  Walpole  only  too 
well  understood,  proceeded  as  much,  or  more, 
from  the  side  of  France,  Gibraltar,  and  the  Medi- 
terranean. The  best  excuse  that  the  great  min- 
ister ever  ventured  to  make  for  himself  was  that 
his  policy  was  the  best  under  the  circumstances. 
At  any  rate  it  turned  out  most  disastrously.  His 
country  had  bought  peace  for  a  short  time  at  the 
cost  of  a  future  struggle  for  existence.  France 
and  Spain  resumed  the  position  from  which  they 


104  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

had  been  hurled  in  the  great  wars  of  William 
III.  and  Marlborough,  and  the  work  had  to  be 
done  over  again. 

Burke's  We  must  not  leave  this  subject  without  fairly 

accounted8  facing  Burke's  statement  that  he  had  conversed 
with  many  of  the  principal  actors  against  Wai- 
pole,  and  with  those  who  principally  excited  that 
clamour,  and  "found  that  none  of  them,  no,  not 
one,  did  in  the  least  defend  the  measure  [of  de- 
claring war]  or  attempt  to  justify  their  conduct." 
This  seems  to  be  too  specific  a  statement  to  be 
set  down  as  mere  rhetoric ;  but  it  must  not  be 
taken  for  more  than  it  is  worth.  Nor  can  we 
suppose  it  possible  that  Chatham  could  have  been 
counted  as  one  of  the  "many  principal  actors"  ; 
for  his  glorious  career  opened  with  the  debate  on 
the  Convention  of  Pardo,  and  he  was  from  be- 
ginning to  end  identified  with  the  principle  of 
supporting  British  independence  against  France 
and  Spain.  No  doubt  some  of  the  "  principal 
actors''  were  originally  governed  by  party-spirit 
in  the  first  instance,  and  not  having  a  clear  con- 
science in  the  matter,  forgot  in  later  times  how 
much  ground  they  really  had  for  their  action. 

We  must  also  remember  the  period  of  gloom 
and  depression  which  fell  upon  the  nation  soon 
after  the  war  commenced,  and  which  scarcely 
lifted  till  Pitt  threw  over  the  scene  the  illumina- 
tion of  his  glory.  This  period  synchronised  with 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       105 

the  most  impressionable  part  of  Burke's  life,  a 
period  when  Englishmen  looked  about  regretfully 
for  such  a  leader  as  even  Walpole,  with  all  his 
faults,  had  been,  and  were  slow  to  understand 
that  they  had  the  greatest  statesman  of  his 
century  rising  to  power  in  their  very  midst.  The 
'•'  ringing  of  bells  "  for  joy  at  the  war  was  soon, 
as  Walpole  predicted,  succeeded  by  "  wringing  of 
hands."  The  ecstatic  burst  of  national  delight  at 
Vernon's  success  was  the  one  short-lived  moment 
of  exultation,  to  be  succeeded  by  many  a  bitter 
disappointment.  The  very  next  year  after  the 
war  commenced  saw  France  abetting  Spain. 
Three  years  later  Prussia  ranged  herself  on  the 
same  side.  In  1744  the  mask  was  dropped,  and 
open  war  commenced  with  the  enemy  whom  Wal- 
pole, unlike  an  Englishman,  had  dreaded. 

What  a  dreary  history  is  that  of  the  succeeding  Gloom  of 
Administrations.  What  a  state  of  naval  anarchy  ceedmg 
did  Mathews'  action  off  Toulon  reveal.  What 
millions  appeared  to  be  wasted  on  the  Continent. 
How  disgracefully  was  England  governed  when 
the  Rebellion  of  1745  broke  out.  What  a  humi- 
liating treaty  was  that  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  What 
a  painful  period  of  half-peace,  half-war  succeeded 
that  so-called  Peace.  And  how  hard  it  was  to 
convince  the  nation  that  nothing  could  possibly 
restrain  their  enemies  from  attempting  to  recover 
the  position  they  had  attained  in  the  previous 


106  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

century  but  a  desperate  and  determined  struggle 
for  supremacy.  It  was  twenty  years  before 
victory  decisively  declared  itself  on  the  British 
side.  This  was  not  much,  perhaps,  for  the  found- 
ing of  an  empire  ;  but  during  the  extreme  tension 
of  the  process  how  many  statesmen  must  have 
shared  the  misgivings  of  the  people,  and  brooded 
with  sad  reflections  over  what  might  easily  have 
come  to  be  reckoned  the  madness  of  those  who 
provoked  the  conflict. 

If,  then,  we  may  fairly  acquit  the  nation  of 
embarking  on  the  war  with  Spain  after  the 
fashion  of  pirates,  out  of  a  hope  of  plunder,  and 
fully  aware  of  its  "  extreme  injustice,"  let  us 
ask  ourselves  what  must  have  been  its  sentiment 
Provoca-  when  France — first  covertly  and  then  openly — 
part  of  appeared  on  the  scene.  With  that  country  the 
British  had  had  no  quarrel  since  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht.  In  order  to  keep  on  good  terms  with 
it  their  Government  had  thrown  overboard  nearly 
all  its  ancient  traditions,  and  borne  with  a 
strange  equanimity  insults  from  Spain  which 
at  any  other  period  would  have  produced  instant 
war.  France  had  no  common  ground  in  the 
complaints  made  by  the  Spaniards  in  the  West 
Indies,  whether  just  or  not.  From  the  British 
point  of  view  it  ought  rather  to  have  sided 
with  them.  And  yet  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  French  policy  was  grounded  on  something 


EVENTS    WHICH    LED    TO   WAR   WITH    SPAIN.       107 

deeper  than  appeared  on  the  surface,  and  that 
it  was  not  unnatural  under  the  circumstances. 
It  was  none  the  less  galling  to  the  men  whose 
memory  of  the  times  of  William  and  Anne  had 
not  even  yet  been  obliterated. 

Nor  did  it  mitigate  their  resentment  to  find, 
as  the  true  nature  of  the  war  developed  itself, 
that  the  cause  of  the  Pretender  had  once  more, 
under  the  influence  of  his  special  friend  Cardinal 
Tencin,  the  Prime  Minister  of  France,  become 
the  leading  factor  in  French  counsels.  The  old 
intolerable  pretension  to  force  a  Popish  sovereign 
on  their  country,  so  far  from  being  abandoned, 
was  now  to  be  enforced  by  the  bayonets  of  the 
chief  general  in  Europe,  Marshal  Saxe.  If  any 
doubt  had  remained  as  to  the  necessity  of  war 
with  Spain,  the  conduct  of  her  far  more  danger- 
ous ally  strengthened  the  national  conviction 
from  day  to  day.  In  short,  if  we  observe  the 
whole  course  of  the  proceedings  of  the  two 
Powers,  banded  as  they  were  together  by  a  secret 
treaty,  we  shall  find  it  not  only  impossible  to 
admit  that  the  war  was  one  of  plunder  and  War  just 

.     .          .  .       .  and  neces- 

mjustice  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  but,  on  sary. 
the  contrary,  we  shall  be  constrained  to  declare 
it  a  war  of  self-defence,  a  just  and  necessary  war, 
just  both  morally  and  politically,  a  war  only  too 
long  delayed,  a  war  which  carried  in  its  train 
the  history  of  the  world. 


108 


CHAPTER    VI. 


BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   DURING   THE   WARS 
WHICH   FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE — 1739-1763. 

Recapitu-    WE  are  now,  then,  face  to  face  with  an  enlarged 
the  history  "Foreign   Policy   of   Great   Britain"    which   we 

of  British  ° 

Foreign      must  both   connect  with   and  differentiate  from 

Policy. 

the  policy  of  preceding  times.  In  order  that  we 
may  see  our  way  more  clearly  let  us  recapitulate. 
We  have  traced  the  origin  and  fundamental 
principles  of  this  policy  in  the  dread  of  invasion 
by  foreign  Powers,  which  during  the  early  times 
of  English  history  had  been  attended  with  success 
on  no  less  than  four  different  occasions.  That 
dread  had  become  an  integral  part  of  the  English 
inheritance.  We  have  watched  its  development 
under  the  prolonged  rivalry  of  the  growing  House 
of  France  with  the  Norman  and  Plantagenet 
Kings  of  England.  We  observed  the  great 
change  in  the  relation  of  States  to  one  another 
which  took  place  at  the  opening  of  what  we 
rightly  call  "Modern  History";  and  saw  that 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.          109 

the  system  of  Balance  as  understood  by  England 
and  France,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Tudors, 
grew  naturally  and  beneficially  out  of  that 
change.  We  saw  how  in  Elizabeth's  hands  it 
became  the  salvation  of  her  country,  and  how  the 
Stuart  sovereigns  deliberately  apostatised  from  it. 
We  watched  its  resumption  under  William  III. 
and  Anne,  and  traced  the  fresh  departure  which 
it  took  in  their  wars ;  for  to  their  time  belongs 
the  additional  policy  of  guarding  the  Mediter- 
ranean in  defence  of  the  expanding  relations  with 
the  Levant  which  grew  out  of  the  successful 
struggle  with  Louis  XIV. 

We  have  now  arrived  at  a  still  further  step  in 
the  progress  of  this  Foreign  Policy.  The  some- 
what minute  detail  into  which  our  survey  of  the 
Walpolian  era  has  necessarily  run  will  not  have 
been  thrown  away  if  we  have  been  thus  enabled 
to  measure  what  a  momentous  change  was  pro- 
duced by  the  contest  with  united  France  and 
Spain,  and  to  observe  that  the  laissez-faire  policy 
of  the  British  Peace-Minister,  at  first  so  wise  a 
leader,  and  then  so  ignobly  foolish,  brought  it  on. 
Nothing  can  be  more  plain  than  that  a  decided 
line  of  conduct  on  Walpole's  part,  conceived  in 
the  spirit  of  earlier  and  later  statesmen,  would 
have  induced  both  France  and  Spain  to  pursue  a 
different  policy.  It  is,  indeed,  quite  true  that  if 
the  country  had  not  been  awakened  out  of  its 


110  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

sleep  by  repeated  insults  and  grievous  losses,  it 
would  have  borne  with  more  impatience  the 
taxes  necessary  for  war.  And  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  struggle  which  was  heralded 
by  such  gloomy  presages,  and  which  more  than 
once  produced  a  national  feeling  akin  to  de- 
spair, was,  in  fact,  the  process  by  which  the 
modern  British  empire  was  founded.  But  those 
considerations  are,  as  we  say,  after  date.  Placing 
ourselves  in  that  generation,  we  are  called  upon 
to  measure  the  agony,  the  suspense,  the  loss 
effected  by  the  conduct  of  a  corrupt  Government ; 
and  the  course  of  our  inquiry  has  demanded  that 
we  should  not  shrink  from  the  exposure. 

We   may  then   sum  up    the    enlarged    British 

Foreign   Policy  now  before  us,  engraved  by  this 

struggle    in    every  British    heart,  in  the   famous 

ships,        words — "ships,    colonies,    and    commerce,"    -a 

and  com-    policy  new  and  yet  old.     We  have  seen  how  far 

merce.  . 

it  was  old.  It  was  new,  inasmuch  as  the  country 
fondly  took  for  granted,  after  it  had  leaped  to 
liberty  at  the  Revolution  and  had  under  the  new 
regime  brought  the  despot  of  Europe  to  his  knees, 
that  its  course  as  a  naval,  a  colonial,  and  a  commer- 
cial Power  would  be  progressive  and  unchecked. 
Great  Britain  had  not  put  forth  these  things  as 
its  aims,  for  the  wars  had  been  defensive  ;  it 
was  a  mere  accident  that  they  had  brought  pros- 
perity in  their  train.  It  was  now  seen  that 


WARS   WHICH    FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.        Ill 

everything  was  to  begin  again ;  and  it  was  also 
gradually  borne  in  upon  the  national  mind  that 
there  was  an  alarming  European  conspiracy 
formed  in  order  to  deprive  the  envied  Mistress  of 
the  Seas  of  the  ships,  colonies,  and  commerce 
which  she  had  fondly  supposed  were  beyond  the 
reach  of  attack.  Year  after  year  unfolded  more 
and  more  the  serious  nature  of  the  attempt ;  nor, 
though  the  struggle  was  intermittent  for  short 
periods,  was  it  relinquished  till  Nelson  won  the 
battle  of  Trafalgar  in  1805. 

During  the  century  which  had  elapsed  before  Dangers 
the  war  of  1739  the  American  colonies  of  England  Great  Bn- 

n       n     1  .  MI  •  tain  and  its 

had  been — one  might  say,  silently — growing  up  dependen- 
into  vigorous  manhood,  and  for  the  latter  part  of 
that  time  had  been  as  much  concerned  with  the 
Spanish  quarrel  as  the  British  themselves  ;  they 
were  now  threatened  with  extinction  or  conquest 
by  the  combined  efforts  of  France  and  Spain. 
The  East  India  Company  also,  having  by  this 
time  established  its  rights  and  privileges  in  the 
three  Presidencies  of  India,  found  itself  in  the 
greatest  danger  from  the  French.  The  masterly 
way  in  which  these  insidious  movements  had 
been  made,  almost  unknown,  and  unopposed  by 
the  British  Government,  is  the  most  remarkable 
part  of  the  situation.  It  was  hard  to  make 
ordinary  observers  believe  the  actual  facts  of  the 
case.  But  it  had  now  become  impossible  to  deny 


cies. 


112  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

that  the  war  was  a  struggle  for  national  exist- 
ence, a  war  for  ships,  colonies,  and  commerce  as 
the  outworks  of  the  defence  of  the  realm.  There 
were  not  wanting  those  who  still  sighed  for 
isolation,  still  wondered  why  Great  Britain  could 
not  keep  to  herself  without  meddling  with  foreign 
affairs,  why,  in  short,  they  could  not  roll  back  the 
stream  of  time.  It  took  many  years  to  convince 
the  nation  as  a  whole  that  the  obligations  into 
which  it  had  entered,  and  the  interests  bound 
up  with  its  daily  life,  demanded  sacrifice.  But 
the  stern  teaching  of  failure  and  disappointment 
gradually  forced  its  way,  and  the  frequent 
glimpses  of  victory  led  at  last  to  a  glorious 
consummation.  As  at  the  time  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, it  now  again  became  an  axiomatic  part  of 
Foreign  Policy  to  treat  the  combinations  of 
European  States  as  an  essential  factor  in  the 
safety  of  the  British  Isles,  the  British  colonies, 
and  the  British  commerce. 

Deplorable       Perhaps  the   most    convincing   proof  that  the 

Royal        fundamental  conditions  of  such  a  European  policy 

were  inextricably  mixed  up  with   all  the   other 

necessary  conditions  of  British  safety,  lies  in  the 

miserable  effects  of  the  weak  and  degraded  con- 

o 

dition  of  the  Royal  Navy  when  the  war  at  last 
began.  An  officer  of  merit  in  his  day,  Sir  Charles 
Wager,  too  easily  giving  way  to  the  prevailing 
temper,  had  allowed  the  naval  service  to  fall  into 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE.        113 

the  state  which  the  readers  of  '  Anson's  Voyage ' 
will  remember  from  the  account  of  its  disasters. 
The  type  of  ships  remained  as  it  had  been  in 
previous  generations.  When  the  contest  for  the 
command  of  the  Mediterranean  began  in  earnest, 
it  was  found  that  not  only  the  French  but  the 
Spaniards  had  possessed  themselves  of  a  superior 
type  to  that  of  the  British  ;  and  it  was  only  by 
servilely  copying  those  which  had  been  captured 
that  the  unequalled  crews  of  the  latter  found 
themselves  fairly  matched  with  their  enemies. 
The  errors  made  in  the  choice  of  such  officers  as 
Mathews  and  Lestock  to  command  the  fleets  on 
which  depended  the  safety  of  the  country,  were 
an  additional  proof,  if  any  were  required, — and 
these  did  not  stand  alone, — that  the  feeble  Gov- 
ernment of  that  period  had  lost  sight  of  the 
ancient  landmarks  just  at  the  very  time  when 
the  Bourbon  Powers  were  mustering  their  forces 
on  all  sides,  and  closing  round  their  former 
conqueror. 

Under  the  great  officers  whom  the  course  of 
the  war  gradually  drew  to  light,  and  whom  the 
king  and  the  people  forced  to  the  headship  of  the  Reform  of 

Royal  Navy, — Anson,   Hawke,  Warren.   Pocock,  the  key- 
stone of  the 
Saunders,  and  their  pupils  Howe  and  Keppel, —  national 

the  service  raised  its  head  again,  and  gave  the 
elder  Pitt  the  material  he  required  for  founding 
the  modern  British  empire  in  the  Seven  Years' 

H 


success. 


114  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

War  (1756-1763).  In  other  words,  the  recovery 
of  an  imperial  position  by  the  British  people  was 
marked  by  the  welding  together  of  the  old  and 
the  new  elements  of  Foreign  Policy.  The  latter 
could  not  exist  in  safety  without  the  former,  and 
the  key  of  the  whole  was  to  be  found  in  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  sea -forces.  The  security  of  the 
country  from  invasion  was  to  be  guarded  as  of 
old  by  sea-supremacy ;  the  coasts  of  the  Nether- 
lands must  be  in  friendly  hands ;  the  colonies 
must  be  saved  from  absorption  by  the  French 
and  Spaniards,  who  had  been  for  so  long  a  time 
laying  their  hostile  plans ;  India  must  be  kept  free 
for  the  development  of  British  trade  and  govern- 
ment ;  the  Mediterranean  must  be  retained  at 
any  cost  by  a  sufficient  fleet  and  by  the  help  of 
its  fortified  depots  at  Gibraltar  and  Minorca. 
For  the  latter  of  these  Malta,  later  on,  became 
the  substitute. 

So  it  re-  As  the  colonies  increased  in  number,  and  the 
wars  of  the  century  strengthened  the  British 
position,  this  policy  became  so  natural  that  its 
necessity  was  never  seriously  disputed.  It  has 
only  been  obligatory  on  British  statesmen  to  re- 
view the  situation  from  time  to  time,  and  adapt 
the  dimensions  of  the  Navy  to  the  changing 
armaments  of  other  nations,  so  that  it  might  at 
least  be  a  match,  as  of  old,  for  any  other  two 
combined.  This,  we  see  then,  is  not  in  any  sense 


mains. 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        115 

a  discovery  of  to-day.  It  may  have  been  too 
much  put  out  of  sight  under  the  influences  of  a 
long  peace,  and  Captain  Mahan's  '  Sea  -Power' 
has  no  doubt  been  useful  in  reviving  a  wholesome 
public  opinion  on  the  subject ;  but  the  most  ele- 
mentary knowledge  of  English  history  is  sufficient 
to  establish  a  perfect  familiarity  with  the  prin- 
ciples involved.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  remarkable  book 
above  mentioned  has  had  and  will  have  a  general 
effect  on  the  other  nations  of  the  European  world, 
and  in  that  way  a  reflex  effect  upon  Great  Britain 
by  no  means  altogether  to  its  advantage.  When 
the  plain  and  irrefutable  doctrine  of  "  Sea-Power  " 
becomes  common  property,  Great  Britain  .will  not 
be  left  alone  to  translate  it  into  action,  but  will 
assuredly  find  herself  under  the  same  necessity 
of  a  constant  increase  of  sea-armaments  as  the 
Continental  nations  already  experience  with  re- 
spect to  their  land-forces.  However  deplorable,  Additional 

question 

there  is  no  escape;  for  to  the  former  lines  of  of  food- 
Foreign  Policy  already  detailed  there  has  been 
added,  during  the  last  half-century,  the  necessity 
of  providing  for  the  sustenance  of  an  immense 
population  which  depends  on  food -supplies  im- 
ported from  foreign  countries. 

Let  us  then  resume  our  illustrations  of  the 
change,  or  rather  growth,  of  British  Foreign 
Policy  ushered  in  by  the  war  of  1739.  We  have 


116  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

in  this  chapter  to  trace  it  as  it  developed  itself 
in  the  capable  hands  of  the  elder  Pitt,  and  under 
the  great  chiefs  whose  noble  succession  culminated 
at  the  end  of  the  century  in  Lord  Nelson. 
The  army        It  will  be  observed  that  in  describing  the  pro- 

couldnot  .  ...  . 

keep  step  cesses  of  growing  public  opinion  in  connection 
navy.  with  our  subject  we  have  said  nothing  about  the 
army,  and  very  little  about  the  policy  concerned 
with  the  coasts  of  the  Low  Countries.  As  to  the 
former,  we  may  remark  that  the  long  peace  which 
succeeded  Marlborough's  campaigns  interfered 
with  the  training  of  military,  even  more  than 
of  naval,  officers,  and  that  the  renewal  of  war 
exhibited  the  poverty  of  the  country  in  that 
respect  to  a  still  greater  extent.  Such  generals 
as  Lord  Stair  and  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  on 
the  Continent,  and  Braddock  in  America,  were 
much  of  a  piece  with  the  unsatisfactory,  or  at 
best  commonplace,  admirals  who  were  alone  avail- 
able for  command  at  sea.  It  was  not  till  the  war 
itself  had  formed  and  brought  to  light  a  Wolfe 
and  an  Amherst,  a  Clive  and  a  Coote,  that  any 
confidence  could  be  placed  in  the  men  who  were 
to  command  the  excellent  material  which  the 
nation  has  always  produced  at  demand.  But 
what  could  any  of  them  have  effected  had  not 
Anson,  Hawke,  and  Boscawen  stopped  the  French 
reinforcements  on  their  way  to  America,  and  shat- 
tered the  fleets  which  were  about  to  invade  Eng- 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE.        117 

land,  or  if  Warren  in  the  West,  and  Pocock  in 
the  East,  had  not  secured  that  freedom  from  in- 
terference by  sea  which  gave  the  talents  of  the 
generals  a  fair  field? 

It  is  worth  remarking  that  each  of  the  earliest 
battles,  one  on  each  element,  which  displayed  the 
want  of  generals  and  admirals,  brought  to  light 
at  the  same  time  the  man  who  was  to  exercise 
surpassing  influence  on  the  coming  struggles. 
We  cannot,  of  course,  compare  the  influence  of 
George  II.  with  that  of  Chatham ;  but  it  is  riot 
too  much  to  say  that  the  great  minister  could 
have  done  nothing  without  the  king,  who,  having 
proved  himself  a  hero  at  Dettingen,  used  the 
whole  power  of  the  Crown  in  support  of  the  one 
man  whom  he  found  fit  to  take  the  helm.  It  was 
George  II.  who,  arriving  on  the  spot  in  time  to  George  n. 
remedy  the  errors  of  his  general,  led  in  person  Hawke. 
the  magnificent  charge  which  turned  a  defeat 
into  a  glorious  victory — though  he  had  to  retreat 
from  a  want  of  supplies,  which  was  not  his  fault. 
Again,  it  was  Captain  Hawke  in  the  Berwick, 
who  shone  out  so  far  above  every  other  actor  in 
Mathews'  miserable  battle  off  Toulon,  that  his 
rise  to  the  headship  of  the  navy  commenced  from 
that  day.  There  was  plenty  for  him  to  do. 

But  we  may  still  further  say  about  the  army 
and  its  influence  upon  Foreign  Policy  that,  with 
the  exception  of  the  fine  officers  brought  to  the 


118  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

front  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  it  made  no  ad- 
vance like  the  navy  in  the  supply  of  first-rate 
talent.  The  war  with  the  American  colonies  was 
waged  by  generals  inferior  to  George  Washing- 
ton, and  the  only  Englishman  who  might  have 
matched  him,  Lord  Cornwallis,  was  so  ill -sup- 
ported by  his  colleagues  that  his  surrender  at 
Yorktown,  which  practically  closed  the  war,  ought 
not  to  be  regarded  as  his  fault.  When  the  great 
Revolution  -War  with  France  demanded  that 
every  disposable  talent  should  be  employed  in 
order  to  deal  with  the  military  enthusiasm  of 
the  Revolution,  the  old  Teutonic  practice  of  the 
German  Courts  prevailed ;  and  the  king,  so  much 
to  be  commended  in  most  respects,  prevailed  on 
even  Mr  Pitt  for  a  time  to  give  the  command  of 
the  British  forces  on  the  Continent  to  the  Duke 
of  York.  But  that  serious  error  had  at  least  the 
effect  of  showing  the  colonel  of  one  of  his  regi- 
ments what  ought  not  to  be  done  ;  and  he  never 
forgot  the  lesson.  This  was  the  future  Duke  of 
Wellington. 

Alliance  As  to  the  coast  of  the  Low  Countries,  it  is 
LOW  conn-  enough  to  say  that  the  principle  of  alliance  and 
amity  between  Great  Britain  on  one  side,  and  the 
Dutch  and  Flemings  on  the  other,  which  had 
been  retained  through  so  many  centuries,  and 
which,  when  temporarily  broken  by  the  Dutch 
wars,  was  so  fully  renewed  by  William  III.,  re- 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.        119 

mained  not  only  unimpaired  but  strengthened 
after  the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  For  the  purposes 
of  Marlborough's  "Grand  Alliance,"  indeed,  the 
Dutch,  as  we  have  seen,  were  far  less  serviceable 
than  they  had  been  under  their  own  Stadtholder ; 
but  that  was  chiefly  because  their  strength  had 
been  exhausted  during  the  consuming  conflict 
which  they  had  sustained  against  the  two  suc- 
cessive tyrants  of  Europe.  Their  fortunes  might 
have  been  repaired  if  the  British  navies  had  not 
pushed  them  out  of  the  position  which  they  had 
fondly  hoped  would  have  been  their  own,  the 
dominion  of  the  sea,  and  the  leadership  of  the 
colonial  world.  But  their  short-lived  ascendancy 
had  been  acquired  during  the  collapse  of  Britain 
under  the  Stuarts,  and,  as  it  happened,  the  Dukes 
of  Brunswick  brought  with  them  to  England  that 
Hanoverian  influence  over  the  Dutch  which  had 
already  stood  them  in  good  stead,  and  used  it 
with  the  greatest  skill  and  energy. 

This  influence  was,  as  we  now  perceive — though  Hanover  in 

relation  to 

the  fact  has  scarcely  found  its  way  into  our  Eng-  Holland, 
lish  histories — far  more  than  a  set-off  against  the 
Continental  "  entanglements  "  which  the  posses- 
sion of  Hanover  brought  with  it.  It  was  as  the 
great  Teutonic  leader  of  outraged  Europe,  during 
the  anomalous  condition  of  the  Austrian  Empire, 
that  Great  Britain  had  won  and  extended  her 
position  under  Marlborough  ;  and  Hanover,  as  we 


120  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

shall  see,  was  to  form  in  a  sense  a  fulcrum  for 
the  support  of  the  lever  by  which  Chatham  moved 
the  world.  The  change  of  the  allegiance  of  the 
Netherlands  from  Spain  to  Austria  helped  to  knit 
the  bonds  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  opposite 
coasts,  and  the  best  possible  proof  of  their  politi- 
cal connection  was  afforded  when  the  French 
Revolution  broke  out.  It  was  the  union  between 
the  militant  Republicans  of  France  and  the  demo- 
cratic portion  of  the  Hollanders  which  brought 
home  to  the  British  the  danger  to  which  they 
were  exposed ;  and  France  declared  war  in  con- 
sequence of  the  younger  Pitt's  remonstrances. 
That  also  we  shall  examine  more  in  detail.  Since 
the  Peace  of  Vienna  the  bonds  have  been  still 
more  closely  interwoven ;  and  to  safeguard  the 
independent  position  of  both  Holland  and  Belgium 
is  one  of  the  obligations  which  bind  Great  Britain 
to  place  herself  as  the  active  auxiliary,  when  re- 
quired, of  any  particular  State  or  States  on  the 
Continent. 

We  may  take  as  the  text  of  the  Foreign  Policy 
of  Great  Britain,  at  the  time  when  the  war  broke 
out  in  1739,  a  well-known  passage  from  Ranke's 
luminous  'History  of  England'  (v.  405):  "  The 
fall  of  Walpole  was  not  the  fall  of  an  ordinary 
minister,  but  the  fall  of  the  political  system 
based  on  the  first  union  of  the  House  of  Hanover 
with  the  Regent  of  France  [under  George  I.]  It 


WARS   WHICH    FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.        121 

was  a  return  to  the  policy  which  had  at  that 
time  been  abandoned — the  policy  of  war  against 
France  and  the  Bourbon  interest  of  Europe  ;  and 
that  at  a  time  when  these  had  the  upper  hand 
both  by  land  and  sea."  We  have  seen  that  on  Gloomy 
almost  every  side  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  fo?(££ 

Britain. 

were  endangered,  and  that  Walpole  had  not  been 
hurled  from  power  a  day  too  soon.  We  have 
noted  the  almost  despair  of  the  people  at  finding 
their  navy  reduced  to  such  a  state  that  no  de- 
pendence could  be  placed  upon  it,  and  the  general 
sense  of  fury  at  discovering  that  the  Bourbon 
family  were  acting  on  a  steady  principle  of  co- 
operation and  aggression,  while  there  seemed  to 
be  no  one  at  the  head  of  affairs  to  cope  with  them. 
France  was  now  protected  on  her  eastern 
frontier  by  Lorraine ;  and  the  Mediterranean 
seemed  about  to  realise  the  condition,  dear  to 
the  French  through  so  many  centuries,  of  be- 
coming a  French  lake.  The  last  days  of  the 
country  which,  as  Burke  says,  William  III.  had 
taught  to  regard  herself  as  "  the  arbitress  of 
Europe,  the  tutelary  angel  of  the  human  race," 
seemed  to  be  drawing  near.  What  was  to  pre- 
vent the  commerce,  by  means  of  which  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  had  been  nursed  into  prosperity, 
from  being  swept  off  the  face  of  the  sea  ?  The 
foundations  of  the  British  empire  were  thus  laid 
in  a  general  sense  of  alarm  and  insecurity,  and 


122  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

the  Continental  Powers  soon  found  out  that  when 
this  feeling  was  once  predominant  the  character 
of  the  people  broke  out  much  in  the  same  way 
as  of  old. 

The  Re-          The   British   were  not   themselves   aware  how 
1745  was     much  benefit  they  had  derived  from  what  seemed 

of  great 

service  to    so  disastrous  at  the  moment,  the  Rebellion  of  1745. 

England. 

The  union  of  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  has 
been  for  many  centuries,  and  always  must  be, 
the  first  and  most  essential  condition  of  success 
in  entering  upon  a  European  war.  The  Union 
with  Scotland  under  Queen  Anne  had  been  a 
noble  beginning ;  but  the  practical  independence 
of  the  Highlands  had  survived  that  operation, 
and  was  not  extinguished  till  the  battle  of  Cul- 
loden.  Now  at  last,  over  mountain  and  plain  alike, 
the  law  reigned  supreme,  and  the  power  of  the 
feudal  chiefs  was  abolished.  Now  at  last  these 
gallant  savages  were  disarmed.  From  this  time 
forth  they  fairly  set  out  with  characteristic  energy 
upon  that  race  of  education  and  civilisation  on 
which  their  Lowland  brethren  had  had  the  start 
of  them,  and  in  which  the  Scotch  as  a  people  have 
outstripped  all  competitors.  They  were  soon  to 
find  themselves  amongst  the  foremost  ranks  of  the 
British  forces  when  the  genius  of  the  elder  Pitt 
called  forth  their  warlike  spirit  into  a  legitimate 
channel  by  enlisting  them  as  Highland  regiments 
with  a  Highland  costume  under  Highland  officers. 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE.        123 

And  Ireland,  which  has  so  often  in  history  been  Ireland 

_  .  .  .  .      under  Lord 

a  dead  weight  upon  British  enterprise,  was  at  this  Chester- 
same  period  in  a  happier  condition  than  usual 
through  the  splendid  administration  of  Lord 
Chesterfield.  At  this  critical  moment  another 
obstacle  to  national  progress  was  thus,  at  least 
partially,  removed  by  his  means.  Nor  did  the 
effects  of  his  admirable  measures,  which  kept 
Ireland  so  tranquil  during  the  Rebellion  of  1745 
that  troops  quartered  there  were  spared  for  the 
English  emergency,  pass  away  with  his  period 
of  office.  We  cannot  but  connect  with  it  the 
subsequent  rapid  increase  in  the  value  of  Irish 
land,  and  the  eagerness  with  which  tenants  now 
sought  to  obtain  leases  at  largely  increased  rates. 
Thus  agriculture  began  to  supply  in  some  degree 
the  void  which  English  jealousy  of  the  trade  and 
commerce  of  the  sister  island  had  created ;  and 
when,  after  some  years,  this  immediate  source 
of  prosperity  received  a  check,  a  compensation 
was  found  in  the  general  reclamation  of  bog  and 
waste  lands,  and  in  a  course  of  general  improve- 
ment to  which  the  troubles  of  the  latter  part  of 
the  century,  consequent  on  the  Revolt  of  the 
American  colonies,  alone  brought  a  cruel  and  too- 
prolonged  suspension. 

If  we  may  pause  for  a  moment  to  explain  how 
this  exceptional  state  of  Ireland  was  brought  about 
by  Chesterfield's  brief  administration  in  1745,  we 


124  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

must  remember  that  he  was  "  the  first  Lord- 
Lieutenant,  since  the  subjugation  of  the  island 
by  William  III.,  to  introduce  order  and  economy 
into  Irish  finance,  to  encourage  Irish  science,  and 
to  seek  out  and  employ  merit  without  reference 
to  private  or  political  interest."  Ireland,  it  was 
publicly  said,  enjoyed  a  serenity  unknown  to  the 
greater  part  of  Europe.  And  this  success  was  pur- 
chased, not  by  the  depression  of  the  Protestants, 
whose  associations  for  the  defence  of  the  island 
received  Chesterfield's  earnest  encouragement,  still 
less  by  the  neglect  of  efficient  preparation  for 
soldierly  defence  if  the  wave  of  Jacobitism  should 
break  upon  its  shores.  This  mixture  of  firmness 
and  conciliation  in  the  hands  of  an  enlightened 
statesman  accounts  for  the  phenomenon. 
Militia  Add  to  the  practical  union  of  the  three  countries 

organised          ,  .  . 

at  last.  which  made  straight  the  road  to  empire,  the  effect 
of  the  Scottish  Rebellion  in  putting  an  end  to  the 
repugnance  of  the  English  to  establish  a  regular 
militia,  and  we  cease  to  wonder  at  the  enormous 
contrast  presented  by  the  country,  when  Pitt 
took  the  helm,  to  its  condition  under  Walpole  and 
his  immediate  successors.  The  memory  of  the 
Cromwellian  tyranny  and  of  the  attempts  both 
of  James  II.  and  William  III.  to  establish  a 
standing  army  had  hitherto  been  too  strong  to 
allow  the  nation  to  tolerate  even  a  militia.  The 
people  hated  and  were  ashamed  of  the  foreign 


WARS   WHICH    FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.        125 

troops  brought  over  from  time  to  time  on  an 
emergency,  but  were  quite  aware  that  some  dis- 
ciplined force  was  required  at  such  times  ;  and  the 
Rebellion  of  1745  brought  the  need  home  in  an 
unmistakable  way.  Such  an  exhibition  of  national 
panic  as  that  of  "  Black  Friday  "  at  the  appearance 
of  the  insignificant  force  led  by  the  Pretender,  and 
such  a  revelation  of  jobbing  and  corruption  as  that 
which  prevailed  in  the  highest  quarters  concern- 
ing the  forces  raised  to  deal  with  the  invasion, 
were  felt  to  be  a  disgrace  beyond  bearing.  But 
the  prejudice  did  not  yield  to  one  assault,  nor  was 
the  remedy  found  till  Pitt  was  strong  enough  to 
take  the  matter  in  hand.  He  could  now  work  on 
a  secure  base. 

When  Pitt,  after  having  at  last  surmounted  Pitt  and 
every  wave  of  opposition,  was  forced  to  the  at  the 
headship  of  affairs  in  1756,  he  had  no  longer  to 
trouble  himself  about  the  unification  of  the  king- 
dom or  its  home -defences,  and  saw  before  him 
a  task  which  exactly  suited  his  statesmanlike 
genius.  He  had,  indeed,  to  throw  to  the  winds 
his  former  opinions  with  regard  to  Hanover ;  for 
he  perceived  that  instead  of  being  hampered  with 
a  barren  responsibility  for  this  outlying  Conti- 
nental State,  that  State,  under  the  circumstances 
of  Frederick  the  Great's  war  with  the  rest  of  the 
Powers,  might  be,  as  it  turned  out  to  be,  of  in- 
estimable value  to  his  own  country  in  the  struggle 


126  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

which  had  been  forced  upon  her.  It  is  difficult  to 
say  in  which  respect  the  soldierly  old  George  II. 
was  most  useful  at  this  crisis — whether  as  Fred- 
erick's uncle  taking  a  leading  part  in  the  com- 
binations of  Northern  Germany  against  France, 
or  as  the  keen  observer  of  military  and  naval  con- 
duct at  home,  encouraging  the  brave  and  getting 
rid  of  the  incompetent.  Nor  was  it  a  small  thing 
that  the  shocking  feud  in  the  Royal  Family 
should  have  been  extinguished  just  at  this  time 
by  the  death  of  Frederick  Prince  of  Wales.  It 
had  served  one  good  end,  at  least,  in  forming  a 
rallying-point  for  the  opposition  to  Walpole  and 
his  feeble  successors.  The  king  and  Pitt  were 
now  left  free  to  take  up  a  Foreign  Policy  which 
they  had  no  choice  but  to  pursue,  and  which, 
as  we  have  said,  was  fairly  represented  by  the 
phrase  "  Ships,  Colonies,  and  Commerce." 

The  words,  and  the  thoughts  suggested  by  the 
words,  are  inextricably  combined.  "  Ships  "  con- 
notes both  royal  and  commercial  ships ;  " Colonies" 
connotes  the  ships  which  are  to  protect  them  and 
the  ships  which  are  to  convey  troops,  Govern- 
ment supplies,  and  commercial  cargoes ;  "  Com- 
merce "  connotes  the  exchange  of  commodities 
which  ships  alone  can  convey.  So  that,  as  in 
the  very  beginning  of  national  life,  the  country 
clearly  understood  that  the  Royal  Navy  must 
be  maintained  in  a  state  of  efficiency  suitable 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        127 

to  the  times.  Each  year  which  had  elapsed 
since  the  war  of  1739  broke  out  had  been  teach- 
ing its  lessons,  and  Pitt  found  to  his  hand  the 
justly  celebrated  Lord  Anson  as  the  organiser  Lord  An- 
of  the  navy,  and  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  who  had  Hawke. 
lost  no  time  in  justifying  the  splendid  promise 
he  had  given,  in  command  of  the  Channel  fleet. 
Thus  a  head  and  a  right  arm  were  available 
for  the  naval  service  which  were  exactly  suited 
to  its  needs.  Not  that  the  great  minister  was 
capable  of  using  the  matchless  British  war- 
weapon  without  more  experience  than  he  had 
yet  acquired.  His  treatment  of  the  affair  of 
Admiral  Byng  was  unsatisfactory,  and  his  failure  Pitt  fails 
at  Kochefort  in  1757  was  much  more  his  own 
fault  than  that  of  any  one  else.  But  he  made 
no  more  mistakes.  Selecting,  from  the  junior 
ranks  of  generals,  Wolfe  and  Amherst,  keeping 
Hawke  at  the  head  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  employ- 
ing Boscawen  at  the  head  of  the  Mediterranean 
Fleet,  and  Pocock  at  the  head  of  that  in  the 
Indian  Ocean,  he  placed  Howe,  Rodney,  and 
Keppel  in  command  of  the  squadrons  employed 
in  making  diversions  upon  the  coast  of  France. 
At  the  same  time  he  protected  the  flank  of  Fred-  His  plans, 
erick's  Prussian  forces  by  British  and  Hanoverian 
troops  judiciously  placed  under  Prince  Ferdinand 
of  Brunswick.  Further,  the  king  and  the  united 
people  of  the  United  Kingdom  were  at  his  back, 


128  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

and  they  let  him  know  it ;  while  Parliament 
made  no  difficulty  as  to  the  expense  of  his  arma- 
ments, or  the  subsidies  paid  over  to  the  indomit- 
able Frederick.  Great  Britain  and  Prussia  rose 
Prussia  and  together  with  a  bound.  The  spectacle  of  Fred- 
the  Great,  erick's  extraordinary  victories,  turning  defeats 
into  triumphs  over  arid  over  again,  had  a  great 
effect  upon  the  British ;  and  there  is  no  doubt 
that  the  vigour  and  thoroughness  of  such  a 
statesman  as  Pitt  had  a  distinct  effect  upon  the 
commanders  whom  he  employed. 

The  method  by  which  these  high  qualities  took 

effect  has,  however,  been  often,  perhaps  gener- 

pitt'sreia-  ally,  misrepresented.     Pitt  figures  in  history  as  a 

tioiitothe          J  •    i   •          i-          i  - 

officers  in    sort  of  slave-driver,  nourishing  his  whip  over  men 

command.  . 

who  would  otherwise  have  behaved  no  better 
than  their  predecessors.  The  true  reading  of 
his  administration  is  that  he  chose  the  men  who 
had  already  shown  courage  and  genius,  gave 
them  the  needful  material  for  success,  and  threw 
aside  the  useless  instruments  of  former  times,  so 
that  the  fine  officers  in  command  felt  that  their 
services  would  be  appreciated,  however  far  they 
might  depart  from  the  usual  fruitless  system  of 
routine  which  had  hung  like  a  leaden  weight 
upon  the  services.  Hawke,  who  had  discarded 
traditional  rules  even  in  1747,  required  no  spur 
to  do  the  same  thing  at  Quiberon  when  he  broke 
up  the  fleet  and  army  which  were  about  to  invade 


WARS   WHICH    FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        129 

the  British  shores,  under  circumstances  unparal- 
leled in  the  history  of  the  world.  Boscawen, 
though  he  failed  to  keep  the  French  ships  within 
Toulon,  did  not  scruple  to  run  them  ashore  and 
capture  them  on  the  neutral  territory  of  Por- 
tugal, being  quite  aware  that  the  invasion  of 
Britain  was  to  be  stopped  at  any  cost.  Wolfe 
was  allowed  to  follow  his  own  plans ;  nor  did  he 
require  any  spur  or  slave-whip.  And  the  same 
may  be  said  of  the  rest.  The  judicial  murder 
of  Admiral  Byng  has  been  made  too  much  of. 
It  found  a  witty  exponent  in  Voltaire,  whose 
mocking  phrase — "  pour  encourager  les  autres  " 
—has  been  taken  as  gospel  truth  ever  since. 

There  is  truth  in  the  phrase,  no  doubt.  The 
treatment  of  this  sad  affair  elevated  the  stan- 
dard of  naval  capacity,  and  acted  as  a  warning 
to  future  possible  Byngs ;  but  the  error  of  em- 
ploying so  incompetent  an  officer,  who  owed  his 
rise  to  interest,  was  never  sufficiently  brought 
home  to  those  who  deserved  blame ;  nor  did  the 
evil  effect  of  such  partiality  prevent  the  per- 
petration of  the  same  fault  to  an  almost  in- 
credible extent,  in  the  later  history  of  the  Royal 
Navy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  great  officers  of 
the  Seven  Years'  War  were  worthy  founders  of 
the  empire,  sans  peur  et  sans  reproche.  They 
only  required  to  be  left  free,  and  to  know  that 
their  acts  would  be  favourably  interpreted  if  they 


130  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

gave  a  good  account  of  the  enemy.     It  may  here 

be  remarked  that,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  it 

was  possible  for  Pitt  to  find  his  agents  in  men  of 

The  Em-     social  standing  and  family  position.     The  empire 

pire  found-  .  .    , 

edbythe    was  founded   by  an  aristocracy,  which  was  per- 

aristocracy.  . 

haps  then,  with  all  its  faults,  at  its  best. 

The  first  part  of  the  programme  of  Foreign 
Policy  was  thus  completed.  The  Royal  Navy 
had  swept  all  others  off  the  sea,  and  its  position 
as  the  first  line  of  defence  was  assured.  Under 
its  wing  commerce  had  flourished.  During  the 
earlier  and  less  fortunate  war  (1739-1748)  mer- 
chants had  indeed  suffered  very  serious  losses, 
but  the  enemy  had  suffered  more,  so  that  the 
balance  of  prizes  wras  estimated  to  be  in  favour 
A  "nation  of  Great  Britain  by  two  millions  sterling.  During 
keepers."  the  uneasy  peace  which  intervened  (1748-1756) 
between  that  war  and  the  next  British  commerce 
made  great  strides,  and  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War  it  rose  to  such  a  pitch  that  it  enabled  the 
country  to  stand  up  under  its  reverses  during 
the  revolt  of  the  colonies,  assisted  as  they  wTere 
by  France,  Spain,  and  Holland.  The  security 
of  that  commerce  was  the  ground  on  which  the 
war  of  1739  was  waged,  and  had  become  the 
leading  factor,  or  almost  the  leading  factor,  in 
Foreign  Politics.  Throughout  the  century  the 
development  of  manufactures  by  means  of  canals, 
new  coal  mines,  and  progressive  inventions  of 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        131 

machinery,  gradually  made  Great  Britain  the 
"workshop  of  the  world";  and  thus  the  place 
of  commerce  was  more  and  more  firmly  fixed  as 
the  centre  of  Foreign  Policy  round  which  every- 
thing else  was  to  revolve.  The  people  became  a 
"  nation  of  shopkeepers." 

Perhaps  this  is  most  observable  in  the  treaties  witness 
of  the  century,  and  not  least  in  the  great  Treaty  ties. re 
of  Paris,  which  concluded  the  Seven  Years'  War 
in  1763.  In  all  of  them  alike  the  victories  of 
Great  Britain  were  most  inadequately  recognised. 
Statesmen  and  diplomatists  contented  themselves 
with  securing  the  entrance  of  the  Mediterranean 
by  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  so  that  their  ships 
might  pass  freely  and  the  Levant  trade  be  un- 
interrupted ;  with  establishing  the  exclusive  pos- 
session of  North  America  and  India  which  had 
been  won  by  arms ;  and  with  strengthening  the 
West  Indian  position,  though  not  excluding  other 
nations,  so  as  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  the  state 
of  things  out  of  which  the  war  of  1739  had  arisen. 
The  commercial  classes  were  satisfied,  and  they 
now  represented  the  public  sentiment  more  than 
at  any  previous  time  in  English  history. 

And  it  is  well  to  remind  ourselves  of  this  fact, 
for  we  are  very  likely  to  forget  it  in  the  literary 
warfare  which  raged  around  these  various  treaties 
as  well  as  in  the  political  partisanship  which 
coloured  the  public  notices  of  the  times,  and  which 


132  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

have,  somewhat  discreditably  to  our  modern 
teaching,  coloured  them  ever  since.  It  is  also 
left  too  much  out  of  sight  that  in  her  contests 
with  France  and  Spain,  Great  Britain  was  fight- 
ing for  the  maintenance  of  the  Protestant  interest 
in  Europe,  and  for  the  freedom  of  the  weaker 
States  (of  which  Hanover  was  one)  from  the 
domination  of  the  more  powerful,  as  well  as  for 
the  primary  object  of  keeping  intruders  off  her 
Britain  the  own  shores.  She  was,  in  short,  the  visible  cham- 

champion 

of  inter-     pion  of  International   Law,  and  thus  found  her 

national        * 

Law.  duties  to  her  own  subjects  correspond  with  her 
duties  to  her  neighbours.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Balance  of  Power  was,  in  her  hands,  only  another 
phrase  for  those  elementary  duties.  Her  mixed 
Continental  and  Colonial  position,  and  her  head- 
ship of  the  Reformed  Communions,  developed 
on  her  part  a  persistent  hostility  to  tyrants 
which  also  provided  for  her  own  defence.  Her 
support  of  the  weak  made  her  strong.  With  the 
internal  concerns  of  other  States  she  had  never 
interfered  except  when  and  so  far  as  those  con- 
cerns affected  her  own  rights,  her  own  safety, 
her  own  existence  as  a  nation. 

But  while  we  cannot  help  observing  that  suc- 
cesses in  war  were  invariably  followed  by  a  re- 
treat from  the  strong  but  invidious  position  which 
the  British  might  have  been  justified  in  assuming, 
it  is  far  from  necessary  to  attribute,  with  com- 


WARS    WHICH   FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE.        133 

placent  optimism,  this  fact  to  the  deliberate  fore- 
thought and  judgment  either  of  the  Government 
or  people.  It  is  rather  the  compensation,  the 
self-acting  balance,  not  obvious  perhaps  at  first 
sight,  provided  by  a  free  Constitution,  the  roots 
of  which  penetrate  to  the  very  structure  and  com- 
position of  the  nation.  Self-government  involves 
an  ultimate  appeal  to  the  nation.  However 
ardently  a  people  rush  into  war,  and  however  just 
the  cause,  they  soon  grow  weary  of  it  when  the 
needful  sacrifices  are  brought  home  to  them.  That 
weariness,  even  though  they  have  achieved  suc- 
cess, leads  them  to  accept  and  approve  of  terms 
which  are  often  below  the  position  attained  by 
the  war.  The  members  of  the  Government 
which  has  carried  on  the  war  are  generally  the 
last  to  see  this  change  of  opinion,  or  to  recognise 
its  justice  ;  but  they  have  to  give  way,  and  when 
they  have  done  so  the  popular  voice  which  has 
forced  their  hand  not  seldom  turns  against  them. 
Yet  in  spite  of  the  complaints  which  naturally  fill 
the  air,  the  right  course  has,  on  the  whole,  been 
pursued. 

The  affairs  of  the  American  colonies  occupied  British 
by  far  the  largest  space  in  the  Foreign  Policy  of  *«  America 
Great  Britain  during  the  period  treated  in  this 
chapter.     We  have  seen  that  the  colonists  had  a 
large  share  in  bringing  about  the  war  of  1739. 
They  and  the  British  merchants  were  in  full  sym- 


134  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

pathy  in  their  determination  to  retain  their  trade 
with  the  Spanish  settlements  ;  and  it  was  one  of 
the  main  objects  of  France,  by  means  of  the  secret 
treaty  of  1733,  to  make  use  of  the  Spanish  footing 
in  North  America  in  order  to  support  its  grand 
scheme  of  attack  upon  the  British  colonies.  The 
three  Bourbon  thrones  of  France,  Spain,  and  the 
two  Sicilies  had  not  been  acquired  for  a  mere  show 
of  grandeur,  or  even  for  the  purpose  of  dominating 
the  Mediterranean.  The  prospects  of  a  French 
America  and  a  French  India  had,  under  Louis 
XV.,  succeeded  to  the  European  ambitions  of 
Louis  XIY.  The  English  had  indeed  preceded 
them  in  both  directions ;  the  Dutch  had  preceded 
the  English  and  the  Portuguese,  at  least  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  It  was  very  natural  that  the 
French  should  ask,  Why  should  not  France  have 
its  turn  ?  And  in  truth  the  French  and  British 
were  now  so  intermixed  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  St  Lawrence  that  their  petty  jealousies  and 
differences  could  no  more  be  composed  without 
hostilities  than  the  West  Indian  quarrels  between 
Spain  and  Great  Britain  in  1739. 

Attack  on        Thus,  whatever  might  be  the  unpractical  dreams 
mg  the       of  the   British   Government   when  it    made   the 

peace  after 

Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1748,  the  French 
never  stopped  for  a  moment  in  their  career.  All 
they  wanted  at  that  critical  time  was  a  free  pas- 
sage for  their  ships  and  soldiers  between  France 


WARS    WHICH   FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        135 

and  her  western  colonies,  undisturbed  by  the 
ubiquitous  navy  of  their  ancient  rival.  Their 
chief  attention  was  bestowed  on  this  main  part  of 
their  policy.  In  India  Dupleix  was  encouraged  also  on 
and  assisted  to  follow  up  the  advantages  already  Africa, 
gained  over  the  British.  In  the  West  Indies  and  indies, 
on  the  African  coast  all  neutral  territory  was 
claimed  for  France  by  the  simple  process  of  setting 
up  posts  and  proclamations,  and  in  some  cases  by 
actual  occupation.  In  North  America  no  pains 
were  spared  to  strengthen  the  fortifications  of  the 
island  of  Cape  Breton,  and  especially  of  its  capital 
Louisbourg ;  to  form  extensive  alliances  with  the 
savage  Indian  tribes  at  the  back  of  the  British 
settlements,  who  were  now  armed,  and  to  some 
extent  disciplined,  for  the  conflict  which  would 
soon  begin  ;  and  above  all  to  establish  a  chain  of 
forts  which  should  connect  their  prosperous  Cana- 
dian colony  with  the  Mississippi,  and  so  with 
Louisiana,  and  with  the  forces  of  their  allies,  the 
Spaniards.  They  were  also  bent  on  obtaining 
water-access  to  Canada  by  lake  and  river  to  the 
south  of  the  St  Lawrence,  which  is  ice-closed  in 
winter. 

This  was  an  extremely  clever  scheme.  If  the 
sturdy  British  colonists  who  had  already  given 
so  much  trouble,  and  who  were  very  much  more 
numerous  than  those  of  France  and  Spain,  could 
only  be  hemmed  in  by  a  military  cordon  in  their 


136  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

rear,  and  checked  by  great   naval  and  military 
stations  in  front,  there  would  be  some  real  pros- 

A  French  pect  of  a  French  America.  Jonquiere  and  Galis- 
soniere  were,  as  agents  for  the  aggrandisement  of 
their  country,  only  second  to  Dupleix  and  Lally 
in  India ;  but  they  have  dropped  out  of  general 
history.  It  did  not  much  trouble  the  national 
conscience  that  some  of  these  aggressive  forts 
were  built  within  territories  which  the  British 
had  long  considered  their  own.  Why  should 
these  people  be  the  only  colonists  to  extend  and 
encroach  upon  their  neighbours  ?  The  French 
Indians  were  not  indeed  of  much  service  except 
to  cut  off  a  few  straggling  settlers,  and  to  use 
the  scalping  -  knife  with  a  scandalous  freedom ; 
but  considerable  bodies  of  disciplined  French 
soldiers  had  been  stealthily  introduced  into  the 
new  forts.  The  colonists  could  make  no  united, 
and  therefore  no  effective,  resistance ;  and  Great 
Britain  was  not  at  all  likely  to  begin  over  again 
an  expensive  war  for  such  a  trifle. 

The  British  Government  did,  however,  in  1749, 
take  one  step  which  showed  they  were  not  un- 
aware of  the  future  danger — the  foundation  of 
the  military  colony  of  Halifax,  a  thoroughly  states- 
manlike measure ;  but  it  only  led  to  further 

The  French  French  awression.     Though  the  limits  of  Nova 

in  Nova  . 

Scotia.  Scotia  (or  Acadie)  had  been  carefully  recognised 
by  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  the  French  colonial 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED    THE    EMPIRE.        137 

governor  made  no  scruple  of  pursuing  the  same 
policy  as  had  been  decided  upon  in  the  case  of 
the  older  colonists.  He  seized  upon  the  adjacent 
unoccupied  territory,  built  forts  all  along  the  rear 
of  the  Acadian  colony,  cut  off  their  fur-trade,  and 
encouraged  rebellion  amongst  the  old  French 
settlers,  who,  having  accepted  loyally  the  terms  of 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  had  hitherto  lived  in  quiet 
subordination  to  the  British  Government.  The 
Jesuit  missionaries  were  particularly  concerned  in 
the  spreading  of  sedition.  Thus  a  petty  border 
warfare  had  commenced  between  the  colonists  of 
the  two  nations,  in  which  the  British  could  not 
but  suffer  most.  The  feebleness  of  the  Home 
Government  precluded  redress  of  grievances,  and 
the  peculiarly  unsatisfactory  representation  of 
Great  Britain  at  the  Court  of  France  by  Lord 
Albemarle  made  things  worse. 

So  far  had  the  Pelham  administration  been 
from  comprehending  the  full  danger  of  the  situ- 
ation that  in  1750  there  had  been  a  large  reduc- 
tion of  the  navy,  to  which  Anson  reluctantly 
gave  way,  and  against  which  Pitt,  from  the  side 
of  the  Opposition,  protested  in  vain.  Even  the 
Spaniards  renewed  their  old  methods  of  haras- 
sing British  trade  in  the  West  Indies,  and  ill- 
treating  British  merchants  in  Spain.  In  India 
the  genius  of  Clive  had  begun  to  shine  through 
the  cloud  of  gloom  which  had  fallen  over  the  pros- 


138  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

pects  of  the  British;  but  no  one  could  possibly 
foresee  what  would  be  the  end  of  the  struggle 
upon  the  great  Colonial  question  into  which  the 
country  was  being  forced.  Resolutely,  but  yet 
sadly,  did  the  nation  enter  upon  it,  for  the  people 
trusted  Newcastle's  Government  still  less  than 
they  had  trusted  that  of  Walpole ;  and  the  half- 
measures  which  were  at  first  adopted  were  as 
unsuccessful  as  such  half-measures  always  are. 
British  out-  The  French  outwitted  the  British  during  the 

witted  by 

the  French.  Peace  on  every  point.  They  passed  over  to 
North  America  by  ones  and  twos,  so  secretly 
that  their  number  was  not  even  guessed  at,  a 
fleet  of  twenty-five  line-of-battle  ships,  and  on 
board  these  ships  troops  of  soldiers.  Still  further, 
from  their  vantage-ground  at  Toulon  they  sent 
out  a  fleet  and  regiments  of  soldiers  to  lay 
siege  to  Port  Mahon,  which  was  almost  taken 
before  the  Government  received  any  information. 
The  unfortunate  selection  of  Byng  to  command 
the  relieving  force,  and  his  distressing  failure, 
filled  the  measure  of  the  national  wrath,  and 
forced  Pitt  to  the  helm. 

Attempt  to      This  renewed  attempt  of  France  and  Spain  to 

close  the 

Mediter-  close  the  Mediterranean  to  British  commerce  was 
a  part  of  the  general  attack  now  organised  upon 
Great  Britain,  but  only  a  subordinate  part.  It 
grew  out  of  the  efforts  of  the  British  to  support 
the  Balance  of  Power  on  the  Continent,  which 


ranean. 


WARS    WHICH    FOUNDED   THE   EMPIRE.        139 

had  seriously  exercised  their  diplomacy  and  their 
arms  for  many  years ;  but  the  imbecility  of  the 
Walpole,  Pelham,  and  Newcastle  Governments 
had  stood  in  the  way  of  any  general  success. 
The  cause  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  and  Maria 
Theresa  had  indeed  been  honourably  supported, 
and  British  superiority  in  the  Mediterranean  had 
been  on  the  whole  retained. 

The  defence  of  their  colonies  in  America  formed 
the  chief  ground  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  as  far 
as  the  British  were  concerned.  The  invasion  of 
England  was  soon  to  exhibit  itself  as  a  portion 
of  the  enemy's  general  attack,  and  thus  every 
branch  of  its  Foreign  Policy  was  brought  to  the 
test.  This  is  what  makes  the  Seven  Years'  War 
so  important  a  feature  in  history  —  important 
enough  on  the  Continent,  but  much  more  so  to 
Great  Britain.  All  that  had  been  hitherto  cher- 
ished as  vital  to  the  wellbeing  and  even  exist- 
ence of  the  nation  was  in  extreme  danger,  and 
its  triumphant  emergence  from  a  sea  of  troubles, 
as  the  war  went  on,  fixed  the  circle  of  its  future 
policy.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  idea  of 
leaving  the  colonies  to  their  fate  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  have  ever  entered  the  British  mind.  The 
American  colonists  had  grown  up  like  children 
round  their  parents.  They  were  an  integral  part 
of  the  British  Isles,  with  institutions  in  nearly  all 
respects  similar  to  those  of  the  mother  country. 


140  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Nor  did  they  regard  the  mother  country  in 
any  different  light.  The  idea  of  separation  had 
British  never  been  entertained  for  a  moment.  It  had 
mentpfits  been  generally  felt  to  be  invaluable  that  there 
Colonies,  should  be  a  common  link  between  the  Colonies 
and  the  Crown,  that  fixed  boundaries  between 
themselves  should  be  formed  and  preserved,  and 
that  order  should  be  maintained  during  the  grow- 
ing period  of  society,  the  more  so  that  they  had 
no  unity  and  little  mutual  intercourse,  being  kept 
apart  by  intense  jealousies,  arising  out  of  their 
different  origins  and  constitutions.  But  now  they 
felt  further  that,  with  French  and  Spaniards 
closing  round  them,  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  them  to  have  the  protection  of  Great  Britain ; 
and  all  the  more  when  their  local  expeditions 
against  their  enemies  failed,  as  they  generally 
did.  Without  army  or  navy,  and  separated  by 
great  distances,  how  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  It  is 
remarkable  that  some  writers  should  have  blamed 
the  mother  country  for  not  allowing  them  to  run 
alone  as  soon  as  they  were  fairly  settled.  That 
comes  from  not  understanding  the  age,  or  perhaps 
from  transferring  the  ideas  of  a  small  party  of 
modern  political  economists,  now  almost  extinct, 
to  the  society  which  existed  in  the  middle  of 
last  century.  On  the  contrary,  to  be  left  alone 
was  the  one  thing  that  neither  party  wished  nor 
would  have  tolerated.  Their  interests  were 


WARS   WHICH   FOUNDED    THE   EMPIRE.        141 

identical,    and   the    loyalty   of  the   colonists   to  Mutual 
Great  Britain — up  to  the  time  when  events  led 
to    separation  —  was,    speaking   generally,    vivid 
and  unwavering. 

The  above  sketch  will  have  made  plain  the  The  Seven 
outlines  of  the  Foreign  Policy  established  by  the  WMT.ITM- 
Seven  Years'  War,  the  same  indeed  which  we  its  effects, 
have  been  tracing  throughout  the  history  of 
England.  It  seemed  to  be  fixed  for  all  time 
by  the  ascendancy  of  the  Royal  Navy,  the  low 
condition  to  which  the  French  and  Spanish  navies 
had  been  reduced,  the  firm  alliance  of  the  Powers 
which  held  the  Dutch  and  Flemish  coasts  in  a 
league  with  Prussia  and  Hanover,  the  constant 
growth  of  British  commerce,  the  command  of  the 
Mediterranean,  and  above  all,  as  it  appeared  at 
the  time,  by  the  unity  of  the  American  colonies 
—now  increased  by  Wolfe's  conquest  of  French 
Canada — with  the  mother  country.  The  empire 
was  founded  ;  but  as  we  do  not  profess  to  describe 
the  war  here,  it  is  enough  for  our  present  purpose 
to  remark  that  Great  Britain  had  lavished  her 
resources  on  the  protection  of  her  American 
colonies  from  the  French  and  Spaniards,  and 
opened  up  to  them  a  boundless  development. 
We  must  now  glance  at  the  causes  of  the  over- 
clouding of  this  fair  prospect. 


142 


CHAPTER  VII. 

BEITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY    FROM    THE    CLOSE    OF    THE    SEVEN 

YEARS'  WAR  TO  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  FRENCH-REVOLU- 
TION WAR — 1763-1789. 

The  Peace  THE  reign  of  George  III.,  which  commenced  with, 
1763.  or  rather  by  a  very  little  preceded,  the  Peace  of 
Paris,  in  1763,  brought  with  it,  though  insensibly, 
a  great  change  in  the  scheme  of  Foreign  Policy 
traced  in  the  last  chapter.  The  thunders  of 
war  had  ceased,  and  Pitt  had  retired.  That 
it  was  time  he  should  retire,  and  so  make  way 
for  peace,  may  be  called  perhaps  the  sober  judg- 
ment of  history ;  but  there  were  many,  who  were 
unable  to  take  a  larger  view  of  the  subject, 
who  saw  in  the  Peace  only  the  personal  influence 
of  a  Court  favourite,  Lord  Bute,  over  a  young 
and  inexperienced  king,  and  who  considered  the 
country  to  have  been  stopped  disastrously  in  a 
career  of  grandeur  which  would  have  raised  her 
to  a  summit  of  power  from  which  her  enemies 
would  never  have  been  able  to  depose  her.  We 


FROM   1763   TO   1789.  143 

shall  not  here  dwell  upon  this  question.  Enough 
that  large  majorities  in  Parliament  supported  the 
peace  party,  and  that  the  great  man  who  might 
perhaps  have  composed  the  differences  with  the 
colonies  had  been  reduced  to  impotence.  When 
he  again  took  the  helm  in  1765  his  health  had 
given  way,  and  being  only  a  nominal  head  of  the 
Government,  the  rupture  with  the  colonies  which 
George  Grenville  had  set  on  foot  was  carried 
further  by  Charles  Townshend,  one  of  the  col- 
leagues of  Pitt,  now  Earl  of  Chatham. 

Instead,  then,  of  pursuing  a  Foreign  Policy,  one  changed 

i        T  ,.       i  •    i  i      -,        relations 

leading  element  ot  which  was  to  protect  and  de-  with  Amer- 
ican colon- 

velop  the  American  colonies,  the  young  king  and  ists- 
his  incompetent  ministers  found  themselves  faced 
by  an  alienated  colonial  population.  The  ideas  of 
the  colonists  had  undergone  a  great  change, 
partly  owing  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  longer 
any  hostile  pressure  upon  them  from  France  and 
Spain,  and  partly  because  they  had  taken  offence 
at  the  neglect  and  blunders  of  the  home  Govern- 
ment. These  were  the  underlying  elements  of 
discontent,  the  one  discreditable  in  the  abstract  to 
the  colonists,  but  incidental  to  human  nature,  the 
other  equally  discreditable  to  the  mother  country, 
but  incidental  to  the  low  political  standard  of 
government,  which  was  due  to  the  long  and 
unbalanced  tenure  of  office  by  the  Whig  Revolu- 
tion-families. If  any  one  could  have  foreseen  that 


144  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

a  war  for  independence  would  arise  out  of  these 
elements  of  ill-will,  which  interpenetrated  one 
another,  a  very  slight  attention  to  the  wishes  of 
the  colonists  would  probably  have  prevented,  or 
at  least  deferred,  the  disruption ;  but  the  neglect 
on  the  part  of  the  British,  so  far  as  it  did  not 
proceed  from  mere  carelessness,  must  be  con- 
sidered as  the  outcome  of  the  insular  feeling  that 
enough  had  been  done  in  the  late  war  for  their 
children  of  the  New  World.  It  was  thought  that 
the  time  had  arrived  when  they  might  fairly  be 
called  upon,  to  pay  some  of  the  interest  of  the 
National  Debt,  some  portion  of  the  immense  ex- 
penses which  had  been  incurred  in  their  behalf. 

It  is  difficult,  when  more  than  a  century  has 
passed  away,  to  place  ourselves  in  the  situation. 
The  right  to  deal  with  the  colonies  as  if  they 
were  a  part  of  the  national  territory  had  not 
Principles  yet  been  practically  disputed.  Even  the  sedi- 
tious "Junius"  maintained  the  right  to  tax, 
while  Burke  declined  to  deny  it,  and  declared 
"  the  constitutional  superiority  of  Great  Britain 
to  be  as  necessary  for  America  as  for  ourselves, 
and  consistent  with  all  the  liberties  a  sober  and 
spirited  American  ought  to  desire."  So  diffi- 
cult was  it  to  impress  the  mother  country  with 
the  notion  that  there  was  a  real  danger  ahead 
that  even  the  kindly  young  king  and  his  easy- 
going minister,  Lord  North,  when  the  obnoxious 


FROM   1763  TO   1789.  145 

taxes  had  been  repealed,  thought  there  could  be 
no  harm  in  helping  the  East  India  Company  by 
imposing  on  the  colonists  a  slight  tax  on  im- 
ported tea.  Then  came,  not  without  warning, 
the  unappeasable  resistance,  the  burst  of  pent-up, 
furious  passion  on  both  sides,  the  blunders  and 
confusion,  the  horrors  of  Civil  War,  and  the  fail- 
ure of  Great  Britain,  assailed  on  all  sides.  Then 
was  tested  the  strength  of  the  newly  -  founded 
empire.  France  and  Spain  fondly  believed  that 
the  moment  of  their  revenge  had  come.  Even 
Holland  remembered  that  she  was  once  the  sea- 
rival  of  England.  No  longer  was  the  mistress  of 
the  seas  to  dominate  the  world.  The  victories 
and  gains  of  three  generations  were  to  be  obliter- 
ated. When  North  America  and  the  West  Indies 
were  once  reclaimed  by  the  aid  of  the  revolted 
British  colonists,  Great  Britain  should  be  again 
confined  to  the  Narrow  Seas,  and  India  would 
surely  be  recovered  under  some  new  Dupleix. 

These    keen  politicians  were   right  enough   as  European 

.  allies  of 

to  the  immediate  prospect.     The  assistance  of  the  the  coion- 

.  ....  lsts- 

European  enemies  of  Great  Britain  did  indeed 

enable  the  previously  overmatched  colonists  to 
hold  their  own ;  and  the  power  of  the  British 
Government  was  almost  paralysed  by  the  sus- 
tained opposition  of  great  British  statesmen  who 
did  not  scruple  to  take  advantage,  in  Parliament 
and  out  of  it,  of  the  crisis  at  which  their  coun- 


146  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

try  had  arrived.  But  these  politicians  had  not 
calculated  upon  the  tenacity  of  the  hold  which 
the  history  of  the  past  had  infused  into  the 
very  nature  of  the  British  people,  and  above 
all,  upon  the  king  who  was  their  representa- 
tive, not  only  by  office,  but  in  spirit  and  senti- 
ment. This  tenacity  was  by  no  means  chiefly 
founded  on  animosity  to  the  revolted  colonists, 
but  rather  upon  the  fear  of  the  revolt  spreading 
to  other  portions  of  the  empire,  and  especially  to 
Ireland,  and  upon  the  disgust  occasioned  by  the 
unprovoked  aggression  of  the  European  Powers 
which  had  not  so  long  before  made  peace  after 
a  tremendous  struggle,  a  Peace  in  which  the 
conqueror  had  granted  far  easier  terms  than 
the  circumstances  required.  Was  the  whole 
fabric  of  empire,  built  up  during  the  ages  with 
such  vast  expenditure  of  industry,  money,  and 
human  life,  to  collapse  like  a  child's  castle  of 
cards  ? 

views  of  The  king,  who  felt  his  responsibility  pro- 
'  foundly  on  this  point,  had  been  by  no  means,  as 
often  represented,  one  of  those  most  bent  upon 
harsh  measures.  That  assertion  is  false.  He 
would  gladly  have  repealed  the  Stamp  Act 
rather  than  enforce  it  with  the  sword.  But 
colonial  independence  presented  itself  as  some- 
thing which  it  was  a  solemn  duty  to  prevent  at 
all  costs.  No  inherent  right  was  ever  claimed 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  147 

for  it ;  all  policy  seemed  to  be  against  it.  "A 
small  State,"  wrote  the  king  to  Lord  North, 
"  may  certainly  subsist,  but  a  great  one,  mould- 
ering, cannot  get  into  an  inferior  situation,  but 
must  be  annihilated.  By  perseverance  we  may 
bring  things  to  a  peace ;  by  giving  up  the  game 
we  are  destroying  ourselves  to  prevent  our  being 
destroyed."  Again,  "  The  country  has  a  right  to 
have  the  struggle  continued  till  convinced  it  is  in 
vain."  With  all  classes  the  war  had  been  popular 
on  these  grounds,  though  prolonged  failure  had  its 
effect  at  last.  Lord  Chatham,  who  had  so  vehe- 
mently opposed  taxation,  had  often  said  as  much 
against  Independence  as  any  one ;  and  died  in 
the  act  of  beseeching  his  countrymen  never  to 
give  way  to  the  demand.  Nor  had  the  colonists 
even  thought  of  such  a  thing  till  the  progress 
of  the  war  had  so  embittered  the  strife  that  all 
previous  ideas  were  overwhelmed  in  the  flood  of 
hostility. 

The  patriotic  sentiment  that  his  European 
enemies  must  be  humbled  before  any  general 
peace  was  made,  was  more  keenly  operative  in 
fixing  the  resolution  of  the  king  to  stand  out 
than  anything  else,  substantially  supported  as 
he  was  on  that  point  by  his  people,  though  not 
by  his  ministers,  who  quailed  before  the  com- 
bination of  foreign  foes.  The  surrender  of  Corn- 
wallis,  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  and  the  fail- 


148  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

ures  by  sea  on  the  American  coasts,  had  indeed 
convinced  even  the  king  that  the  United  States, 
led  by  Washington,  one  of  the  few  great  men  of 
all  time,  had  conquered  their  Independence.  It 
had  become  plain  that  the  separation  of  the  two 
countries  by  the  Atlantic  Ocean  was  in  those  days 
really  the  leading  feature  of  the  situation.  Terms 
must  be  made  sooner  or  later.  But  however 
that  might  be,  there  was  to  be  no  cessation  of 
hostilities  with  the  hereditary  enemies  of  Great 
Britain  until  their  interference  had  been  pun- 
ished, and  their  pretensions  reduced.  "  We  are 
contending  for  our  whole  consequence,"  wrote 
the  king  to  North,  "whether  we  are  to  rank 
among  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe,  or  to  be 
reduced  to  one  of  the  least  considerable.  He 
that  is  not  stimulated  by  this  consideration  does 
not  deserve  to  be  a  member  of  this  community. 
We  have  it  not  at  this  hour  in  our  power  to 
make  peace  :  it  is  by  steadiness  and  by  exer- 
tions that  we  are  to  get  into  a  position  to  effect 
it ;  and  with  the  assistance  of  Divine  Providence 
I  am  confident  we  shall  find  our  enemies  forced 
to  look  for  that  blessing." 

This  letter  was  written  in  June  1781  to  encour- 
age the  fainting  heart  of  the  Prime  Minister. 
Only  a  few  months  afterwards  the  gallant 
Rodney  had  destroyed  the  chief  fleet  of  the 
French,  and,  not  long  after  that,  the  Spaniards 


FROM   1763   TO   1789.  149 

had  shattered  themselves  to  pieces  against  the 
Rock  of  Gibraltar.  The  Dutch  had  already  been 
taught  to  bewail  their  miscalculations.  Hawke 
and  Wolfe  had  found  worthy  successors  in  Rodney 
and  Elliot.  The  confederated  hosts  had  once 
more  collapsed  as  in  the  days  of  Chatham,  and  as 
they  were  to  do  again  under  Chatham's  son.  The 
time  had  come  when  the  war  might  be  concluded 
with  honour.  It  was  concluded  in  1783.  Never  Peace  of 
ought  the  words  of  George  III.  to  be  forgotten :  1783. 
"  I  was  the  last  to  consent  to  the  separation ;  I 
will  be  the  first  to  meet  the  friendship  of  the 
United  States  as  an  independent  Power." 

We  can  now  place  ourselves  where  Englishmen 
stood  a  hundred  years  ago,  and  give  the  revolted 
colonists  their  due  meed  of  praise.  They  acted  as 
Englishmen  might  be  expected  to  act.  They  had 
carried  with  them  the  old  English  spirit,  the  old 
English  education  in  freedom  ;  they  rose  against 
what  they  thought  to  be  tyranny ;  they  learnt 
with  marvellous  rapidity  the  elementary  arts  of 
war  from  the  troops  sent  to  reduce  them ;  they 
established  a  well-balanced  Republic — a  model  Effects  of 

.  .    .          the  war. 

for  others,  and  a  realisation  of  their  own  political 
needs.  Both  parties  learnt,  in  the  very  act  of 
separation,  to  respect  one  another.  The  United 
States  have  expanded  to  an  extent  which  no  one 
could  have  even  imagined  in  dreams,  and  spread 
British  institutions  over  no  small  portion  of  the 


150  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

world's  surface.  As  for  Great  Britain,  it  has  been 
truly  said  that  she  "  arose  from  the  war  stronger 
and  greater  than  ever."  She  exchanged  a  barren 
sovereignty  for  an  immense  commerce  with  the 
new  States ;  and  as  separation  must  have  come 
sooner  or  later,  it  is  possible  that  its  postpone- 
ment might  have  brought  less  satisfactory  results. 
Nor  could  the  renewed  struggle  with  France  and 
Spain  have  been  long  delayed.  That  also  was 
well  over  when  it  was  ;  for  it  was  thus  that  Great 
Britain  secured  eleven  years  of  rapid  recovery 
and  amazing  growth  under  the  younger  Pitt,  and 
gained  an  enormous  and  unprecedented  develop- 
ment before  the  still  greater  trial  of  the  French- 
Revolution  wars  still  more  terribly  taxed  her 
resources. 

upon  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  there  is  another  and 

Britain.  a  truer  view  of  the  Great  Revolt  than  is  usually 
presented  in  popular  books.  After  the  war  the 
British  people  could  say — with  more  political  truth 
than  General  Scott's  "  Wayward  sisters,  go  in 
peace," — "  Manly  children,  take  your  inheritance 
and  prosper."  As  for  the  British  empire,  which 
had  been  founded,  as  we  have  seen,  in  self-defence, 
it  turned  out  to  be  all  the  more  firmly  planted  by 
the  assault  of  the  first  great  storm  which  had 
broken  upon  it.  The  British  oak,  if  we  may  use 
the  simile,  struck  its  roots  the  deeper  for  the  loss 
of  branches,  which  by  their  too  great  weight  had 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  151 

exposed  it  to  danger.  It  was  still  young  and 
vigorous  enough  to  put  forth  fresh  branches  in 
their  place,  and  the  healthy  verdure  of  the  newer 
shoots  soon  filled  up  the  void,  and  concealed  the 
ravages  of  the  hurricane. 

For  a  time,  indeed,  these  newer  shoots  were  few.  upon  the 
The  loss  of  Minorca  was  of  small  consequence  to 


British  commerce  since  the  Rock  of  Gibraltar  had  and  India. 
been  proved  impregnable,  but  it  had  been  deeply 
felt.  It  was  the  only  drawback  to  the  general 
satisfaction  at  the  Peace  of  Versailles  in  1783. 
Twenty  years  were  to  elapse  before  the  safe  posses- 
sion of  Malta  could  supply  that  influence  in  Italy 
and  Sicily  which  was  required  to  keep  up  British 
supremacy  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  delay  only 
the  more  rigorously  determined  the  course  of 
British  policy  when  the  nations  once  more  clashed 
together  in  mortal  conflict.  Canada,  which,  after 
Wolfe's  victory,  had  been  wisely  provided  with 
a  liberal  constitution,  had  not  only  remained 
vehemently  loyal  during  the  struggle,  but  had 
become  the  refuge  and  home  of  the  Loyalists  of 
the  United  States.  It  thus  presented  itself  as 
in  some  sense  a  set-off  against  the  loss  of  those 
States,  as  well  as  a  channel  for  commerce  which 
promised  to  widen  every  year  ;  and  India,  which 
had  been,  like  the  old  American  colonies,  too 
much  overlooked  by  the  mother  country,  became, 
as  soon  as  the  Peace  of  Versailles  was  made,  the 


152  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

concern  of  rival  ministers  and  rival  governments. 
Fox's  India  Bill  failed  to  command  national 
assent ;  and  Pitt's  Bill,  which  he  carried  as  soon 
as  he  became  Prime  Minister,  settled,  under  the 
great  administration  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  that 
magnificent  possession  almost  in  the  form  and 
system  which  obtained  down  to  our  own  day. 

With  trade  opening  out  in  all  these  directions, 
the  change  which  had  been  effected  by  the  loss  of 
the  United  States  was  rather  a  change  in  name 
than  in  reality.  The  necessity  of  defending  those 
States  from  European  aggression  had  indeed 
passed  away,  but  the  protection  of  the  East  and 
West  Indies  and  of  Canada  remained  as  much  a 
part  of  British  policy  as  ever,  and  took  a  larger 
development  as  more  and  more  capital  was  sunk 
in  those  possessions. 

But  before  taking  .a  survey  of  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  the  younger  Pitt,  we  must  notice  a  very 
important  ingredient  in  the  war  which  we  have 
briefly  sketched  in  connection  with  the  American 
colonies  and  with  Lord  Chatham.  The  so-called 
The  Armed  "  Armed  Neutrality  "  had  been  sprung  upon  Great 

Neutrality.          .       .  fc 

Britain  just  at  the  moment  when  she  was  reeling 
in  the  struggle  with  the  revolted  States,  and  was 
weighted  with  France,  Spain,  and  Holland  on  her 
back.  The  Empress  Catherine  headed  the  attack 
on  British  maritime  supremacy,  and  before  long 
was  joined  by  Prussia — which  had  not  forgotten 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  153 

that  the  Peace  of  Paris  had  been  made  without 
her  complicity, — by  Holland,  Denmark,  Sweden, 
Portugal,  Naples,  and  the  Empire.  France  and 
Spain  did  not  join  the  league,  but  gladly  ac- 
cepted its  principles.  Under  the  circumstances 
the  stoppage  of  the  British  Right  of  Search  was 
tantamount  to  the  destruction  of  the  means  by 
which  she  had  hitherto  grown  great.  It  may 
be  well  to  place  this  matter  in  its  true  light. 

The  Right  of  Search  exercised  in  war  by  Great 
Britain,  contrary  to  the  falsely  assumed  right  of 
Spain  exercised  in  peace  in  the  West  Indian  seas, 
"  had  generally  been  acknowledged  as  the  law  of 
nations,"  and  she  was  under  solemn  engagements 
with  other  Powers,  under  which  they  had  "  altered 
the  primitive  law  by  mutual  stipulations."  l  That 
"free  ships  should  make  free  goods"  had  been 
allowed  under  certain  special  treaties  for  mutual 
benefit ;  but  this  provision  was  accompanied  by 
the  rule  that  "  enemy  sliips  should  make  enemy 
goods."  The  last  was  not  a  rule  necessarily  con- 
nected with  the  first,  but  supremely  important 
in  its  operation  ;  for  it  formed  an  effective  security 
against  the  collusion  which  must  otherwise  take 
place.  But  what  now  occurred  ?  By  the  Armed 
Neutrality  the  latter  rule  was  simply  abolished, 
while  the  former  was  peremptorily  authorised 
as  of  universal  application  ;  and  thus  the  Right 

1  British  Declaration,  Annual  Register,  xxiii.  349. 


154  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

of  Search  could  only  be  exercised  with  extreme 
difficulty.  If  Great  Britain  had  consented  she 
would  in  fact  have  relinquished  the  power  of  pre- 
venting supplies  of  every  kind  from  being  poured 
into  France,  Spain,  and  the  colonies  with  which 
she  was  in  deadly  conflict.  The  universal  law 
was  to  be  broken  at  a  moment  when  its  con- 
tinuance, however  unpleasing  to  other  nations, 
could  alone  enable  her  to  bring  the  war  to 
an  end.  She  defied  the  Confederacy,  and  her 
naval  victories  secured  her  position.  With  the 
Peace  of  Versailles,  the  Armed  Neutrality  dis- 
solved ; — to  reappear  when  storms  once  more  broke 
upon  the  British  maritime  supremacy.  The 
attempt,  however,  had  the  effect  of  bringing 
Russia  to  the  front  as  a  great  Baltic  Power  with 
which  British  Foreign  Policy  had  to  reckon ;  and 
this  advance  of  Russia,  itself  largely  due  to 
Chatham's  neglect,  taxed  to  the  utmost  as  he 
had  been  with  the  French  struggle,  formed  one 
of  the  younger  Pitt's  chief  difficulties  when  he 
came  to  be  Prime  Minister  in  1784. 
The  rise  of  The  rise  of  Russia  had  been  steadily  pro- 
gressing since  Peter  the  Great  had  established 
her  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  at  the 
beginning  of  the  century.  She  had  indeed  failed 
in  crushing  Prussia,  though  the  Empire  and 
France  had  joined  in  the  attempt ;  and  Frederick 
had  made  his  country  a  great  independent  Power. 


FBOM   1763   TO   1789.  155 

In  1772  the  fatal  Partition  of  Poland  took  place ; 
and  then,  when  the  Empress  Catherine  found 
herself  firmly  placed  on  the  throne,  she  used  her 
great  talents  and  unscrupulous  diplomacy  for 
the  purpose  of  crushing  Sweden  in  the  north 
and  Turkey  in  the  south.  In  spite  of  her  enor- 
mous extent,  Eussia  was  determined  to  have 
further  room  to  expand  both  in  the  Baltic  and 
the  Mediterranean.  Both  of  the  threatened 
States  were,  however,  unfortunately  for  Russia, 
the  allies  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  younger  Pitt 
found  himself  obliged  to  prevent  the  success 
of  Russia  in  both  directions,  not  only  for  the 
sake  of  the  British  allies,  but  for  the  sake  of 
British  commerce,  which  had  greatly  increased 
in  both  seas.  The  Porte  had  been  in  close  Relations 

IT  •    i         i          -n        T   i  •  •          between 

alliance  with   the  JcmMisn   ever  since  the  reign  Great  Bri- 

'  tain  and 

of  Queen  Elizabeth.  No  small  share  of  the  Turkey. 
Asiatic  traffic  which,  as  its  route  through  Europe 
changed  from  age  to  age,  had  left  so  many 
marks  on  the  fortunes  of  the  West,  had  now 
fallen  into  English  hands.  For  some  genera- 
tions the  "Turkey  Merchants"  had  been  the 
typical  representatives  of  English  commercial 
wealth,  and  had  scarcely  yet  been  eclipsed  by 
the  rising  fortunes  amassed  in  the  East  and 
West  Indies. 

The  alliance   of  the   Porte  with   France   was 
indeed    older    than    that   with   England ;    for   a 


156  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

diversion  from  the  side  of  Turkey  had  often 
been  a  part  of  French  policy  in  their  wars  with 
Austria.  But  the  elder  Pitt,  as  we  have  said, 
had,  during  the  mortal  struggle  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  always  favoured  Russia  as  against 
France;  and  Fox,  in  1783,  had  been  deaf  to  the 
proposal  of  France  that  she  and  Great  Britain 
should  combine  to  check  the  aggressions  of 
Russia  upon  Turkey,  and  upon  what  remained 
of  Poland.  The  alliance  of  Great  Britain  and 
Turkey  had,  in  fact,  been  hitherto  a  commercial 
connection,  but  it  was  felt  that  the  possession 
of  India  made  it  a  very  important  alliance  to 
the  former  of  the  two  countries,  and  that  cir- 
cumstances might  arise  which  would  call  for  a 
more  strictly  political  alliance. 

It  was  this  old  and  valued  ally  which  now 
lay  crushed  beneath  the  heel  of  the  Muscovite. 
The  recent  Treaty  of  Kainardji  had  detached 
the  Tartars  from  the  Turks,  planted  Russia 
on  the  shores  of  the  Euxine,  and  established  a 
Russian  Protectorate  of  the  Christian  vassal 
States  of  the  Porte.  The  Turkish  fleet  had 
been  destroyed.  The  Empress  had  quite  re- 
cently carried  her  conquests  still  further.  The 
capture  of  Oczakoff  distinctly  announced  the 
coming  partition  of  the  Ottoman  empire.  It 
was  about  to  follow  the  fate  of  the  still  un- 
digested Poland  and  Finland. 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  157 

Still  more  pressing  were  affairs  in  the  Baltic,  Plots  of  the 
for  they  were  nearer  home ;  and  Eussia  had  led,  cSESSe 

-,  _  and  the 

as  we  have  seen,  nearly  all  the  nations  of  the  Emperor 

^          .  .  Joseph  II. 

Continent  in  the  cause  of  the  Armed  Neutrality. 
The  hostility  of  Russia  endangered  the  safety  of 
the  British  Channel ;  and  long  before  the  French 
Revolution  ruled  the  situation  in  Europe,  she  and 
Austria,  under  Catherine  and  Joseph,  were  sap- 
ping away  the  Dutch  barrier  which  was  so  impor- 
tant to  Europe.  As  early  as  1781  Joseph  had 
begun  to  work  out  his  wild  scheme  of  giving  to 
the  Elector  of  Bavaria  the  Austrian  Netherlands, 
while  he  was  to  take  Bavaria  in  exchange ;  and 
he  had  gone  so  far  as  to  dismantle  the  Barrier 
Towns,  which  had  cost  such  vast  expenditure  in 
blood  and  money  under  Queen  Anne.  This 
affected  Holland,  inasmuch  as  the  French,  already 
in  a  republican  ferment  caught  from  America 
and  prepared  by  Voltaire  and  Rousseau,  were 
overrunning  the  Netherlands  and  settling  them- 
selves amongst  the  Dutch.  A  republican  party, 
as  opposed  to  that  of  the  Stadtholder,  had  always 
existed  there,  and  now,  reinforced  by  the  French, 
was  about  to  imperil  the  protection  which  England 
had  always  considered  of  vital  importance  to  the 
safety  of  the  Channel.  This  insane  plan  of 
Joseph's  was  indeed  peremptorily  stopped  by 
Frederick  the  Great.  It  was  his  last  political  act  Frederick 
before  his  death  in  1786  removed  the  one  great  i 


158  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

obstacle  to  a  European  revolution ;  but  Pitt  bad 
to  meet  the  now  imminent  danger  by  again 
forming  tbe  old  alliance  between  Great  Britain, 
Prussia,  Sweden,  and  tbe  Dutch  Government,  and 
thus  he  once  more  checked  the  designs  of  France. 
For  the  moment  the  Baltic  and  the  Channel  were 
safeguarded  ;  but  the  French  Revolution  occurred 
almost  immediately  afterwards,  and  the  repub- 
lican enthusiasts  would  brook  no  denial.  That 
Pitt's  measures  had  even  a  temporary  success  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  he  represented  the  complete 
readiness  of  his  people  to  go  to  war  on  the  subject, 
and  that  is,  after  all,  the  only  real  strength 
of  diplomacy. 

Pitt's  Foreign  Policy  up  to  this  point  had  been 
wonderfully  successful.  Austria  and  Denmark 
had  been  detached  from  their  alliance  with 
Russia — an  immense  result.  But  the  British 
people  were  not  prepared  to  support  him  and  the 
king  in  their  further  measures  for  the  protection 
of  Turkey.  It  was  too  far  off.  If  they  had  been 
properly  supported,  the  Empress  would  have  found 
herself  confronted  by  British  fleets  and  by  Polish 
and  German  armies  subsidised  by  British  gold. 
The  opportunity  was  lost,  and  the  Crimean  War 
was  required,  two  generations  later,  to  save  the 
East  Mediterranean  from  becoming  Russian.  But 
something  had  been  done.  The  further  partition 


FROM   1763   TO    1789.  159 

of  Turkey  was  warded  off  by  the  dread  of  British  Turkey 
interference ;    but    the   suzerainty   of  the   Porte  Ktt. 
was  never  efficiently  asserted  till  1856,  when  the 
special  protectorate  of  Russia  over  the  Christian 
provinces  was  abolished. 

It  was  then  at  last  that  the  collective  guarantee 
of  the  European  Powers  was  established  as  the 
substitute  for  the  Russian  protectorate,  which  was 
only  another  name  for  gradual  absorption.  The 
true  principles  of  International  Law  were  then  at 
last  laid  down  by  the  consent  of  all  the  Great 
Powers.  A  sort  of  Amphictyonic  Council  was  to 
regulate  the  affairs  of  Europe,  an  idea  which  had 
been  before  the  European  mind  for  some  centuries. 
Each,  as  Sully  had  said,  and  which  we  once  more 
repeat,  must  be  powerful  enough  to  be  respected 
by  its  neighbours,  and  each  intimately  concerned 
with  the  external  policy  of  every  other ;  each 
should  be  internally  strong  and  well-ordered,  or 
independence  would  be  impossible.  Each  was  to 
have  an  interest  in  the  prosperity  of  the  rest. 
The  struggles  of  the  French  -  Revolution  period, 
which  we  have  here  forestalled,  only  exposed  too 
clearly  the  need  of  these  principles. 

We  are  now  in  a   position  to  sum   up   Pitt's  General 
Foreign  Policy  in  comprehensive  terms,  or  rather  Pitt's 
to  remind  ourselves  of  it, — for  we  have  already  Policy, 
emphasised  it  as  the  necessary  policy  of  the  em- 


160  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

pire  then  and  now.  It  was  to  combine  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  defence  and  preservation  of  the  united 
British  Isles,  of  her  colonies,  and  of  her  now 
world-wide  commerce,  with  the  old-established 
principles  of  International  Law  and  Balance  of 
Power.  Such  European  concert  as  was  possible 
had  been  skilfully  obtained.  The  aggressions  of 
three  States  of  the  first  class,  France,  Russia,  and 
Austria,  had  been  checked  without  war.  The 
security  of  the  smaller  States,  which  in  previous 
European  settlements  had  been  constituted  the 
barriers  and  "  buffers  "  between  their  more  power- 
ful neighbours,  -  -  a  security  which  has  often 
proved  itself  invaluable, — had  been  restored  as 
far  as  was  still  possible,  or  at  least  preserved 
from  threatened  injury.  In  the  earlier  years  of 
George  III.  those  who  were  responsible  for  Euro- 
pean concert  in  maintaining  public  rights  had  not 
perceived,  or  had  neglected,  their  duty.  In  the 
nine  years  of  Pitt's  brilliant  peace  administration 
the  wholesome  action  of  international  principles 
had  been  once  more  triumphantly  established. 
Portugal.  One  such  minor  State  has  not  yet  been  noticed. 
Portugal  may  be  grouped  with  the  States  of  the 
Mediterranean,  amongst  which  it  had  been  the 
policy  of  Great  Britain  to  constitute  herself  an 
independent,  if  not  supreme,  Power.  It  had 
long  been  reckoned  as  a  natural  ally.  Not  only 
was  its  chronic  hostility  to  Spain  as  marked  as 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  161 

the  chronic  hostility  of  Holland  to  both  Spain 
and  France,  and  its  interests  so  far  exactly  coin- 
cident with  the  interests  of  England  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic,  but  its  seaboard  was  most 
conveniently  situated  for  mutual  commerce,  and 
Lisbon  was  almost  an  unequalled  port.  Perhaps 
there  was  no  stronger  bond  of  union  between  any 
two  States  of  Europe.  From  the  time  when 
English  crusaders  helped  the  Portuguese  to  expel 
the  Moors  this  friendship  had  been  almost  unin- 
terrupted. Though  wanting  in  the  character- 
istics of  blood,  faith,  and  social  intimacy  which 
had  signalised  the  relations  between  the  English 
and  Dutch,  the  alliance  had  not  suffered  as  those 
had  from  serious  hostilities.  The  treaties  with 
Portugal  which  were  made  by  the  Long  Parlia- 
ment, by  Cromwell,  and  by  Charles  II.,  on  his 
marriage  with  Catherine  of  Braganza,  were  only 
less  advantageous  to  both  countries  than  Queen 
Anne's  Methuen  Treaty,  which  was  strictly  an 
offensive  and  defensive  compact. 

By  that  treaty  also  the  Portuguese  wines,  im- 
ported in  exchange  for  English  wool,  became  the 
substitute  for  the  wines  of  France ;  and  so  re- 
markably were  public  and  private  interests  in- 
terwoven in  those  days  that  even  Hallam  found  it 
necessary  to  remark  that  the  desire  to  taste  once 
more  French  wines  had  no  small  influence  in  carry- 
ing the  Peace  of  Utrecht.  The  generous  assist - 

L 


162  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

ance  sent  from  England  on  occasion  of  the  great 
earthquake  at  Lisbon  had  kept  alive  the  sense 
of  obligation,  and  this,  a  little  later,  when  Spain 
was  employed  in  one  of  her  frequent  attempts  to 
subjugate  her  smaller  neighbour,  was  still  further 
strengthened  by  the  aid  of  British  troops.  No 
one  understood  the  value  of  the  alliance  better 
than  the  Marquis  de  Pombal,  the  one  great 
minister  Portugal  has  produced ;  and  it  was  no 
slight  title  to  British  confidence  that  under  his 
auspices  Portugal  was  the  first  country  to  expel 
the  Jesuits  (1759). 

These  amicable  relations  were  too  firmly  estab- 
lished to  be  shaken  by  the  momentary  adhesion 
of  Portugal  to  the  Armed  Neutrality,  or  by 
the  abandonment  of  the  commercial  part  of  the 
Methuen  Treaty  which  Pitt,  in  his  pursuit  of  com- 
mercial equality  with  France  and  other  nations, 
found  to  be  necessary.  The  value  of  friendly 
relations  with  Portugal  was  soon  to  be  tested. 

Thus  when  the  tremendous  war  with  Revol- 
utionary, and  then  Napoleonic,  France  broke  out, 
in  spite  of  all  Pitt's  efforts,  his  country  had  no 
new  tactics  to  adopt.  Her  position  was  under- 
stood at  home  and  abroad.  She  had  merely 
strengthened  and  adapted  to  circumstances  what 
experience  had  dictated.  Great  Britain  had 
advanced  far  beyond  her  neighbours  in  the 
development  of  all  the  resources  necessary 


FROM   1763   TO    1789.  163 

for  interposition,  if  that  should  be  needed.  She 
could  afford  to  wait,  as  she  did  wait,  till  every 
expedient  had  been  tried  before  she  plunged  into 
the  gigantic  conflict  which  was  not  only  to  settle 
the  question  of  her  independence,  but  to  decide 
her  future  existence  as  an  empire. 

This  patience  was  no  doubt  misinterpreted  as  strong 
tameness,  and  as  a  relinquishment  of  a  glorious  of  Great 

1     .  Britain 

past ;    but  calm  observers,  if  any  such  were  left  before  the 

*  great  war. 

after  the  French  Revolution  began,  might  have 
remembered  that  the  spirited  methods  by  which 
the  British  empire  had  been  secured  of  old  were 
not  abandoned.  Besides  the  great  colonial  war 
which  we  have  noticed,  Great  Britain  had  on 
two  occasions,  one  quite  recent,  announced  to 
the  world  that  there  was  a  point  beyond  which 
she  would  not  be  forced  even  where  the  casus 
belli  seemed  small  and  unimportant.  In  the 
affair  of  the  Falkland  Islands  in  1770,  her  in- 
stant armament  and  categorical  remonstrance 
forced  Spain  to  withdraw  from  her  insulting  posi- 
tion ;  and  in  the  affair  of  Nootka  Sound  in  1790, 
almost  exactly  similar,  Pitt  followed  the  old  path 
with  precisely  the  same  result.  In  both  cases 
alike,  it  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Spain  to 
find  out  how  far  she  could  go  in  the  way  of  ex- 
clusion and  intimidation.  She  was  manifestly 
wrong.  War,  indeed,  on  such  questions  might 
seem  absurd;  yet  the  same  unhesitating  spirit 


164  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

was  shown  in  the  prompt  exaction  of  repara- 
tion. A  firm  diplomacy  and  instant  preparations 
for  war  secured  the  neutrality  of  France,  and 
brought  the  offender  to  reason. 

Thatgov-  We  are  now  about  to  deal  with  the  develop- 
war  policy,  merit  of  British  Foreign  Policy  at  the  period  of 
the  war  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  unwelcome 
war  which  broke  in  so  rudely  upon  the  breathless 
haste  and  rush  of  the  British  people  in  their  for- 
ward progress.  It  is  in  reality  more  easy  to 
describe  than  in  the  foregoing  periods  ;  for,  as  we 
have  said,  the  outlines  of  it  remained  precisely 
as  they  have  just  been  formulated, — only  applied 
to  a  new  series  of  facts.  From  1793  to  1815 
there  was  but  one  object  before  the  eyes  of  king 
or  ministers,  Parliament  or  people,  and  this  was 
to  restrain  the  aggressive  action  of  France,  first 
in  her  political  frenzy,  and  then  in  her  military 
ambition.  This  object  was  to  be  attained  in 
concert  with  the  other  States  of  Europe,  and 
yet  the  problem  was  to  be  solved  of  so  co-oper- 
ating as  to  prevent  any  of  them  from  seizing 
that  overwhelming  supremacy  which  could  not  be 
permitted  in  the  case  of  France. 
An  explicit  In  other  words,  it  fell  once  more  to  the  lot  of 

sumethe     Great  Britain  to  be  summoned,  unwillingly  sum- 
old  posi-  .    . 

tionin       moned,  to  the  front  for  the  purpose  of  admims- 

Europe. 

tering  the  International  Law  of  Europe.  The 
call  was  explicit ;  but  it  none  the  less  represented 


FROM    1763   TO   1789.  165 

the  vital  interests  of  Great  Britain.  It  was  not 
only  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  people  felt  a 
genuine  disgust  at  the  principles  which  issued  in 
the  horrors  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  a  pro- 
found sympathy  for  the  oppressed  nations  which 
fell  under  the  French  yoke  ;  they  were  convinced 
that  in  fighting  for  others  the  British  were  also 
fighting  for  themselves.  This  conviction  nerved 
every  arm  and  inspired  every  sacrifice.  The 
movement  never  really  lost  its  first  impulse.  It 
was  not  quixotic ;  it  was  never  selfish  in  any  but 
the  best  and  most  honourable  sense.  It  was  the 
dictate  of  judgment  as  well  as  feeling,  of  common- 
sense  as  well  as  philanthropy.  Its  motives  were, 
in  short,  mixed,  and  ought  not  to  have  been 
otherwise. 

It  is  not  so  very  long  since  it  was  taken  as  Attacks  on 
a  matter  of  course  that  the  policy  pursued  by 
Great  Britain  in  the  Revolution  war  was  dis- 
graceful and  ruinous,  that  the  ambition  of  Pitt 
was  the  real  cause  of  it,  that  the  aspirations  of 
France  for  liberty  justified  not  only  her  domestic 
but  her  foreign  policy,  and  that  the  vast  National 
Debt  which  the  war  bequeathed  to  Great  Britain 
was  the  just  punishment  for  her  interference. 
This  was  surely  the  language  of  party-spirit, 
of  peace  -  at  -  any  -  price,  of  a  mock  liberality, 
shaping  a  theory  for  the  past  in  accordance  with 
the  views  of  subsequent  popular  writers,  and 


166  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

totally  opposed  to  the  sentiments  which  had 
animated  the  British  nation  during  the  mighty 
struggle.  These  views  of  the  past,  we  may  safely 
say,  no  longer  predominate. 

We  may  attribute  this  change  partly  to  the 
inevitable  influence  of  reaction,  and  the  improved 
habits  of  examining  contemporary  literature  ;  but 
also  not  a  little  to  particular  books,  such  as  Von 
Sybel's  '  French  Revolution '  and  Lord  Stanhope's 
Keform  '  Life  of  Pitt.'  In  the  period  of  the  Reform  Bill, 

Bill  poll-  .  . 

tics  col-      — "sixty  years  since,  — when  victory  was  achieved 

cured  his-  J  J  .  J 

tory.  over  the  obstructive  Tory  influences  of  the  previ- 
ous half-century,  history  professed  to  have  gone 
shares  with  the  victors,  and  the  arrows  of  the 
'  Edinburgh  Review,'  multiplied  and  sharpened  in 
a  thousand  quarters,  found  their  way  to  the  very 
heart  of  the  public  in  England,  in  the  United 
States,  the  Colonies,  and  the  Continent.  The 
dreadful  past  was  supposed  to  be  the  deplorable 
result  of  an  unnatural  union,  between  an  imbecile 
king  and  a  proud,  imperious  minister.  Though 
Fox  himself  found  out  when  too  late  that  he 
had  been  deceived,  his  older  opinions,  which  had 
become  so  notorious  during  the  greater  part  of 
his  career,  were  once  more  brought  to  the  front. 
Even  the  old  Whig  admiration  of  Napoleon  had 
a  revival  and  found  a  vivid  expression,  wholly  in- 
consistent with  the  ultra-liberalism  which  formed 
the  rest  of  the  historical  programme.  He  and 


FROM    1763   TO    1789.  167 

Fox  were  martyrs  who  had  been  shamefully  per- 
secuted by  inferior  men  incapable  of  understand- 
ing their  greatness.  But  the  numerous  Memoirs 
which  have  seen  the  light  in  recent  years  have 
not  confirmed  that  view,  and  in  England  at  any 
rate  it  is  very  generally  repudiated. 


168 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 

BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   DURING   THE   FRENCH- 
REVOLUTION  WAR — 1793-1800. 

Pitt's  views  WE  begin  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain 

as  to  the  . 

French  Ee-  during  the  greatest  of  all  its  wars  with  a  brief 

volution. 

statement  of  Pitt's  position  at  its  opening.  Only 
ignorance  or  party-spirit  could  fail  to  note  that  he 
was  almost  the  last  person  in  the  kingdom  to  admit 
that  the  course  taken  by  France  called  for  war, 
and  that  there  was  everything  in  the  world  to 
dispose  him  to  peace.  For  more  than  three  years 
-1789-1793 — he  guided  the  country  through 
the  extreme  excitement  produced  by  the  dreadful 
scenes  passing  in  France.  At  every  pause  of  the 
terrible  drama  his  voice  was  to  be  heard  loudly 
proclaiming  non-interference.  He  positively  re- 
fused to  join  the  Allied  Powers  at  Pilnitz.  He 
was  obviously  and  avowedly  forced  into  war  at 
last  by  the  nation,  and  had  no  choice. 

The  ideas  which  ruled  that  almost  invincible 
repugnance  were  open  to  all  the  world.     As  a 


DURING    THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       169 

statesman  he  regarded  France  in  the  light  of  a 
counterpoise  to  Russia,  which  was  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  paralysis  of  Western  Europe  to 
complete  the  absorption  of  Poland.  He  had  per- 
suaded himself  that  the  Revolution  was  only  a 
temporary  unsettlement,  called  for  by  the  finan- 
cial and  social  diseases  of  France,  and  that  she 
would  soon  return  again  to  her  place  in  the 
European  Balance,  from  which  she  could  not  be 
spared.  The  British  nation,  led  by  Burke,  inter- 
preted the  course  of  events  with  more  sagacity, 
and  failed  to  find  any  element  in  French  society 
strong  enough  to  arrest  its  headlong  career.  The 
Revolution  was  already  infecting  the  neighbour- 
ing States,  and  the  British  Isles  more  than  all 
others.  From  the  point  of  view  of  British  pros- 
perity there  was  every  excuse  for  Pitt's  inclina- 
tion to  shut  his  eyes  to  the  true  state  of  things. 
To  have  attained  such  wonderful  success  in  the 
development  of  his  country's  resources,  and  now 
to  see  the  whole  object  of  his  life  torn  away  from 
him  by  war,  was  a  prospect  the  horror  of  which 
can  only  be  measured  by  those  who  have  made 
a  study  of  the  work  he  performed  during  the  first 
period  of  his  administration. 

But  the  time  came  when  he   found  that  he  War  forced 
would  have  had  to  relinquish  every  shred  of  the  French, 
political  inheritance  which  had  been  intrusted  to 
him,  every  particle  of  the  Foreign  Policy  he  had 


170  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

himself  proclaimed  to  the  world,  had  he  shut  his 
eyes  to  what  the  French  proceeded  to  do  without 
the  slightest  consideration  for  British  interests, 
and  yet  fully  aware  of  the  importance  attached 
to  their  acts.  To  put  it  shortly — they  overran 
and  annexed  Holland,  and  on  the  remonstrance 
of  the  British  minister  declared  war.  Pitt  had 
now  no  alternative.  The  shores  of  the  Low 
Countries  had  always,  as  we  have  seen,  been 
recognised  as  a  vital  part  of  the  English  defence  ; 
for  their  ports  dominated  the  Channel.  The 
action  of  Great  Britain  was  to  be  viewed  not 
only  from  the  side  of  the  general  considerations 
of  International  Law  and  national  obligation,  but 
from  the  side  of  strategy  and  self-defence. 
Pitt  had  Pitt  had  indeed,  as  a  separate  proposal,  and  in 
the  issue,  the  presence  of  the  dangerous  advance  of  Russia, 
paid  some  attention  to  overtures  for  the  French 
annexation  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  It  was 
one  of  his  few  mistakes,  and  could  not  have  been 
put  into  practice  ;  but  to  allow  the  occupation 
of  the  whole  of  the  Low  Countries  by  a  State 
which,  whether  professedly  hostile  or  not,  would 
hold  the  southern  and  eastern  coasts  of  the 
British  Channel,  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  the 
Gulf  of  Lyons,  was  nothing  more  nor  less  than  to 
place  a  rope  round  the  British  neck,  and  to  hand 
the  end  of  it  over  to  those  who  were  only  too 
ready  to  do  the  rest.  It  was  to  give  up  a 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR.       I7l 

thousand  years  of  history,  to  wipe  out  from  past 
records  the  thousands  of  lives,  the  millions  of 
money,  and  the  innumerable  obligations  incurred 
in  building  up  the  empire.  It  was  to  open  up  a 
frightful  future  of  war,  with  every  disadvantage 
of  place  and  time,  with  diminished  resources,  and 
a  sense  of  paying  a  tremendous  penalty  for  the 
indulgence  of  a  momentary  infatuation.  Better 
to  take  the  dreadful  plunge  at  once  into  the 
old  state  of  war,  subsidies,  and  alliances,  with  all 
its  unknown  future  of  debt,  distress,  and  sedition, 
than  attempt  to  assume  the  attitude  of  affected 
insular  indifference,  false  to  every  tie  of  honour 
and  policy,  and  laden  with  the  heavy  certainty 
of  future  retribution. 

Happily  for  the  world  these  views  commended 
themselves  even  to  the  pacific  Pitt.  The  plunge 
was  taken.  The  war  which  had  been  declared  by 
France  on  February  8,  1793,  broke  out ;  and  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  the  modern  world,  as  we 
now  find  it,  was  the  result  of  the  British  Foreign 
Policy,  of  which  the  defence  of  the  Channel  shore 
had  always  been,  speaking  generally,  a  funda- 
mental part.  As  that  policy  further  developed, 
Napoleon  himself  confessed  that  it  was  the  British, 
with  their  naval  power,  their  foreign  subsidies, 
and  finally  with  their  operations  in  the  Peninsula, 
who  interposed  between  him  and  the  triumphs  on 
which  he  had  with  good  reason  taught  Europe  to 


172  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

reckon.     There  is   every  reason  for  insisting  on 
the  cogency  of  the  grounds  for  war  as  they  pre- 
sented themselves  to  British  statesmen. 
Eeasons          Of  course  we  may  well,  at  this  distance  of  time, 

why  war 

could  not    indulge  the  wish  that  it  had  been  possible  to  let 

be  evaded.  r 

the  French  people  work  out  their  own  Revolution ; 
but  we  should  deceive  ourselves  if  we  compared 
the  wise  non-interference  of  modern  times  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  States  with  the  circumstances 
of  the  great  French  Revolution.  It  was  different 
in  kind  to  anything  which  has  ever  been  seen 
before  or  since.  There  was  no  pretence  of  leaving 
other  nations  alone.  Distinctions  of  race  and 
history  disappeared  in  the  proclamation  of  the 
brotherhood  of  man.  The  republican  propaganda 
openly  professed  to  inculcate  its  principles  wher- 
ever its  emissaries  could  penetrate.  Every  one 
knows  its  famous  "Declaration  to  the  Nations." 
This  it  was  which  gradually,  and  almost  insen- 
sibly, carried  away  all  the  defences  of  peace  one 
after  the  other,  however  steadfastly  men  like  Pitt 
clung  to  them.  Even  in  1792  he  looked  forward 

o 

to  "fifteen  years  of  peace."  But  how  could  so- 
ciety hold  together  if  no  barrier  was  to  be  raised 
against  the  influx  of  paid  propagandists,  and  the 
flood  of  sedition  which  came  pouring  in  from 
France  ?  Burke  was  indeed  raising  the  barrier  by 
his  extraordinary  skill  and  energy.  How  could 
Pitt  but  give  his  aid  ?  In  short,  neutrality  was 


DURING   THE    FRENCH-RE VOLUTION    WAR.       173 

impossible,  both  on  social  and  political  grounds ; 
and  this  is  now  very  generally  understood. 

Again,  then,  the  principles  which  had  governed  The  old 
the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain  for  so  many  pSSTre- 

n     .  appears. 

generations  appeared  in  active  operation  at  the 
commencement  of  the  new  war.  Again  they 
were  represented  by  the  phrase  "  ships,  colonies, 
and  commerce,"  under  the  conditions,  which  were 
only  gradually  realised,  of  a  united  people  in  both 
islands,  of  the  continued  protection  of  the  British 
Channel,  and  of  the  conservation  of  the  European 
Balance  of  Power.  The  Koyal  Navy  was  organ- 
ised on  the  principle  of  being  a  match  for  all  the 
other  navies  of  Europe  under  whatever  combina- 
tion ;  and  it  protected  the  colonies  which  were 
still  left  after  the  American  Revolt,  as  well  as 
India.  While  naval  supremacy  brought  about  Naval  su- 
the  absorption  of  the  maritime  possessions  ofr 
other  countries,  it  also  protected  in  every  sea  the 
commerce  which  multiplied  its  activities  as  the 
ocean  became  more  and  more  the  exclusive  prop- 
erty of  its  mistress.  The  recurring  military 
expeditions  to  Holland  which  characterised  the 
first  years  of  the  war,  pursued  indeed  the  same 
melancholy  course  as  in  former  times ;  but  they 
at  least  exemplified  the  doctrine  of  Channel- 
protection,  and  gradually  taught  the  country 
that,  however  marked  its  loyalty  to  the  Crown, 
it  was  no  longer  safe  to  put  its  trust  in  the 


174  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

inexperienced  princes  of  the  blood  then  available. 
Descents     The    descents  upon    France  were    in   accordance 

on  France. 

with  precedent,  but  were  only  useful  as  far  as 
they  kept  at  home  French  troops  which  would 
otherwise  have  been  employed  beyond  the  frontier. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  they  were  even  more 
deficient  in  local  success  than  those  of  the  elder 
Pitt,  who  acted  on  the  same  policy ;  for  the  loyal- 
ist French  emigres  who  were  at  first  reckoned  as 
an  accession  of  strength,  proved  to  be  useless. 

Gathered  round  and  bearing  up  all  other  con- 
siderations with  a  daily  increase  of  cogency  was 
the  undying  instinct  that,  over  and  above  the 
Foreign  insular  aspects  of  Foreign  Policy,  the  true  and 
and  sub-  permanent  safeguard  of  British  interests  was  to 
be  found  as  of  old  in  uniting  the  insulted  and  en- 
dangered nations  of  Europe  against  the  offender. 
The  new  -  born  Republic  which  was  breaking 
through  its  own  limits  on  every  side,  and  osten- 
tatiously taking  the  place  occupied  by  Spain  in 
the  sixteenth,  and  by  monarchical  France  itself 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  was  destroying  the 
Balance  and  trampling  it  to  pieces.  At  any  risk 
the  old  safeguard  must  be  renewed  for  the  sake 
of  one  and  all.  France  was  to  be  attacked  on 
every  side, — in  the  Mediterranean,  on  its  western 
coasts,  on  its  northern  and  eastern  frontier ;  and, 
as  the  one  nation  which,  by  the  help  of  its  navy, 
was  able  to  retain  its  ships,  colonies,  and  com- 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       175 

merce,  Great  Britain  was  to  find  payment  for  the 
armies  of  Europe.  If  the  population  was  unable 
to  bear  any  further  taxation,  posterity  must  be 
called  upon  to  bear  its  share. 

And  here  came  in  the  singular  advantage  en-  British 
joyed  by  Great  Britain  in  its  fund  of  credit.  No  a 
other  nation  possessed  anything  to  be  compared 
with  it.  A  far-seeing  sagacity  enabled  British 
rulers  to  perceive  that  at  such  a  crisis  the  risk 
of  raising  immense  loans  must  be  run.  The  best 
thing  to  say  about  it  is  that  the  risk  has  been 
run  with  success,  and  that  their  foresight  has 
been  justified.  This  is  not  to  say  that  sufficient 
efforts  have  been  made  to  keep  the  National 
Debt  within  safe  bounds.  France  and  the  United 
States  have  each  in  turn  read  a  much  later  lesson 
to  Great  Britain,  which  ought  to  be  taken  to 
heart ;  but  something  has  been  done  to  reduce 
the  British  Debt,  and  the  way  to  do  more  has 
been  opened  up  in  recent  times.  It  was  emphati- 
cally credit,  the  British  power  of  raising  loans-on 
the  public  security  to  almost  any  extent  and  pay- 
ing no  exorbitant  interest,  which  saved  Europe. 

What  was  the  secret  of  this  wonderful  credit  ? 
It  was  the  product  of  many  things  peculiar  to 
England.  To  name  only  a  few  of  them,  it  re- 
sulted from  steady  persistence  in  the  financial 
system  established  in  the  reign  of  William  III.  ; 
from  the  growth  of  trade,  manufactures,  com- 


176  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

merce ;  from  the  multiplication  of  markets  for 
British  produce — and  this  during  war  as  well  as 
peace ;  from  the  security  afforded  by  a  ubiquitous 
Royal  Navy ;  from  the  social  order  which,  under 
the  peaceable  succession  to  the  Crown  and  the  de- 
cay of  Jacobitism,  had  made  great  progress;  and  in 
this  connection,  from  what  we  may  call  the  hard- 
ening of  the  Constitution  in  proportion  as  its  three 
divisions, — King,  Lords,  and  Commons, — each  in 
its  own  place,  developed  and  improved  its  rela- 
tions with  its  co-ordinates  and  the  people.  In 
The  Law  fact  the  Law  was  King,  and  went  hand  in  hand 

was  King.         .   ,     ri       ... 

with  Credit. 

Perhaps  if  we  were  to  inquire  how  it  was  that 
such  a  source  of  power  was  available  at  this  par- 
ticular juncture  to  an  extent  which  eclipsed  all 
previous  wealth  of  resource  known  to  history,  we 
should  assign  the  first  place  to  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain  had  not  to  begin  afresh  with  her 
TheKoyai  Royal  Navy,  as  she  had  in  1739  after  a  long 
the  height  period  of  peace  and  neglect.  A  strong  link  of 
fine  officers  connected  that  sad  awakening  of 
the  country,  and  its  consequent  uprising,  with 
the  crisis  of  the  French  Revolution.  We  have 
seen  how  the  great  Lord  Hawke,  who  was  so 
much  concerned  with  founding  the  empire,  formed 
a  school  of  which  Lord  Rodney  and  Lord  Howe, 
his  pupils,  were  the  noble  representatives.  The 
elevated  standard  set  by  Hawke  was  never 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-KEVOLUTION    WAR.       177 

lowered.  The  whole  naval  service  was  impreg- 
nated with  his  spirit,  and  successive  governments 
proceeded  on  his  maxims.  Nelson  was  a  post- 
captain  when  Hawke  died,  and  represented  on  a 
still  grander  scale  his  public  spirit  and  mag- 
nanimity. Hood,  Jervis,  Bridport,  Duncan,  and 
Collingwood  were  only  the  leaders  of  a  great  body 
of  brave  and  capable  men  such  as  the  country 
never  had  before,  and  will  be  very  fortunate  if  it 
ever  sees  again. 

But  it  must  be  admitted  that  this  navy  had  a  French 
special  advantage  unknown  in  former  wars.  The  moralised, 
aristocratic  French  navy  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury was  peculiarly  obnoxious  to  the  Republicans, 
and  was  soon  deprived  of  many  of  its  best  officers. 
In  the  army  this  would  have  been  of  less  conse- 
quence, but  the  sea  is  a  stern  mistress,  and  exacts 
a  strict  apprenticeship  of  many  years.  For  the 
formation  of  a  fighting  navy  simple  instruction 
and  theoretical  tuition,  however  superior  they 
may  be,  are  inadequate  :  training  at  the  hands 
of  skilled  experts  versed  in  the  traditions  of  the 
service,  and  the  lessons  learnt  by  opportunities 
of  putting  theory  into  instant  practice,  are  abso- 
lutely essential  in  addition.  Experienced  soldiers 
may  indeed,  like  Blake,  Monk,  and  others  at  the 
time  of  the  English  Civil  War,  be  converted  into 
good  seamen  if  they  possess  the  necessary  gifts ; 
but  mere  republican  enthusiasm  turned  out,  as 

M 


178  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

might  have  been  expected,  to  be  no  education  at 
all,  and  in  some  respects  was  worse  than  none. 

It  was  no  doubt  owing  to  the  sense  of  security 
inspired  by  a  navy  which  was,  from  its  own 
excellence  and  the  deficiencies  of  its  enemy,  tri- 
umphant on  almost  every  occasion,  that  the  credit 
of  Great  Britain  stood  the  immense  pressure 
The  Armed  which  was  laid  upon  it.  In  vain  the  Armed 

Neutrality  ..... 

again.  Neutrality  again  raised  its  head.  The  spectacle 
of  the  British  nation  occupying  the  seas  of  the 
world  so  as  to  prevent  all  others  from  sharing 
in  a  commerce  which  they  alone  had  a  navy  to 
support,  and  forbidding  them  by  a  rigid  exac- 
tion of  the  Right  of  Search  from  making  profit 
by  trading  with  France,  was  more  than  human 
nature  could  stand ;  but  till  the  war  was  over, 
and  for  many  a  long  year  afterwards,  Great 
Britain  refused  to  relinquish  her  advantage. 
Such  a  surrender  was  indeed  impossible  till 
quite  a  recent  date.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
how  future  naval  wars  can  be  carried  to  a  con- 
clusion under  the  change  which  has  in  later  times 
been  effected. 

It  was  in  consequence  of  this  sense  of  security 
engendered  by  naval  predominance  and  financial 

Failures  in  soundness  that  the  military  failures  in  Holland 
were  felt  so  slightly  that  they  had  no  important 
effect  upon  the  credit  of  Great  Britain  with  capi- 
talists. The  failure  was  a  distress  at  the  time, 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       179 

but  its  true  significance  was  much  better  appraised 
than  it  has  been  in  later  generations.  It  was 
plain  enough  to  intelligent  persons  that  British 
generals  and  armies  could  not  possibly  in  those 
days  be  a  match  for  Continental  generals  and 
armies  till  they  had  acquired  an  amount  of  ex- 
perience in  war  under  approved  masters  which 
an  insular  State,  with  a  very  small  standing 
army,  could  not  afford.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  French  Revolution  produced  almost 
at  once  a  nation  of  soldiers,  of  whom  the  very 
best  came  to  the  surface.  Distinguished  courage 
and  conduct  in  the  field  raised  the  private  to  the 
rank  of  an  officer,  even  of  a  general  or  marshal, 
as  a  matter  of  course ;  and  every  soldier  knew 
it.  Even  these  however  failed,  as  might  be  ex- 
pected, just  at  first ;  but  necessity,  the  necessity 
of  dealing  with  an  enemy  at  every  point  of  the 
frontier,  was  the  stern  teacher  which  elevated 
the  French,  almost  at  a  bound,  to  the  first  rank 
of  military  nations.  Their  enemies  soon  found  Military 

.  .  .  .       eminence 

this  out,  with  an  astonishment  which  is  pathetic,  of  France, 
and  at  a  cost  which  was  terrible.  The  British 
suffered  far  less  than  any  other  opponent,  and 
considering  the  mistakes  they  made,  far  less  than 
they  deserved.  They  had  at  least  their  ships  to 
fall  back  upon. 

The  fact  is  that  both  army  and  generals  had  to 
be  absolutely  created  afresh,   to  learn  in  small 


180  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

sections,  to  learn  slowly.  They  were  hampered 
by  a  multitude  of  traditional  impediments,  by 
antiquated  usages  of  Frederick  the  Great's  time, 
by  what  soldiers  call  "  pipe-clay,"  and  civilians 
"red-tape";  above  all,  by  the  prevailing  custom 
already  mentioned  of  employing  members  of  the 
Royal  Family  in  the  field  before  they  had  been 
trained  to  their  duty  and  had  proved  that  they 
were  masters  of  their  art,  under  exactly  the  same 
apprenticeship  as  pther  officers. 
Gradual  The  standard  being  thus  lowered,  it  was  all  the 


mentof  more  creditable  to  Sir  Ralph  Abercromby,  Sir 
army.  John  Moore,  and  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  that  they 
— for  it  was  chiefly  their  work,  assisted  at  the 
Horse  Guards,  when  no  longer  on  foreign  service, 
by  the  Duke  of  York — gradually  succeeded  in 
raising  it  to  a  higher  level ;  and  that  at  last,  after 
years  of  failure,  they  produced  a  school  of  officers 
who  proved  themselves  in  the  end  the  worthy 
rivals  of  their  brethren  at  sea,  and  not  inferior 
to  the  French  marshals,  as  well  as  a  body  of 
troops  who  "  could  go  anywhere  and  do  any- 
thing." Then  also,  towering  above  them  all,  came 
to  the  front  the  man  who  had  been  the  chief 
agent  in  the  process,  and  who,  alone  in  Europe, 
could  be  matched  with  the  great  Napoleon. 
Unfair  These  considerations  may  be  thought  too  obvi- 

treatment  i     -i     •  T  T  t> 

of  Pitt's      ous,  but  they  are  needed  in  order  to  dispose  01 
ures.         the    attacks   which    Macaulay   and    others   have 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       181 

made  on  the  memory  of  Pitt  with  regard  to  his 
so-called  failure  to  wield  with  effect  the  forces 
at  his  disposal.  He  did  the  utmost  which  his 
circumstances  permitted,  and  it  is  as  absurd  to 
condemn  him  for  not  using  the  army  which  he 
had  not  got,  as  to  deny  him  the  credit  which 
he  deserves  for  the  success  of  the  weapon  which 
he  had  to  his  hand,  the  Royal  Navy.  The 
error  arises  from  the  refusal  to  balance  against 
one  another  the  two  things  which  ought  to  be 
balanced.  In  the  War  of  the  Revolution,  as 
distinguished  from  that  with  Napoleon,  each 
contending  side  was  armed  with  one  superior 
and  one  inferior  weapon ;  the  true  objects  of 
comparison  being  the  soldiers  of  France  and  the 
sailors  of  Britain.  In  the  latter  war  the  sailors 
had  little  to  do,  for  their  enemies  were  soon 
annihilated ;  while  the  armies  had  come  to  be 
fairly  on  a  level  as  regards  efficiency :  or  rather 
the  demoralisation  of  the  French  and  the  im- 
provement of  the  British  in  the  Peninsula  gradu- 
ally gave  the  superiority  in  both  weapons  to  the 
latter.  This  position,  in  conjunction  with  the 
uprising  of  the  Continental  nations,  meant  vic- 
tory. Pitt  had  passed  away ;  his  successors 
were  feeble ;  but  nothing  could  now  impede  the 
onward  march. 

So  much  for  the  weapons  at  Pitt's  command 
for  the  defence  of  the  British  Isles,  especially  of 


182  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  Channel  and  of  the  countries  bordering  the 
Channel,  for  the  protection  of  commerce,  and  for 
the  support  of  the  credit  which  could  alone  enable 
his  country  to  hold  out  against  the  French  propa- 
ganda. It  is  remarkable  that  he  should  have 
achieved  such  a  measure  of  success  at  a  time  when 
his  basis  of  operations,  or  at  least  the  Irish  part 
of  it,  was  by  no  means  in  the  condition  which 
was  required  in  order  that  he  might  use  those 
weapons  with  their  full  power.  Unlike  his  father 
when  he  founded  the  empire,  he  was  hampered 
and  crippled  by  the  rebellious  condition  of  the 
Condition  sister-island.  We  have  seen  that  the  island  was 
in  a  comparatively  healthy  state  under  the  elder 
Pitt, — at  least  it  was  in  a  course  of  gradual  and 
wholesome  improvement,  and  gave  no  trouble. 
But  Ireland  was  not  left  in  peace  to  pursue  a 
course  of  self- improvement.  Not  long  before  the 
younger  Pitt  came  into  power  the  principles  of 
republicanism  made  their  way  from  America, 
and  bore  fruit  much  as  they  had  in  France ;  for 
in  each  case  there  was  a  soil  well  prepared  to 
receive  them. 

The  Penal  Laws  against  Papists  had  been  a 
necessary  consequence  of  aggressive  and  most 
dangerous  Jacobitism ;  nor  could  they  be  re- 
pealed, though  in  practice  they  were  greatly 
mitigated.  The  Protestant  Parliament  became, 
however,  after  the  American  War,  a  centre  of  dis- 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       183 

affection ;  and  when  France,  Spain,  and  Holland 
joined  the  colonists  with  a  view  to  recovering 
their  losses  in  the  war  of  empire,  this  Parliament, 
with  the  help  of  the  Irish  volunteers,  who  had 
been  raised  for  the  defence  of  the  united  Em- 
pire, practically  separated  the  British  from  the 
Irish  Government.  The  two  Acts  which  bound 
the  two  Legislatures  to  one  another  were  repealed 
under  Irish  pressure  at  the  moment  when  Britain 
was  at  its  most  critical  condition.  This  was 
suicidal  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government, 
but  the  knife  was  at  its  throat,  and  nothing  else 
could  be  done.  Nor  was  it  possible  to  retrace  the 
step  when  peace  returned. 

Pitt  found  it  necessary  to  wait  till  a  Union  of 
the  two  islands  could  be  effected,  and  in  the 
meantime  to  check  by  such  means  as  were  still 
in  his  power  the  further  development  of  the  Irish 
aspirations  for  independence.  The  Union  came 
about  in  a  way  which  could  hardly  have  been 
expected.  Pitt's  numerous  reforms  served  only 
to  exasperate  the  Irish.  Every  year  showed  that 
something  else  was  necessary,  and  the  need  of 
corporate  union  became  more  and  more  appar- 
ent. Then  came  the  French  Revolution,  which 
turned  the  idea  of  practical  separation  into  dis- 
tinct rebellion.  Revolutionary  societies  spread  Ireland 
like  wildfire  over  the  island,  and  in  1795  the  factions. 
organisation  was  practically  complete,  though  the 


184  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

actual  rebellion  did  not  break  out  till  1798.  The 
Irish  Protestants,  formed  into  "  Orange  Lodges," 
kept  it  at  bay ;  but  the  direct  interference  of  the 
French,  and  the  open  adhesion  of  the  rebels  to 
France,  brought  matters  to  a  point.  Was  Ireland 
to  be  French  or  English  ?  That  was  the  plain 
issue.  The  Jacobin  Clubs  at  Dublin  and  Belfast 
ordered  regiments  of  "  National  Guards "  -  so 
called  after  the  French — to  be  levied,  with  French 
uniforms  and  passwords.  The  battle  was  no 
longer  to  be  fought  on  the  Continent  or  at  sea, 
but  on  the  shore  of  Ireland,  within  a  few  miles  of 
the  English  coast. 

Then  at  last,  just  before  it  was  too  late,  the 
British  Government,  acting  on  timely  information, 
i-  seized  the  chosen  leader  of  the  Rebellion,  Lord 

1798.  Edward  Fitzgerald,  and  without  much  difficulty 
put  down  the  armed  forces  which  had  risen  in 
Wexford.  Lord  Cornwallis,  whom  we  have  heard 
of  in  the  American  War,  and  who  had  spent  nine 
years  in  India  establishing  on  a  secure  footing  the 
new  order  of  things  brought  about  by  Pitt's  India 
Bill,  was  now  given  carte  blanche,  or  nearly  so, 
to  set  the  troubled  affairs  of  Ireland  to  rights  on 

The  Union,  the  footing  of  corporate  union.  As  then  estab- 
lished the  Union  has  remained ;  and  from  that 
day  the  internal  difficulties  which  had  so  seriously 
interfered  with  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great 
Britain  passed  away.  The  "  United  Kingdom  of 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR.       185 

Great  Britain  and  Ireland  "  could  now  act  from  a 
secure  base,  the  troops  were  no  longer  interned  in 
Ireland  as  if  in  an  enemy's  country,  and  no  small 
part  of  their  success  abroad  was  due  to  the  pres- 
ence of  brave  Irishmen  in  the  ranks  of  the  army. 

The  organisation  of  India  cannot  be  reckoned  India, 
in  any  strict  sense  as  part  of  the  base  from  which 
Pitt's  Foreign  Policy  was  developed.  But  he 
reaped  indirectly  the  fruit  of  his  treatment  of  that 
vast  country  which  he  had  embodied  in  the  famous 
Bill  carried  at  the  commencement  of  his  Ministry. 
Interpreted  and  admirably  worked  as  it  was  by 
Cornwallis,  the  designs  of  the  enemy  were  frus- 
trated just  before  the  time  when  the  absence  of 
wise  organisation  on  the  part  of  the  British 
would  have  given  the  French  a  fair  chance  of 
proceeding  once  more  with  the  plans  they  had 
been  obliged  to  relinquish  in  the  reign  of  George 
II.  The  waves  of  hostile  aggression  rolled  off 
from  India  as  from  an  immovable  rock.  So  also  The  Coi- 
with  the  colonies  which  still  remained  faithful. 
They  had  received  suitable  constitutions,  and 
clung  the  more  closely  to  the  mother  -  country 
the  more  fiercely  she  was  attacked.  Her  suc- 
cesses were  theirs,  and  her  men  of  war  formed 
the  ever-shifting  and  yet  constant  link  between 
the  scattered  portions  of  the  empire.  These  were 
days  when  "Imperial  Federation"  had  not  been 
heard  of,  but  the  foundation  was  laid  by  the 


186  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

settlement  of  officers  of  both  services  upon  colonial 
lands,  granted  at  the  Peace  by  way  of  pension — 
the  sensible  form  in  which  Government  strength- 
ened its  hold  upon  the  daughter  States. 
Patriotism       It  is  unnecessary  to  do  more  than   allude  in 

of  the  old  .  J 

Whigs.  this  place  to  the  enormous  assistance  which  Pitt 
received  in  his  arduous  task  from  the  collapse 
of  his  great  rival  Fox,  and  the  junction  of  the 
Moderate,  or  "  Old  Whigs,"  with  himself,  under 
the  guidance  of  Burke  and  the  Duke  of  Portland. 
Never  did  the  old  Revolution-families  more  nobly 
prove  their  right  to  be  consulted  on  the  destinies  of 
their  country.  The  services  they  had  performed 
at  the  Revolution  had  been  worn  out  of  memory 
by  the  errors  of  the  factions  into  which  they 
had  been  split  up.  They  were  now  reinstated. 
The  influence  of  Pitt  and  the  teaching  of  Burke, 
coinciding  with  the  conviction  that  the  battle  for 
life  or  death  had  commenced  for  their  country, 
separated  them  from  Fox  and  his  friends  by  a 
cleavage  which  could  not  be  filled  up.  Patriotism 
took  the  place  of  party,  and  their  old  leader  was 
left  with  an  insignificant  following  both  in  Parlia- 
Scotiand  ment  and  the  country.  Scotland  had  forgotten 
land.  its  ancient  feud,  and  Ireland,  though  the  weak 
place  of  the  nation,  could  be  left  till  the  proper 
time  had  arrived  to  deal  with  its  new  disturb- 
ances. It  was  this  settled  Government,  this 
unanimity  of  Parliament,  this  harmony  of  King, 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR.       187 

Lords,  and  Commons,  which  enabled  Pitt  to 
grasp  the  full  power  of  the  State  and  exhibit  his 
country  in  its  old  position  before  the  astonished 
world. 

We  must  now  follow  in  a  little  more  detail 
Pitt's  use  of  his  weapons  of  war,  of  his  partly 
united  base,  and  of  the  national  credit.  His  plan 
might  indeed  be  briefly  described  as  war  with 
France,  and  alliance  with  all  her  enemies,  save 
and  except  so  far  as  the  Armed  Neutrality  for 
a  brief  period  suspended  it.  In  1793,  Pitt  having,  Pitt's 
as  we  have  seen,  been  absolutely  deprived  of  all  * 
choice  by  the  conduct  of  France  to  Holland,  and 
her  Declaration  of  War  with  Great  Britain, 
formed  his  alliances  rapidly  with  Russia,  Sar- 
dinia, Spain,  Naples,  Prussia,  Austria,  Portugal, 
Tuscany,  and  several  of  the  Princes  of  the  Ger- 
man States ;  not  one  of  which,  such  was  the 
general  financial  weakness  of  Europe  at  this  time, 
could  do  anything  considerable  in  war  without 
subsidies  from  the  Island -Kingdom.  The  spec- 
tacle of  such  a  system  of  general  subsidising  is 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  afforded  in  the 
history  of  the  world ;  but  it  had  already  been 
witnessed  on  a  smaller  scale  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  and  had  now  come  to  be  reckoned  as  a 
matter  of  course.  It  has  indeed  been  treated — 
such  is  the  force  of  habit — in  much  the  same 
way  by  modern  historians ;  but  it  will  take  a 


188  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

place  of  its  own    in    the    future  history  of  this 
great  upheaval  of  the  western  nations. 
Discussion       The  only  justification  for  such   an  anomalous 
policy  of     proceeding,  open  to  abuse,  and  often  abused,  was 

subsidies.  .  . 

the  absolute  necessity  of  the  case.  For  it  is 
plain  that  nothing  can  exercise  so  wholesome  a 
check  upon  the  belligerency  of  a  nation  as  the 
ever-present  fact  that  it  has  to  pay  out  of  its 
own  resources  for  war.  Nothing  can  be  more 
demoralising  than  a  system  of  spending  the 
money  of  other  people  yet  unborn.  What  is 
patent  enough  in  private  life  is  equally  true  of 
States.  And  looking  back  on  the  past,  it  might 
be  argued  that  even  if  the  Continental  States 
had  not  been  subsidised  by  the  British,  even 
supposing  that  the  French  had  in  consequence 
overrun  them  at  the  commencement  of  the  war, 
they  would  have  sooner  rallied  under  the  flag  of 
a  desperate  patriotism  and  forestalled  the  days  of 
the  "  Storm  of  Nations  "  in  1813. 

The  weakness  of  this  line  of  argument  consists 
in  the  application  of  modern  ideas  to  the  times 
which  now  lie  far  behind  us,  so  much  farther  than 
the  mere  lapse  of  years  would  suggest.  The  up- 
heaval has  passed  away,  and  the  whole  face  of 
Europe  has  been  changed  by  the  effects  of  the 
French  Revolution.  But  at  that  time  Continental 
society  was  still  monarchical  and  feudal.  Its 
frame  was  fast  wearing  out,  and  very  much 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       189 

required  the  influx  of  the  new  ideas  which  made 
their  way  from  America,  and  then  from  France ; 
and  yet  if  those  ideas  had  come  down  upon  the 
nations  like  a  flood,  without  preparation,  without 
even  such  preparation  as  France  had  received, 
who  can  say  what  might  have  been  the  con- 
sequences ?  Theories  are  not  of  much  use,  espe- 
cially as  to  the  past ;  but  a  review  of  actual 
facts  teaches  us  practical  lessons.  There  was  no 
popular  resisting  power  to  the  mad  enthusiasm 
of  French  revolutionary  armies,  no  popular  repre- 
sentation, no  exhibition  therefore  of  the  popular 
will,  no  power  of  raising  taxes  to  the  extent 
required  for  an  unforeseen  war  of  an  internecine 
kind.  Of  all  the  Continental  sovereigns  not  one 
inspired  enthusiastic  devotion  or  unlimited  con- 
fidence ;  the  Powers  were  divided  by  old  grudges 
and  new  jealousies ;  each  feared  that  the  other 
would  accept  the  French  bribes  to  betray  its 
rivals.  Concert  without  a  solid  base  would  have 
been  hopeless.  That  base  was  the  British  Treas- 
ury, and  Napoleon  fell  before  the  indomitable 
perseverance  of  his  triumphant  enemy,  the  British 
taxpayer. 

The  National  Assemblies  of  Germany  had  be-  Condition 
come  the  merest  forms.    "  Nowhere,"  says  Heeren,  can  states. 
Professor  of  History  at  Gottingen,  writing  in  1833, 
"  had  they  been  modelled  into  a  true  national 
representation.     But  the  idea  of  it  not  only  lived 


190  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

in  theory,  disseminated  and  fostered  by  the  first 
writers  of  the  day,  but  was  seen  to  be  perman- 
ently realised  in  a  neighbouring  happy  Island- 
State.  It  could  not  therefore  pass  away  from 
practical  politics,  and  was  necessarily,  during  the 
storms  of  the  following  period,  the  Polar  Star 
which  was  for  ever  kept  in  view  in  all  the 
*  aberrations  of  the  times/'  These  words  of  a 
very  competent  observer  are  such  as  a  writer 
belonging  to  the  British  Isles  might  have  hesi- 
tated to  use ;  but  they  describe  the  truth.  The 
minds  which  revolted  from  the  extremes  both  of 
despotism  and  democracy  fondly  turned  towards 
the  British  Constitution.  But  such  ideas  could 
not  operate  effectively  at  such  a  moment.  A 
generation  must  pass  away.  Dire  experience  was 
to  teach  its  terrible  lessons.  The  "  first  writers 
of  the  day  "  could  do  little  till  those  lessons  were 
learnt  by  both  rulers  and  ruled.  The  resistance 
must  come,  if  it  came  at  all,  from  the  great 
feudal  societies,  just  as  they  were ;  and  nobly 
they  did  their  duty  in  standing  firm,  after  many 
vacillations,  to  the  cause  of  independence  and 
European  concert.  But  they  were  unprovided 
with  the  necessary  funds  to  meet  such  an  emer- 
A  question  gency.  Hence  the  question  resolved  itself  into 

of  finance.    *  J  . 

one  of  money.  The  objects  of  the  Continental 
States  threatened  by  France  were  identical  with 
those  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  latter  alone  could 


DURING  THE  FRENCH- RE  VOLUTION  WAR.   191 

pour  in  the  supplies.  She  must  perforce  inter- 
pose if  Europe  were  not  again  to  be  handed  over 
to  a  frightful  tyranny. 

But  was  Great  Britain  called  upon  to  prevent 
this  frightful  tyranny?  We  have  seen  that  it 
was  at  least  in  accordance  with  all  her  previous 
Foreign  Policy  and  with  all  the  European  tradi- 

tions  of  Balance  that  she  should  do  so.      There  Great  Bri- 
tain, 
was  as  yet  no  system  of  a  standing  European 

concert.  And  we  have  also  seen  that  the  fulfil- 
ment of  this  international  duty  had  been  always 
found  to  correspond  with  a  policy  of  safety  to 
Great  Britain  herself,  and  the  support  of  her 
commercial  prosperity.  Safety  to  herself,  because 
France,  aggrandised  by  the  conquest  of  surround- 
ing States,  would  be  a  danger  of  tenfold  magni- 
tude compared  with  France  struggling  for  her 
own  frontiers  against  a  host  of  enemies  sustained 
by  British  subsidies.  Just  as  in  the  struggle  of 
the  days  of  Louis  XIV.,  France  did  in  fact 
never  find  herself  at  leisure  to  bring  her  full 
power  to  bear  upon  England.  As  Wellington 
wrote  to  his  trembling  Government  during  the 
Peninsular  War,  "  You  may  complain  of  the  ex- 
penses of  war,  but  if  you  decline  it  you  will  have 
to  meet  the  invader  on  your  own  shores."  That 
was  the  fundamental  conviction.  Ever  since  1066 
it  had  been  so.  The  Norman  invasion  was  to  be 
the  last,  and  so  it  has  been — has  been  as  yet. 


192  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

With  the  security  of  British  shores  went  hand  in 
hand  commercial  prosperity. 

Posterity  On  Pitt  has  been  thrown  the  responsibility  for 
this  stupendous  resolution — to  make  British  pos- 
terity pay  for  the  salvation  of  Europe  and  the 
safety  of  the  British  empire ;  but  it  cannot  be 
too  often  repeated  that  he  was  only  the  minister 
and  representative  of  the  king,  the  Parliament, 
and  the  nation.  Never  was  a  policy  more  de- 
liberately accepted,  ratified,  and  pursued  by  a 

Pitt's  futile  people.      But    it    is    only  fair   to  Pitt,  on  whom 

efforts  to       1        r  J 

make         so  much   odium  has  fallen  from  many  quarters, 

peace. 

to  observe  that  though  forced  into  war,  he  was 
never  tired  of  making  attempts  to  procure  peace. 
It  is  indeed  a  question  whether  the  dignity  of 
the  nation  was  sufficiently  consulted  in  these 
efforts.  The  first  occasion  was  in  1795,  not 
long  after  the  commencement  of  the  war ;  but 
it  was  perfectly  useless,  for  the  French  were 
intoxicated  with  their  surprising  successes,  and 
naturally  declined  to  pay  attention  to  such  a 
proposal  at  such  a  time.  In  1796  the  French 
appeared  to  have  a  little  more  desire  to  con- 
sider the  question,  but  they  had  no  idea  of 
relinquishing  what  they  fondly  regarded  as  the 
first-fruits  of  their  harvest,  the  possession  of  the 
Netherlands,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  Pitt  under- 
stood too  well  what  the  safety  and  interest  of 
Great  Britain  required,  and  what  the  traditions 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       193 

of  her  Foreign  Policy  all  through  the  centuries 
had  laid  down. 

Nor  would  he,  had  he  wished,  have  been  able 
to  carry  the  nation  with  him  in  accepting  such 
terms.  Burke  had  once  more  alarmed  the  coun- 
try by  his  'Thoughts  on  a  Eegicide  Peace/  and 
public  opinion  was  almost  entirely  with  him. 
Still  more  sternly  than  before  he  dwelt  on  the 
inherently  aggressive  nature  of  the  French  Re- 
public ;  but  he  was  now  able  to  adduce  as  evi- 
dence the  career  it  had  run  since  the  Revolution, 
its  difference  in  kind  from  anything  yet  experi- 
enced, not  only  in  its  warlike  energy  but  in  its 
social  principles ;  to  show  that  these  principles 
were  subversive  of  all  government,  all  religion, 
all  society ;  that  no  country  could  rest  with 
safety  at  peace  with  such  a  neighbour,  so  close 
at  hand,  and  imbued  with  such  a  spirit  of  pro- 
pagandism ;  that  its  doctrines,  thus  passionately 
forced  by  a  novel  species  of  missionaries  upon  all 
the  world,  were  of  the  grossest  kind ;  and  that 
Great  Britain  would  suffer  far  more  by  a  peace 
which  might  commend  itself  as  a  specious  ad- 
vantage than  even  by  the  most  disastrous  war. 
These  sentiments  were  more  suited  to  influence 
the  great  body  of  thoughtful  people  than  the 
political  question  concerning  the  Netherlands ; 
but  the  Government  no  doubt  felt  its  responsi- 
bility for  the  safety  of  the  Channel  and  the 

N 


194  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

coasts  to  be  of  the  first  importance,  and  rele- 
gated sentiment  to  the  second  place.  Sentiment, 
however,  when  largely  shared  by  a  people,  must 
have  its  due  weight,  and  no  Government  can 
afford  to  ignore  it. 

Once  more,  in  1797,  though  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte was  already  flaming  in  the  van  of  the 
Revolutionary  hosts,  Pitt,  influenced  on  these 
occasions  by  his  friend  Wilberforce,  whose  tender 
heart  fitted  him  for  a  philanthropist  in  the  first 
place,  and  a  statesman  only  in  the  second,  again 
attempted  to  make  peace.  He  was  staggered  by 
the  default  of  Prussia,  the  old  ally  of  the  British 
in  the  formation  of  their  empire,  but  now  totter- 
ing under  feeble  government,  and  closely  pressed 
by  the  French.  Professing  to  be  satisfied  with 
compensation  from  the  Ecclesiastical  States,  she 
made  a  secret  compact  with  France  in  1796, 
by  which  she  gave  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
the  bone  of  contention  between  Gallo-Frank  and 
Teuton  for  so  many  centuries.  And  it  seemed 
to  many  a  hopeless  task  to  defend  the  Low 
Conquest  Countries,  though  invaluable  to  England,  without 
allies.  allies ;  for  Austria,  pressed  beyond  bearing,  had 
herself  given  up  their  defence ;  and  Spain,  which 
though  of  no  weight  as  a  military  Power,  had 
ships  and  sailors  of  which  France  would  well 
understand  the  use,  even  this  Spain,  which  had 
had  experience  enough  of  French  ambition,  had 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR.       195 

gone  over  to  the  ever  -  growing  Republic  which 
struck  terror  in  all  directions. 

Worse  than  all,  the  one  strong  arm  of  Great 
Britain  had  in  this  year  suffered  for  some  months 
a  paralysis,  which  made  the  most  sanguine  fear 
that  some  grave  disaster  to  the  country  would 
happen  at  the  most  critical  moment  of  the  island 
history.  The  Mutinies  of  Spithead  and  of  the  The  Muti- 
Nore  were  indeed  the  most  dangerous  events  Royal 

Navy. 

that  had  befallen  the  nation  for  centuries.  It 
is  said  that  on  one  of  the  crises  of  this  terrible 
time  occurred  the  only  sleepless  night  of  the 
great  minister,  whose  feeble  frame  could  never 
have  held  out  to  middle  life,  as  it  did,  if  he 
had  not  possessed  the  wonderful  gift  of  night- 
rest,  even  during  the  most  trying  events  of 
that  momentous  period.  The  grand  coalition  of 
European  States,  not  yet  four  years  old,  was 
already  half-ruined,  and  the  navies  of  Spain  and 
Holland  were  in  the  hands  of  France. 

The  fortitude  of  British  statesmen  would  have 
been  superhuman  could  they  have  witnessed 
under  such  circumstances,  without  dismay,  the 
crumbling  away  of  the  Royal  Navy.  The  crisis 
was  however  met  with  courage  and  promptitude, 
and  the  mutiny  turned  out  to  have  been  a  bless- 
ing in  disguise.  Nothing  short  of  it  could  have 
removed  the  abuses  under  which  that  popular 
service  had  laboured  for  years,  and  when  it  was 


196  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

over  nothing  could  exceed  the  vigour  and  patriot- 
ism of  the  very  men  who  had  been  concerned 
in  it.  With  their  old  furious  energy  they  rushed 
Battle  of  upon  the  Dutch  fleet  at  Camperdown,  and  very 
down.  few  of  their  victories  were  more  complete.  The 
battle  of  St  Vincent  in  February  1797  might 
have  been  considered  a  set-off  against  the  de- 
pressing position  of  affairs  which  led  to  the  pro- 
posals for  peace  in  this  year,  for  it  broke  up 
the  plan  of  uniting  the  Spanish  with  the  Dutch 
and  French  navies  in  a  descent  upon  England ; 
and  it  had  the  still  further  merit  of  bringing  to 
the  front  Nelson,  who  was  about  to  become  the 
hero  of  heroes  in  the  history  of  naval  affairs ; 
but  its  fame  had  grown  dim  under  the  storm 
of  the  Mutinies.  Napoleon  was  conquering  half 
the  world,  and  the  millions  spent  in  subsidies 
seemed  to  have  been  thrown  away.  Thus  the 
international  aspect  of  affairs  receded  into  the 
distance,  and  once  more  an  attempt  was  made 
to  drop  out  of  the  European  struggle,  even  at  the 
expense  of  relinquishing  nearly  all  the  colonial 
conquests  which  had  been  made.  Why  should 
not  Great  Britain  be  allowed  to  pursue  her  com- 
mercial instincts,  and  gather  up  the  fruits  of  her 
immense  sacrifices  ? 

It  is  not  of  much  use  to  speculate  as  to  what 
might  have  been  the  result  of  a  Peace  in  1797. 
If  the  French  could  have  remembered  the  ancient 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       197 

maxim  that  "half  is  better  than  the  whole," 
they  would  certainly  have  left  off  in  their  career 
of  conquest  at  a  much  better  point  for  the  exten- 
sion of  their  empire  and  of  their  political  prin- 
ciples than  they  secured  at  the  Treaty  of  Vienna. 
But  no  Peace  could  have  lasted  under  such 
humiliations  as  Austria,  Prussia,  Spain,  Italy, 
and  the  Low  Countries  had  been  forced  to  under- 
go. Great  Britain  would  never  have  given  up 
the  struggle  for  the  Mediterranean ;  Napoleon 
would  never  have  rested  till  he  had  acquired 
the  command  of  it,  and  with  it  the  road  to  Egypt 
and  India.  At  any  rate  the  British  proposals 
were  scarcely  noticed  by  the  triumphant  French, 
and  the  battle  of  Camperdown  announced  at  once 
the  repentance  of  the  mutineers,  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  French  hopes  of  a  descent  upon  Eng- 
land with  the  help  of  the  excellent  Dutch  sea- 
men. 

This  failure  turned  the  eyes  of  the  brilliant  The  mean- 
vouns:  conqueror  towards  the  alternative  of  ruin-  poieon's 

descent  on 

ing  the  only  country  which  he  really  feared,  Egypt. 
by  blocking  her  way  to  India  through  the  roads 
of  Egypt  and  Turkey,  and  by  setting  up  at  Con- 
stantinople a  great  French  empire  which  might 
gradually  tear  away  India  by  the  help  of  a 
French  organisation  of  the  great  Mahratta 
princes.  That  this  was  the  far-reaching  plan 
which  dazzled  himself  and  the  French  Govern- 


198  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

ment  is  even  more  evident  now  than  it  was  at 
the  time.  All  strategic  considerations  were  lost  in 
the  blaze  and  glamour  of  anticipated  success  ;  and 
certainly  if  any  one  could  have  accomplished  the 
gigantic  enterprise  it  was  Napoleon ;  nor  was  the 
Government  of  the  Directory,  which  was  already 
powerless  in  his  hands,  at  all  unwilling  to  let  him 
dash  himself  to  pieces  on  any  rock  that  he  chose 
to  run  upon.  He  made  short  work  of  the  Direc- 
tors when  he  returned  from  Egypt. 

All  eyes  were  now  fixed  on  this  new  direction 
of  French  energy.  It  was  a  much  less  expensive 
and  dangerous  process  for  Great  Britain  than  the 
former  efforts  made  by  her  enemy  against  the 
coasts  of  the  three  kingdoms ;  for  the  French  had 
no  command  of  the  sea,  and  with  Nelson  on  the 
spot  were  not  likely  to  have  a  reasonably  sound 
basis  of  operations.  To  India  the  Government 
turned  with  confidence ;  for  Cornwallis,  having 
laid  the  foundations  of  good  order  firm  and  strong, 
had  already  curbed  the  power  of  Tippoo  Sultan, 
and  Lord  Mornington  was  well  capable  of  dealing 
with  the  difficulties  which  Napoleon  might  raise 
up  by  alliance  with  that  treacherous  prince. 

The  real  danger  arose  from  the  possible  success 

of  Napoleon  in  his  designs  upon  Constantinople ; 

but  if  not  won  by  a  coup  de  main,  there  was  not 

Nelson  and  much  chance  of  his  success  in  that  quarter.     Hap- 

Sidney 

Smith.       pily  two  naval  officers,  exactly  fitted  for  the  work 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION    WAR.       199 

which  fell  to  them,  were  on  the  spot,  and  the  rash 
enterprise  fell  dead.  Nelson's  entire  destruction 
of  the  French  fleet  at  Aboukir,  and  Sidney  Smith's 
defence  of  Acre,  gave  the  deathblow  to  the  expe- 
dition, which  once  more  illustrated  the  obvious 
truth  that  success  can  never  be  achieved  in  a 
country  which  can  only  be  reached  by  sea,  so 
long  as  the  sea  is  in  command  of  its  enemies.  To 
Napoleon  himself  the  absolute  failure  of  his  ill- 
starred  enterprise  proved  that  his  theories  of 
reaching  Great  Britain  through  the  overthrow  of 
her  Turkish,  Egyptian,  and  Indian  power  were 
mere  dreams,  and  set  him  once  more  upon  the 
old,  practical,  and  direct  methods  of  action. 

These,  however,  could  only  succeed  if  the  reins  Napoleon's 

.  .        coup  d'etat. 

of  power  were  in  his  own  hands.  It  was  easier 
to  execute  a  coup  d'etat  upon  the  Government  of 
his  own  country  than  on  that  of  the  Turks.  His 
countrymen  had  become  used  to  such  things  ;  they 
forgave  him  his  failure  in  Egypt,  which  indeed 
they  proclaimed  to  be  a  glorious  triumph  ;  for  they 
rightly  understood  that  they  had  before  them  the 
most  capable  man  who  had  appeared  for  centuries. 
They  were  as  ready  to  put  everything  into  his 
hands  as  he  was  to  accept  the  task.  He  would 
at  least  restore  order,  and  organise  the  forces  set 
free  by  the  Revolution.  His  own  designs  were 
larger  still,  and  they  were  soon  developed.  When 
he  had  reorganised  France  in  all  the  multitudinous 


200  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

details  of  her  civil,  military,  religious,  and  social 
life,  he  felt  that  the  time  would  speedily  arrive 
when  he  might  bribe  or  threaten  Europe  into  a 
combination  against  the  one  disturbing  Power 
which  still  dared  to  be  independent. 
Returns  But  first  he  must  chastise  the  Continental 

on  Austria  . 

andEussia.  nations  which  had  presumed  to  take  advantage 
of  his  absence  in  the  East.  These  were  Austria 
in  the  first  place,  and  Russia  in  the  second.  Both 
in  Italy  and  Switzerland  these  two  Powers  had 
turned  the  scale  against  the  French,  whose  con- 
quests had  not  yet  been  consolidated ;  and  also  in 
Bavaria,  which  had  often  before  been  more  French 
than  German,  and  which  had,  up  to  the  time  of 
this  last  reaction,  been  reckoned  by  the  French 
as  tolerably  safe.  Though  Napoleon  only  re- 
turned from  Egypt  on  October  9,  1799,  he  con- 
trived to  be  recognised  as  supreme  ruler,  under 
the  name  of  First  Consul,  on  December  1 5  of  that 
year,  and  ten  days  later  offered  peace  to  Great 
Britain.  This  was  a  transparent  artifice  to  gain 
time,  and  Napoleon  confessed  as  much  at  a  later 
date.  Having  gained  a  position  from  which  he 
could  move  the  world,  he  would  put  off  the  chas- 
tisement of  his  chief  enemy  for  a  year  or  two. 

British  re-   But  the  British  Government  declined  the  offer. 

fuse  peace.  .  . 

Perhaps  it  might  not  have  been  so  peremptorily 
declined  had  ministers  foreseen  his  victory  at 
Marengo  and  that  of  Moreau  at  Hohenlinden. 


DURING   THE   FRENCH-REVOLUTION   WAR.       201 

The  brilliant  general  had  not  yet  given  proof  of 
his  capacity  for  bringing  order  out  of  the  French 
chaos.  The  weakness  of  the  German  Powers  was 
not  even  yet  understood.  The  desertion  of  the 
common  cause  by  Russia  was  wholly  unexpected, 
for  the  new  Czar  Paul  had  not  as  yet  appeared 
to  be  more  than  eccentric.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Mediterranean  had  been  regained  by  the 
battle  of  the  Nile,  and  the  capture  of  Malta  by 
the  British  fleets  was  imminent.  Ou^ht  the  offer 

o 

of  peace  to  have  been  accepted  ? 

Some,  judging  by  after-events,  have  thought 
so.  But  the  British  instinct  was  probably  cor- 
rect. No  secure  peace  could  have  been  obtained. 
A  disarmament  and  reduction  of  taxation  would 
certainly  have  followed  a  peace,  however  hollow 
it  might  be,  and  the  great  general  having  re- 
conquered his  neighbours,  all  alike  despairing 
and  unassisted  by  British  gold,  would  no  doubt 
have  suddenly  taken  his  enemy  across  the  Chan- 
nel at  a  serious  disadvantage.  The  same  miser- 
able ending  as  characterised  the  rupture  of  the 
Peace  of  Amiens  would  surely  have  come  when 
the  British  were  far  less  able  to  deal  with  an  inva- 
sion than  they  were  in  1803,  and  that  before  the 
Union  with  Ireland  had  been  sufficiently  advanced 
to  remove  the  dangers  which  had  weighed  upon 
the  strategy  and  resources  of  Pitt  during  the 
Revolut  ion- War . 


202  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

With  the  accession  of  Napoleon  to  supreme 
power, — for  such  was  his  Consulate,— and  with 
the  rejection  of  his  specious  offers  of  peace,  we 
may  close  our  survey  of  the  Foreign  Policy  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  eighteenth  century,  for  we 
have  arrived  at  the  very  last  week  of  it.  It  is 
remarkable  that  Napoleon's  instalment  in  power 
at  the  head  of  the  French  empire  should  have 
been  almost  exactly  coincident  with  the  opening 
of  a  fresh  age — an  age  which,  in  many  ways,  bears 
his  mark  from  beginning  to  end.  The  age  opens, 
and  the  centuries  which  we  have  specially  con- 
sidered end,  with  the  most  tremendous  assault  of 
all  made  by  Napoleon  upon  the  British  empire ; 
and  we  trace,  exactly  as  in  the  very  first  stage  of 
our  inquiry,  the  same  principles  lying  at  the 
bottom  of  the  British  Foreign  Policy, — the  deter- 
mination to  be  supreme  at  sea,  and  the  equally 
fixed  resolution  to  keep  what  hold  was  yet  pos- 
sible on  the  coasts  of  the  Channel.  It  is  true 
that  shortly  afterwards,  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens, 
the  second  point  was  neglected  under  the  stress 
of  the  pressure  caused  by  the  war,  but  only  for  a 
brief  moment.  That  Peace  could  be  nothing  but 
a  truce.  It  lasted  only  fourteen  months,  and  then 
The  LOW  came  the  final  struggle.  When  the  Emperor  of 
the  West  had  been  humbled  to  the  dust  the  old 
policy  was  renewed,  and  the  Low  Countries  be- 


DURING   THE    FRENCH -RE  VOLUTION   WAR.       203 

came,  as  they  had  almost  always  been,  an  out- 
work of  the  British  fortress,  guarded,  when  the 
rearrangement  of  European  States  took  place  at 
the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  by  precautions  adopted  for 
their  integrity  only  second  to  the  position  secured 
for  Great  Britain  itself. 


204 


CHAPTER    IX. 

BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY    DURING    THE 
NAPOLEONIC   WAR — 1798-1807. 

WE  have  traced  the  outlines  of  British  Foreign 
Policy  through  the  centuries  preceding  the  nine- 
teenth, and  have  observed  a  remarkable  continuity 
through  all  changes  of  dynasties  and  in  spite  of 
the  rise  of  new  Continental  States,  as  well  as  the 
growth  of  new  habits  of  political  thought.  It 
will  not  then  surprise  us  to  find  that  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  also  this  Foreign  Policy  remains 
almost  exactly  the  same  from  first  to  last.  In 
the  following  chapters  we  have  to  trace  it  as  it 
was  exhibited  throughout  the  period  of  intense 
pressure  caused  by  the  Napoleonic  wars,  including 
the  uneasy  truce  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  to  mark 
its  resemblance  to  the  past  at  the  Treaty  of 
Vienna,  and  to  observe  the  fidelity  of  British 
ministers  to  the  old  model  during  the  subsequent 
years. 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  205 

We  have  now  to  deal  with  Napoleon,  though  he  Napoleon 
has  only  just  commenced  his  wonderful  career  at  Consul, 
the  head  of  all  the  forces  of  France,  and  observe 
how  it  was  that  he  succeeded  in  using  his  grand 
position  so  as  immediately  to  obliterate  the  failure 
of  his  Oriental  expedition.  The  nations  of  Europe 
might  well  take  warning  that  such  a  genius  for 
war  and  peace  had  never  yet  appeared  on  the 
stage  of  the  world.  Even  his  victories  scarcely 
excite  so  much  astonishment  as  his  almost  instan- 
taneous reorganisation  of  France.  Into  this  we 
need  not  here  enter,  save  so  far  as  to  say  that  it 
made  the  French  a  more  formidable  Power  than 
they  had  been  even  under  the  early  revolutionary 
impulse.  Despairing  of  efficient  government 
under  any  of  the  systems  which  had  so  rapidly 
succeeded  one  another,  the  French  people  were 
easily  persuaded  that  republican  ideas  could  be 
preserved  and  extended  under  the  shadow  of  a 
monarchy,  and  that  at  any  rate  internal  order 
would  flourish  under  the  same  strong  and  able 
hand  which  was  capable  of  placing  France  at 
the  head  of  the  nations.  These  ideas  took 
such  firm  root  that  they  survived  even  the 
barefaced  assumption  of  all  Imperial  attributes 
by  the  man  of  their  choice,  and  the  change  of 
daughter-republics  into  satellite  kingdoms  under 
the  government  of  his  brothers  and  friends. 
They  survived  the  removal  of  nearly  all  the 


206  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

national   landmarks,    tottering    as    they    already 
were  under  the  storms  of  the  Revolution, 
ms  re-  Much  may  indeed  be  said  in  favour  of  Napoleon's 

forms. 

legal  and  social  reforms.  Most  of  them  have  been 
permanent,  and  all  bear  the  marks  of  extraordi- 
nary power  and  knowledge.  His  reform,  so  called, 
of  the  Church,  conduced  equally  to  the  unity  and 
force  of  his  power.  Crushing  every  opposing 
force,  Popes,  bishops,  and  clergy,  he  destroyed 
the  old  Gallican  Church,  and  substituted  for  it 
an  Imperial  Church  which  could  not  but  become, 
as  it  did,  ultramontane  to  a  degree  scarcely 
known  elsewhere.  A  mere  Deist  himself,  he  re- 
solved to  be  the  absolute  master  of  unresisting 
ecclesiastics,  and  he  gained  his  end.  In  short, 
Europe  found  itself  confronted  by  such  an  organ- 
isation as  had  never  been  seen  before,  and  the 
sense  of  the  danger  which  was  impending  weighed 
heavily  on  all. 

His  fresh  Between  Napoleon's  accession  to  supreme  power 
as  First  Consul  and  the  Peace  of  Amiens  he  con- 
trived, in  the  very  midst  of  his  civil  reforms,  to 
win  back  from  Austria  and  Russia  much  more 
than  the  gains  which  he  had  made  before  his 
Eastern  expedition,  and  which  they  had  recovered 
in  his  absence.  The  battle  of  Marengo  soon  sur- 
passed the  triumphs  of  Lodi  and  Arcola,  and  that 
of  Hohenlinden  won  by  Moreau  brought  about 
the  Treaty  of  Luneville,  by  which  France  again 


DURING    THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  207 

advanced  to  the  Rhine,  and  again  ruled  the 
"  Cisalpine  Republic"  in  Italy.  Britain  also  pur- 
sued her  accustomed  course,  balancing — we  might 
almost  say  checkmating — the  European  influence 
attending  these  successes  by  securing  the  Medi- 
terranean and  the  Baltic  with  her  fleets.  The 
remains  of  the  French  army  in  Egypt  were  con- 
quered by  Abercromby  at  Alexandria  in  1801, 
thus  putting  an  end  to  the  dreams  of  French 
empire  in  the  East ;  and  Malta  surrendered  to 
the  British  fleet — a  pregnant  fact  for  the  future. 
In  the  Baltic  the  Czar  Paul,  who  had  succeeded 
Catherine  in  1796,  though  his  troops  had  been 
beaten  by  the  French,  was  cajoled  by  Napoleon ; 
and  already  offended  by  the  British  seizure  of 
Malta  (where  he  was  Grand  -  Master  of  the 
Knights)  from  the  French,  reconstituted  the 
Armed  Neutrality.  In  this  policy  he  was  The 
joined  by  the  other  Baltic  States  —  Denmark.  Neutrai- 

Q          1  J    -D  •  'ity»  again. 

Sweden,  and  Prussia. 

The  attempt  to  cripple  in  this  manner  the  force 
of  Great  Britain  on  the  element  which  formed  her 
strength  was  dealt  with  promptly  at  Copenhagen 
by  Nelson,  now  at  the  height  of  his  glory,  but 
serving  nominally  under  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  a  cau- 
tious admiral  of  the  old  school.  It  was  one  of  Battle  of 

r»  i         T\  Copen- 

his  greatest  achievements ;  for  the  Danes  were 
not  only,  like  the  Dutch,  fine  seamen  of  the 
same  stock  as  the  English,  but  their  fleet  was 


208  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

supported  by  very  powerful  batteries,  lining  an 
intricate  channel  of  the  most  dangerous  char- 
acter to  sailing  ships.  Nelson's  captains  and 
crews  were  however  by  this  time  invincible,  and 
the  gallant  Danes  were  glad  to  receive  terms 
which  enabled  the  fleet  to  proceed  on  its  way 
to  the  Russian  coast  of  the  Baltic.  No  further 
action  was  required  ;  for  the  insane  Paul  was 
murdered,  and  Alexander,  his  son  and  successor, 
immediately  renewed  the  British  alliance.  It  is 
worth  remarking  that  the  two  finest  battle-odes 
in  the  English  language  belong  to  this  period. 
With  accidental  impartiality  Campbell  sang  the 
French  victory  of  Hohenlinden  on  the  land,  and 
the  English  victory  of  Copenhagen  on  the  sea. 

The  revival  of  the  Armed  Neutrality  was  useful 
to  Europe  and  to  Great  Britain  itself  in  the  end  ; 
for  it  taught  the  latter  that  though  her  pre- 
tensions were  sanctioned  by  general  usage  and 
quite  justifiable,  the  exercise  of  such  powers  by 
one  State  against  all  others,  she  being  alone  in 
a  position  to  command  the  necessary  force,  was 
so  invidious  that  some  concession  had  become 
necessary.  The  principle  that  blockades  of  ports 
Neute3itd  ^7  proclamation  were  invalid  unless  there  were 
accepted,  sufficient  ships  to  enforce  them,  was  now  laid 
down  as  a  canon  of  International  Law.  This  was 
rather  an  apparent  than  a  real  loss  to  Great 
Britain ;  and  when  Napoleon  in  his  turn  pro- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  209 

claimed  blockades  of  whole  coasts  without  any 
naval  force  whatever  to  support  the  proclamation, 
his  action  was  not  only  vain  and  contrary  to  the 
new  arrangements,  but  was  deemed  by  all  the 
world  ridiculous.1 

The  French  successes  being  thus  balanced  by 
those  of  the  British,   and  both  countries   being 
weary    of    the    war    and    its    immense    taxation, 
matters  were  ripe  for  the  Peace  of  Amiens.     It  Peace  of 
was  felt  that  it  could  be  only  a  truce,  but  that  1802. 
was  better  than  war.     Nothing,  however,  could 
be  much  less  like  a  real  peace ;    for  subjects  of 

1  "  On  the  17th  of  June  1801  was  signed  at  St  Petersburg  a  Con- 
vention between  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  settling  the  points  that 
had  been  in  dispute.  The  question  of  Malta  was  tacitly  dropped. 
As  regards  neutral  claims  Russia  conceded  that  the  neutral  flag 
should  not  cover  enemy's  goods,  and  that  colonial  produce  could 
not  by  a  neutral  be  carried  from  the  colony  to  the  mother  country 
of  a  nation  at  war.  Great  Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  conceded 
the  right  of  neutrals  to  carry  on  the  coasting  trade  of  a  belligerent, 
and  that  naval  stores  should  not  be  classed  as  contraband  of  war. 
As  regarded  searching  merchant- vessels  under  convoy  of  a  ship  of 
war,  Russia  yielding  the  principle,  Great  Britain  accepted  methods 
which  would  make  the  process  less  offensive.  Sweden  and  Denmark 
followed  the  lead  of  Russia,  though  the  Baltic  States  renewed  among 
themselves  the  [old]  engagements — that  the  neutral  flag  should 
cover  enemy's  property  on  board,  and  that  the  convoy  of  a  ship  of 
war  should  exempt  merchant- vessels  from  search.  These  principles 
were  in  point  of  fact  modifications  sought  to  be  introduced  into 
International  Law,  and  not  prescriptive  rights,  as  commonly  im- 
plied by  French  historians  (Thiers,  H.  Martin,  and  Lanfrey).  For 
this  reason  both  the  United  States  and  the  Baltic  Powers,  while 
favouring  the  new  rule,  were  little  disposed  to  attempt  by  arms  to 
compel  the  surrender  by  Great  Britain  of  a  claim  sanctioned  by 
long  custom." — Mahan,  ii.  57,  58. 

O 


210  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

serious  discord  presented  themselves  almost  every 
week  while  it  lasted.  It  did  indeed  go  on  for 
fourteen  months,  and  it  is  surprising  that  it 
lasted  so  long.  Its  terms  are  characteristic  of 
the  policy  which  we  have  been  tracing.  Of 
the  conquests  made  by  British  fleets  all  were 
given  up  except  Ceylon,  which  was  necessary  to 
the  rulers  of  India,  and  Trinidad  in  the  West 
Indies,  which  protected  the  southern  access  to 
the  British  possessions  and  the  trade  with  South 
America.  Even  Malta,  the  key  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, was  to  be  restored  to  the  Knights 
from  whom  the  French  had  taken  it ;  but  on  the 
condition  that  it  was  to  be  under  the  protection 
of  some  third  Power  not  named.  France  on  her 
part  relinquished  Rome  and  Naples.  This  peace 
had  the  sanction  of  Pitt ;  but  he  had  himself 
resigned  office  some  time  previously  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Roman  Catholic  Emancipation. 
Napoleon's  The  joy  of  the  British  at  the  cessation  of  the 
thespeace!g  war  led  the  upper  classes  to  disregard  all  risks 
in  order  to  gratify  the  intense  passion  for  foreign 
travel  which  had  for  centuries  been  character- 
istic of  the  aristocracy.  Not  that  any  one  could 
be  fairly  supposed  to  guess  that  if  the  war  broke 
out  again  Napoleon  would  detain  every  English 
man  and  woman  within  his  dominions,  a  proceed- 
ing worthy  of  an  Oriental  despot.  That  was  only 
the  final  act  of  aggression.  We  may  sum  up  the 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  211 

previous  provocation  given  by  Napoleon  in  a  few 
words.  The  British  tried  to  shut  their  eyes  to 
it,  so  thankful  were  they  for  a  little  rest ;  but 
they  soon  found  that  every  part  of  their  tradi- 
tional Foreign  Policy  was  not  only  threatened, 
but  attacked,  while  the  hostile  measures  of  their 
arch-enemy  were  contemptuously  displayed  with- 
out concealment.  On  the  pretext  that  the  re- 
fusal of  the  British  to  evacuate  Malta  was  an 
act  of  hostility  and  breach  of  faith,  though  the 
stipulated  conditions  had  not  been  complied  with, 
Napoleon  adopted  the  plan  of  territorial  seizure 
during  peace  pursued  by  Louis  XIV.  after  the 
Peace  of  Nimeguen.  He  took  possession  of 
Switzerland,  Elba,  and  other  territories,  com- 
pelled Spain  to  give  up  to  France  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas,  sent  a  threatening  expedition 
to  the  West  Indies,  and  finally  published  the 
report  of  his  agent,  Sebastiani,  on  the  condition 
of  Turkey  and  the  Levant, — a  distinct  indication 
of  the  contemplated  seizure  of  Egypt  and  the 
Ionian  Islands. 

Great  Britain  was  also  threatened  still  nearer  He  pre- 

.  pares  to 

home.       vast  armaments  were  preparing  in  the  invade 

England. 

ports  of  France  and  Holland ;  and  Napoleon's 
emissaries  were  pouring  into  Ireland.  Emmet's 
rebellion  in  1803  was  the  result.  When,  to 
crown  all,  Lord  Whitworth,  the  British  ambas- 
sador, was  repeatedly  and  openly  insulted,  the 


212  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

general  indignation  could  no  longer  be  restrained. 
Perhaps  it  is  enough  to  remark  on  this  point  that 
even  Macaulay,  the  fervent  admirer  of  Fox's  oppo- 
sition to  the  earlier  war,  admits  that  "  the  restless 
ambition  and  insolence"  of  Napoleon  were  "in- 
supportable," and  that  a  war  for  the   "  dignity, 
the  independence,  the  very  existence  of  our  nation 
was  at  hand."     And  thus  sorrowfully,  almost  de- 
spairingly, Great  Britain  prepared  once  more  for 
war.     We  can  see  at  this  distance  of  time  that 
there   was    no    real    ground    for    the    feeling    of 
despair,  and  it  soon  passed  away  when  the  issue 
was  again  joined.     The  revenues  of  the  country, 
swelled  by  her  ever-growing  commerce,  by  the 
discovery   of  coal,   and    by  the   demand  for   her 
manufactures,    were    equal    to    those    of   all    the 
rest  of  Europe  combined.     If  her  debt  was  also 
larger   than    that    of    all    the    rest    together,    it 
was    nothing    new.       There    was    no    difficulty 
about   credit ;    and  the  existence   of  the  empire 
was    keenly    felt    to    be    the    concern    of   future 
generations  as  well  as  of  the  present. 
Napoleon        The  reluctance  to  enter  once  more   upon  the 
Dete-       war  was  largely  connected  with  the  retirement 
of  Pitt,  and  with  the  national  perception  of  the 
incapacity  of  Addington  for  such  measures  as  the 
times  required.     Pitt  did  not  find  it  possible  to 
keep  on  amicable  terms  with,  and  would  not  take 
service  under,  him.    The  eyes  of  the  nation  turned 


mis. 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  213 

to  Canning,  as  the  future  representative  of  Burke 
and  Pitt,  but  he  was  still  young  and  comparatively 
untried.  Whatever  was  wanting  to  inspire  the 
British  people  with  enthusiasm  and  resolution  was 
however  given  by  Napoleon's  act  above  mentioned, 
the  detention  in  France  of  some  ten  thousand  Brit- 
ish subjects  who  had  taken  advantage  of  the  peace 
to  visit  France,  and  his  determined  refusal  to 
liberate  them.  Such  a  course  was  unheard  of; 
his  pretext  was  ridiculous,  and  the  interference 
of  the  act  with  the  domestic  life  of  the  whole 
country  brought  it  home  to  the  people.  Never  Rupture  of 

T  IP  the  Peace> 

was  a  greater  mistake  made  by  any  ruler  01  isos. 
men.  The  nation  sprang  to  arms,  and  swore 
to  continue  the  struggle  to  the  bitter  end,  cost 
what  it  might.  When  once  a  nation's  domestic 
life  is  outraged  questions  of  politics  disappear, 
and,  like  a  bear  robbed  of  her  whelps,  the  most 
pacific  become  dangerous.  In  no  better  way 
could  Napoleon  have  enlisted  every  sentiment  of 
patriotism  in  support  of  sacrifices  which  made 
themselves  increasingly  felt  as  the  British  lost 
their  money  in  useless  subsidies,  and  their  allies 
one  after  another  by  conquest.  Great  Britain 
stood  at  last  isolated, — stood  at  bay,  desperate 
but  proudly  erect,  while  all  the  rest  of  Europe 
grovelled  at  the  feet  of  the  mighty  conqueror. 
Public  opinion,  both  in  Great  Britain  and 
abroad,  has  at  last  given  its  verdict  on  the  char- 


214  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

acter  and  conduct  of  Napoleon.  We  are  however 
now  in  danger  of  forgetting  how,  in  the  midst  of 
methods  adopted  to  obtain  his  ends  in  which  he 
offended  against  every  canon  of  right  and  justice, 
he  was  yet  the  necessary  scourge  of  Europe  ;  in 
other  words,  how  much  such  a  scourge  was  re- 
quired. Such  a  scourge  was  once  the  barbarous 
Attila,  innocent  of  modern  culture.  The  corrupt 
society  of  the  effete  Roman  world  had  to  be  re- 
placed by  a  fresher  and  more  capable  stock,  and 
Europe  re-  he  led  the  way.  So  also  the  modern  world,  which 
lesson.  had  grown  up  into  the  place  of  the  old,  required 
in  its  turn  to  be  penetrated  by  the  ideas  of 
liberty,  though  disguised  under  the  ill-fitting 
garb  of  Napoleonism.  The  foundations  of  Con- 
stitutionalism were  laid  in  suffering  and  sacrifice. 
The  light  of  patriotism  was  elicited  from  the  clash 
of  arms  and  the  severe  lessons  of  adversity. 

The  process  was  certainly  terrible.  Great  Bri- 
tain was  indeed  saved  from  the  actual  presence  of 
the  conqueror  and  his  irresistible  hosts,  but  none 
the  less  was  she  called  upon  to  face  difficulties 
which  seemed  to  all  but  the  most  gallant  spirits 
insuperable,  and  to  suffer  losses  which  appeared 
irreparable.  It  was  not  till  the  death  of  Pitt 
that  the  country  realised  to  the  full  the  stress 
of  the  struggle  on  which  Napoleon  had  forced  it 
to  enter  once  more,  but  for  the  moment  the 
enthusiasm  of  courage  and  patriotism  surmounted 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  215 

all  considerations  for  the  future.  The  old  king 
was  a  tower  of  strength,  and  though  Pitt  was 
content  to  drill  his  Cinque  Port  Volunteers  at  British 

i  •  defence 

W aimer,  he  was  felt  to  be  a  power  in  reserve,  onshore. 
The  whole  country  resounded  with  the  voice  of 
the  drill-sergeant ;  no  divisions  of  politics  or  race 
broke  the  union  of  hearts.  Feudal  times  appeared 
to  have  come  round  again ;  King,  lords,  and 
commons  prepared  for  the  field  of  battle ;  the 
hunting-men  of  every  county  formed  and  led  a 
cavalry  which  at  least  knew  how  to  ride,  and 
the  gentry  took  their  place  at  the  head  of  the 
local  militia  and  volunteers.  Who  shall  say  what 
the  result  would  have  been,  even  if  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  " army  of  England"  had  succeeded 
in  forming  a  landing  ? 

This   was,   however,   virtually  impossible.      In  Efficiency 

.  ,  ,T  of  thenaval 

spite  of  untimely  economies  the  Royal  Navy  defence, 
was  in  undisputed  command  of  the  Channel,  and 
Nelson  was  at  its  head.  Whether  superintending 
the  defences  of  the  Channel,  or  watching  the 
French  fleet  in  Toulon,  all  eyes  were  fixed  on  the 
man  who  had  come  to  represent  the  ancestral 
sea-power  of  England  in  a  personal  sense  never 
known  before  even  in  the  days  of  Drake,  or  Blake, 
or  Hawke,  or  Rodney,  or  Howe.  It  was  the 
culmination  of  all  the  ages  in  which  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  Great  Britain  had  been  developed  and 
extended  upon  the  basis  of  the  sovereignty  of 


216  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

the  seas.  The  labour  and  the  expense  of  the 
process  had  been  enormous,  but  not  a  farthing 
of  it  had  been  wasted.  At  the  moment  of  trial 
it  stood  the  shock,  and  the  storm  rolled  off  to 
other  latitudes. 
Pitt  re-  The  imminence  of  danger  forced  Pitt  to  the 

sumes 

office.  front  once  more.  It  was  a  remarkable  coinci- 
dence that  he  resumed  office  on  the  very  day 
(May  18,  1804)  when  Napoleon  assumed  the 
title  of  Emperor.  Not  that  he  had  been  a  mere 
spectator  at  any  time.  That  was  impossible. 
While  at  Walmer  Castle,  before  the  Peace  of 
Amiens,  he  and  Nelson,  who  commanded  in 
the  Downs,  held  frequent  converse  on  the  best 
methods  of  meeting  the  combinations  which 
Napoleon  was  forming  for  the  destruction  of  the 
one  enemy  he  had  to  fear.  The  recess  of  the 
room  in  which  they  met  is  still  shown.  The  two 
minds  most  capable  at  that  moment  of  the  insight 
and  penetration  which  the  times  required,  here 
perhaps  struck  out  the  large  ideas  which  bore 
fruit  when  Nelson's  day  of  trial  came.  At  any 
rate  it  was  these  combinations  which  from  the 
moment  of  the  rupture  of  the  peace  in  1803  filled 
every  mind  with  anxious  thoughts,  till  the  battle 
of  Trafalgar  broke  down  the  whole  hostile  fabric 
just  as  a  spider's  web  is  torn  through  by  a  whirl- 
wind. 

The  general  plan  of  Napoleon  was  the  same 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  217 

which  the  French  had  for  centuries  entertained.  Napoleon's 
It  was  to  decoy  away  from  the  Channel  the  British  S 
fleets  by  feints  of  attack  upon  other  parts  of  her 
dominions,  and  to  take  advantage  of  their  absence 
to  invade  the  island  with  an  army,  under  cover 
of  an  overpowering  naval  force.  Never  yet  had 
such  plans  been  under  the  control  of  a  consum- 
mate genius  for  war,  unfettered  by  any  authority. 
If  success  had  been  possible  under  the  then  condi- 
tions of  wind  and  sails  and  wooden  ships,  it  would 
at  this  time  have  been  achieved.  What  may 
happen  in  the  future  under  the  conditions  of 
steam,  iron  ships,  and  torpedoes,  who  can  say? 

Until  quite  lately  the  combinations  of  the 
last  few  months  before  the  end  came  at  Trafal- 
gar have  engrossed  the  attention  of  historians. 
The  recent  works  of  Captain  Mahan  have  en- 
larged the  picture.  He  has  laid  under  contri- 
bution the  French  and  English  documents  of  the 
time,  and  by  their  aid  has  presented  to  us  the 
shifting  phases  of  Napoleon's  mighty  plan,  as  it 
experienced  the  changes  of  events  which  neces- 
sitated its  revision,  or  at  least  were  thought  to 
do  so.  We  may  well  take  a  brief  summary  of 
these  events,  since  they  illustrate  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  Great  Britain  with  peculiar  clearness. 

The  strategy  against  which  Napoleon  had  to  The  old 
contend  on  the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  the  British 

resumed. 

comprised,  as  before,  the  strict  blockade  of  French 


218  BBITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

ports  which  had  been  so  effective  in  the  past,  and 
the  protection  of  British  commerce  by  squadrons 
cruising  in  all  the  European  waters,  as  well  as  on 
the  coasts  of  the  British  colonies  and  India.  This 
resumption  of  the  old  policy  was  made  so  rapidly, 
and  was  so  little  expected  by  the  French  despot, 
that  in  the  matter  of  nautical  preparations  he 
was  all  but  entirely  forestalled.  The  British 
navy  had  been  most  unwisely  reduced  by  Lord 
St  Vincent  under  the  Addington  administration ; 
but  the  loss  was  supplied  before  it  became  irrepar- 
able, and  Nelson  in  himself  was  worth  more  than 
one  fleet ;  while  the  French  required  years  to 
form  an  efficient  navy.  The  process  had  as  yet 
scarcely  begun  ;  and  the  efforts  necessary  to  build 
large  ships  were  largely  and  inefficiently  expended 
upon  the  flotillas  of  small  vessels  and  flat-bottomed 
boats  which  were  intended  to  cover  the  proposed 
invasion.  The  Emperor  was  forced  to  use  chiefly 
what  fleets  he  already  had,  and  to  add  to  them 
those  of  other  nations. 
Napoleon's  Napoleon's  first  plan  was  to  destroy  British 

first  plan.  •        TVT       j  i  -n  i  •    • 

commerce  in  JNorthern  Europe  by  seizing  Han- 
over, which  carried  with  it  the  Hanse  Towns,  and 
especially  Hamburg,  and  to  threaten  the  Medi- 
terranean and  the  Indian  communications  of  Great 
Britain  by  the  seizure  of  the  peninsula  of  Otranto, 
from  which  he  expected  that  he  would  be  able  to 
command  Morea,  the  Ionian  Islands,  and  Egypt. 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  219 

It  was  this  which  justified  Nelson's  alarm  for  the 
Levant,  an  alarm  aggravated  by  his  devotion  to 
the  Neapolitan  Court.  In  these  two  directions 
Napoleon  hoped  to  employ  portions  of  the  British 
fleets  while  the  invasion  of  England  was  impend- 
ing. Though  the  diversion  of  these  fleets  was 
soon  planned  upon  other  lines,  the  same  principle 
ruled  them  all.  So  tremendous,  however,  were 
the  risks  he  ran,  and  so  contrary  to  all  probability 
was  his  success,  that  many  writers  have  held  that 
he  never  had  any  serious  intention  to  invade  ;  but 
Captain  Mahan  (ii.  116,  117)  reviews  the  question, 
and  shows  the  contrary. 

The  British  fleets  were  not  concentrated  in  the  Disposition 
Channel ;  but  large  squadrons  of  frigates  kept  fleets. 
constant  watch  over  the  boats  and  vessels  as- 
sembled in  French  and  Dutch  ports,  from  the 
Texel  to  the  Channel  Islands.  The  navy  had 
been  reduced  to  that  policy  by  the  repeated 
failures  to  destroy  these  vessels  which  had  been 
made  in  1801  by  small  squadrons  under  the 
direction  of  Nelson  himself  and  Sidney  Smith  ; 
for  their  skilful  disposition  under  cover  of  shore 
batteries  formed  an  invincible  obstacle  even  to 
the  bravest  commanders.  This,  however,  wras 
only  a  part  of  the  defence  of  England.  Admiral 
Cornwallis's  large  fleet  formed  the  blockade  of  the 
French  fleet  at  Brest  with  the  same  continuous 
and  unflinching  resolution  which  distinguished 


220  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

that  of  Hawke  before  the  battle  of  Quiberon  ;  for 
it  was  that  Brest  fleet  which  it  was  necessary  at 
all  hazards  to  prevent  from  covering  the  invasion. 
A  few  line-of-battle  ships  at  Spitheacl,  and  at  the 
Downs,  and  some  others  cruising  within  reach  in 
the  North  Sea,  formed  the  nucleus  of  defence 
round  which  Cornwallis  was  to  rally  if  he  were 
blown  off  to  sea  and  the  Brest  fleet  should  escape 
in  his  absence. 
Nelson  off  The  Toulon  fleet  was  placed  under  the  sur- 

Toulon. 

veillance  of  Nelson,  whose  acquaintance  with 
the  questions  concerning  the  Mediterranean  was 
profound.  It  was  felt  that  this  Toulon  fleet 
was  the  weapon  which  Napoleon  would  use  to 
force  the  situation,  but  no  one  could  as  yet 
penetrate  his  full  design.  As  the  seizure  of 
Egypt,  with  its  threatening  bearing  on  India, 
had  been  one  of  Napoleon's  original  schemes  in 
1798  for  balancing  the  naval  force  of  his  enemy 
in  the  Mediterranean,  so  in  Nelson's  mind  it 
continued  to  be  one  of  the  chief  dangers  against 
which  he  had  to  guard,  long  after  the  Emperor 
had  relinquished  it  for  a  deeper  and  more  un- 
expected policy.  At  one  time  the  great  admiral 
believed  that  the  Toulon  fleet  was  to  make  for 
Egypt,  at  another  that  it  would  slip  out  of  the 
Straits  to  support  the  invasion  of  England  or 
Ireland ;  and  it  turned  out  to  be  true  that  this 
last  was  the  work  for  which  it  was  intended  as 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  221 

long  as  Napoleon  had  an  admiral  whom  he  could 
trust ;  and  such  a  man  he  believed  that  he  had 
found  in  Latouche  Treville. 

Captain  Mali  an  attributes  Nelson's  practice  of 
keeping  his  fleet  at  anchor  at  the  Maddalena 
Islands  on  the  north  coast  of  Sardinia,  or  cruising 
far  out  of  sight  between  Spain  and  Italy  while  he 
watched  the  French  at  Toulon  with  such  frigates 
as  he  had,  to  the  defective  condition  in  which 
Lord  St  Vincent  had  left  his  ships ;  and  Nelson's 
own  despatches  seem  to  intimate  as  much.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  admiral  often  takes  credit 
to  himself  for  not  actually  blockading  the  enemy, 
but  giving  them  every  opportunity  to  escape,  in 
order  that  they  might  be  tempted  to  come  out 
and  do  battle.  The  reconciliation  of  the  two 
different  motives  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  Nelson 
found  it  absolutely  impossible  to  blockade  Toulon 
closely  in  the  existing  condition  of  his  squadron, 
and  became  so  accustomed  to  the  necessity  of 
lying  in  harbour,  and  trusting  to  the  look-out 
kept  by  his  few  frigates,  that  he  learnt  during 
his  two  tedious  years  of  watching  to  regard  that 
policy  as  his  own  choice  instead  of  its  being 
forced  on  him  by  necessity  as  the  second  best 
course. 

That  it  was  a  decidedly  defective  plan  of  block-  His  defec- 
ade,  or  rather  not  a  blockade  at  all,  was  proved  ade. 
by  the  event.     Villeneuve,   who   had  succeeded 


222  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

Latouche  Treville  in  the  summer  of  1804,  got 
away  next  spring  from  Nelson  without  much 
difficulty,  and  even  when  he  returned  unobserved 
to  refit  his  ships  which  had  been  battered  by  a 
storm,  he  made  a  second  escape,  which  enabled 
Napoleon  to  work  out  his  final  plan,  though  un- 
successfully. There  was  only  one  sure  method 
of  checkmating  the  French,  or  at  least  only  one 
which  promised  all  the  elements  of  security  which 
the  nature  of  the  case  permitted,  and  that  was  to 
blockade  both  the  Brest  and  Toulon  fleets  so 
closely  as  to  be  always  in  touch  with  them,  or  if 
driven  off  for  the  moment,  to  be  instantly  before 
the  port  again.  Even  an  abundance  of  frigates 
or  look-out  ships  must  have  failed  to  take  the 
place  of  the  blockading  fleet.  Even  in  the  steam- 
warfare  of  the  future,  ironclads  which  cannot 
keep  the  sea  in  all  weathers  will  not  save  Eng- 
land from  invasion  when  the  day  of  trial  comes ; 
and  to  keep  up  a  sufficient  relief  for  these,  so  as 
to  have  a  superior  force  to  the  enemy  always 
before  the  blockaded  port,  will  require  a  second 
fleet  at  hand  nearly  equal  to  the  first.  This  is 
the  great  lesson  of  the  Napoleonic  war,  which 
was,  after  all,  only  a  repetition  on  a  large  scale, 
as  far  as  the  sea  was  concerned,  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War  of  which  Hawke  was  the  hero. 
Napoleon's  Napoleon's  new  plan  in  1805  seems  to  have 
plan.  been  adopted  on  account  of  his  distrust  of  Vil- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  223 

leneuve,  who  was  yet,  in  his  opinion,  the  best 
admiral  at  his  disposal ;  a  well-formed  distrust, 
as  his  failure  at  the  critical  moment  showed  only 
too  plainly.  Was  there  no  junior  officer  whom  he 
might  have  discovered  and  brought  to  the  front 
at  such  a  moment  ?  He  determined  at  any  rate, 
under  the  circumstances,  to  deprive  his  Toulon 
fleet  of  the  importance  it  had  assumed  in  his 
earlier  plan.  It  was  no  longer  to  make  for  the 
British  Channel,  and,  without  disturbing  the  Brest 
fleet  and  its  blockading  force,  to  cover  the  landing 
of  his  troops  ;  but  to  take — to  use  Mahan's  expres- 
sion— "  the  inferior  rdle  of  a  diversion."  Gan- 
teaume,  at  the  head  of  the  Brest  fleet,  was  to  take 
its  place,  and  escaping  Cornwallis  in  some  storm, 
to  cover  the  invasion,  or  make  for  Ireland  with 
a  large  military  force.  The  Toulon  and  Roche- 
fort  fleets  were  to  sail  for  the  West  Indies,  and 
thus,  it  was  hoped,  decoy  away  some  thirty 
British  line-of-battle  ships  to  defend  their  colo- 
nies. When  some  of  these  colonies  had  been 
taken  the  fleets  were  to  return  to  Ferrol.  In  the 
meantime  the  invasion  would  have  taken  place, 
and  the  concentrated  French  fleets  would  over- 
power Cornwallis. 

Yet  another  plan  was  suggested  by  the  temp-  His  third 
tation,  to  which  the  Emperor  yielded,  of  adding 
the    Spanish    fleet    to    his    navy.     Spain    was   in 
no    condition    to    resist,    and    was    obliged    to 


224  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

incur  the  hostility  of  Great  Britain,  contrary 
to  its  ancient  maxim,  which  subsequent  events 
most  fully  justified,  "  Peace  with  England,  and 
war  with  the  rest  of  the  world."  The  lesson 
was  first  taught  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  and 
was  never  forgotten  with  impunity.  It  is  one 
of  the  highest  tributes  to  British  sea  -  power. 
The  temptation  to  reckon  Spanish  ships,  as 
they  were  at  that  period,  among  the  available 
naval  force,  would  have  had  no  weight  with 
the  British,  who  knew  well  that  mere  size  and 
number  are  worse  than  useless  unless  the  equip- 
ment, the  officers,  and  the  crews  are  efficient ; 
but  Napoleon's  ideas  on  nautical  subjects  were 
almost  entirely  based  on  the  calculations  which 
govern  military  operations  on  shore ;  and  though 
he  himself  directed  his  admiral  to  regard  two 
Spanish  as  only  equivalent  to  one  French  ship, 
their  mere  presence  in  line  of  battle  was  a  serious 
weakness  to  a  combined  force.  He  hoped  also 
to  have  received  a  much  more  effective  addition 
from  Holland ;  but  all  his  schemes  were  drowned 
in  the  waters  of  Trafalgar  before  this  part  of 
them  could  take  effect.  The  Toulon  fleet,  though 
still  under  Villeneuve,  was  now  restored  to  its 
first  destination,  but  not  before  the  British  had 
punished  the  unhappy  Spaniards  by  seizing  the 
treasure-ships  which  were  to  have  enriched  the 
French,  without  issuing  any  Declaration  of  War. 


DURING    THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  225 

This,  was  held  up  to  reprobation  as  piracy,  but 
its  justice  is  now  generally  admitted  even  by 
Spanish  historians.  It  must  be  ranked  in  the 
same  category  with  the  seizure  in  1807  of  Danish 
ships,  which  were  practically  the  property  of 
France ;  but  no  doubt  a  larger  force  should  have 
been  sent,  so  as  to  excuse  the  Spanish  squadron 
from  making  a  useless  resistance.  This  was  done 
in  the  case  of  the  Danes. 

The  final  plan  of  the  naval  campaign  was  The  final 
not  absolutely  disclosed  till  Villeneuve,  who  had 
evaded  Nelson,  had  been  driven  back  by  storms 
to  Toulon.  He  and  Ganteaume  received  their 
orders  on  March  2,  1805,  and  the  campaign  now' 
began  which  ended,  six  months  later,  at  Tra- 
falgar. Villeneuve  was  to  sail  as  soon  as  possible 
for  Cadiz,  picking  up  the  ships  in  that  port, 
then  for  Martinique,  to  wait  there  forty  days 
for  Ganteaume,  and  if  he  did  not  appear,  to 
give  him  a  second  rendezvous  at  the  Canary 
Islands.  With  the  whole  forty  ships  he  was 
then  to  cover  the  invasion.  But  Ganteaume 
never  got  out.  He  begged  to  be  allowed4  to 
fight  the  blockading  squadron  when  reduced  for 
a  short  period  from  twenty-one  to  fifteen  ships, 
but  was  refused.  He  never  had  another  chance. 
Possibly  Napoleon  was  right  in  believing  that 
he  would  even  with  that  superiority  of  force 
have  been  beaten ;  and  his  strategy  was  to 

p 


226  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

avoid  all  fighting  till  the  critical  moment  should 
arrive  in  the  Channel.  He  afterwards  bitterly 
reproached  Villeneuve  for  not  running  a  necessary 
risk  on  the  chance  of  success  ;  but  he  had  himself 
to  blame  for  not  letting  Ganteaume  fight  when 
he  was  ready  and  willing  to  do  so  with  a  sub- 
stantial majority  of  ships. 
French  and  To  destroy  the  enemy  if  a  chance  offers  with- 

British  J  .  . 

strategy      out   looking   further,   is    the    only   true    nautical 

compared. 

method.  The  English  have  always  adopted  it, 
the  French  seldom,  if  ever.  It  is  thus  that  their 
finest  officers  have  so  often  failed  to  show  the 
dashing  spirit  which  their  land-battles  have  ex- 
hibited, and  which  is  inherent  in  the  national 
character.  Being  ordered  to  defend  rather  than 
to  attack,  to  pursue  some  ulterior  object  rather 
than  dispose  of  their  enemy  on  the  spot,  they 
have  generally  missed  their  opportunity,  and  then 
after  all  failed  in  that  ulterior  object.  Even  on 
land  this  is  a  demoralising  process  :  at  sea  it  is 
fatal. 

vnieneuve  At  last,  Villeneuve  having  sailed  on  March 
1805.  '  31st,  began  that  exciting  chase  which  Nelson,  in 
an  agony  of  breathless  eagerness,  pursued  till 
victory  at  last  crowned  his  incessant  labour,  and 
at  the  same  time  put  an  end  to  his  glorious  life 
and  to  the  naval  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
her  enemies.  With  this  last  series  of  guesses 
and  mistakes,  of  intuitions  and  successes,  we  are 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  227 

all  so  familiar  that  it  may  be  summed  up  in  a 
few  words.  The  dramatic  interest  heightens  as 
we  proceed.  We  follow  the  hero  to  Alexandria, 
fully  persuaded  as  he  was  that  the  French,  when 
Villeneuve  made  his  first  start,  were  on  their  old 
Egyptian  track.  The  best  excuse  for  Nelson  not 
having  as  yet  discovered  Napoleon's  intention  to 
make  his  Toulon  fleet  the  chief  instrument  of  his 
strategy  for  the  invasion  of  England,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Emperor's  well-known  opinion  that 
the  East  was  the  most  vulnerable  point  of  the 
British  empire, — an  opinion  which  his  despatches 
show  he  had  not  even  yet  relinquished, — and  in 
the  skill  with  which  he  had  blinded  friends  and 
enemies  by  still  professing  to  make  Egypt  his 
object.  The  idea,  as  we  have  said,  fell  in  only 
too  well  with  Nelson's  past  experiences,  and  his 
sentiment  concerning  the  Neapolitan  people. 

Yilleneuve's  second  escape  on  March  31st  found 
Nelson  still  groping  about  as  blindly  as  ever,  and 
it  was  not  till  April  16th  that  he  discovered  that 
his  enemy  had  made  off  through  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar.  On  the  13th  of  May  Villeneuve  had 
reached  Martinique  with  a  fleet  of  eighteen  line- 
of-battle  ships,  made  up  of  different  detachments, 
while  Nelson  had  been  fretting  under  foul  winds 
in  the  Mediterranean,  and  did  not  leave  Gibraltar 
till  May  llth.  The  whole  Atlantic  lay  between 
them. 


228  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

Nelson  There  were,   however,   no    further   guesses    or 

pursuit.  mistakes  on  his  part.  Finding  from  English 
despatches  that  news  of  Villeneuve's  departure 
for  the  West  Indies  had  arrived,  he  took  it  on 
his  own  responsibility  to  follow  him  with  perhaps 
the  greatest  speed  that  a  fleet  of  sailing  ships  has 
ever  attained.  That  was  the  one  point, — to  get 
at  the  enemy,  or  at  least  divine  his  further  move- 
ments, prevent  him  from  conquering  the  West 
Indian  colonies,  and  track  him  to  Europe  again 
before  the  junction,  which  the  hero  never  knew, 
but  rightly  guessed,  was  designed,  could  be 
effected.  Napoleon  had  made  another  mistake. 
Attempting  too  much,  he  lost  all.  The  conquest 
of  West  India  Islands  was  a  matter  of  trifling 
consequence  in  comparison  with  the  great  end 
of  invasion  which  he  had  in  view.  The  success 
of  his  scheme  of  decoy,  so  as  to  divide  the  British 
fleets,  was  as  well  provided  for  by  the  mere  visit 
of  his  Toulon,  Cadiz,  and  Rochefort  squadrons  to 
the  West  Indies  as  by  their  lingering  for  the 
purpose  of  conquest ;  and  every  day  was  lost  dur- 
ing which  they  lingered.  His  last  chance  was  to 
get  these  squadrons  back  to  Brest,  where,  along 
with  Ganteaume's  Brest  fleet,  they  might  have 
overpowered  Cornwallis,  and  then  covered  the 
invasion  before  any  squadron  sent  in  pursuit  to 
the  West  Indies  could  arrive.  As  it  was,  Nel- 
son, in  spite  of  his  enforced  delay,  was  within 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  229 

a  hundred  miles  of  Villeneuve  before  the  latter 
knew  of  his  arrival.  Nor  would  he  have  failed 
to  dispose  of  the  French  at  once  had  he  not  been 
grossly  misled,  by  false  information,  to  Trinidad, 
which  gave  Villeneuve  his  chance  of  slipping 
away,  and  sailing  to  Europe  according  to  the 
orders  he  had  received. 

An  important  link  in  the  progress  of  the  cam-  His  fore- 
paign  was  now  supplied  by  Nelson's  foresight  in  81 
sending  the  Curieux  brig,  Captain  Bettesworth, 
to  the  northward  of  his  own  course,  in  order  to 
obtain  news  of  Villeneuve,  whom  he  rightly 
guessed  to  be  bound  for  Ferrol,  where  a  Spanish 
and  French  fleet  was  blockaded  by  a  small  British 
force.  He  himself  made  for  Gibraltar,  whence  he 
had  set  forth,  in  order  to  be  on  his  own  station 
again,  ready  to  defend  the  Mediterranean  if 
Villeneuve  should  make  for  it,  and  await  fresh 
instructions.  But  the  French  fleet  sailed  slowly, 
and  Bettesworth,  having  caught  sight  of  it, 
hurried  to  England  with  the  news.  He  was 
just  in  time.  Pitt  had  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
Admiralty,  in  succession  to  his  friend  Dundas, 
Sir  Charles  Middleton,  lately  created  Lord  Bar- 
ham,  a  veteran  of  eighty  years,  who  had  already 
shown  superior  capacity.  He  now  played  a  great 
part.  With  amazing  promptitude  he  sent  de- 
spatches to  Cornwallis  with  orders  to  strengthen 
Calder's  squadron  off  Ferrol.  Calder  was  to 


230  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

cruise  a  hundred  miles  west  of  that  port  in  order 
to  intercept  Villeneuve ;  but  Brest  was  to  be 
sealed  fast  as  before,  while  Nelson's  fleet  and 
that  of  Collingwood,  who  was  blockading  Cadiz, 
were  to  take  care  of  the  south. 

These  dispositions  were  successful,  except  so  far 

action.  .    *-  *- 

as  that  Sir  Robert  Caider's  fleet  of  fifteen  ships 
was  too  weak  to  conquer  decisively  Villeneuve's 
twenty.  At  least  he  thought  so,  and  after  gain- 
ing a  decided  advantage,  did  not  renew  the  com- 
bat. For  this  error  he  was  tried  by  court-martial 
(after  Trafalgar)  and  reprimanded  —  almost  the 
only  case  of  an  officer  being  punished  for  gaining 
a  victory.  At  any  rate  he  crippled  his  enemy ; 
who  however  got  into  Ferrol  during  his  temporary 
absence,  and  raised  the  French  fleet  to  twenty- 
nine  ships.  On  learning  this  Calder  gave  up  the 
blockade,  and  joined  Cornwallis  off  Brest.  The 
failures  of  Calder  were  conspicuous  in  the  blaze  of 
such  glories  as  Nelson  and  Collingwood  achieved, 
but  his  error  was  hardly  greater  than  that  of  the 
trusty  Cornwallis  himself,  who  now  tarnished  his 
just  reputation  for  judgment  by  dividing  his  fleet 
off  Brest,  and  sending  Calder  off  with  eighteen 
ships  to  watch  Villeneuve  at  Ferrol.  The  French 
had  thus  the  game  in  their  own  hands  if  they 
had  known  how  to  play  it.  Villeneuve  with  his 
twenty-nine  ships  had  nearly  double  the  force  of 
either  Calder  or  Cornwallis,  and  Napoleon's  com- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  231 

binations  had  worked  themselves  out,  after  a 
chapter  of  accidents,  into  an  unexpected  sim- 
plicity. Even  a  second  -  rate  French  admiral 
would  have  taken  advantage  of  Calder's  in- 
feriority of  force,  and  attacked  either  him  or 
the  fleet  off  Brest.  If  successful  there,  the  in- 
vasion would  have  taken  place,  supposing  the 
weather — a  factor  on  which  no  one  could  count 
— did  not  interfere. 

But  Villeneuve  more  than  justified   the  Em-  vuieneuve 

.  loses  his 

perors  doubts.  He  had  experienced  a  run  of  chance, 
good  fortune  in  escaping  from  Nelson,  but  that 
had  exhausted  all  his  powers.  He  had  at  the 
critical  moment  also  a  piece  of  luck  of  which  he 
knew  nothing,  in  the  departure  to  England  of 
Nelson  himself,  sick  and  weary ;  but  fortune  only 
favours  the  brave.  Villeneuve  had  personal  cour- 
age enough,  but  not  moral  courage.  He  retreated 
to  the  south  instead  of  advancing  to  the  north, 
and  was  caught  by  the  British  fleet  at  Cadiz 
when  making  his  way  again  out  of  that  port, 
on  October  21st.  Collingwood  had  meanwhile 
been  reinforced  ;  the  blockade  was  effectual ;  and 
Villeneuve  should  not  now  have  left  his  secure 
anchorage.  But  he  received  orders  to  proceed  to 
the  Mediterranean  for  the  purpose  of  supporting 
the  Emperor's  Italian  campaign.  Nelson  arrived 
from  England  to  take  command  of  Collingwood's 
fleet  almost  at  the  same  moment.  The  French 


232  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Admiral's  action  was  quickened  by  the  discovery 
that  he  was  no  longer  to  be  trusted,  but  to  be 
superseded  by  Admiral  Rosilly.  This  meant  dis- 
grace ;  and  he  put  his  own  honour  before  his 
duty, — for  Napoleon,  when  he  gave  the  order, 
did  not  know  that  Collingwood  had  been  rein- 
forced. Here  was  Villeneuve's  final  blunder, 
unless  we  add  to  it  the  faulty  disposition  of  his 
fleet.  To  draw  up  his  ships  in  line,  for  it  only 
accidentally  became  a  crescent,  was  indeed  the 
scientific  form  of  meeting  an  enemy  who  attacked 
in  column ;  but  when  his  fleet  was  only  a  little 
superior  in  numbers,  to  form  twelve  of  his  ships 
into  an  independent  reserve  under  Gravina,  was 
to  give  himself  away.  When  his  fleet  wore  and 
received  the  British  on  the  port  tack,  heading  for 
Cadiz,  this  reserve  fell  into  the  rear,  and  became 
an  easy  prey  to  Collingwood's  division. 
Nelson's  Nelson's  instinctive  belief  that  Napoleon's 

strategy.  L 

strategy  was  based  on  the  command  of  the 
Mediterranean, — though  he  had  not  foreseen,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  great  naval  campaign,  that 
the  invasion  of  England  would  take  the  first 
place  in  his  designs,  —  was  now  to  bear  fruit. 
We  have  seen  that  he  made  for  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar  on  his  arrival  from  the  West  Indies. 
When  he  joined  Collingwood  he  still  made  it 
his  first  object  to  prevent  the  French  fleet  from 
running  out  of  Cadiz  into  the  Mediterranean, 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  233 

and  took  up  his  position  so  as  to  intercept  it. 
He  also  pursued  his  old  plan  of  trying  to  entice 
the  enemy  to  come  out  and  fight,  by  retiring  out 
of  sight  of  the  Spanish  shores,  leaving  frigates 
to  convey  intelligence ;  but  it  was  a  different 
thing  to  be  at  sea  within  immediate  striking 
distance,  and  to  be  at  anchor  as  of  old  on  the 
north  coast  of  Sardinia.  Cut  off  from  the 
Straits,  and  too  far  off  Cadiz  to  retreat,  Vil- 
leneuve  had  no  choice  but  to  fight ;  and  wisely 
kept  Cadiz  open  in  case  of  the  failure  which  he 
knew  to  be  imminent.  In  fact  the  French  and 
Spaniards,  though  they  had  thirty-three  ships 
to  the  British  twenty-seven,  were  beaten  before 
they  began,  and  we  are  left  to  admire  the  des- 
perate courage  which  in  many  instances  they 
showed  when  all  hope  had  passed  away. 

The  actual  details  of  the  battle  are  too  well  Battle  of 
known  to  justify  an  account  which  could  produce 
very  little  in  the  way  of  facts  and  reflections 
that  is  not  already  known,  or  has  not  already 
attracted  attention.  The  interest  of  a  conflict 
of  which  the  result  was  a  foregone  conclusion, 
and  which  leads  us  to  pity  the  doomed  allies 
almost  as  much  as  to  glory  in  the  victors,  pales 
before  the  intense  passion  of  the  tragedy  as  it 
centres  in  the  action  of  the  man  who  will  for 
ever  remain  at  the  head  of  the  British  roll  of 
naval  heroes.  His  pregnant  sayings  before  the 


234  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

battle,  his  idolised  position  among  the  noble  sea- 
men whom  he  came  to  lead — heightened  as  it 
was  by  a  presentiment  that  it  was  for  the  last 
time,  his  dying  words,  his  last  embraces  of  his 
friend,  his  last  tribute  to  the  mastering  idea  of 
duty  which  had  been  his  lode -star — combined 
romance  and  history  in  the  most  exact  propor- 
tions, and  lifted  the  English  Nelsoniad  to  a  level 
with  the  epics  of  Greece  and  Home, — with  the 
advantage  of  being  true.  The  story  is  dramatic 
enough  without  being  turned  into  a  poem ;  but 
it  is  surprising  that  it  has  never  found  expression 
except  in  prose  and  in  a  famous  song. 

A  new  era  The  battle  of  Trafalgar  was  a  far  more  marked 
event  and  dividing  point  in  the  history  of  the 
mighty  struggle  than  the  Peace  of  Amiens  and 
its  rupture.  The  peace  had  been  a  mere  truce, 
and  its  breach  a  mere  continuation  of  the  war, 
on  the  same  guiding  principles  and  with  the 
same  weapons  as  before.  The  grand  European 
confederation  was  again  formed  and  subsidised ; 
the  fleets,  as  we  have  seen,  distributed  much  as 
before,  so  as  to  guard  the  Channel  and  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  to  blockade  the  French  ports ; 
while  various  squadrons  defended  British  com- 
merce, and  the  few  land-forces  at  command  were 
reinforced  by  hundreds  of  thousands  of  volun- 
teers. The  real  value  in  war  of  that  latter  force 
was  never  tested,  because  the  battle  of  Trafalgar 


DURING    THE    NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  235 

put  an  end  to  the  idea  of  invasion,  or  indeed  to 
the  aggressive  action  of  any  French  naval  force. 

Henceforth  it  was  to  be  a  new  war,  and  Napo- 
leon was  the  first  to  perceive  it.  Without  wait- 
ing for  Villeneuve's  destruction  of  all  his  hopes 
and  projects  by  his  final  retreat  to  Cadiz,  know- 
ing too  well  what  would  happen,  he  broke  up  his 
camp  at  Boulogne  some  days  before  the  battle  ; 
and  everything  having  been  secretly  prepared 
by  his  prescient  genius,  turned  the  tide  of  war 
upon  Austria.  The  poor  relics  of  the  French 
navy  were  soon  either  destroyed  or  rendered 
useless,  as  he  foresaw.  There  remained  for  him  Motives  of 
only  the  subjugation  of  the  British  allies — solid  policy!00 
and  decisive  victories  by  land  instead  of  dreams 
of  victory  by  sea.  Through  their  subjugation 
he  believed  that  he  should  be  able  to  accomplish 
what  his  rash  Egyptian  expedition  of  1798  and 
his  passionate  plans  of  invading  England  had 
signally  and  irretrievably  failed  to  achieve.  His 
island  enemies  had  beaten  him  at  every  turn. 
What  had  supplied  their  inexhaustible  funds? 
Their  manufactures,  and  their  commerce  with  all 
the  world.  These  resources  should  be  struck 
down  and  rendered  powerless  by  the  simple  ex- 
pedient of  stopping  the  access  of  the  British 
people  to  their  accustomed  markets.  If  the 
whole  coasts  of  Europe  were  closed  to  their 
ships  the  change  would  soon  make  itself  felt. 


236  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

If  he  could  produce  this  result  by  the  conquest 
of  his  immediate  neighbours  and  by  treaties  with 
the  rest,  wrung  from  their  fears,  this  should  be 
first  tried.  If  that  failed,  he  would  conquer  all 
Europe,  and  then  his  triumph  would  at  last  be 
complete. 

This  view  of  Napoleon's  conduct  has  been  re- 
cently revived — for  it  was  not  unfamiliar  to  former 
generations  of  Englishmen — by  Captain  Mahan, 
and  it  may  on  the  whole  be  accepted  ;  but  it  must 
not  be  supposed  that  the  tremendous  drama  wrhich 
it  took  eight  years  to  work  out  under  this  grand, 
comprehensive  plan,  was  present  to  the  mind  of 
the  great  strategist  from  the  moment  when  he 
turned  his  back  upon  Boulogne,  and  left  his  vast 
naval  armaments  to  moulder  away.  He  was  no 
doubt  drawn  on  by  events,  by  the  necessity  of 
breaking  up  the  coalition  of  Austria,  Prussia,  and 
Russia  with  Great  Britain  which  he  well  knew 
that  Pitt  was  once  more  constructing,  by  the 
ever-growing  difficulties  of  the  task  which  he 
had  undertaken,  and  by  the  successful  defiance 
of  all  his  precautions  on  the  part  of  his  inde- 
fatigable enemy ;  but  if  he  had  any  governing 
principle  at  all  beyond  the  necessity  of  making 
brilliant  conquests  in  order  to  keep  up  his  Im- 
perial supremacy  in  France,  this  was  his  motive. 
In  the  indulgence  of  his  policy  he  knew  that  he 
represented  the  ancient  quarrel  of  centuries,  but 


DURING    THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  237 

he  did  not  divine  that  eventual  failure  would 
change  the  aspect  of  that  enmity,  and  lead  his 
people  to  embrace  the  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
as  their  best  aid  against  the  nations  which  they 
had  so  terribly  injured. 

The  battle  of  Austerlitz,  which  signalised  the 
gigantic  character  of  the  new  war,  occurred,  with 
dramatic  promptitude,  so  immediately  after  that 
of  Trafalgar,  that  the  gratitude  of  deliverance 
from  French  invasion  was  almost  forgotten  by 
Englishmen  in  the  horror  of  the  new  catastrophe. 
The  invincible  legions  of  the  conqueror  seemed 
about  to  lay  prostrate  all  the  thrones  of  the  Con- 
tinent, and  to  cut  off  every  branch  of  the  alliance 
by  means  of  which  the  British  Government  had 
hoped  to  restrain  the  French  within  some  bounds. 
There  was  no  longer  place  for  naval  enterprise ; 
there  was  no  Continental  State  capable  of  using 
the  subsidies  which  had  hitherto  played  so  great 
a  part  in  British  strategy.  What  was  to  be  done? 
It  was  no  wonder  that  the  miserable  prospect 
gave  the  finishing  stroke  to  the  worn-out  frame 
of  William  Pitt.  It  was  a  sad  recurrence  of  the 
lot  which  fell  to  his  father.  The  two  greatest 
and  most  successful  ministers  whom  their  country 
had  ever  possessed  died,  not  when  the  arms  of 
Hawke  and  Wolfe  in  one  case  and  of  Nelson  in 
the  other  had  raised  them  each  respectively  to 
the  highest  renown,  one  as  the  founder  of  an 


commerce. 


238  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

empire,  the  other  as  the  destroyer  of  the  French 
navies,  but  from  the  shock  of  the  American  War 
which  broke  the  heart-strings  of  Chatham,  and 
from  the  success  of  the  arch-enemy  who  had  over- 
thrown the  allies  of  Chatham's  son.  With  Pitt, 
the  pilot  who  had  "  weathered  the  storm,"  and 
Nelson,  who  had  ruled  Britannia's  waves  like  a 
sea-god,  died  for  the  moment  the  hearts  of  the 
British. 

But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  even  in  the 
midst  of  their  grief  they  thought  of  succumbing 
British  to  the  pressure ;  not  for  a  moment  did  the  com- 
merce of  their  merchants  cease  to  be  pushed  in 
every  channel  which  presented  itself,  new  and 
old.  The  efforts  of  the  French  corsairs,  manned 
by  seamen  who  no  longer  found  employment  in 
the  men-of-war,  were  expended  in  vain  against 
the  fleets  of  convoyed  ships  "  spread  like  wild 
swans  on  their  flight,"  sailing  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  frigates  such  as  Byron  described,  im- 
patiently waiting  for  the  laggards,  "  the  flapping 
sail  hauled  down  to  wait  for  logs  like  these." 
The  master-portrait  of  an  everyday  sight  which 
he  draws  in  imperishable  verse  has  never  been 
surpassed ;  but  if  we  wish  to  see  the  grand 
picture  of  the  combined  British  sea  -  forces  of 
war  and  peace,  as  they  presented  themselves  to 
the  eager  gaze  of  a  competent  observer  at  a 
critical  moment  of  English  history,  we  should 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  239 

turn  to  the  Life  of  Metternich.  The  young 
ambassador  to  Great  Britain  in  1793  was  taken 
to  a  hill  in  the  Isle  of  Wight,  from  whence  he 
saw  on  a  summer  day  the  great  fleet  of  Lord 
Howe,  at  Spithead,  anchored  in  three  divisions, 
with  two  vast  convoys  on  either  side,  one  stretch- 
ing along  the  Solent,  the  other  towards  St  Helen's. 
In  admirable  language  he  describes  them  as  they 
all  got  under  weigh  at  Lord  Howe's  signal,  the 
three  divisions  of  the  great  fleet  manoeuvring  with 
the  precision  of  land  battalions  on  a  field-day,  the 
clouds  of  merchant-ships  making  their  way  under 
convoy,  and  disappearing,  one  cluster  of  them  up 
Channel  to  the  North  Sea,  the  other  down  Channel 
to  the  Mediterranean  and  India,  to  Africa,  the 
West  Indies,  and  the  shores  of  America. 

Such  historical  pictures  as  these  make  more 
impression  than  statistics  on  the  ordinary  reader ; 
but  Captain  Mahan  has  done  well  to  put  before  captain 

.    .  .         Mahan's 

us  the  warfare  against  British  commerce  which  treatment 

of  the  sub- 
accompanied  the  military  struggle,  in  a  manner  Ject- 

well  calculated  to  show  its  importance ;  and  he 
has  succeeded  in  making  it  intelligible  to  the 
careful  student  who  looks  below  the  surface,  and 
who  desires  to  register  the  lessons  taught  at  that 
time  for  future  use.  He  has  the  advantage  of 
being  able  to  regard  it  from  the  point  of  view  of 
a  neutral,  and  thus  to  show  how  the  measures 
which  the  British  found  to  be  necessary  with 


240  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

regard  to  neutrals  could  not  but  issue  some  day 
in  war  with  the  country  to  which  he  himself 
belongs.  To  make  his  story  clear  he  has  wisely 
divided  the  subject  chronologically.  His  first 
part  extends  from  the  opening  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary War  to  1806,  when  Napoleon,  who  had 
hitherto  followed  the  example  of  the  various 
French  Governments,  including  the  Directory, 
determined  to  exclude  Great  Britain  from  all  the 
ports  of  Europe,  and  for  that  purpose  issued  the 
"  Berlin  Decree."  The  second  part  traces  the 
working  of  that  and  the  "  Milan  Decree,"  their 
failure,  and  the  final  attitude  of  Great  Britain" 
towards  neutrals  as  it  issued  in  the  war  of  1812 
with  the  United  States. 

It  took  six  years,  counting  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  Revolutionary  War  (1793-1799),  to 
obtain,  as  regards  commerce,  the  full  advantage 
of  British  naval  supremacy,  but  by  the  end  of  that 
time  "  the  French  flag  had  been  swept  from  the 
sea."  The  amount  of  commerce  which  fell  into 
the  hands  of  neutrals  was  at  first  increasingly 
Hard  but  great  every  year.  The  British  carrying  -  trade 
So?*5  could  not  keep  up  with  the  demand  for  British 
produce,  and  the  vessels  of  the  United  States 
were  its  main  auxiliaries,  but  the  restraints  put 
upon  them  by  the  British  Government  were  severe 
and  increasing.  The  French,  on  their  part,  held 
firmly  to  the  principle  that  to  destroy  British 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  241 

commerce  was  to  destroy  Britain,  and  reckoned 
all  neutrals  who  carried  it  as  enemies.  So  that 
the  Americans  and  other  neutrals  were  injured 
by  both  parties,  nor  were  their  remonstrances 
attended  to  during  the  fury  of  the  struggle.  But 
Great  Britain  gradually  established  the  principle 
which  Captain  Mahan  admits  was  necessary  not 
only  for  her  predominance,  but  for  her  "  self-pre- 
servation " — viz.,  that  the  United  Kingdom  should 
become,  for  that  war,  the  storehouse  of  the  world's 
commerce.  He  calls  it  a  "great  conception"  (ii. 
242),  "  radically  sound  and  in  the  end  victorious, 
for  upon  Great  Britain  and  upon  commerce  hung 
the  destinies  of  the  world." 

Thus  at  any  rate — for  she  insisted  that  all  pro- 
visions carried  by  neutrals  to  France  should  be 
reckoned  as  "  contraband  "  —  she  isolated  her 
enemy,  and  forced  her  to  rely  upon  her  internal 
resources.  The  luxuries  of  sugar  and  coffee,  and 
the  necessaries  of  manufactured  clothing  and  vari- 
ous articles  of  daily  use,  hitherto  derived  from  the 
British  or  from  their  own  colonies,  could  now 
alone  be  obtained  by  smuggling  and  by  the  cor- 
ruption of  officials,  which  of  course  immensely 
raised  the  prices  arid  profits  to  the  vendors.  The 
depots  for  these  goods  on  the  Continent  were  of  contmen- 
necessity  in  neutral  territories,  first  in  Holland,  for  British 
then  when  that  country  became  French,  in  the 
towns  at  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser, 

Q 


242  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

especially  Hamburg.  Thus  the  efforts  of  the 
French  to  exclude  British  commerce  from  Europe, 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  it,  issued,  during 
the  years  which  preceded  the  battles  of  Trafal- 
gar and  Austerlitz,  in  the  production  of  exactly 
the  opposite  effect. 

The  vast  progress  which  had  signalised  Pitt's 
peace-administration,  and  the  dread  of  the  stop- 
page of  that  progress  which  had  so  distressed  the 
minister  and  made  him  cling  to  peace  long  after 
the  nation  had  begun  to  clamour  for  war,  were 
only  strengthened  and  increased  beyond  all  calcu- 
lation by  the  measures  of  succeeding  French  Gov- 
ernments. No  other  manufactories  could  compete 
Growth  with  those  of  England.  She  employed  larger  and 
resources,  larger  numbers  of  workmen,  who  flocked  to  her 
shores  from  surrounding  nations.  Her  villages 
expanded  into  towns,  her  towns  into  great  cities. 
Her  discoveries  of  coal  within  her  own  limits,  and 
the  growth  of  her  canal-system,  opened  up  ever- 
new  portions  of  her  territory.  Her  harbours  were 
filled  with  shipping ;  her  sails  covered  every  sea. 
An  upward  rise  in  her  social  state  was  continually 
taking  place,  and  the  necessary  taxes  were  borne 
with  increasing  ease.  While  all  this  national 
prosperity  was  showing  itself,  and  giving  a  con- 
fident spirit  which  triumphed  over  every  obstacle, 
Desire  for  it  had  also  the  effect  of  a  longing  desire  to 
bring  the  war  to  an  end,  so  that  the  blessings  of 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  243 

wealth  might  be  enjoyed  without  war- taxes,  and 
the  numerous  reforms  which  were  needed  for  the 
lower  and  middle  classes  might  have  some  chance 
of  being  effected.  Hence  the  joy  of  the  people 
when  the  Peace  of  Amiens  was  brought  about  ; 
hence  the  ovation  given  by  the  London  populace 
to  the  French  minister  who  conveyed  the  ratifica- 
tion— a  mark  of  degeneracy,  as  the  infuriated 
Nelson  thought,  when  he  cried  out  against  the 
"  scoundrels  who  dragged  a  Frenchman's  carriage." 

Again,  nothing  but  the  conviction  that  Napo-  Butresoiu- 
leon  had  deliberately  left  them  no  alternative  but  ttont  § 
war  if  they  wished  to  preserve  not  only  their 
wellbeing  but  their  lives,  bore  them  up  when 
they  tumultuously  demanded  the  rupture  of  the 
Peace,  when  they  were  depressed  by  the  defeat  of 
their  allies  and  the  death  of  Pitt,  and  when  the 
Conqueror  of  Europe  issued  the  fiat  which  de- 
clared the  exclusion  not  only  of  every  British 
article  but  of  every  British  subject  from  the  whole 
vast  circumference  of  the  Continent.  Then  came 
to  their  aid  the  memories  of  the  past  achieve- 
ments of  their  race,  the  inbred  confidence,  which 
so  many  centuries  had  engrained,  in  their  nautical 
and  commercial  enterprise,  the  resolution  to  run 
all  risks,  even  to  the  offence  of  those  very  neu- 
trals to  whom  they  were  so  much  indebted,  rather 
than  give  way  to  Napoleon  on  a  single  point. 
One  or  other  must  succumb. 


244  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

The  stmg-  In  short,  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain 
withNa-  might  be  compendiously  described  at  this  critical 
not  with  period  as  war  to  the  death  with  Napoleon  (not 
people.  with  the  French  people  as  such)  and  alliance  with 
the  rest  of  the  world,  but  only  just  so  far  as 
nations  would  co-operate  with  her  in  the  mortal 
struggle.  Whatever  she  might  do  afterwards, 
during  that  war  she  would  hear  of  no  compro- 
mise with  her  ancient  rights  and  privileges.  This 
brought  on  the  war  with  the  United  States  in 
1812;  but  the  northern  nations,  which  had  been 
concerned  in  the  twice  -  repeated  "  Armed  Neu- 
trality," learnt,  speaking  generally,  to  forget  their 
claims  for  the  present  in  the  dangers  to  which 
they  were  exposed  in  common  with  the  great 
Sea -power,  and  in  the  advantage  which  they 
gained  from  the  goods  which  her  merchants  in- 
troduced. As  the  would-be  master  of  the  world 
extended  his  ideas  of  land  -  blockade  from  one 
conquered  nation  to  another,  he  more  and  more 
exhibited  himself  as  the  personal  enemy  of  the 
human  race,  and  the  British  as  its  deliverers. 


245 


CHAPTER    X. 

BRITISH  FOREIGN  POLICY  DURING  THE  NAPOLEONIC 

WAR  (continued) — 1807-1808. 

IT  did  not  suit  either  the  British  Government  or 
the  people  to  rest  satisfied  with  the  mere  con- 
quests of  commerce,  however  sure  they  might  be 
in  the  long-run  to  prevail.  The  nation  which 
had  lowered  the  pride  of  Philip  II.  of  Spain  and 
Louis  XIV.  of  France  was  by  no  means  willing 
to  believe  that  she  could  not  assist  the  Con- 
tinental Powers  to  make  head  against  the  new 
Emperor  of  the  West.  The  difficulty  was  where  The  system 
to  find  a  fulcrum  on  which  the  lever  might  rest 
which  was  to  move  the  world.  The  year  1806 
had  seen  the  extraordinary  spectacle  of  ancient 
thrones  tumbled  down  one  after  another  by  the 
modern  Charlemagne.  Austria  and  Prussia  licked 
the  dust.  Prussian  troops  had  been  beaten  at 
Austerlitz  when  combined  with  those  of  Austria  ; 
and  the  French  victories  over  Russia  at  Eylau 
and  Friedland  lowered  the  Czar  to  the  level  of 


246  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

his  fellow-monarchs.  The  "  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  "  practically  extended  the  limits  of  France 
into  the  centre  of  Europe,  and  British  subsidies 
to  conquered  States  were  by  the  terms  of  the 
case  impossible.  There  were  no  independent 
States.  The  victorious  British  fleets  could  find 
no  enemy  to  employ  their  energies,  nor  was  there 
any  question  as  to  the  safety  of  India.  All  over 
that  vast  peninsula  the  British  rule  was  making 
progress  under  the  able  hands  of  the  Marquis 
Wellesley  and  of  his  brother,  Sir  Arthur,  who 
had  already  served  his  great  apprenticeship  in 
preparation  for  the  work  which  no  one  yet 
guessed  was  in  store  for  him. 

But  how  to  check  the  conqueror  of  Europe  ? 
This  was  the  vital  question  which  the  Ministry 
of  Fox  and  Grenville,  the  feeble  successors  of  Pitt, 
HOW  to  found  themselves  called  upon  to  answer.  A  new 
place?  direction  for  the  old  British  Foreign  Policy  was 
required,  but  it  was  not  forthcoming.  Fox  hoped 
to  shape  it  in  an  impossible  way.  He  was  bound 
by  his  antecedents  to  see  if  the  peace  which  he 
had  been  so  often  demanding  from  Pitt  could  not 
be  obtained  by  himself,  now  that  he  could  treat 
directly  with  Napoleon.  He  soon  found  himself 
mistaken.  The  Emperor's  circumstances  were 
much  too  prosperous,  and  his  negotiations  were 
consequently  a  mere  mockery.  Fox's  efforts 
had  thus  only  added  one  last  failure  to  those 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  247 

which  had  attended  him  throughout  his  politi- 
cal career. 

Nor  could  the  "Ministry  of  all  the  Talents"  Failure  of 
make  the  least  head  against  the  tide  of  misfor-  cessors. 
tunes  which  flowed  from  the  hands  of  Napoleon. 
Ill  -  conceived  and  ill  -  managed  expeditions  in 
South  America,  in  Egypt,  and  in  Turkey  pro- 
claimed their  incapacity.  Almost  unobserved 
however  a  Dutch  colony  was  at  this  very  time 
appropriated  by  the  British,  from  which  vast  and 
quite  unexpected  consequences  have  resulted.  It 
was  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  which  seemed  at 
first  to  be  only  useful  as  commanding  the  high- 
way to  India,  but  which  has  led  to  the  exten- 
sion of  British  power  and  influence  over  a  large 
portion  of  the  African  continent.  In  the  very 
same  year  was  carried  at  last  the  Abolition  of  Abolition 

the  Slave-trade,  to  which  Clarkson,  Wilberforce,  slave- 
trade, 
and  others  had  devoted   their  lives  in  a  noble 

crusade  against  received  opinions,  prejudice  of 
the  fiercest  kind,  and  the  most  dense  ignorance. 
Thus  the  gradual  freedom  of  the  negro  corre- 
sponded with  the  development  of  British  settle- 
ments on  the  continent  from  which  the  race 
had  come, — settlements  which  had  as  yet  been 
only  feebly  represented  on  the  western  coasts. 
The  unwonted  pause  in  an  active  Foreign  Policy 
presented  an  opportunity  which  Pitt  looked  for 
in  vain,  but  the  credit  for  the  great  act  of  Aboli- 


248  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

tion  must  never  be  separated  from  the  names  of 
Fox  and  Grenville. 

And  here  it  may  be  proper  to  take  advantage 

bilities  of  x        \ 

the  English  ot  this  pause  to  set  the  historic  course  pursued 

for  slavery. 

by  Great  Britain   in   a  light  which  is  too   much 
obscured.     No  one  would  think  of  defending  her 
ancient  patronage  of  the  Slave-trade,  but  we  have 
no  business  to  judge  the  agents  or  the  statesmen 
of  those  times  by  modern  standards.     The  best  of 
men  did  not  at  first  perceive  the  inherent  vice  of 
slavery.     In  our  own  days  we  have  been  called 
upon  to  witness  the  long  and  painful  process  by 
which   public  opinion  has  been  formed  amongst 
our  kinsmen  in  the  United  States.     The  trade  in 
negroes  with  Africa  had,  as  we  all   know,  been 
established  with   the   benevolent   idea   of  saving 
the  feebler  races  of  Mexico  and  the  West  Indies 
from    extinction;    so    that    the    moral    sense    of 
Europe  was    for   a   very   long    time   wholly  un- 
shocked  by  its  continuance.    The  Assiento  or  con- 
tract for  the  exclusive  right  of  importing  negroes 
from  Africa  to  the  Spanish  colonies  was  granted 
to   Great   Britain  at   the  Peace  of  Utrecht  as  a 
compensation  for  her  many  sacrifices  in  the  cause 
of  peace.     No  one  remonstrated  on  the  ground  of 
its  cruelty  or  wickedness.     It  was  thought  to  be 
a  simple  commercial  transaction  with  a  particular 
Company.     About   that  very  time  we   have  the 
strongest  proof  that  the  form  of  slavery  brought 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  249 

about  by  the  slave-trade  was  not  in  itself  con- 
sidered reprehensible.  The  Society  for  the  Pro- 
pagation of  the  Gospel  received  from  the  brilliant 
Christopher  Codrington  for  missionary  purposes 
a  portion  of  his  West  India  estates,  with  its  con- 
tingent of  negro-slaves  ;  but  its  records  show  that 
the  notion  of  emancipating  them  never  struck 
the  excellent  bishops  and  other  dignitaries  who 
formed  its  Committee,  though  they  undertook 
their  education  and  conversion  as  a  primary  duty. 
It  became,  in  short,  a  received  doctrine  that 
negroes  were  better  off  as  slaves  than  amongst 
their  own  savage  kindred,  and  no  doubt  there 
were  many  cases  in  which  this  was  true.  Naval 
officers  who  had  served  in  the  West  Indies  im- 
bibed the  views  of  the  planters,  and  helped  to 
propagate  the  illusion.  Nor  were  the  horrors 
of  the  Middle  Passage  so  shocking  in  its  early 
stages.  It  was  one  of  the  evils  accompanying 
the  working  of  the  Act  that  the  difficulties  of 
transport  greatly  multiplied  the  sufferings  of 
the  slaves.  Those  who  delight  in  minimising 
the  good  fame  of  their  country  may  well  be 
reminded  that  it  was  Great  Britain  after  all 
which  steadily  put  down  this  foul  practice  as 
carried  on  by  its  own  offspring,  and,  by  the  force 
of  a  strenuous  and  constant  pressure  upon  other 
nations,  has  gradually  abolished  the  trade  all 
over  the  civilised  world.  Her  ability  to  do  so 


250  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

sprang  from  her  Foreign  Policy,  which,  guided 
by  the  commercial  instinct,  tended  to  make  and 
keep  her  mistress  of  the  seas.  Still  more, 
when  did  any  nation  make  a  greater  sacrifice 
than  that  which  formed  the  corollary  of  the 
Abolition  Act,  when  Great  Britain  paid  down 
twenty  millions  sterling  as  compensation  to  her 
own  planters  for  the  emancipation  of  all  slaves 
within  her  dominions  ? 

The  new  Fox's  death  in  1807,  and  the  incapacity  of  the 
Ministry  of  which  he  had  been  the  main  strength, 
brought  on  the  ministerial  stage  the  remains  of 
Pitt's  party,  along  with  the  Pittite  Whigs — a 
junction  which  by  no  means  inspired  the  confi- 
dence which  the  Government  had  enjoyed  while 
the  great  minister  was  its  guiding  spirit  and  all- 
powerful  champion.  In  the  new  Ministry  the 
Duke  of  Portland  was  the  nominal  head,  but  it 
included  Canning  and  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley — the 
first  as  Foreign  Secretary,  the  last  as  Secretary 
for  Ireland  ;  and  in  observing  the  course  of  these 
two  great  men  we  are  for  our  present  purpose 
absolved  from  noticing  the  rest.  The  future  was 
in  their  hands. 

The  name  of  the  former,  though  it  was  many 
years  before  he  became  Prime  Minister,  connects 
British  Foreign  Policy  with  the  course  it  had 
pursued  under  Pitt.  Canning  w^as  his  pupil  and 
friend,  his  enthusiastic  supporter  in  speech,  in 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  251 

verse,  in  prose.  His  '  Anti- Jacobin '  had  already 
in  some  degree  taken  the  place  of  Burke' s  more 
solemn  appeals  to  the  nation.  It  was  his  es-  Canning's 

.  T  i        special 

pecial  merit  that  he  knew  how  to  enlist  the  merit, 
sympathies  of  the  British  people  in  a  cause 
which  he  made  his  own,  the  cause  of  Spain,  or 
rather  of  the  Spaniards ;  and  its  adoption  placed 
the  British  on  the  track  of  which  they  were  in 
search.  It  gave  them  a  foremost  place  in  the 
direct  and  active  pursuit  of  the  conflict  with 
Napoleon,  and  was  perhaps,  by  drawing  off  his 
forces  to  Spain,  the  chief  agency  in  bringing 
about  his  fall.  We  must  dwell  a  little  longer 
on  the  circumstances  which  turned  British 
Foreign  Policy  in  this  direction,  and  on  the 
statesman  whose  preparation  seemed  to  have 
peculiarly  fitted  him  to  take  advantage  of  them. 

When  the  successful,  all-victorious  "  Emperor  Napoleon 
of  the  West"  had  laid  the  great  monarchs  of a 
Europe  at  his  feet,  it  was  natural  that  he  should 
think  it  only  a  small  thing  to  imitate  his  as- 
sumed prototype  Charlemagne  in  the  Spanish 
Peninsula.  But  that  was  an  imperfect  model. 
No  Saracens  were  at  hand  to  keep  him  north 
of  the  Ebro.  He  would  realise  the  dreams  of 
Louis  XIV.,  and  "  abolish  the  Pyrenees."  It 
required  but  a  word  to  direct  a  sufficient  force 
into  the  midst  of  a  people  who  would  not  dare 
to  resist,  and  to  cajole  into  his  power  an  effete 


252  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Royal  Family,  whom  he  would  replace  by  his 
own  brother  Joseph.  Unfortunately  for  himself 
and  his  plausible  scheme,  he  had  to  reckon  in 
this  matter  with  George  Canning. 

The  great  conqueror  now  found  himself  for 
the  first  time,  and  just  at  the  moment  when 
he  had  arrived  at  the  summit  of  his  career,  face 
to  face  with  his  destiny.  Kings,  armies,  and 
alliances  had  been  shattered  to  pieces  by  his 
hands.  He  had  set  on  foot  a  policy  by  which 
the  only  enemy  he  had  to  fear  would  soon  be 
reduced,  as  he  believed,  to  harmlessness.  All 
Europe  should  learn  what  it  was  to  be  directed 
by  one  beneficent  will,  and  nations  which  had 
stained  the  pages  of  history  by  their  mutual 
contentions  were  to  be  harmonious  co-operators  in 
the  work  of  progress.  He  was  about  to  be  dis- 
illusioned. He  was  to  learn  what  strength  there 
lay  in  the  weakness  of  a  people,  feeble,  disunited, 
contemptible  from  a  military  point  of  view,  and 
ruined  as  a  nation  by  years  of  misgovernment, 
when  the  people  themselves  were  aroused  to  a 
desperate  patriotism,  arid  assisted  by  a  com- 
petent military  force  of  some  other  nation  round 
which  they  could  rally.  This  was  to  be  the 
The  "  Spanish  ulcer,"  as  he  termed  it,  which  almost 

"Spanish 

ulcer."  from  the  moment  when  he  commenced  his  ne- 
farious attempt  to  enslave  the  country  began  to 
eat  away  his  overweighted  system. 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  253 

Canning,  in  more  respects  than  one,  was  pecu- 
liarly fitted  to  extend  his  great  master's  Foreign 
Policy  by  the  method  which  unexpectedly  offered 
itself  for  acceptance.  His  political  position  was 
the  same.  Like  Pitt  and  like  Burke,  he  had 
been  rather  anti-Foxite  than  one  of  the  so-called 
orthodox  Tories, — who  however,  it  must  be  re- 
membered, followed  each  of  these  men  in  turn 
as  their  natural  leader,  and  deserve  to  share 
their  glories.  It  is  remarkable  that  it  should 
have  fallen  to  these  three  men,  who  were  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  word  above  party,  to 
lead  the  nation  through  its  perils.  It  is  an  exam- 
ple of  the  sterling  patriotism  which  rises  to  the 
surface  in  all  British  emergencies,  leading  the 
large  majority  to  forget  on  such  occasions  their 
party  ties,  and  consigning  the  dregs  to  factious 
insignificance. 

It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  Canning's 
adoption  of  the  Peninsular  policy  was  a  greater 
stroke  of  genius  than  any  for  which  his  predeces- 
sors could  be  credited.  The  old  English  policy  of 
subsidies  to  the  allied  Powers  of  the  Continent, 
the  only  one  open  to  Pitt,  had  collapsed  at  Auster- 
litz,  and  seemed  to  be  buried  in  his  grave.  Can-  Adoption 
ning  saw  that  not  only  must  a  limit  be  put,  for  by  Can- 
the  time  at  least,  to  a  system  of  loans  which  had 
become  useless,  but  that  British  gold  and  British 
troops  must  be  freely  used  in  support  of  some 


254  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

country  where  those  troops,  aided  by  the  navy, 
might  hold  their  own.  The  Low  Countries  were 
no  longer  available  as  of  old.  Was  it  possible 
that  the  Spanish  Peninsula  had  offered  at  last 
the  true  base  of  operations  ?  It  was  a  question 
of  exceeding  difficulty  ;  for  nothing  was  known 
about  the  state  of  Spain.  The  wisest  statesmen 
freely  expressed  their  doubts.1  Large  bodies  of 
the  Tories  entirely  distrusted  a  popular  insur- 
rection, and  they  had  only  too  just  cause  for 
hesitation.  From  another  point  of  view,  in  spite 
of  the  popular  support  which  carried  Canning 
over  every  obstacle,  the  organs  of  the  Whigs 
discouraged  any  further  opposition  to  the  in- 
vincible Napoleon.  With  some  of  them  he  was 
even  yet  an  idol. 

It  was  no  doubt  a  dangerous  experiment,  as 
the  course  of  events  proved.  How  often  was  the 
cause  all  but  shipwrecked  !  Yet  it  was  Canning's 
own  infectious  enthusiasm  which  made  him  dash 
into  the  fray  while  he  had  the  power  to  lead  the 
country ;  and  the  British  were  soon  too  far  com- 
mitted to  draw  back.  That  enthusiasm  was  sup- 

1  It  is  a  wonderful  proof  of  Pitt's  foresight  that  he  remarked  to 
Lord  Wellesley,  the  last  visitor  he  saw  before  his  death,  "  Only  a 
war  of  peoples  could  save  Europe,  and  this  war  would  begin  in 
Spain."  It  was  one  of  those  prophecies  which  help  to  fulfil  them- 
selves. Canning  and  the  Wellesleys  no  doubt  shared  that  opinion, 
and  treasured  up  the  saying.  See  *  Talleyrand,'  ii.  105,  by  Lady 
Blennerhasset  (English  Edition). 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  255 

plied  by  his  popular  sympathies.     His  confidence 
in  the  desperate  resolution  of  the  Spanish  people 
turned  out  at  last,  after  many  a  bitter  trial,  to 
be  well-founded.      The  truth   is,  if  we   examine  The  out- 
Canning's  career,  we  shall  find  that  with  all  his  his  popular 

sympa- 

contempt  of  the  arts  of  the  demagogue,  and  all thies- 
his  horror  of  the  French  Revolution  and  its 
English  supporters,  there  was  a  side  of  his  charac- 
ter which  led  him  to  believe  from  the  bottom 
of  his  heart  that  the  people  of  England  would  be 
with  him  if  they  were  only  properly  led.  Instead 
of  leaving  them  out  of  his  calculations,  as  was  too 
much  the  fashion  of  an  ancient  aristocratic  society, 
he  would  write  for  them,  legislate  in  their  favour, 
use  them  for  the  public  service,  attract  and  guide 
them  into  patriotism.  These  ingrained  ideas  as 
to  his  own  people  helped  him  to  believe  in  the 
people  of  Spain  and  Portugal. 

But  before  Canning  engaged  in  this  congenial 
field  for  his  talents  he  became  responsible  for 
one  of  the  boldest  strokes  of  British  war-policy 
which  had  yet  been  made.  The  Czar  Alexander, 
staggered  by  the  unexpected  success  of  Napo- 
leon, and  offended  with  the  British,  whose  op- 
position to  the  Armed  Neutrality  had  prevented 
them  from  making  common  cause  with  Russia  as 
entirely  as  they  had  with  Austria  and  Prussia, 
showed  a  disposition  to  come  to  terms  with  the 
conqueror.  Of  this  Napoleon  well  knew  how  to 


256  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

take  advantage.  "  Let  us  divide  the  world,"  said 
he ;  "  Great  Britain  will  soon  be  harmless,  and 
you  shall  have  Turkey  as  far  as  the  Balkans, 
Finland,  and  the  rest  of  Poland."  The  Emperor 
of  the  West  would  treat  with  the  "  Emperor  of 
the  East "  on  equal  terms.  On  a  raft  moored  in 
the  river  Niemen  this  Peace  of  Tilsit  (July  7, 
1807)  was  concluded  between  the  two  despots. 
There  were  also  secret  Articles,  but  they  were 
not  secret  to  Canning,  whose  information  was 
excellent ;  and  one  of  them  provided  for  the  use 
of  the  Danish  fleet  by  the  French  against  Great 
Seizure  of  Britain.  The  minister  was  equal  to  the  occasion, 
fleet.  and  instantly  replied  to  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  by 
seizing  the  fleet  at  Copenhagen.  It  was  only  a 
question  of  days  and  hours  whether  the  two  allies 
should  use  this  fleet  against  his  country,  or  be 
prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  menaced  State. 
There  was  no  hesitation.  Not  an  hour  was  lost. 
To  the  amazement  of  the  .Emperors  of  the  East 
and  West,  while  they  were  still  paying  compli- 
ments to  one  another,  the  thing  was  done.  Lords 
Gambier  and  Cathcart,  with  a  force  against  which 
resistance  was  hopeless,  carried  off  the  fleet  to 
England,  the  Danes  having  refused  the  offered 
terms  of  surrendering  it  as  a  deposit  till  a  general 
peace.  This  was  a  most  dexterous  stroke ;  but 
few  things  gave  a  greater  shock  to  the  opinion 
still  entertained  of  British  honour.  "  No  expe- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  257 

dition,"  says  Lord  Malmesbury,  "  was  ever  better 
planned  or  better  executed,  and  none  ever  occa- 
sioned more  clamour."  l 

It  was  too  successful,  too  barefaced  a  robbery,  Defence  of 
—so  the  world  said.  Here  was  the  nation  which 
professed  such  philanthropical  sentiments,  in 
which  Wilberforce,  after  a  struggle  of  twenty 
years,  had  just  carried  the  Abolition  of  the 
Slave-trade, — a  nation  which,  from  a  pinnacle 
of  moral  elevation,  was  never  weary  of  de- 
nouncing the  crimes  of  its  enemies,  condescend- 

O  ' 

ing  to  an  act  which  deserved  to  be  classed  with 
the  violent  defiances  of  elementary  law  so  often 
committed  by  the  French.  This  was  the  language 
of  friends  and  foes  upon  the  Continent,  and  of 
not  a  few  in  the  country  by  which  the  blow  was 
struck.  Even  Heeren,  an  historian  of  the  times, 
who,  writing  a  generation  afterwards,  most  plainly 
perceived  the  true  relations  between  Great  Britain 
and  Napoleon  during  the  deadly  struggle,  passes 
over  the  seizure  of  the  fleet  with  the  dry  remark 
that  "  it  gave  England  an  accession  of  security 
but  not  of  renown." 

Since  those  days,  however,  historical  opinion 
has  decidedly  settled  down  in  favour  of  *  the 
course  which  Canning  pursued.  Even  at  the 
time,  Wilberforce,  statesman  and  philanthropist, 
declared  the  "  policy  might  be  doubtful,  but  our 

1  Malmesbury  Diaries,  iv.  391. 
R 


258  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

right  clear  if  self-defence  is  clear "  ;  and  again, 
"  After  much  reflection  I  am  convinced  that 
under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  the 
Danish  expedition  was  just."  The  fact  is  that 
the  issue  has  been  absurdly  confused  and  dis- 
torted by  the  bitter  hostilities  of  the  times. 
The  arguments  against  the  British  action  towards 
a  Power  with  which  there  was  no  war,  assumed 
as  a  premiss  the  independence  of  the  gallant 
Danes ;  whereas  their  independence,  like  that  of 
Holland,  could  only  be  a  reality  when  collective 
Europe  guaranteed  it.  When  the  Continent  was 
parcelled  out  between  France  and  Russia,  the 
Danish  fleet  belonged  to  one  or  other  or  both  of 
those  nations.  Denmark  was  grievously  to  be 
pitied  for  finding  herself  in  such  a  dilemma ;  but 
what  country  did  not  suffer  in  that  fearful  con- 
flict ?  It  would  have  been  well  if  she  could  have 
accepted  the  conditions  offered  her  ;  but  she  not 
unnaturally  preferred  to  throw  herself  into  the 
arms  of  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  and  took 
the  consequences.  The  seizure  of  these  ships  was 
neither  better  nor  worse  than  a  thousand  other 
acts  which  occur  in  war,  and  which  pass  unheeded 
from  the  simple  necessity  of  the  case  in  hand. 

It  must  also  be  remembered — and  it  is  part  of 
our  general  subject — that  Denmark  had  its  own 
policy  in  reference  to  Sweden  and  Norway,  which 
cannot  be  severed  from  these  transactions.  It  is 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  259 

indeed  the  key  to  them.  Sweden  was  at  this 
moment  the  one  ally  in  the  north  which  elected 
to  stand  by  the  hard  -  pressed  British ;  and 
yet  it  was  an  impotent  ally,  for  its  king  was  to 
all  practical  purposes  insane.  When  Canning 
sent  Sir  John  Moore  with  a  small  but  efficient 
army  to  support  Gustavus  IV.,  he  was  obliged  to 
return  as  he  went,  for  no  common  action  was 
possible.  Great  Britain  then,  it  is  plain,  could 
not  let  the  Baltic  take  care  of  itself.  Necessity  The  state 
was  laid  upon  her.  The  policy  of  Denmark  was  Baltic, 
naturally  opposed  to  that  of  the  ally  of  Sweden, 
its  deadly  enemy.  Under  such  circumstances 
there  could  be  no  basis  of  support  for  Great 
Britain  in  the  friendliness  of  either  the  people  of 
Denmark  or  their  rulers,  even  if  they  had  not  the 
excuse  that  they  were  acting  under  pressure.  It 
was  precisely  that  action  under  pressure  which 
the  British  could  not  afford  to  permit.  It  had 
no  choice.1 

This  high-handed  act — for  such,  however  justi- 
fiable, it  was — had  removed  one  danger.  It  was 
a  sort  of  corollary  to  Trafalgar.  There  should  be 


1  The  foregoing  paragraphs  are  taken  from  *  Imperial  England,' 
published  in  1880.  It  is  satisfactory  to  be  able  to  quote  in  confir- 
mation of  them  Captain  Mahan's  mature  judgment  recently  deliv- 
ered :  "  The  transaction  has  been  visited  with  the  most  severe,  yet 
uncalled-for,  condemnation.  ...  To  have  receded  before  the  ob- 
stinacy of  the  Danish  Government  would  have  been  utter  weak- 
ness."—Influence  of  Sea  Power,  &c.,  ii.  277. 


260  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

no  revival  of  the  threat  of  invasion,  no  interfer- 
ence with  the  steady  progress  of  British  manu- 
factures or  commerce.  But  what  a  spectacle 
presented  itself  to  the  new  Foreign  Minister, 
The  Con-  face  to  face  with  the  new  "  Continental  System," 

tinental 

System,  formulated  by  the  Berlin  Decree  of  November 
21,  1806,  and  the  Milan  Decree  of  December  17, 
1807  ;  and  forced  upon  the  nations  of  the  Con- 
tinent !  The  arbiter  of  Europe,  building  on  the 
foundation  laid  by  the  preceding  French  revolu- 
tionary Governments,  and  extending  the  platform 
of  the  old  "  Armed  Neutrality"  of  the  northern 
nations,  threatened  the  absolute  destruction  of 
his  inveterate  foe.  Baffled  in  Egypt  and  Syria, 
baffled  on  the  coast  of  Boulogne,  his  naval  forces 
absolutely  destroyed,  he  had  taken  his  revenge. 
He  had  by  these  Decrees  at  last  succeeded  in 
sealing  up  the  whole  of  the  coasts  of  Europe,  as 
he  supposed,  from  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain. 
He  had  only  to  deprive  her  of  the  coast  of  Por- 
tugal, the  one  friendly  strip  of  territory  left 
through  w^hich  the  "nation  of  shopkeepers  "  could 
pour  their  goods  into  Europe.  This  last  ally,  the 
most  ancient  of  England's  allies,  was  forced  to 
declare  war  with  her  friends  in  August  1807. 
Her  fleet  was  to  be  seized  in  the  Tagus  by  the 

The  French  army  which  poured  into  the  country ;  and  then 

seize  For-  J  . L  .  .  .    . 

tugai.         Great   Britain   would  die   of  inanition,   then  the 
world  would  be  at  rest.     These  calculations  were 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  261 

falsified ;  the  first  by  a  British  naval  force  on  the 
spot,  the  second  by  the  inherent  difficulty  of  the 
scheme  which  appeared  so  feasible  on  paper. 
Canning,  who  had  seized  the  Danish,  was  not 
likely  to  allow  the  Portuguese  fleet  to  be  absorbed 
by  French  land-forces.  He  encouraged  the  Royal 
Family  to  seek  refuge  in  Brazil  rather  than  sub- 
mit, and  a  British  fleet  convoyed  them  on  their 
way ;  while  the  vanguard  of  Junot's  army  arrived 
only  in  time  to  obtain  a  distant  view  of  the  last 
ship  of  the  Portuguese  naval  service  clearing  out 
of  the  Tagus. 

The  final  object,  the  annihilation  of  British 
commerce  by  the  "  Continental  System,"  was  a 
more  complicated  matter,  and  was  decided  against 
Napoleon  by  two  main  agencies,  —  the  resolute 
measures  taken  by  the  British  Government,  and 
the  spontaneous  working  of  the  universal  law  of 
supply  and  demand.  Both  of  these  were  alto- 
gether beyond  the  Emperor's  power  to  control. 
But  it  could  not  be  expected  that  the  wisest 
statesmen  would  be  able  to  forecast  this  future. 
The  present  was  dismal  enough.  The  "  Conti- 
nental System"  declared  the  British  Isles  to  be 
in  a  state  of  blockade,  and  every  British  subject 
found  on  the  Continent  a  prisoner  of  war.  It 
prohibited  all  trade  in  British  or  colonial  mer- 
chandise, and  it  forbade  all  vessels  sailing  from 
British  harbours  or  colonies  to  touch  the  shores 


262  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

of  the  Continent.  Against  these  Decrees  the 
outraged  British  Government  issued  the  famous 
British  "  Orders  in  Council,"  which  retaliated  by  pro- 
inCoun-  hibiting  neutrals  from  entering  any  port  which 
was  under  French  influence,  by  an  actual  blockade 
of  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser,  by  a  declar- 
ation of  blockade  against  all  ports  which  excluded 
the  British  flag,  and  by  the  capture  of  all  ships 
whatever  which  proceeded  to  the  said  ports  with- 
out having  first  touched  at  a  British  port,  and 
paid  duty. 

These  all-embracing  measures  on  both  sides 
destroyed  for  a  time  the  whole  trade  of  neutral 
nations.  They  were  particularly  resented  by  the 
United  States,  which  stood  outside  the  circum- 
ference of  the  struggle,  and  were  prepared  to  reap, 
if  possible,  the  full  harvest  of  commerce  to  which 
they  considered  they  had  a  right.  On  the  other 
hand,  both  belligerents,  believing  their  own  policy 
to  be  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  refused  to  listen 
to  the  remonstrances  of  the  neutral  Powers.  Both 
in  their  desperation  resorted  to  the  principle  of  a 
"  paper  blockade "  ;  but  the  difference  was  that 
the  ships  of  Great  Britain,  forced  by  their  foe 
into  an  unwonted  severity,  were  in  a  position 
to  carry  it  out  more  or  less  effectually  by  the 
capture  of  offenders  at  sea ;  while  not  even 
Napoleon  could  prevent  the  organised  smuggling 
which  will  always  exist  where  the  wants  of  a 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR. 


263 


people  rise  to  a  certain  point  and  pass  beyond 
control. 

The  British  were  thus  able  to  concentrate  the  British 
trade   of  the  world   in  their  own  hands.     They  tion  of 

,.  J    trade. 

did  not,  as  we  have  seen,  prevent  neutrals  from 
carrying  goods  to  Continental  ports  so  long  as 
they  first  touched  on  British  shores  and  paid 
duty ;  the  object  of  the  Government  was  to 
enrich  their  country  so  that  it  might  be  able  to 
rely  upon  its  own  resources  in  the  mortal  con- 
flict, and  thus  to  assist  the  Continental  States  to 
enfranchise  themselves  when  the  time  should 
arrive.  Those  who  were  the  universal  pay- 
masters, and  were  drawing  by  hundreds  of 
millions  on  posterity  for  this  purpose,  should 
at  least  have  the  power  of  paying  interest  to 
the  national  creditors. 

It  is  well  that  we  should  remember  how 
matters  appeared  to  that  generation.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  observe  what  that  generation 
could  hardly  perceive  till  events  disclosed  the 
fact,  that  the  great  general  and  statesman  who 
was  now  bestriding  the  world  like  a  Colossus, 
was  marching  straight  on  to  his  own  destruction 
by  means  of  his  "  Continental  System."  He  was  Effect  of 

French  po- 

shuttmg  up  Europe  in  one  vast  prison,  isolating  Hey  on  the 
the  Continent  while  he  thought  he  was  isolating 
Great  Britain,  and  driving  the  despairing  popu- 
lations to  rebellion  while*  he  pretended  to  be  their 


264  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

deliverer.  Surrounded  by  an  army  of  spies,  what 
could  these  oppressed  people  do  but  darkly  con- 
spire and  grimly  watch  for  the  signal  of  insur- 
rection ?  As  each  port  used  for  the  landing  of 
British  goods  was  closed,  one  after  another,  in 
the  Baltic  and  in  the  Mediterranean  and  on  the 
Atlantic  coasts  of  the  Peninsula,  its  place  was 
taken  by  individual  enterprise  which  it  was  the 
common  interest  to  keep  secret,  just  as  in  the 
previous  century  British  merchandise  made  its 
way  in  spite  of  all  obstacles  to  the  coasts  of 
Spanish  America. 

Smuggling  thus  became  so  universal  that  in 
1810  the  great  jailor  himself  was  obliged  to 
legalise  it  by  means  of  licences.  Even  before 
that  his  own  regiments  had  been  clothed  in 
British  broadcloth.  The  consequences  of  this 
system  were  not  only  disastrous  to  himself,  but 
beneficial  to  his  enemy  in  other  ways  than  by  the 
wealth  it  brought  them.  The  professed  liberator 
became  odious,  not  only  as  a  cruel  conqueror,  but 
as  a  confessed  tyrant,  forcing  the  sense  of  misery 
upon  nations,  families,  and  individuals  by  inter- 
fering with  the  first  law  of  civilisation,  the  free 
interchange  of  all  useful  and  familiar  commodities. 
On  the  other  hand,  his  own  acts  presented  Great 
Britain  before  the  Continent  as  the  liberator  and 
benefactor  of  the  human  race.  The  envy  which 
had  attended  her  nautical  triumphs,  the  spectacle 


DURING    THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  265 

of  her  prosperity,  the  arrogance  and  selfishness 
with  which  she  was  charged,  the  high-handed 
though  justifiable  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet, 
were  all  forgotten  in  the  indignant  desire  for 
what  Napoleon  would  not  allow  men  to  have, 
or  only  at  prices  for  a  licence  which  none  could 
afford  but  the  wealthy,  or  prices  enhanced  by 
the  unavoidable  risks  of  smuggling. 

Under  these  circumstances  Heligoland,  close 
off  the  German  coast,  was  seized  by  the  British 
as  an  emporium  for  the  contraband  goods  of  their 
merchants ;  Malta  was  used  for  the  same  purpose 
in  relation  to  the  coasts  of  Italy ;  and  neutrals 
found  their  way  freely  into  Russian  and  other 
Baltic  ports  under  British  licences,  granted  on 
their  having  paid  duty  in  England.  The  climax 
of  the  Emperor's  despotic  and  reckless  policy  was 
reached  when,  exasperated  by  the  success  of  the 
methods  which  had  been  pursued  for  the  evasion 
of  his  futile  decrees,  he  ordered  that  all  British 
manufactured  goods,  wherever  found  within  his 
empire  or  in  countries  under  his  power,  should 
be  publicly  burned ;  and  this  was  done.  It  has 
been  justly  called  a  "  frantic "  act. 

The  sentiments  of  disgust  and  resentment  on 
the  part  of  cowering  Europe  were  now  exchanged 
for  despair  and  conspiracy.  Russia  was  sullenly 
verging  on  war,  and  every  other  nation  was 
looking  for  an  opportunity  to  throw  off  the  yoke 


266  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

which  it  detested.  The  natural  working  of  these 
principles  and  counter  -  principles  took  effect 
gradually  ;  the  impulse  to  his  own  destruction 
was  given  by  Napoleon  himself  in  1807,  at  a 
time  when  it  seemed  that  no  weapon  forged  by 
man  could  reach  to  his  towering  and  impregnable 
height.  Having  handed  over  the  Empire  of  the 
East  to  Russia,  and  obtained  her  compliance 
with  his  schemes  for  rounding  off  the  Empire  of 
the  West,  he  made  up  his  mind  to  realise  his 
dream  of  absorbing  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  and 
in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent,  as  he  thought,  all 
possibility  of  resistance.  The  "  Continental  Sys- 
tem" could  then  be  perfected  in  the  south,  as 
he  intended  that  it  should  be  in  the  north  of 
Europe. 

We  need  not  dwell  on  the  details  of  the  open- 
ing  of  the  Peninsular  War.  The  story  of  the 
Spain.  shameful  seizure  of  the  Spanish  Royal  Family, 
the  apparently  mad  insurrection  of  the  Spanish 
people,  the  unexpected  glories  of  Saragossa,  the 
still  more  extraordinary  capture  of  Dupont's 
army,  and  then,  in  painful  contrast,  the  failures 
of  Spain,  the  crushing  defeats,  the  treacheries, 
the  surprises  of  all  sorts  which  marked  the  pro- 
gress of  the  struggle,  all  these  are  familiar 
enough.  But  it  is  not  easy,  now  that  we  know 
the  result,  to  measure  the  weight  of  the  argu- 
ments which  decided  the  course  of  the  great 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  267 

Foreign  Minister  on  whom  lay  the  chief  respon- 
sibility of  accepting  the  challenge. 

Canning's  merits  in  this  respect  have  been  ob-  Canning 

•  •  111  i     accepts  the 

scured  by  the  errors  into  which  he  was  led  through  challenge, 
the  inexperience  of  his  agents,  especially  through 
the  influence  of  the  poetical  but  unpractical  Frere. 
How  bitter,  and  yet  how  well  deserved,  is  Napier's 
scathing  exposure  of  the  waste  of  British  subsidies 
poured  into  the  coffers  of  those  who  had  not  the 
smallest  idea  how  to  use  them,  of  the  corruption 
and  incapacity  of  the  Spanish  upper  and  middle 
classes,  the  mountain  upon  mountain  of  obstacles 
which  they  piled  up  against  the  British  enterprise. 
And  yet  it  could  hardly  have  been  otherwise.  It 
is  a  terrible  thing  for  a  nation  which  has  once 
been  great  to  learn,  under  the  torture  of  bitter 
experience,  that  it  is  perfectly  incapable  of  ob- 
taining its  own  freedom,  and  must  depend  for 
it  on  another  nation  which  it  has  little  reason 
to  love,  and  could  hardly  help  suspecting  of 
selfish  ends.  It  is  easy  to  turn  into  ridicule 
the  bombastic  pretensions,  the  absurd  ebullitions 
of  national  vanity,  the  feeble  combinations,  the 
childish  strategy  of  a  people  who  had  been  subject 
for  centuries  to  every  political  and  social  disad- 
vantage. All  that  might  be  forgotten  if  it  did 
not  live  in  an  immortal  work.  Napier's  *  Penin- 
sular War '  has  never  been,  nor  is  it  ever  likely 
to  be,  superseded.  There  we  have  the  winged 


268  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

words  of  an  eye-witness,  brave,  capable,  exact, 
industrious,  eloquent.  His  Whig  admiration  of 
Napoleon  is  itself  an  advantage,  since  his  keen 
appreciation  of  the  "Iron  Duke"  acquires  force 
from  the  evident  signs  of  impartiality. 
Reasons  for  To  those  who  have  followed  the  preceding 
policy.0'  sketch  of  British  Foreign  Policy,  the  arguments 
which  weighed  with  Canning  against  those  above 
mentioned  will  readily  suggest  themselves.  From 
a  military  point  of  view  there  were  advantages 
which  the  Revolution-war  had  never  yet  afforded. 
The  Peninsula  could  be  reached  both  from  the 
Atlantic  and  from  the  Mediterranean.  Its  dis- 
tance from  England  was  not  too  great ;  it  cut 
asunder  the  home  resources  of  France ;  it  had 
fine  harbours  for  British  fleets.  The  moral  ad- 
vantage was  also  great ;  for  this  support  of  an  op- 
pressed people,  rising,  regardless  of  odds,  against 
the  common  enemy,  called  forth  the  more  generous 
and  noble  element  in  the  British  character,  and 
raised  the  strife  above  the  level  of  the  usual  politi- 
cal combinations  so  unintelligible  to  the  masses. 

It  was  this  which  made  the  difference  between 
the  present  enterprise  and  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  in  Queen  Anne's  time.  The  military 
advantages  were  much  the  same,  though  greater 
now  than  before,  since  on  that  occasion  the  war  in 
Flanders  and  Germany  starved  the  war  in  Spain ; 
but  the  Spanish  people  did  not  then  feel  any 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  269 

general  desire  to  throw  off  the  French  yoke, 
and  looked  upon  English  and  Germans  as  greedy 
foreigners  bent  on  their  own  aggrandisement, 
while  the  ancient  jealousies  between  Castile  and 
Aragon,  and  the  diverging  interests  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain,  formed  special  features  which 
really  controlled  the  situation.  The  hopes  of  a 
successful  issue  were  in  this  case  much  better 
grounded.  The  people  of  a  whole  nation,  proud 
and  brave,  though  disorganised,  were  sure  to 
feel  the  iron  of  this  later,  more  undisguised, 
French  tyranny  enter  into  their  soul ;  and  in 
that  corner  of  Europe  not  only  might  French 
armies  be  detained  from  trampling  upon  other 
nations,  but  fresh  heart  might  be  given  to  the 
whole  mass  of  the  down-trodden  populations  of 
Europe.  These  might  learn  in  time  to  follow  the 
example  of  Spain.  At  the  very  least  Portugal 
might  be  saved,  the  old  ally  and  valuable  friend 
of  the  British. 

All  this  entered  into,  the  calculations  of  Canning 
and  his  friends.  All  this  came  to  pass,  and  much 
more.  It  is  high  time  also  that  we  took  a  large 
and  generous  view  of  the  conduct  of  the  Penin- 
sular nations.  It  will  be  to  all  time  the  glory 
of  Spain  and  Portugal  that  the  terrific  sufferings 
they  endured  at  the  hands  of  the  Emperor  placed 
them  in  the  front  rank  with  Great  Britain  in  the 
liberation  of  the  world. 


270  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

The  secret  Lastly,  in  reviewing  Canning's  direction  of 
ning's  British  Foreign  Policy  we  are  to  remember,  not 
only  his  irrevocable  seizure  of  the  Peninsula  as 
the  British  battle  -  ground,  but  his  courage  in 
resisting  Napoleon's  overtures  at  the  Congress 
of  Erfurt  (1808).  With  proper  spirit  he  refused 
to  listen  to  them  unless  the  Spanish  nation,  re- 
cently overrun  by  French  armies,  were  included 
in  the  negotiations.  To  have  listened  at  that 
moment  would  have  been  high  treason  to  Europe. 
He,  in  fact,  represented  the  indomitable  spirit  of 
Pitt,  his  mighty  gift  for  ruling  senates,  his  power 
of  infusing  his  own  enthusiasm  into  others,  his 
reliance  upon  elevated  principles  which  were  not 
shared  by  the  ordinary  run  of  statesmen. 

These  are  the  qualities,  tried  in  a  time  of  sore 
need,  which  oblige  us  to  forget  how  much  longer 
Canning  persisted  in  leaning  upon  the  indepen- 
dent efforts  of  the  Spaniards  than  experience 
justified,  and  how  inferior  he  showed  himself  to 
the  Marquis  Wellesley  in  the  political  ability 
necessary  for  dealing  with  the  complicated  ques- 
tions which  were  always  arising  between  the 
British  and  their  allies.  He  was  unfortunate 
in  having  to  leave  office  before  he  had  the  oppor- 
tunity of  retrieving  those  errors.  We  shall  come 
across  him  again  as  the  director  of  British  Foreign 
Policy  at  a  later  date,  and  we  shall  understand 
him  better  for  having  fairly  assigned  him  his 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR. 


271 


place  during  his  first  administration.  Even  if 
he  had  not  effectively  championed  the  cause  of 
liberty  in  Greece  and  elsewhere  at  the  close  of 
his  career,  his  relation  to  the  Peninsular  War 
must  yet  for  ever  place  him  in  the  first  rank 
of  British  statesmen. 


272 


CHAPTER   XL 

BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   DURING  THE  NAPOLEONIC 

WAR  (continued) — 1808-1814. 

Sir  Arthur  THE  other  great  agent  in  British  Foreign  Policy 
besides  Canning  was  Arthur  Wellesley,  soon  to 
become  Duke  of  Wellington — the  man  who  made, 
we  might  almost  say,  no  mistakes,  the  destined 
man  whose  gigantic  shadow  had  already  been 
dimly  projected  before  his  country  from  the  plains 
of  India.  Trained  in  the  best  school  for  British 
generals,  having  learned  many  valuable  lessons 
in  the  disastrous  campaigns  for  which  the  Duke 
of  York  was  responsible  in  the  Low  Coun- 
tries ;  in  India,  thrown  upon  his  own  responsi- 
bility at  the  critical  age  when  a  man  may  make 
or  mar  his  fortunes ;  always  enjoying  the  advan- 
tage of  contact  with  the  leading  minds  of  the 
day,  such  as  his  great  brother  the  Marquis,  and 
the  members  of  the  Cabinet  which  he  served  as 
Secretary  for  Ireland,  from  first  to  last  we  detect 
in  him  nothing  small.  His  standard  was  lofty ; 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  273 

his  acquired  qualities  were  so  exactly  comple- 
mentary to  those  which  he  possessed  by  nature, 
that  nothing  was  wanting  for  such  a  man  but  a 
fair  field. 

The  British  public,  with  every  disposition  to 
follow  Canning's  lead  as  a  statesman,  felt  deeply 
the  need  of  a  military  leader.  They  had  a  choice 
of  seamen,  men  of  the  Nelson  type,  formed  in  his 
school ;  but  they  were  of  no  use  for  this  enter- 
prise. Not  many  were  observant  enough  to 
perceive  that  the  instrument  had  been  already 
formed  ;  nor  did  even  these  really  understand 
their  good  fortune  till  the  voice  of  all  Europe 
shouted  his  name  in  their  ears. 

It    might    seem    at    first    sight    questionable  weiiesiey 
whether   it   is   right   to   treat   the  great   Duke,  banning  as 

the  nation- 

who  was  the  agent  and  servant  of  the  Govern-  airepre- 

.  sentative. 

ment  during  the  Peninsular  War,  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  British  Foreign  Policy  in  succession 
to  Canning,  who  resigned  office  in  1809  on  ac- 
count of  his  quarrel  and  duel  with  Lord  Castle- 
reagh.  Strictly  speaking,  of  course,  this  cannot 
be  affirmed.  Mr  Perceval,  and,  after  he  was 
assassinated,  Lord  Liverpool,  were  the  Prime 
Ministers  responsible  for  the  war  which  we  speci- 
ally associate  with  Canning  as  Foreign  Secretary  ; 
but  the  Duke,  soon  after  the  war  began,  was 
in  reality  master  of  the  situation.  The  Gov- 
ernments under  which  he  commanded  were  those 


274  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

of  second-rate  men;    and  the  difficulties   under 
which  they  laboured  were  stupendous. 

Popular  enthusiasm  is  a  grand  impulsive  force, 
but  it  soon  evaporates  under  trial  unless  it  is 
fanned  by  the  corresponding  enthusiasm  of  the 
highest  class  of  leaders ;  and  even  they  must 
have  some  supply  of  success  and  triumph  to  feed 
the  flame.  A  sagacious  judgment  might  perceive 
in  the  first  victories  of  Moore  and  Wellesley, 
though  they  bore  little  immediate  fruit,  in  the 
temper  of  the  Spanish  people  as  distinguished 
from  their  leaders,  and  in  the  stirrings  of  im- 
patient patriotism  which  were  thus  kindled  in 
the  other  conquered  nations  of  Europe,  sufficient 
and  more  than  sufficient  encouragement  to  perse- 
vere. But  when  it  seemed  that  the  British  were 
entirely  overmatched  by  the  immense  armies  which 
Napoleon,  after  the  first  successes  of  the  Spaniards, 
poured  into  Spain  under  his  best  marshals,  when 
the  mismanaged  and  disastrous  Walcheren  Expe- 
dition had  drained  off  so  large  a  portion  of  the 
British  resources,  when  tidings  of  the  entire  un- 
preparedness  and  unwillingness  of  the  Spaniards 
to  be  helped  came  with  every  mail,  when  all 
attempts  to  support  Wellesley  from  the  east  of 
the  Peninsula  were  found  to  be  futile  —  these 
things  were  too  much  for  the  average  Briton. 
Even  though  the  great  battle  of  Talavera  proved 
to  demonstration  that  the  British,  led  by  their 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  275 

undaunted  chief,  could  conquer,  though  almost 
desperately  hampered  by  their  Spanish  allies,  a 
far  superior  force  of  the  French,  it  scarcely 
affected  the  British  discontent. 

These  murmurs  at  the  waste  of  money,  wrung  British 
from  taxpayers  whose  enthusiasm  had  cooled m 
under  so  many  disappointments,  and  at  the  losses 
sustained  by  so  many  families  in  a  war  which 
seemed  to  display  unusual  recklessness  of  life, 
could  not  but  have  an  effect  on  feeble  ministries. 
They  might  have  been  brushed  aside  by  Pitt. 
Canning  had  for  the  time  retired  from  his  great 
position.  A  most  short-sighted  policy  prevailed 
at  headquarters.  Ministers  would,  and  they 
would  not.  They  dared  not  give  up  the  war. 
They  would  starve  it.  Yet  nothing  availed  to 
sour  the  temper  of  the  great  general.  Over  and 
over  again  it  was  his  right  arm  which,  humanly 
speaking,  alone  supported  the  Government.  Over 
and  over  again,  when,  fainting  under  the  pressure 
of  factious  and  turbulent  opposition,  those  at  the 
helm  refused  their  general  the  necessary  supplies, 
or  almost  crippled  his  strategy  by  untimely  inter- 
ference, or  in  despair  threw  the  whole  responsi- 
bility for  continuing  the  war  upon  his  shoulders, 
it  was  his  magnificent  courage,  patience,  sagacity, 
all  -  comprehending  foresight,  which  carried  the 
vessel  of  the  State  over  the  tumultuous  waves. 
Nothing  but  the  conviction  which  he,  and  he 


276  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

alone,  infused  by  degrees  into  the  nation,  that 
it  was  at  last  reaping  the  fruits  of  so  many 
years  of  bitter  trial  and  heroic  sacrifice,  could 
have  turned  the  tide.  If  we  had  to  fix  upon 
the  particular  part  of  his  noble  roll  of  great 
deeds  which  chiefly  produced  this  effect,  we 
should  select  the  events  which  gathered  round 
Torres  the  Lines  of  Torres  Vedras.  This  was  generally 

Vedras.  .  . 

acknowledged  by  the  generation  which  witnessed 
the  struggle, — for  it  was  obvious  enough, — but 
perhaps  is  not  so  clearly  perceived  now  that  the 
famous  battles  which  followed  it  have  intervened 
with  more  brilliant  effect  in  the  pages  of  history. 

It  is  enough  here  to  remind  the  reader  that  the 
defences,  secretly  prepared  with  consummate  fore- 
sight and  skill,  were  used  with  equal  judgment  on 
the  advance  of  Massena's  army,  which  was  driven 
to  an  ignominious  retreat  with  the  loss  of  30,000 
men,  while  the  British  were  rested  and  refreshed, 
reinforced  and  enthusiastic.  Portugal  was  thus 
set  free,  and  the  victor  ready  to  invade  Spain. 
The  consequences  were  soon  apparent.  The  un- 
worthy opposition  in  England  to  the  Peninsular 
War  sank  and  slunk  away ;  the  crushed  peoples 
Revival  of  of  the  Continent  took  heart.  All  through  the 
spirit6*"  year  1811  preparations  for  a  united  struggle 
which  should  be  to  the  death  were  in  progress, 
and,  as  usual,  Great  Britain  was  quite  understood 
to  be  the  one  independent  Power  whose  inex- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  277 

haustible  resources  would,  when  the  day  came, 
be  distributed  throughout  the  mass.  Once  more, 
then,  the  British  stood  in  the  way  of  the  Emperor 
of  the  West,  just  as  they  had  barred  his  progress 
so  often  before.  His  wisest  plan,  had  it  been 
possible,  would  have  been  to  take  command  of 
his  Spanish  armies  and  attempt  to  dispose  of 
Wellington  at  once.  But  he  held  too  many 
threads  in  his  hand,  and  felt  that  enslaved  Europe 
might  rise  while  he  was  shut  up  in  Spain.  It 
was  too  great  a  risk.  He  could  not  be  sure  that 
it  would  be  a  short  campaign,  and  unless  it  were 
short  he  was  lost.  So  he  resolved  to  deal  first 
with  Russia,  and  settle  afterwards  with  Great 
Britain.  It  turned  out  that  he  was  rushing  to 
ruin. 

By  this  time  the  cup  of  misery  which  Napoleon 
had  forced  Europe  to  drink  was  full,  while  at 
the  same  time  his  own  France  was  exhausted 
by  the  incessant  drain  of  men  and  money,  and 
quite  unable  to  recoup  his  immense  expenses 
by  trade  or  commerce.  Great  Britain  was  also 
bitterly  suffering,  but  her  Government  at  least 
continued  to  fight  the  commercial  battle  with 
success.  Her  "Orders  in  Council"  met,  as  we 
have  seen,  her  enemy  at  every  turn,  and  forced 
the  trade  of  all  neutrals  into  her  own  ports ; 
while  the  Emperor  ruled  his  subject  States  by 
military  force  alone,  and  to  supply  his  needs 


- 


278  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Gloomy      was    obliged    to    anticipate   his    stock  of  French 

prospects  .  . 

of  the        soldiers  from  a  generation  which  ouemt  not  yet 

French. 

to  have  been  taken  from  boys'  schools.  Thus 
he  found  the  service,  not  unnaturally,  becoming 
unpopular,  and  wholesale  evasions  of  military 
duty  a  standing  difficulty.  All  this  time  he 
was  attempting  to  make  war  support  war,  and 
wherever  he  was  put  to  expense,  to  recoup  him- 
self from  the  subject  nation  which  caused  it. 
In  Spain  he  was  gradually  arousing  the  whole 
people  to  fury  by  the  exactions  necessary  to 
support  his  armies ;  and  though  of  little  or  no 
use  as  regular  troops,  the  guerilla  warfare,  which 
they  organised  in  a  more  or  less  scientific  form, 
exactly  suited  their  genius,  and  forced  the  French 
to  detach  such  immense  convoys  of  regulars  to 
carry  in  provisions  and  escort  despatches  that 
for  the  last  two  years  of  the  war  this  formed  a 
sensible  diversion  in  favour  of  the  British.  To 
this  was  added  the  drain  of  French  troops  which 
began  as  soon  as  ever  the  Emperor  discovered 
that  Russia  was  meditating  hostilities,  and  be- 
came serious  at  the  end  of  the  year  1811.  We 
are  brought,  then,  to  the  opening  of  the  final 
act  of  the  drama,  and  observe  that  two  main 
causes  operated  to  bring  it  on. 

The  revolt  of  Russia  was  at  bottom  no  doubt 
due  to  the  rising  sense  of  indignation  at  the 
treatment  she  had  received,  along  with  her  allies, 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  279 

at  the  hands  of  one  whom  she  could  not  but 
regard  as  a  contemptible  upstart  of  mushroom 
growth.  The  Czar,  remembering  the  fate  of  his  Causes  of 
father,  perceived  that  there  must  be  some  change  resistance, 
from  the  false  position  he  had  assumed  on  the 
raft  at  Tilsit,  as  joint-Emperor  of  Europe  with 
Napoleon.  His  subjects  might  be  loyal  enough 
if  he  represented  them,  but  only  on  that  con- 
dition. They  were  now  disgusted  by  the  effects 
of  the  "  Continental  System,"  which  had  been 
forced  upon  them  with  ever-fresh  importunity. 
Napoleon,  intent  on  his  one  main  object  of 
striking  down  Great  Britain  through  the  exclu- 
sion of  her  commerce,  and  finding  that  his  system 
was  rendered  to  a  great  extent  nugatory  by 
the  passive  resistance  of  the  German  and  Scan- 
dinavian peoples,  grew  more  and  more  deter- 
mined to  persevere  at  all  costs.  Having  incor- 
porated Holland  and  made  himself  master  of 
the  German  and  Danish  coasts,  in  order  that 
he  might  put  down  smuggling  with  severe  com- 
pleteness, he  conceived  himself  to  be  approaching 
a  successful  result  of  so  many  efforts.  But  he 
offended  the  pride  and  independence  of  Russia 
beyond  all  bearing  when  he  insisted  on  the 
same  severity  in  the  case  of  that  great  country. 

The   Czar,    in    pursuance   of  the    principles    of  injured  by 

the  Con- 

the  Armed  Neutrality,  had  already  taken  a  line  tmentai 

*  m     System. 

of  his  own  with  respect  to  neutrals,  though   it 


280  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

was  impossible  to  deny  that  under  the  pretence 
of  neutrality  they  imported  British  goods.  From 
Russia  these  goods  had  been  conveyed  to  the 
great  Fair  of  Leipsic,  and  the  Czar  positively 
refused  to  rescind  the  decrees  which  thus  frus- 
trated the  Emperor's  policy.  The  peremptory  and 
offensive  language  of  Napoleon  coincided  with 
his  reckless  seizure  of  Oldenburg,  the  Duke  of 
which  State  was  related  to  the  Czar  ;  and  both 
sides  prepared  for  the  war  which  had  become  in- 
evitable. This  was  the  main  cause  of  the  war. 
Its  connection  with  Great  Britain  was  direct  in 
so  far  as  Napoleon's  proceedings  were  grounded 
on  the  Russian  refusal  to  join  him  against  his 
deadly  enemy  ;  but  the  action  of  the  Czar  was 
not  taken  in  concert  with  the  British,  though 
they  soon  made  common  cause. 
Tempted  The  other  operative  motive  of  the  Russian 

by  the  em-  . 

pioyment    policy  was  the  detention   01   so  large   a   Jbrench 

of  French     r         J   .  .  .  8 

troops  in    force   in   Spain.      This   was    a   strategic   circum- 

Spain.  m  °  f 

stance  of  great  weight.  Only  a  portion  of  the 
vast  French  army  could  be  brought  against 
Russia,  and  thus,  what  was  of  inestimable  value 
in  such  a  case,  the  enemy  would  be  divided 
into  two  halves  by  a  diversion  which  was  not 
created  by  Russia  herself.  The  consequence  was 
not  so  apparent  at  first,  because  the  consum- 
mate skill  of  the  Emperor  made  a  more  efficient 
force  out  of  the  troops  marshalled  under  his 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  281 

banner  from  the  conquered  nations  than  could 
have  been  expected ;  but  it  was  foreseen  by 
the  wiser  of  the  Czar's  counsellors,  and  when 
the  trial  came  it  was  soon  evident  that  these 
auxiliaries  could  not  be  relied  upon.  Here 
again  the  impulse  towards  resistance  proceeded 
from  the  movement  in  Spain  which  the  British 
had  initiated.  The  example  of  an  invading 
force  lured  to  its  destruction  by  the  opening 
out  of  the  Spanish  people  to  receive  it,  and 
then,  led  by  British  troops,  closing  in  upon  its 
rear,  was  certainly  not  lost  upon  the  much 
larger  population  of  stubborn  Russia.  That 
great  country  taught  the  world  for  all  time 
that  any  sacrifice,  even  of  the  greatest  and 
most  cherished  national  possessions,  such  as 
"  Holy  Moscow,"  was  not  to  be  named  in  com- 
parison with  national  freedom. 

Austria   and   Prussia  were  no  less   impressed  Position  of 

0  11        Austria 

with  the  spectacle  presented  by  Spam  and  theandPrus- 
leadership  of  Wellington,  and  they  were  far 
more  affected  by  the  rigour  of  the  "  Contin- 
ental System "  ;  but  crushing  defeats  had  ren- 
dered them  powerless  for  the  time,  and  Austria 
had  been  forced  to  consent  to  the  ignominy  of 
marrying  her  Emperor's  daughter  to  the  con- 
queror in  the  room  of  the  divorced  Josephine. 
She  had  to  provide  30,000  troops,  who  formed 
the  main  strength  of  the  right  wing  of  the 


282  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

great  army  of  invasion.  Prussia  had  to  supply 
a  contingent  of  20,000,  who  formed  the  main 
strength  of  the  left  wing,  and  also  vast  muni- 
tions of  war.  To  that  brave  nation  the  disgrace 
of  thus  slavishly  serving  the  tyrant  of  Europe 
was  the  more  terrible,  as  it  had  already  begun 
to  adopt,  under  Stein,  Hardenberg,  and  Scharn- 
horst,  the  reforms  which  were  to  bear  fruit  in  a 
just  retaliation  and  eventually  in  empire.  The 
political  freedom  and  military  education  organised 
by  these  great  men.  may  be  summed  up  in  a 
sentence  or  two.  The  antiquated  feudal  system 
of  land  and  of  servitude  was  abolished,  the 
serfs  emancipated,  the  peasant  farmers  became 
free  tenants,  and  the  towns  were  enfranchised ; 
while  the  system  of  short  service  and  regular 
drafting  into  the  reserves  soon  turned  the  people 
into  a  nation  of  soldiers.  Within  the  compass 
of  these  few  words  lies  the  secret  of  national 
strength  ;  but  at  the  crisis  of  1812  Prussia  was 
not  ready  to  take  an  independent  part ;  and 
Napoleon  had  practically  surrounded  it  by  his 
organisation  of  the  German  States,  of  Poland, 
and  of  West  Galicia.  It  had  not  long  to  wait. 
The  inva-  The  main  army  was  composed  of  French, 
Russia.  Italians,  Poles,  Swiss,  Rhenish,  Germans,  Illy- 
rians,  and  others.  Some  twenty  nations  in  all 
followed  the  standards  of  the  modern  Xerxes, 
some  half-million  of  soldiers,  with  every  requisite 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  283 

for  war, — "  all  but  their  hearts  were  there  ; " — and 
when  the  truth  leaked  out  that  this  unwieldy 
mass  had  been  driven  headlong  into  a  trap, 
rewards  and  punishments  ceased  to  take  effect. 

Step  for  .step  with  Napoleon's  march  to  destruc-  weiimg- 
tion  advanced  the  sure  and  steady  battalions  of  vance. 
the  British  army  under  Lord  Wellington.  Not 
till  1812,  indeed,  was  he  ready  to  make  the  long- 
desired  advance  upon  Spain  itself,  which  was  the 
reward  of  Torres  Vedras.  The  possession  of  the 
great  frontier  fortresses  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  on 
the  north  of  the  frontier,  and  Badajos  on  the 
south,  was  a  necessary  preliminary  for  this  ad- 
vance ;  and  though  for  their  siege  the  British 
General  had  no  proper  guns  nor  engineering  im- 
plements, nevertheless,  in  the  early  months  of 
1812,  by  dint  of  skilful  manoeuvres  and  a  terrible 
loss  of  life,  chiefly  at  Badajos,  both  were  cap- 
tured, and  the  way  to  Madrid  lay  open  wherever 
he  chose  to  invade.  Such  storming  of  fortified 
towns  recalls  the  ruder  warfare  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  but  it  was  this  or  nothing.  No  corres- 
ponding energy  was  shown  in  England,  and  the 
bare  bodies  of  soldiers  had  to  do  the  duty  of  war 
material.  Even  in  the  Middle  Ages  there  would 
have  been  more  assistance  from  the  science  ap- 
propriate to  the  warfare  of  the  times ;  but  the 
result  justified  the  so-called  recklessness  of  life, 
which  was  really  a  calculated  venture.  Officers 


284  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

and  men  could  now  undertake  the  most  hazard- 
ous adventures,  and  gloried  in  the  opportunity. 
The  invasion  of  Spain  from  the  northern  fron- 
tiers of  Portugal  now  took  place,  and  the  decisive 
battle  of  Salamanca  on  July  12,  1812,  issued  in 
a  great  British  victory  over  Marshal  Marmont  at 
the   very   moment  when    Napoleon    was   in    full 
The  RUS-     career  on  the  way  to  Russia.     That  fatal  march, 

sian  stra-  ..  1  _    _ 

tegy.  the  noble  resolution  of  liussia  that  no  terms 
should  be  listened  to  while  an  enemy  remained 
within  the  empire,  the  storm  of  Smolensk,  the 
continued  retreat  of  Kutusoff  and  his  army,  the 
battle  of  the  Borodino,  where  each  side  lost 
some  40,000  men,  the  advance  upon  Moscow, 
the  rejoicing  of  the  wearied  invaders  when  they 
had  once  got  into  comfortable  quarters,  with  the 
general  himself  lodged  in  the  Kremlin  ;  and  then, 
the  sudden  bursting  forth  of  the  flames  from  a 
hundred  quarters,  the  despair  which  seized  the 
invaders  when  they  found  the  fire  inextinguish- 
able, their  hoped-for  supplies  destroyed,  their 
sheltering  roofs  burnt  over  their  heads ;  and 
when  the  truth  flashed  upon  them  that  there 
was  nothing  for  them  but  to  retreat  by  the 
way  they  came — all  this  is  such  history  as  few 
can  forget.  When  the  premature  winter  set 
in,  and  this  almost  countless  multitude,  shortly 
before  so  glorious  in  "  battle's  magnificently 
stern  array,"  was  destroyed  by  the  prolonged 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  285 

agony  of  a  relentless  frost,  a  relentless  enemy, 
and  an  absolute  disorganisation,  the  imagination 
requires  the  help  of  a  Dante  to  realise  the  facts, 
and  the  illustrations  of  a  Dore  to  present  them. 

This  was  not  a  mere  rebuff  to  an  ambitious 
soldier  who  desired  to  conquer  the  world  for 
conquest's  sake,  no  mere  outcome  of  long-pent- 
up  national  hatred.  What  was  the  cause  of 
Napoleon's  quarrel  with  the  Czar?  It  was  his 
fixed  determination  to  force  Europe  into  the 
formation  of  one  uniform  barrier  against  British 
commerce.  The  policy  was  all  -  embracing,  ad- 
mitting of  no  exception.  If  any  potentate 
showed  reluctance  or  connivance  with  the  enemy 
—still  more  if  he  resisted — his  country  must  be 
subdued.  Thus  whole  nations  and  peoples,  out-  General 
raged  beyond  endurance,  were  aroused  to  fury,  Europe, 
and  after  this  fatal  retreat,  taking  courage  from 
one  another,  declared  war  with  him  to  the  death. 
Imperialism  was  no  longer  possible  in  Europe  ; 
nations  with  such  a  history  as  those  of  the 
Continent  possessed  could  never  be  treated  as 
if  nationalism  had  ceased  to  be  the  rule  of  their 
existence.  In  order  to  carry  out  the  theory 
adopted  by  one  nation,  it  could  not  be  that 
others  should  be  made  to  bend  by  force.  The 
ancient  world  had  afforded  lessons  of  the  same 
sort,  which  had  been  forgotten. 

It  was  still  however  necessary  to  put  an  end 


> 


286  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

to  the  rule  of  the  man  who  had  so  misled  his  own 
long-suffering  people  and  trodden  down  the  rest 
of  the  world.  Both  sides  prepared  for  the  final 
struggle.  With  masterly  skill  and  courage  the 
common  enemy  once  more  gathered  his  legions 
together  to  resist  the  united  tide  of  avenging 
The  war  nations.  The  year  1813  opened  with  the  for- 
tion!  ward  march  of  the  irresistible  Russians,  with 
the  enthusiastic  rising  of  the  Prussians,  already 
turned  into  a  nation  of  freemen  and  soldiers,  and 
with  alliances  between  Great  Britain  and  these 
patriotic  peoples,  to  whom  she  promised  a  great 
subsidy  besides  the  diversion  hitherto  made  by 
her  in  the  Peninsula.  Bernadotte  also  brought 
over  the  Swedes.  Napoleon  indeed  still  found 
friends  in  Saxony,  in  Italy,  and  in  Denmark ; 
and  the  Rhenish  provinces  still  provided  their 
contingents ;  while  Austria,  which  had  hitherto 
suffered  most,  remained  uncertain  what  to  do. 
The  Elbe  divided  the  defeated  invaders  from 
the  avengers. 

The  War  of  Liberation  actually  began  on  March 
27,  1813,  and  the  hesitation  of  those  who  had  not 
yet  thrown  in  their  lot  with  Russia  and  Prussia 
soon  stiffened  into  patriotic  action  under  the  en- 
thusiastic impulse  of  the  Liberators.  Napoleon, 
after  his  usual  manner,  gave  them  little  time  to 
decide ;  and  if  he  had  only  been  able  to  provide 
artillery  and  cavalry,  trained  forces  which  cannot 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  287 

be  raised  in  a  moment,  as  rapidly  as  he  collect- 
ed men,   he  might  yet   have   turned  the    scale. 
But  though  he  won  the  battles  of  Liitzen  and  The  fatal 
Bautzen,  he  could  make  no  decided  impression  France, 
upon  the  masses  whom  he  saw  gathering  around 
him  on  every  side,  and  hoped  that  a  two  months' 
truce  might  enable  him  to  act  with  better  results. 

This  was  another  of  the  errors  which  this  great 
master  of  the  art  of  war  found  himself  forced  to 
commit,  or  perhaps  we  should  say  one  of  the  in- 
evitable consequences  of  an  ambition  which  had 
"  o'erleaped  itself."  He  could  hardly  have  failed 
to  foresee  the  inevitable  consequence.  During 
these  two  months  the  waverers  were  plied  from 
every  side.  They  began  to  feel  that  there  was 
something  solid  to  fall  back  upon ;  and  all  the 
while  Napoleon  showed  himself  as  resolute  as 
ever  to  rivet  the  chains  on  the  nations  which 
he  still  held  in  subjection.  This  determined  the 
long  -  lingering  resolution  of  Austria,  alarmed 
though  it  had  been  at  the  liberal  principles  of 
the  Prussian  liberators.  She  now  threw  herself 
into  line  with  them  and  Russia,  and  from  that 
moment  steadfastly  worked  for  the  overthrow  of 
the  tyrant. 

The  three  great  armies  under  Schwartzenberg,  The  Allies 
Bllicher,  and  Bernadotte  converged  upon  Dresden,  at  Dresden, 
the  headquarters  of  Napoleon,  and  the  finest  spirit 
prevailed.     It  was  all  one  army,  one  great  united 


,- 


288  BRITISH    FOREIGN   POLICY. 

force,  of  which  Austria,  out  of  regard  for  its  old 
Imperial  position,  was  acknowledged  as  the  chief. 
The  three  sovereigns  accompanied  their  armies, 
not  as  generals,  but  to  be  at  hand  for  mutual 
support.  When  had  such  a  thing  been  seen  be- 
fore, since  the  first  settlement  of  the  Teutons  in 
Europe  ?  But  when,  since  Attila,  had  such  an 
enemy  been  seen  ?  But  the  absence  of  any  really 
great  general  in  this  vast  force  is  too  plainly  to 
be  perceived  in  any  account  of  the  campaign. 
Partly  from  this  cause,  but  still  more  from  the 
immense  difficulty  of  combining  the  unwieldy 
levies  of  different  nations,  the  attack  of  the 
Allies  upon  Dresden  failed.  Moreau,  the  victor 
of  Hohenlinden,  did  his  best  as  general,  and  was 
killed  in  the  battle. 

Napoleon  Happily  the  forces  opposed  to  Napoleon  were 
atLeipsic.  too  numerous,  and  animated  with  too  vehement 
a  spirit,  to  make  the  defeat  of  much  consequence. 
Happily  also  there  was  a  Prussian  general  of 
cavalry  who,  though  not  of  the  first  rank,  pos- 
sessed the  impassioned,  all-defying  temper  which 
makes  up  for  many  deficiencies.  Old  Marshal 
Bllicher — "  Marshal  Forwards,"  as  the  soldiers 
loved  to  call  him — was  the  representative  of  all 
the  patriotic  elements  which  were  combined  in 
the  Army  of  Liberation.  Napoleon  had  intended 
to  follow  up  in  person  his  victory  at  Dresden, 
but  was  obliged  to  leave  Marshal  Macdonald  in 


DURING   THE    NAPOLEONIC   WAR.  289 

his  place.  Bliicher  annihilated  Macdonald's  army 
at  Katzbach;  Bernadotte  defeated  Oudinot  at 
Gross- Beeren  ;  and  Ney  was  routed  by  Billow 
and  Bernadotte.  Finding  himself  by  this  time 
too  weak  to  hold  Dresden,  Napoleon  concentrated 
all  his  forces  at  Leipsic,  and  here  the  great  three- 
days'  "  battle  of  the  nations"  was  fought,  the 
greatest  of  that  or  perhaps  any  other  war, — 
fought  by  half  a  million  of  combatants,  and  re- 
sulting in  the  ruin  of  the  overpressed  and  over- 
matched Emperor.  The  Allies  were  in  a  decided 
superiority  of  numbers,  and  Napoleon  had  to 
retreat  on  October  18. 

The  Allies  had  also  recently  become  more 
closely  compacted  than  ever  by  the  Treaty  of 
Toplitz  (September  9,  1813),  in  which  the  views 
of  Metternich,  representing  Austria,  prevailed  to 
keep  the  princes  of  the  E/henish  Confederation 
on  their  thrones,  instead  of  deposing  them, 
when  the  protection  of  their  late  conqueror  and 
ruler  should  be  finally  removed.  This  was  a 
wise  provision.  It  saved  the  institution  of 
monarchy  for  Europe,  and  left  it  for  the  coming 
age  to  apply  the  checks  upon  that  form  of 
Government  necessary  for  political  growth  and 
personal  freedom, — those  controlling  popular  in- 
fluences which  had  been  displayed  by  Great 
Britain  during  the  war,  and  adopted  by  Prussia 
in  the  recent  moment  of  her  agony.  The  op- 

T 


., 


290  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

posite  policy,  advocated  by  Russia  and  Prussia 
in  the  white-heat  of  their  fury  against  all  the 
adherents  of  the  tyrant,  would  have  split  up 
many  millions  of  Germans  into  hostile  divisions 
at  a  critical  moment,  and  left  a  legacy  of  civil 
war  for  the  immediate  future. 

Kismgof  Though  Schwartzenberg  was  the  general  in 
Germans,  command  of  the  allied  army  at  Leipsic,  Blucher 
carried  off  the  chief  glory  of  this  decisive  battle, 
and  it  was  he  who  gave  no  rest  to  the  defeated 
French,  reduced  to  a  third  of  their  numbers,  till 
they  had  crossed  the  Rhine.  Now  arose  the  cry 
of  freedom  and  vengeance  from  the  whole  of  the 
West-German  peoples,  who,  from  being  broken 
up  into  small  States,  had  hitherto  been  forced 
to  march  at  the  heels  of  a  conqueror.  A  popular 
rising,  in  which  even  women  took  part  as  soldiers, 
proclaimed  that  the  power  of  France  over  the 
provinces  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine — a  power 
which  began  in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  was 
bred  out  of  the  religious  conflicts  of  those  times 
—was  gone  for  ever.  Nothing  was  left  of  the 
French  conquests  east  of  the  Rhine  but  the  gar- 
risons of  a  few  great  cities,  which  were  soon 
reduced.  Holland  now  joined  the  victors,  and 
the  assistance  rendered  by  Bernadotte  was  re- 
warded by  the  exchange  of  Pomerania  for  Nor- 
way, the  former  being  passed  over,  though  not 
for  long,  to  Denmark.  The  Danish  adherence  to- 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC  WAR.  291 

France,  almost  throughout  the  war,  told  heavily 
against  that  gallant  people  when  the  tide  of  con- 
quest turned.  Italy  and  Illyria  were  defended 
for  a  time  by  Eugene  Beauharnais  and  Murat. 
The  former  had  to  retire  before  superior  force ; 
the  latter  played  fast  and  loose  with  the  Allies, 
and  ended  by  being  shot  as  a  traitor. 

We    can   easily   survey  this    furious   struggle,  Diplomatic 

,  ,  /  /  .  D°        difficulties. 

spread  over  halt  a  continent,  by  selecting  a  few 
salient  points  such  as  the  foregoing.  But  it  is 
not  so  easy  to  place  ourselves  in  the  midst  of 
the  shifting  policy  of  the  Allies  when  they  had 
once  put  the  Rhine  between  themselves  and  the 
dangerous  fugitive.  Concentrating  their  forces 
at  Frankfort,  the  differences  which  had  been 
suppressed  for  the  moment  began  to  show  them- 
selves. The  Emperor  of  Austria  remembered 
his  daughter,  and  was  unwilling  to  reduce  her 
husband  too  low.  The  surpassing  reputation  of 
Napoleon,  defeated  with  such  difficulty,  hung 
like  lead  over  the  counsels  of  the  Allies ;  he 
might,  if  followed  to  his  lair,  break  through  the 
nets  and  undo  all  that  had  been  accomplished  at 
such  a  sacrifice.  Some  argued  that  he  would 
have  learnt  a  lesson,  and  henceforth  confine  him- 
self to  France.  Let  him,  said  they,  have  his 
"  natural  boundary,"  the  Ehine,  and  be  received 
into  the  ranks  of  the  royal  families  on  equal 
terms.  It  can  hardly  now  be  believed  that 


292  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

such  ideas  prevailed ;  and  it  is  almost  equally 
incredible  that  Napoleon  declined  to  accept  the 
proposal,  which  was  now  definitely  put  before 
him.  Yet  happily  for  the  world,  so  it  was. 
The  opportunity  did  not  recur.  Warned  of  the 
desperate  tenacity  of  the  man  by  this  refusal, 
spurred  by  the  successes  of  Wellington  in  Spain, 
and  pushed  by  the  energetic  zeal  of  Stein  and 
Allies  re-  Bliicher,  the  great  inert  mass  of  the  Allies  once 

solve  to  if 

press  on.  more  resolved  to  move  without  delay.  By  so 
doing  they  disconcerted  all  the  plans  of  Napoleon, 
which  were  based  on  the  belief  that  he  would 
have  the  winter  before  him.  By  giving  him  no 
time  to  recover  from  exhaustion  they  hunted 
him  down. 

And  here  we  may  observe,  since  they  so 
seriously  affected  the  general  issue,  the  corre- 
sponding dates  of  the  British  advance  in  Spain 
during  the  eventful  year  1813.  We  left  Wel- 
lington making  his  forward  movement,  after  the 
battle  of  Salamanca,  just  when  the  Emperor  was 
in  full  march  to  Russia,  and  for  the  second  time 
driving  the  French  out  of  Madrid,  which  he 

correspon-  entered  on   August  12,   1812.     Again,  however, 

dence  of  r>      i          01  •    i  i 

Welling-     the  impotence   ol  the   opamsn  troops,  to  whom 

ton's  vie-  .  .  .  -i 

torieswith  he  had  assigned  an  inferior  part   in  the   move- 

the  move-  ° 

ments  of     ment,   obliged    him  to    retreat ;    but    it   was    for 

the  Allies.  & 

the  last  time ;   and  the  difficulties  of  Napoleon's 
situation  after  the  failure  of  his  rash  invasion  of 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  293 

Russia,  brought  at  last  both  sides  to  something 
like  equality  in  Spain.  Wellington  was  now 
strong  enough  to  threaten  the  communications 
of  King  Joseph  with  France,  and  by  a  series  of 
masterly  manoeuvres  he  stopped  at  Vittoria  the 
retreat  from  Madrid  which  the  French  with 
nervous  haste  commenced.  This  famous  battle 
(June  21,  1813)  was  decisive;  the  French  oc- 
cupation of  Spain  was  at  an  end.  It  would  have 
been  a  more  crushing  defeat  still  if  Welling- 
ton's disposition  of  his  forces  had  been  properly 
carried  out  by  all  his  subordinates.  As  it  was, 
however,  the  rout  was  complete.  Some  2000 
prisoners,  the  whole  of  the  artillery,  the  military 
chest,  and  the  accumulated  treasures  amassed 
from  the  spoils  of  Spain,  along  with  the  despatches 
and  papers  which  had  passed  between  King 
Joseph  and  his  brother,  rewarded  the  victors, 
from  whom  King  Joseph  himself  only  escaped 
with  difficulty.  Further  resistance  was  put  down 
with  ease.  Pampelona  was  soon  surrendered  ; 
San  Sebastian,  which  held  out  three  months,  was 
stormed ;  and  Soult,  who  gallantly  defended  the 
frontier,  was  beaten  in  the  three  furious  battles 
of  the  Pyrenees.  On  October  7,  1813,  Welling- 
ton crossed  the  Bidassoa,  which  divides  France 
from  Spain. 

The  struggle  now  took  the  form  of  a  contest  TheSouth- 
for  South   France,  defended  by  the  only  one  of  campaign. 


294  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Napoleon's  marshals  who  proved  himself  worthy 
to  face  the  only  first-rate  general  of  whom  the 
Allies  could  boast.  It  will  then  be  observed  that 
this  invasion  of  France  was  almost  exactly  con- 
temporaneous with  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  and  that 
the  fury  of  the  struggle,  marked  by  the  numerous 
engagements  which  followed,  resounded  through- 
out Western  Europe,  and  could  not  but  affect 
the  decision  of  the  Allies  to  march  forward  upon 
North  France  in  correspondence  with  the  British 
movement  upon  the  South.  As  soon  as  the  rains 
allowed  Wellington  to  cross  the  numerous  rivers 
which  flow  from  the  Pyrenees  through  Gascony, 
the  forward  progress  of  the  Allies  was  cheered 
by  the  news  of  battle  after  battle,  each  ending 
victoriously  for  their  cause  :  those  of  the  Nive 
and  of  the  Nivelle,  following  upon  that  of  Orthez, 
the  evacuation  of  Bayonne,  and  the  occupation  of 
Bordeaux.  Just  at  the  moment  when  Napoleon 
had  been  forced  to  abdicate,  the  struggle  ended 
with  the  crowning  victory  of  Toulouse,  which 
prevented  the  indefatigable  Soult  from  joining 
hands  with  Suchet,  who  still  commanded  the 
army  of  Catalonia,  now  recalled  for  the  defence 
of  France. 

It  was  deplorable  that  the  news  of  the  Abdica- 
tion had  not  reached  the  armies  before  this  last 
sanguinary  battle,  but  it  had  at  least  the  effect 
of  enabling  the  Allies  to  dictate  terms  of  peace, 


DURING   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WAR.  295 

which  were  not  hampered  by  any  claim  on  the 
part  of  the  French  to  hold  the  southern  provinces 
by  military  force.  These  coincidences  have  been 
insisted  upon  here  because  neither  French  nor 
German  writers  seem  to  remember  much  about 
them  in  modern  times.  They  were  quite  under- 
stood and  appreciated  in  the  earlier  part  of  the 
century. 

To  complete  the  sketch  of  the  British  campaign 
we  have  forestalled  the  Emperor's  Abdication. 
It  was  not  till  the  year  1814  had  commenced  The  Ames 
that  the  allied  armies  found  themselves  able  to  Rhine, 
open  a  winter  campaign  and  cross  the  Rhine. 
This  they  did  in  three  great  divisions,  the 
Austrians  across  the  Upper  Rhine  and  Switzer- 
land under  Schwarzenberg,  the  Prussians  across 
the  Middle  Rhine  under  Bliicher,  the  mixed  army 
of  the  Netherlands  across  the  Lower  Rhine  under 
Biilow  and  Bernadotte.  This  wide  distribution 
of  forces  gave  Napoleon  the  opportunity  of  which 
he  well  knew  how  to  take  advantage.  His  in- 
ferior numbers  might  be  compensated  by  their 
concentration  in  Champagne,  under  the  guidance 
of  a  master  of  the  art  of  war ;  and  his  genius  did 
indeed  effect  as  much  as  could  be  expected ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Allies  could  afford  to 
lose  something,  and  they  pressed  on  without  in- 
termission. The  Congress  of  Chatillon,  February 
3  to  March  15,  1814,  kept  the  various  ministers 


296  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

in  touch  with  one  another,  and  by  the  Treaty  of 
Chaumont,  on  March  1,  the  four  Powers,  Great 
Britain,   Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  formed   a 
quadruple  alliance  for  twenty  years, 
import-          These  common  links  between  the  Powers  are 

ance  of  the 

Congresses  oi  the  highest  importance,  since  they  formed  an 

oftheAl-  &  m  J 

lies.  epoch   in  European    history.       They  lead  up   to 

the  Treaty  of  Vienna  in  the  following  year,  when 
France,  being  finally  freed  from  the  presence  of 
Napoleon,  entered  the  general  Council  of  Europe 
as  a  fifth  Power,  and  the  system  of  concerted 
action  upon  international  questions  began  to 
take  the  place  of  the  armed  interference  of 
particular  States.  Much  yet  remained  to  be 
done.  The  storm  still  left  a  tumultuous  swell 
upon  the  ocean  of  European  life ;  but  through- 
out the  present  century,  which  is  now  drawing 
towards  its  end,  the  principle  has  been  con- 
served, has  been  sometimes  operative,  and  has 
led  to  beneficial  results.  It  is  another  form  of 
the  Balance  of  Power,  which  did  good  in  its  day 
though  sometimes  abused,  but  wrhen  outraged, 
as  by  Charles  V.,  Philip  II.,  Louis  XIV.,  and 
Napoleon,  in  each  case  banded  the  oppressed 
nations  together ;  and  in  each  case  when  the 
common  enemy  had  been  overthrown,  a  vigilant 
watchfulness  against  the  recurrence  of  the  danger 
has  been  more  and  more  firmly  maintained. 


297 


CHAPTER   XII. 

BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   FROM   1814   TO   1827. 

EVEN  in  the  spring  of  1814  illusions  had  not- 
disappeared  at  the  Congress  of  Chatillon.  The 
Allies  still  thought  Napoleon  could  be  left  on  the 
throne,  with  France  reduced  to  its  old  limits  ;  and 
Napoleon  still  believed  he  could  stand  out  for  Napoleon 

still  resists. 

the  Rhine  frontier,  and  for  Italy,  with  Eugene 
Beauharnais  as  king.  Fortunate  it  was  that  he 
had  so  erroneously  measured  the  strength  of  the 
Allies,  who  once  more  marched  forward,  and 
would  now  listen  to  nothing  short  of  abdication. 
They  met  with  reverses,  natural  enough  with  so 
many  masters,  but  recovered  themselves  by  the 
masterly  retreat  of  Bliicher  and  the  advent  on 
the  scene  of  Bernadotte.  In  vain  the  great 
strategist  pushed  his  army  round  the  hosts,  and 
appeared  in  their  rear.  The  Allies  were  numerous 
enough  to  cover  his  diminished  forces,  and  push 
on  to  Paris,  where  they  fought  a  great  battle ; 
and  Bliicher,  always  to  the  front,  stormed  the 


298  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

heights  of  Montmartre.  On  March  31  the 
Allies  entered  Paris  to  the  joy  of  the  people, 
to  whom  they  had  long  previously  proclaimed 
themselves  as  deliverers  from  a  tyrant.  The 
marshals,  finding  the  case  desperate,  insisted  on 
His  their  chiefs  abdication,  and  on  April  4,  1814, 

abdication.   _T         ,  .  . 

JNapoleon  signed  the  instrument  at  .bontame- 
bleau.  The  terms  were  generous.  He  was  still 
to  be  "  Emperor,"  but  his  empire  was  the  island 
of  Elba,  with  a  sufficient  income  for  that  position. 
He  could  expect  no  more. 

But  who  was  to  succeed  ?  It  soon  became 
palpable  that,  exhausted  with  the  struggles  of 
twenty  -  five  years,  the  idea  of  tradition,  of 
security  arising  out  of  the  idea  of  right,  had 
TheBour-  resumed  its  long- forgotten  sway.  The  Bourbons 
alone  offered  any  promise  of  stability ;  and  if 
they  could  have  grasped  the  situation,  they  might 
have  ruled  France,  wearied  with  war  and  ripe 
for  permanent  reforms,  much  longer  than  they 
did ;  but  it  was  soon  discovered  that  they  had 
"  learnt  nothing  and  forgotten  nothing."  Not 
quite  yet,  however,  were  they  at  full  liberty  to 
disclose  their  incompetence.  Their  first  year  of 
sovereignty  was  almost  nominal,  their  restored 
kingdom  being  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies ;  nor 
was  it  till  1818  that  it  was  thought  safe  to  leave 
them  to  themselves.  Not  that  the  victorious 
Allies  for  a  moment  trusted  the  Bourbons  with 


FROM   1814   TO   1827.  299 

the  unlimited  power  which  had  led  to  the  mis- 
fortunes of  the  French  and  the  dangers  to  which 
Europe  had  been  exposed.  It  is  a  remarkable 
tribute  to  the  example  which  had  been  set  by 
Great  Britain  that  her  peculiar  inheritance  of 
Constitutionalism  formed  the  model  on  which  the 
restored  Government  of  France  was  established. 
Louis  XVIII.  had  to  accept  a  Charter  which  The  new 
provided  not  only  for  a  new  House  of  Peers  and 
a  representative  body,  with  powers  of  taxation, 
but  also  for  civil  and  religious  freedom,  for  Trial 
by  Jury,  and  for  the  Liberty  of  the  Press.  The 
old  feudal  privileges  were  not  restored,  and 
equality  before  the  law  was  proclaimed.  Thus 
the  Constitution  was  laid  down  on  a  basis  which 
was  quite  as  liberal  as  the  country  at  that  time 
required ;  and  the  open  interference  of  the  Crown 
with  the  two  Assemblies  was  as  carefully  guarded 
against  as  it  had  been  in  England  itself  after 
centuries  of  struggle. 

To  Talleyrand  belongs  the  honour  of  being  the  Taiiey- 
chief  agent  in  pushing  these  ideas.  From  the 
moment  when  he  began,  along  with  Mirabeau,  to 
take  the  lead  in  the  French  Eevolution,  he  kept 
the  English  Constitution  before  his  eyes.  Tor- 
tuous and  contemptible  as  his  political  course 
often,  and  shameful  as  his  private  life  always, 
was,  he  was  a  patriot,  and  used  his  wonderful 
talents  for  his  country's  good.  No  Government 


300  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

could  do  without  him.  He  remarked  that  when 
they  misused  him  they  had  the  bad  luck  to  come 
to  grief;  and  this  was  true.  When  Napoleon 
was  just  keeping  his  head  above  water  in  the 
Hundred  Days,  he  said  he  would  rather  hear  of 
Talleyrand  coming  in  than  all  the  rest  together. 
But  the  clever  diplomatist  was  better  employed. 
He  was  still  using  his  immense  influence  with 
the  allied  sovereigns  and  their  ministers  to  save 
France  in  its  supreme  hour  of  distress ;  and  he 
succeeded.  He  had  no  favourable  feeling  for 
the  Bourbons,  but  he  respected  their  traditional 
claim,  and  believed  that  if  tied  by  a  Charter  of 
Liberties,  they  might  at  least  form  a  stage  in 
the  regeneration  of  France.  The  English  Revolu- 
tion, he  said,  had  lasted  fifty  years ;  the  world 
must  have  patience  with  the  French.  To  Talley- 
rand also  was  due  the  acceptance  of  the  Charter 
by  Louis  XVIII.  It  was  the  last  thing  the  king 
desired,  but  he  had  no  choice.  On  the  Continent 
it  was  a  new  experiment.  Both  Houses,  the 
Senate  through  Talleyrand,  and  the  House  of 
Representatives  through  Fouche,  openly  and 
categorically  demanded  that  France  should  be 
ruled  like  Great  Britain. 

The  credit  for  the  Charter  of  Constitution  im- 
posed on  France  must  be  shared  with  Russia, 
a  circumstance  due  very  largely  to  the  peculiar 
sentiments  of  the  Czar,  Alexander  I.  Though 


FROM    1814   TO    1827.  301 

at  the  head  of  an  absolute  monarchy,  he  had  The  Czar, 
i  ml  jibed,  partly  from  his  old  tutor  La  Harpe,  i. 
partly  from  English  sources,  a  generous  love  of 
liberty,  not  unconnected  with  the  Western  ideas 
of  religion  which  had  found  an  entrance  into  a 
remarkably  open  and  enthusiastic  mind.  But 
the  political  ideas  of  his  country  also  found  in 
him  a  true  national  representative.  The  out- 
rages and  insults  inflicted  by  the  French  were 
too  fresh  to  be  put  aside ;  and,  mingled  with  the 
fury  suggested  by  the  ruins  of  Moscow  and 
Smolensk,  was  the  desire  for  aggrandisement, 
not  only  as  a  simple  inheritance  from  Peter  and 
Catherine,  but  by  way  of  precaution  and  com- 
pensation. All  this  was  more  than  shared  by 
Prussia,  whose  wrongs  were  of  a  still  more  private 
and  harrowing  nature.  The  Emperor  of  Austria, 
on  the  other  hand,  though  his  country  had  been 
even  yet  more  desperately  mangled  by  the  hand 
of  Xapoleon,  could  not  forget  that  his  daughter 
was  Napoleon's  wife ;  and  when  Great  Britain  Britain  and 
insisted  on  withstanding  the  dismemberment  of  prevent  the 

dismeni- 

France,  Austria  ranged  herself  on  her  side.  France t0f 

In  becoming  the  champion  of  this  policy,  Great 
Britain  acted  consistently  with  her  whole  past 
history.  As  Burke  more  than  once  asserts  in 
his  sonorous  phrases,  she  had  been  the  guardian 
and  administrator  of  the  Balance  of  Power  for 
many  ages.  It  was  essential  to  that  system 


302  BRITISH  FOREIGN   POLICY. 

that  France  should  be  strong ;  and  though  after 
what  had  taken  place  she  could  not  be  allowed 
to  retain  the  Rhine  boundary  at  the  expense 
of  the  Teutonic  peoples  to  whom  the  left  bank 
belonged,  she  should  not  be  deprived  of  the  terri- 
tory which  she  possessed  before  the  war.  This 
settlement  indeed  excluded  her  from  the  other 
countries  which  she  had  occupied — Spain,  Italy, 
Switzerland,  Holland,  and  Belgium ;  but  she  had 
previously  performed  her  part  well  without  these 
conquests,  and  it  was  necessary  that  she  should 
be  able  to  do  so  again.  It  cost  no  little  friction 
— not  very  far  from  a  war — between  the  conquer- 
ors to  obtain  the  admission  of  France,  restored 
to  her  old  limits,  into  the  circle  of  the  Great 
Powers.  But  a  new  representative  of  Great 
Britain  now  appeared  on  the  scene.  The  Duke 
of  Wellington,  fresh  from  his  conquest  of  the 
Peninsula  and  of  South  France,  arrived  at 
Vienna  early  in  1815.  No  defeats  had  deprived 
him  of  the  halo  of  his  victories ;  the  British 
people  recognised  in  him  their  virtual  king ; 
and  his  statesmanlike  grasp  of  the  situation  at 
once  impressed  itself  on  the  allied  sovereigns  and 
their  ministers. 

Napoleon's  The  rude  and  sudden  interruption  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  on  March  7,  1815,  by  the  startling 
news  of  Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba,  has  been 
the  theme  of  very  many  writers.  Perhaps  the 


FROM    1814   TO   1827.  303 

most  extraordinary  thing  about  it  is  the  ignor- 
ance of  his  character  which  the  Allies  had  dis- 
played when  they  supposed  he  would  be  bound 
by  promises  or  treaties  to  remain  in  an  island 
which  was  within  sight  of  the  Continent,  and 
where  he  was  practically  free.  It  was  at  any 
rate  a  generous  confidence,  if  misplaced.  It  was 
shared  by  the  British  military  officer  placed  in 
charge  of  him,  and  by  the  naval  officers  who  were 
supposed  to  watch  his  proceedings.  But  this  was 
to  run  the  risk  of  having  to  do  the  work  of  a 
quarter  of  a  century  all  over  again,  and  the 
Allies  were  not  wrong  in  attributing  the  escape 
to  British  carelessness.  The  armies  had  been  for 
the  most  part  scattered  and  reduced.  Napoleon 
was  not  the  man  to  lose  a  moment  in  taking 
advantage  of  such  a  state  of  things.  There  was 
not  indeed  an  hour  to  lose. 

The  advance  from  Cannes  on  March  1,  1815,  His  ad- 

.  ,    .  vancefrom 

showed  plainly  that  the  new  regime  had  no  re-  Cannes, 
sisting  power  of  its  own.  The  very  people  who 
had  cursed  the  cause  of  their  misfortunes  a  few 
weeks  before,  threw  themselves  at  his  feet  as  he 
rushed  to  Paris, — anything  to  get  rid  of  the 
foreign  occupation.  The  Bourbons  fled  at  once. 
Many  of  the  old  marshals,  most  of  the  old  troops, 
came  again  to  the  front ;  and  though  the  army, 
so  hastily  collected,  was  far  below  the  force  re- 
quired to  match  that  of  the  Allies  when  they 


304  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

should  once  have  formed  their  ranks,  Napoleon 
knew  very  well  that  if  he  could  only  secure  exact 
obedience  to  his  orders,  he  could  balance  that 
superiority  by  rapidity  of  movement,  as  he  had 
often  done  before.  He  knew  the  advantage  of 
a  single  will,  and  he  had  no  reason  to  think  that 
his  enemies  could  secure  any  such  advantage. 
His  stra-  Indeed  he  left  Elba  with  a  full  belief  that  they 

tegy.  . 

were  hopelessly  disunited.  Bliicher  and  Wel- 
lington were  nearest  the  frontier,  and  with  them 
he  would  have  to  deal ;  but  the  first  was  rash, 
and  the  second  was  cautious.  They  were  sure 
not  to  pull  together.  He  would  get  between 
them  and  make  short  work  of  each  in  succession. 
Large  bodies  of  the  British  army,  and  especially 
the  Dutch  and  the  Belgians,  had  fought  under 
his  banner.  They  would  be  sure  to  swell  his 
numbers  after,  if  not  before,  victory,  and  he  could 
then  hurl  them  upon  the  Russians,  who  were 
still  some  marches  further  off. 
Disadvan-  It  was  a  fine  conception,  but  the  conditions 

tages  on 

both  sides,  of  success  were  wanting.  Grouchy  and  D'Erloii 
were  inferior  generals.  Soult,  though  brave 
and  able,  had  never  before  been  chief  of  the 
staff;  and  Ney  was  more  a  soldier  than  a  general. 
Napoleon  himself  was  overwhelmed  with  the 
labours  of  the  previous  days,  and  delays  occurred 
owing  to  his  illness.  The  crisis  required  his  old 
generals,  his  own  old,  unclouded  powers,  and  an 


FROM   1814  TO   1827.  305 

amount  of  time  which  the  Allies  were  not  foolish 
enough  to  grant.  But  on  the  other  side  were 
quite  equal  disadvantages,  especially  on  the  part 
of  the  British.  No  preparations  whatever  had 
been  made  in  England  for  such  a  contingency. 
Recruits  had  to  be  raised  from  all  parts  of  the 
country  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  there  was  no 
time  for  efficient  drill;  but  these  country  lads 
were  placed  under  charge  of  experienced  officers  ; 
and  the  best  was  made  of  the  Belgian  and  Dutch 
troops  who  were  on  the  spot.  Not  more  than 
one-half  of  Wellington's  army  was  composed  of 
superior  fighting  men.  There  was,  however,  an 
absolute  confidence  in  the  Duke,  and  an  unflinch- 
ing resolution  amongst  the  British,  which,  when 
the  trial  came,  told  on  the  recruits  quite  as  much 
as  on  the  veterans. 

Both  sides  made  mistakes,  but  the  British  the  The  British 
fewest.     It  has  been  loudly  asserted  that  Wei-  estmis*w 

,.  ,  .        .  .  takes. 

Imgtons  concentration  on  his  right  wing  was 
one  of  these ;  we  now  know  that  it  was  for 
the  purpose  of  keeping  open  his  retreat  to  the 
sea  in  case  of  defeat.  But  he  seems  to  have 
underrated  the  rapidity  of  his  enemy's  move- 
ments, and  to  have  been  surprised  by  Napo- 
leon's success  against  the  Prussians,  who  were 
beaten  at  Ligny.  Here,  however,  came  in  his 
foresight  as  to  the  battle-field  itself,  and  his 
knowledge  of  Blilcher.  He  was  certain  that  if 

u 


306  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

he  could  only  stand  long  enough  on  the  ground 
he  had  previously  examined,  Bliicher  would  not 
fail  him,  even  though  he  had  retreated  by  the 
wrong  road  after  Ligny,  and  had  to  make  a 
very  difficult  march  in  order  to  act  as  a  reserve 
force  at  the  last.  Nor  was  he  disappointed. 
"  He  saw  what  he  foresaw."  Napoleon,  on  the 
contrary,  had  overrated  the  talents  of  Marshal 
Grouchy,  and  he  had  underrated  the  valour  and 
energy  of  the  Prussians.  He  was  completely 
Battle  of  deceived  when  the  evening  of  Waterloo  closed 

Waterloo.     m  m  &  m 

in.  He  believed  he  was  in  the  presence  of 
Grouchy ;  but  in  fact  he  was  in  the  presence 
of  the  terrible  Bliicher,  and  had  practically  no 
reserves.  What  a  moment  for  him  ! 

Then  came  the  decisive  stroke.  The  patience 
shown  by  Wellington's  army  during  the  whole 
day  won  the  battle.  Mown  down  by  thousands 
under  the  superior  artillery  of  the  French,  but  re- 
maining immovable  against  their  cavalry  charges, 
and  defending  their  outposts  to  the  last  gasp,  it 
was  a  waiting  game  such  as  was  perhaps  never 
played  before.  "  We  must  all  stand  and  die  here," 
said  the  Duke,  and  that  was  perfectly  understood 
by  all.  At  last,  when  the  Prussians  were  un- 
mistakably engaged  with  the  French  flank  and 
rear,  the  word  was  given,  and  the  whole  rem- 
nant of  Wellington's  army  rushing  forward, 
swept  the  French  off  the  field  in  headlong  rout. 


FROM   18H   TO    1827.  307 

The  Prussians,  comparatively  fresh,  took  up  the 
pursuit.  The  French  were  annihilated.  Napo- 
leon had  again  to  abdicate,  and  for  the  last  The  final 
time.  There  could  be  no  more  playing  with 
the  question,  no  more  Elbas  ;  St  Helena  was 
the  best  choice  that  could  be  made.  It  is  a 
pity  that  the  officer  selected  to  keep  this  dan- 
gerous prisoner  in  charge  was  not  a  more  suit- 
able man  than  Sir  Hudson  Lowe. 

We  may  conclude  this  brief  notice  of  Welling- 
ton's victory  by  quoting  the  remark  made*  by 
Lord  Roberts  in  his  '  Rise  of  Wellington  '  —  an 
admirable  little  book  which  has  appeared  while 
the  present  pages  were  being  prepared  for  the 
press  :  "  The  place  I  should  assign  to  Welling-  Lord  Rob- 

,  ,  .  erts'  esti- 

ton  as  a  general  would  be  one  in  the  very  first  mate  of  the 


i  .  . 

rank  —  equal,  if    not    superior,   to    that   given  to  erals- 

Napoleon."  He  then  gives  his  reasons,  —  the 
reasons  of  a  great  soldier  and  general,  —  and 
concludes  :  "  For  a  brief  period  the  military 
genius  of  Napoleon  revolutionised  Continental 
Europe  ;  that  of  Wellington  enabled  him  to 
lead  his  British  soldiers,  few  in  number,  but 
incomparable  in  quality,  from  victory  to  victory, 
to  march  triumphant  from  Lisbon  to  Toulouse, 
and  from  Waterloo  to  Paris,  to  overthrow  his 
great  opponent,  and  to  establish  a  peace  which 
lasted  for  nearly  forty  years"  (p.  190). 

To  return  to  the  Congress.     We  have  noticed 


308  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

The  Con-     the    critical    character    of  the    arrangements    by 

gress  of  J 

Vienna.  which  the  Congress  of  Vienna  secured  to  the 
best  of  their  power  the  Balance  of  the  Conti- 
nental nations.  They  were  now  vitally  con- 
cerned in  checking  the  aggrandisement  of  each 
other,  and  their  wholesome  vigilance  illustrates 
our  subject.  The  compensation  claimed  by  and 
assigned  to  the  country  which  had  raised  her 
national  debt  from  200  millions  of  pounds  to 
800  millions  in  the  great  cause,  which  had  de- 
stroyed the  French  marine,  caused  the  mis- 
carriage of  Napoleon  in  his  designs  upon  Turkey 
and  the  East,  and  contributed  no  small  share 
to  his  final  overthrow  by  the  hand  of  the  Duke 
of  Wellington,  could  not  be  said  to  have  made 
any  gains  commensurate  with  her  victorious 
career.  Of  all  that  she  had  taken  from  France 
and  her  allies,  she  retained  only  the  necessary 
posts  for  her  commerce  in  India,  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  West  Indies,  and  the  German  Ocean. 
The  Isle  of  France,  Malacca,  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  (then  a  small  district  adjoining  the  Cape), 
Malta,  Heligoland  (a  mere  speck  in  the  sea), 
Tobago,  and  St  Lucia  formed  the  whole  of  her 
gains,  though  she  afterwards  bought  with  still 
more  money  the  swampy  territory  of  Demerara 
and  Essequibo  in  South  America.  Ceylon  and 
Trinidad  had  been  acquired  at  the  Peace  of 
Amiens.  But  this  disproportion  passed  almost 


FROM   1814   TO   1827.  309 

unnoticed.  It  was  reckoned  upon  as  a  matter  of 
course ;  and  indeed  she  could  scarcely  have  ex- 
pected to  succeed  in  impressing  moderation  upon  Modera- 

,,.  ,  111,  tionofthe 

her  allies  unless  she  had  herself  set  the  example.    Allies. 

This  spirit  had  found  remarkable  expression  in 
other  ways  at  the  first  Treaty  of  Paris,  made  by 
the  Congress  on  May  30,  1814.  Even  the  spoils 
which  France  had  captured  from  the  capitals  of 
the  world  were  left  in  her  possession,  though  at 
the  second  Treaty  of  Paris,  November  20,  1815, 
the  clause  was  cancelled  by  the  Powers,  whose 
exasperation  at  the  renewal  of  the  war  by  the 
escape  of  Napoleon  could  not  be  restrained  from 
doing  what  was  only  an  act  of  justice.  Even 
two  -  thirds  of  the  war  -  ships  at  Antwerp  were 
returned  to  France,  while  the  remainder  were 
handed  over  to  the  King  of  Holland,  the  country 
which  had  not  long  before  literally  lost  its  name, 
having  been  incorporated  with  France  as  "  the 
alluvia  of  French  rivers." 

In  accordance  with  the  previous  settlements  of  The  King- 

.  dom  of  the 

Europe,  the  Low  Countries  were  now  once  more  Nether- 
lands. 

rendered  independent  of  France,  but  in  the  form 
which  then  seemed  best  fitted  to  secure  them, 
the  union  of  Belgium  and  Holland.  It  was  a 
well-meant  experiment,  in  which  England  was 
chiefly  concerned,  made  under  the  belief  that  the 
friendly  Power  which  kept  the  opposite  side  of 
the  Channel  could  not  be  too  strong  ;  but  the  ar- 


310  BRITISH  FOREIGN   POLICY. 

rangement  ignored  the  essential  differences  which 
had  grown  up  during  ages  between  the  Dutch  and 
the  Flemish  portions  of  the  Low  Countries  ;  and  so 
what  had  really  become  the  natural  division  into 
two  distinct  kingdoms  took  once  more  in  1830 

o 

the  place  of  the  attempted  union.  The  relations 
of  Poland,  Saxony,  and  Italy  to  the  great  Powers 
were  settled  on  as  sound  a  ba.sis  as  the  circum- 
stances of  the  moment  permitted  ;  not,  indeed, 
as  satisfactorily  as  might  have  been  wished,  but 
very  differently  from  what  such  settlement  would 
have  been  except  for  the  determined  attitude  as- 
sumed by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  as  the  British 
plenipotentiary,  and  for  the  assistance  rendered 
him  by  Talleyrand. 

True  view  As  Great  Britain  took  so  prominent  a  part  in 
Treaty  of  these  arrangements,  this  is  the  place  to  remark 
that  to  load  the  Treaties  of  Paris  and  Vienna 
with  obloquy  because  they  disregarded  the 
wishes  of  certain  populations  is  in  the  abstract 
laudable ;  but  it  is  to  mistake  wishes  and 
theories  for  facts  and  realities.  It  is  an  anach- 
ronism, not  unlike  the  complaints  made  on  pre- 
vious occasions  when  prolonged  wars  were 
brought  to  an  end  by  unpopular  treaties.  It 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  great  military 
Powers  which  had  felt  the  iron  heel  of  the  con- 
queror, and  were  hardly  restrained  from  tearing 
France  to  pieces  in  their  vengeful  wrath,  could 


FROM   1814   TO   1827.  311 

cordially  accept  modern  ideas  which  would  have 
had  the  effect  of  materially  reducing  the  compen- 
sations for  losses  to  which  they  naturally  looked. 
It  was  necessary  to  make  the  best  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  to  leave,  as  at  the  Peace  of  Utrecht 
(1713) — the  last  great  settlement  previously  made 
by  the  combined  European  Powers, — the  minor 
arrangements  to  the  action  of  time. 

Europe  could  by  no  means  afford  to  have  any 
more  wars ;  the  very  memory  of  these  dreadful 
times  would  suffice  to  influence  the  nations  to- 
wards a  future  policy  of  pacific  compromises.  So, 
indeed,  it  turned  out.  If  some  of  the  mistakes 
into  which  the  Congress  was  forced,  especially 
as  regards  Italy,  have  not  been  set  right  without 
wars,  it  is  but  fair  to  remember  that  the  general 
peace  has  not  been  seriously  disturbed  till  of  late 
years,  and  that  sudden  changes  might  not  have 
turned  out  so  well  as  did  the  action  and  reaction 
of  despotic  and  constitutional  ideas,  which  we 
shall  presently  trace.  The  lesson  taught  by  the 
active  operation  of  extreme  principles  on  both 
sides  is  generally  the  prelude  to  satisfactory  set- 
tlements. 

It  may  further  be  observed  in  reviewing  the  continuity 

.  T  of  British 

action  of  Great  Britain,  both  in  the  process  and  Foreign 
conclusion  of  this  the  greatest  struggle  in  which 
she  has  ever  been  engaged,  that  it  was  exactly 
consistent  with  the  whole  of  her  previous  Foreign 


312  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

policy.  What  she  now  contended  for  and  carried 
may  be  described  in  the  simple  words  already 
familiar  to  us — viz.,  the  safety  of  her  shores,  her 
commerce,  and  her  dependencies,  the  balance  of 
European  States,  the  concert  of  the  European 
Powers.  The  last,  indeed,  had  been  a  policy  of 
more  recent  date  than  the  rest ;  but  some  glim- 
merings of  the  principle  are  to  be  found  in  the 
time  of  Elizabeth,  and  when  Europe  gradually 
emerged  from  the  barbaric  turbulence  of  the  Re- 
ligious Wars,  it  found  its  most  definite  expression 
in  the  diplomacy  of  Great  Britain.  She  had  also 
proved  in  these  struggles  her  perfect  compre- 
hension of  the  fundamental  political  truth,  that 
the  nation  which  is  not  ready  at  a  great  crisis 
to  make  every  sacrifice  demanded  by  the  occasion 
is  doomed  to  the  loss  of  its  influence,  and  then  of 
its  independence. 

This  is  not  to  claim  superhuman  virtues  for  the 
The  British  British  race.     The  policy  was  forced  upon  it  by 

forced  into      .  .      ..  ,  ,   .    , 

the  path     circumstances  similar  to  those  which  accompany 

they  adopt- 
ed, the  action  of  human  beings    in   every  stage    of 

national  life.  As  each  generation  received  its 
inheritance  from  its  predecessors,  it  followed  the 
law  of  nature  in  attending  to  the  preservation  of 
that  inheritance.  To  preserve  it  demanded  alli- 
ances, for  which  in  the  last  century  the  possession 
of  Hanover  gave  great  advantages.  Each  alliance 
contributed  towards  the  support  of  the  definite 


FROM   1814   TO   1827.  313 

Foreign  Policy  which  was  required  by  the  very 
nature  of  the  empire.  When  Europe  was  invaded 
by  the  aggressive  enthusiasm  of  the  Republican 
French,  and  then  conquered  by  the  genius  of 
Napoleon,  the  time  had  come  to  do  one  of  two 
things — either  to  relinquish  what  previous  genera- 
tions  had  established,  with  the  certainty  of  having 
after  all  to  fight  at  last  on  British  shores,  or  else 
to  do  precisely  what  was  done — engage  in  the 
struggle,  and  fight  to  the  last.  There  was  no 
middle  course.  It  had  not  escaped  the  observa- 
tion of  statesmen  that  Great  Britain  could  no 
longer  depend  on  the  cultivation  of  her  soil,  or  on 
the  exchange  of  her  produce  with  her  colonies, 
but  must  support  herself  by  her  foreign  com- 
merce, extending  over  every  part  of  the  world. 
The  issue  could  not  be  evaded.  The  whole 
past  history  of  the  nation,  as  well  as  its  grow- 
ing necessities,  demanded  the  course  it  took, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  considerable  step 
was  really  wrong  in  the  entire  series  of  transac- 
tions. As  the  empire  was  gained,  so  must  it 
be  defended. 

Our  notices  of  this  period  must  include,  though 
in  the  merest  sketch,  the  American  War  of  1812.  1812. 
We  have  seen  that  it  was  the  inevitable  result  of 
the  British  policy  with  respect  to  neutrals,  main- 
tained with  dogged  resolution,  whatever  might 
be  the  consequences,  as  the  only  means  of  dealing 


314  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

with  Napoleon's  "  Continental  System."  We 
have  also  seen  that  Captain  Mahan  admits  this 
policy  towards  neutrals  to  have  been  necessary 
not  only  for  her  predominance  at  sea,  but  for 
her  self-preservation.  In  making  Great  Britain 
the  "storehouse"  of  the  world's  commerce  he 
recognises  a  "  great  conception,"  radically  sound, 
and  in  the  end  victorious  ;  for  upon  Great  Britain 
and  upon  commerce  hung  the  destinies  of  the 
world  "  (ii.  242).  But  he  not  unnaturally  blames 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  having 
too  tamely  submitted  to  the  indignities  which 
accompanied  the  process,  and  appears  to  think 
the  war  of  1812  justified. 

its  causes.  The  fact  seems  to  be  that  the  patience  of  the 
great  Transatlantic  people  had  been  too  long  and 
too  severely  taxed,  and  that  such  sympathy  as 
there  had  been  with  the  British  cause  was  gradu- 
ally submerged  under  the  stress  of  British  aggres- 
sion. On  the  other  hand,  the  British  Government, 
having  no  further  employment  for  such  great 
numbers  of  men  as  were  required  before  the  battle 
of  Trafalgar,  looked  with  horror  and  aversion  at 
the  employment  of  these  trained  seamen  by  the 
States,  and  the  evasion  of  the  British-  laws  as  to 
neutrals.  So  they  relaxed  no  portion  of  their 
continuous  efforts  to  search  for  them  in  neutral 
ships  and  detain  them  as  prisoners.  Some  of  these 
had  originally  been  Americans,  pressed  into  the 


FROM   1814   TO    1827.  315 

British   service  in  England  or  the  colonies,  and 
glad  to  revert  to  their  original  status. 

Nor   had    the    idea    that    the    States    might 
suddenly  turn  into  a  naval  Power,  and  dispute 
the  predominance  of  the  recognised  mistress  of 
the  seas,  once  crossed  the  minds  of  the  British, 
who  were  totally  unprepared  for  the  emergency 
of  an  American  war.     The  Admiralty  were  absol-  Foresight 
utely  unaware  that  the  American  navy,  though  American 
extremely  small,  had  with   great   sagacity  been  ment- 
supplied   with   a  few  ships    capable   of  meeting 
the    British    frigates    on    their    shores    with    a 
greatly  superior  force.     Nor  could  the  Govern- 
ment, fully  occupied  at  that  moment  with  the 
Peninsular    War    and     Napoleon's     invasion    of 
Russia,    bring    themselves    to   believe   that    the    / 
Americans   were    in   earnest.      Five    days    after 
the   American   Declaration   of  War,  some    time 
before  it  reached  England,  the  Government  did 
what  ought  to  have  been  done  long  previously, 
and  suspended  the  Orders  of  Council  as  regarded 
the    States.      It  was   too   late.      The   American 
War  party  had  been  growing  in  strength,  and 
were  by  no  means  conciliated  by  so  tardy  a  pro- 
ceeding ;    and   thus   the   war   of  _brothers   once  * 
more  commenced. 

The  only  way  in  which  this  ill-conducted  and 
ill-omened  war  can  range  itself  under  the  heading 
of  British  Foreign  Policy,  is  to  regard  it  as  a  mark 


316  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

of  the  resolute  determination  of  the  mother  coun- 
try to  defend  her  loyal  colonies,  and  to  submit  to 
no  limitation  of  her  nautical  rights  at  the  hand 
of  violence.  In  both  these  objects  she  succeeded. 
After  many  fluctuations  she  maintained  her  hold 
on  Canada,  and  when  peace  was  made  in  1815 
was  able  to  retain  the  two  safeguards  of  her 
ancient  policy,  the  Bight  of  Search,  and  the  lia- 
bility to  seizure  of  enemies'  cargoes  borne  under 
neutral  flags.  The  disparity  of  the  frigates  be- 
longing to  the  two  nations  gave  the  British  a 
rude  awakening  and  a  much-needed  lesson ;  but 
Broke's  victory  in  the  Shannon  over  the  Chesa- 
peake, a  ship  of  equal  force,  put  an  end  to  the 
panic,  and  on  the  whole  success  and  defeat  were 
fairly  balanced  between  the  combatants. 
Results.  What  really  turned  the  scale  was  the  stoppage 
of  American  trade  by  the  Power  which  had  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  and  the  collapse  of  American 
credit,  which  threatened  universal  distress  if  it 
should  continue.  Some  of  the  New  England 
States  had  foreseen  these  results  from  the  first ; 
for  the  commercial  portion  of  the  population  had 
already  been  severely  crippled  by  the  anti-neutral 
policy  with  which  Great  Britain  had  fought  out 
the  Napoleonic  war.  The  terms  of  the  Peace  of 
Ghent  were  also  not  a  little  influenced  by  the  fact 
that  the  Continental  war  was  over,  and  Great 
Britain  free  to  act  in  a  much  more  energetic 


FROM    1814   TO    1827.  317 

manner  than  heretofore.  But  the  people  of  the 
States  gained  as  much  fame,  or  more,  by  their 
defence  of  New  Orleans  against  the  veterans  of 
the  Peninsula  as  they  lost  by  the  capture  of 
Washington,  their  capital.  The  success  of  that 
defence  had  been  almost  unexpected,  and  to  a 
young  nation  the  inspiration  of  hope  and  con- 
fidence in  the  future  is  far  more  valuable  than 
material  gains. 

This  fratricidal  war  has  been  an  episode  in  the 
history  of  our  subject.  We  are  now  to  trace 
British  Foreign  Policy  in  the  circumstances  which 
could  not  but  accompany  the  close  of  the  mighty 
struggle,  and  which  required  the  guidance  of 
diplomatic  statecraft  rather  than  arms.  The 
Great  Powers  had  combined  for  the  purpose  of 
putting  an  end  to  Napoleon's  tyranny,  but  it 
was  inevitable  that  they  should  regard  from 
different  points  of  view  the  settling  down  of  the 
nations  which  they  had  liberated.  The  principles 
of  despotism  were  too  deeply  engrained  in  the 
sovereigns  and  ruling  classes  of  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia  to  admit  of  their  leaving  the 
newly-freed  nations  to  go  their  own  way.  Those 
three  Powers  had  already,  in  1815,  agreed  to 
what  was  called  the  "Holy  Alliance,"  by  which  The  "Holy 
they  undertook  to  support  one  another  in  using 
their  influence  to  promote  "justice,  Christian 
charity,  and  peace." 


318  BRITISH  FOREIGN    POLICY. 

Such  noble  sentiments,  sincere  enough  no  doubt, 
depended  for  their  value  upon  the  interpretation 
put  upon  them  by  acts,  and  were  soon  found  to 
be  open  to  a  very  objectionable  application.  To 
support  despotic  governments  by  force  against 
constitutional  parties  in  various  States  appeared 
to  the  Allies  just  and  charitable,  if  not  peaceful ; 
and  it  soon  became  plain  that  another  spirit,  the 
spirit  of  aggrandisement,  which  had  been  peremp- 
torily checked  at  Paris  and  Vienna,  was  incor- 
porated with  this  policy.  France,  or  rather  the 
Bourbon  family,  was,  when  left  to  itself,  on  the 
side  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  the  problems  thus 
presented  to  British  ministers  were  exceedingly 
troublesome  and  inconvenient.  Lord  Castlereagh 
had  dissatisfied  the  British  public  by  failing  to 
offer  any  efficient  resistance  in  a  case  which  was 
felt  to  be  one  on  which  Great  Britain  had  ac- 
quired a  right  to  have  a  potent  voice.  And  as 
the  British  people  were  clamouring  for  reforms 
which  had  been  too  long  withheld,  and  indeed 
impracticable  during  the  war,  the  feeling  towards 
these  Powers  became  entirely  changed  from  the 
friendly  enthusiasm  with  which  the  Czar  and  the 
King  of  Prussia  had  been  received  when  they 
visited  England  in  1814,  to  dislike  and  distrust.. 
Canning's  It  fell  once  more  to  Canning  to  guide  his  coun- 

return  to 

office.        try  through  the  difficulties  of  peace  as  he  had 
previously  guided  them  in  seizing  the  Peninsula 


FROM   1814   TO   1827.  319 

as  the  theatre  of  war.  When  he  came  into  power 
in  1822  the  necessity  for  some  decided  action  on 
the  part  of  the  British  had  become  evident,  nor 
was  the  country  in  a  condition  to  trifle  with  the 
subject.  The  party  of  reform  had  been  gathering 
force,  and  the  dislike  entertained  to  the  character 
of  George  IV.  had  added  to  the  discredit  of  Tory- 
ism. The  state  of  his  relations  with  his  Queen 
had  rendered  him  exceedingly  unpopular,  though 
a  more  unfortunate  standard  round  which  to  rally 
a  political  party  was  never  set  up.  Canning  had 
kept  himself  clear  of  the  general  excitement,  and 
when  Castlereagh  committed  suicide  in  1822,  it 
was  plain  that  the  man  to  supply  his  place  as 
Foreign  Secretary  was  his  old  opponent.  The 
popular  wave  of  discontent  with  the  despotism 
which  animated  the  Great  Powers  had  also  over- 
flowed Italy  and  Spain,  dissatisfied  as  they  were 
with  the  condition  in  which  they  had  been  left  at 
the  Peace.  The  Austrians  had  made  short  work 
with  Italy,  putting  down  with  ease  all  tumultuous 
risings,  and  riveting  the  chains  which  Europe  had 
placed  in  her  hands.  France  was  interfering  in  oppression 
a  similar  way  with  Spain,  Turkey  with  Greece,  Spain,  ' 

'  x  Greece,  and 

and  Prussia  with  Poland.  Poland. 

All  these  movements  were,  in  fact,  the  inevitable 
results  of  the  great  Revolution- War.  The  armies 
which  had  been  combating  one  another  for  more 
than  twenty  years  could  only,  in  the  existing 


320  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

state  of  Europe,  be  wielded  by  sovereigns,  and 
those  of  the  old  absolute  type,  and  of  course  these 
sovereigns  and  their  advisers  considered  the  ques- 
tions which  arose  at  the  Peace  mainly  from  a 
military  point  of  view.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
peoples  of  the  different  States,  though  scarcely 
represented  in  the  various  Governments,  beheld 
themselves  delivered  from  one  tyranny  only  to 
fall  under  the  rule  of  another,  and  had  as  yet  no 
way  of  remedy  except  by  tumultuous  and  irregu- 
lar risings.  Such  constitutional  privileges  as  had 
been  given  to  France  and  Spain  were  as  yet  of 
too  feeble  a  character  to  be  of  use.  Kings  had 
quickly  put  in  practice  the  old  methods  of  dealing 
with  such  disturbing  forces.  In  the  case  of  Spain 
there  was  a  special  danger  to  Great  Britain.  Its 
large  and  powerful  colonies  had  been  seized  with 
the  universal  desire  for  freedom,  and  if  France 
were  to  obtain  possession  of  these  colonies  by  the 
annexation  of  Spain,  all  the  work  of  the  last  cen- 
tury would  have  to  be  done  again  by  the  British. 
The  place  which  Canning  had  formerly  occupied 
as  Pitt's  lieutenant,  and  afterwards  as  the  saviour 
of  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  and  by  that  means  of 
Europe,  exactly  fitted  him  to  deal  with  these 
multiplied  difficulties. 

Against  the  will  both  of  George  IV.  and  of 
the  most  bigoted  of  the  Tories,  he  was  forced 
into  power  by  the  leading  Tory  ministers,  who 


FROM    1814   TO    1827.  321 

were  themselves  satisfied  with  his  general  prin- 
ciples, knew  well  the  public  feeling,  and  saw 
that  he  alone  could  represent  the  country  at  this 
crisis.  For  a  crisis  it  was,  as  was  proved  by  the 
Congresses  of  Troppau  and  Laybach  in  1820  and  Reaction- 
1821 — Congresses  to  be  distinguished  from  those  gresseT 
already  mentioned,  since  only  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia  met.  At  these  gatherings  they  de- 
cided to  assist  each  other  in  carrying  out  the 
Absolutist  policy.  All  movements  towards  con- 
stitutional measures  which  proceeded  from  the 
people  were  to  be  repressed  by  force,  in  whatever 
country  they  might  arise.  It  was  thus  reserved 
for  Great  Britain  to  throw  her  weight  into  the 
scale  of  freedom,  and  at  the  same  time  to  do  so 
without  once  more  plunging  Europe  into  war ; 
and  this  was  the  difficult  task  undertaken  by 
Canning. 

It  was  indeed  found  impossible  to  exercise  any 
direct  interference  with  Austria  in  her  despotic 
treatment  of  Italy.  That  had  to  be  left  to  the 
next  generation ;  but  with  Spain  and  Portugal  canning 
Canning  took  effectual  measures.  The  latter  Spain  and 
country  was  at  once  taken  under  British  pro- 
tection. The  former  was  deprived  of  the  power 
of  doing  an  injury  to  the  general  peace  by  the 
countenance  which  the  British  afforded  to  her 
revolted  colonies  in  South  America.  In  1825  this 
was  followed  by  a  distinct  recognition  of  the 

x 


322  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

independence  of  those  States,  and  has  ever  since 
been  famous  as  the  occasion  when  Canning  de- 
clared that  he  had  called  "  a  new  world  into 
existence  in  order  to  redress  the  balance  of  the 
old."  In  Spain  itself  the  Constitutionalists, 
entered  into  that  struggle  with  the  Absolutists, 
who  were  assisted  by  France,  which  lingered  on 
through  another  generation. 

and  then  But  the  case  of  Greece  gave  Canning  much 
Greece.  more  trouble,  and  excited  the  British  people  to 
a  far  higher  degree.  The  popular  risings  which 
immediately  after  the  Peace  occurred  in  the 
Spanish  Peninsula  extended  to  the  country 
which  at  this  time  was  specially  interesting  to 
the  British.  The  classical  enthusiasm  of  the 
upper  classes  had  been  more  and  more  diffused 
with  the  growth  of  education  all  through  the- 
previous  half-century,  and  found  a  devoted  repre- 
sentative in  Lord  Byron,  now  at  the  very  height 
of  his  popularity.  The  Greeks,  scarcely  count- 
ing the  cost,  rose  in  arms  against  the  Turks  in 
1821,  and  were  the  more  patronised  by  English- 
men since  they  were  specially  distinguished  for 
their  nautical  prowess.  A  glamour  of  romance 
and  poetry  surrounded  the  insurrection,  and  the 
Turks  applied  the  principles  of  repression,  to 
which  they  had  no  doubt  full  claim,  in  the  fero- 
cious and  barbarous  manner  which  has  at  dif- 
ferent times  lent  such  force  to  the  cause  of  their 


FROM    1814   TO    1827.  323 

opponents.  Byron's  c  Childe  Harold/  with  its 
famous  song,  "  The  Isles  of  Greece,"  was  in  every 
one's  mouth. 

So  complicated  and  dangerous  was  the  state 
of  Eastern  Europe  under  these  circumstances 
that  a  Congress  of  all  Europe  was  agreed  upon 
by  the  Five  Powers,  to  be  held  at  Verona. 
Great  Britain  was  to  have  been  represented  by 
Lord  Castlereagh,  but  on  his  suicide  the  Duke  (1 
of  Wellington  took  his  place.  The  situation  was 
almost  ludicrous ;  for  Russia  was  acting  in  op- 
position to  the  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in 
supporting  the  Greek  insurrection  against  Tur- 
key, while  abetting  the  French  in  their  invasion 
of  Spain  for  the  alleged  purpose  of  putting  down 
the  Constitutionalists.  Great  Britain  alone  held 
aloft,  under  Canning's  instructions,  the  principle 
of  internal  independence  in  the  different  States  ; 
but  the  principle  landed  him  in  an  immense  diffi- 
culty as  regarded  Turkey.  It  was  one  thing  to 
discourage  the  ambition  of  Russia,  which  had 
abetted  Greece ;  it  was  another  to  curb  the 
tyranny  of  Turkey.  But  circumstances  came  to 
the  support  of  his  policy,  though  not  till  after 
his  own  death. 

One  effect  of  the  European  complication  may 
be  briefly  stated  at  once.  It  thoroughly  dis- 
credited Congresses;  and  this  almost  imme- 
diately after  they  had  achieved  their  grand 


324  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

triumph  in  the  settlement  of  Europe.  But  they 
have  been  brought  into  useful  operation  in  later 
days ;  and  all  that  can  be  said  against  them  is 
that  such  a  delicate  machinery  should  not  be  used 
except  when  it  is  impossible  to  dispense  with  it. 
Battle  of  As  the  battle  of  Navarino  brought  matters  to 

Navarmo. 

a  crisis  so  soon  after  Canning's  death  in  1827, 
it  must  be  noticed  here  in  connection  with  his 
policy.  The  reluctance  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  interfere  openly  in  favour  of  Greece, 
while  at  the  same  time  a  direct  impulse  was 
given  to  the  insurgents  by  the  British  press  and 
the  assistance  of  British  volunteers,  betrayed  the 
Turks  into  a  complete  recklessness  as  to  Euro- 
pean opinion ;  and  this  speedily  settled  the  ques- 
tion against  them.  The  naval  ardour  of  Admiral 
Sir  Edward  Codrington  was  inflamed  by  the 
cruelties  which  were  proceeding  in  the  imme- 
diate neighbourhood  of  his  fleet,  and  a  decisive 
battle,  which  destroyed  the  Turkish  force,  took 
place,  one  might  almost  say,  of  itself.  The 
British  seaman,  representing  the  sentiments  of 
the  people,  forced  the  hand  of  British  statesmen 
at  Navarino.  To  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  who 
spoke  the  mind  of  Canning,  it  was  an  "  untoward 
event "  ;  but  nothing  else  could  have  solved  the 
difficulty. 


325 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY   AFTER   1827. 

THE  Turks  were,  and  always  have  been,  in  a  false  The  Turks 

-T.  .  in  Europe. 

position.  By  right  of  conquest,  they  had  in  the 
fifteenth  century  come  into  possession  of  the  vast 
territories  of  the  Byzantine  empire ;  and  they 
successfully  defied  all  Europe  to  turn  them  out. 
They  were  then  the  leading  military  power  of  the 
day,  and  seemed  at  one  time  about  to  make  the 
Mediterranean  their  own.  But,  as  it  happened, 
their  conquered  subjects  were  not  only  Christians, 
but  determined  to  remain  so.  As  the  military 
prowess  of  the  conquerors  decayed,  the  oppressed 
people  experienced  sympathy  from  the  surround- 
ing Christian  nations  which  could  not  indeed  find 
much  expression  during  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries  ;  but  the  eighteenth  century  had 
seen  the  gradual  advance  of  Eussia,  which  \\ 
in  religion  and  politics  at  the  head  of  these 
nations,  and  which,  declaring  itself  to  be  the 
Protector  of  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Porte, 


326  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

pursued  a  continuous  course  of  interference.  This 
led  to  conquest,  and  the  consequent  disintegra- 
tion of  the  Ottoman  empire.  The  Peace  of 
Kainardji  in  1774  produced  a  change;  and  Great 
Britain  gradually  and  imperceptibly  succeeded  to 
the  place  of  Protector. 
virtual  It  was  the  commerce  of  the  Levant,  and  the 

Protector-  .  .  .  i  •    i 

ate  of  Great  necessity  to  the  British  01  defending  the  highway 
to  India,  which  naturally  drew  the  two  Powers 
together  by  the  cords  of  mutual  interest.  As  to 
the  Christian  population,  British  influence  would, 
it  was  hoped,  supersede  the  rougher  methods  of 
Russia  in  their  defence ;  but  the  Turks,  taking- 
courage  from  the  Holy  Alliance,  soon  found  out 
that  they  had  relied  too  much  upon  European  for- 
bearance. They  argued  thus.  If  the  Christian 
Powers  had  laid  down  rules  for  the  mutual  sup- 
port of  Absolutist  Governments  against  revolu- 
tionary reforms,  was  the  Ottoman  empire  to  be 
excluded  from  the  benefit  of  such  rules  ?  What 
portion  of  the  empire  which  they  had  formed  so 
long  ago  would  survive  if  the  desire  for  inde- 
pendence was  to  be  indulged  irrespective  of  the 
rights  which  came  in  the  train  of  conquest  ? 

This  was  a  question  of  life  and  death  to  the 
Turks ;  and  the  case  might  have  been  debated 
by  diplomatists  for  ever.  But  the  battle  of 
Navarino  taught  the  Porte  a  rough  lesson.  The 
Turks  now  began  to  discover  that  their  empire 


AFTER   1827.  327 

was  to  be  protected,  but  only  on  condition  that 
it  took  its  place  amongst  the  nations  as  responsible 
to  the  public  opinion  of  Europe.  Nevertheless 
they  plainly  perceived  that  the  mutual  jealousy 
of  the  leading  nations  would  itself  act  as  a  de- 
fence, and  were  not  sorry  to  find  that  Europe 
was  willing  to  believe  in  the  power  of  time  to 
introduce  improvements  upon  the  barbaric  spirit 
of  Mohammedan  government. 

Such  was  the  situation  as  the  course  of  events  The  East- 
interpreted  it ;  and  just  in  that  way  British  tion. 
Foreign  Policy  shaped  itself  in  relation  to  what 
had  come  to  be  called  the  "  Eastern  Question." 
Up  to  his  death  in  1852  the  influence  of  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  on  the  successive  Czars, 
Alexander  I.  and  Nicholas  L,  was  very  great; 
and  it  was  much  to  the  credit  of  their  power- 
ful empire,  which  not  unnaturally  considered  its 
career  of  Turkish  conquest  and  Russian  protec- 
torate only  suspended  during  the  convulsions  of 
Europe,  that  it  followed  so  long  in  the  track  of 
the  European  concert.  When  at  a  later  date  the 
impatience  of  Russia  could  no  longer  be  restrained, 
and  broke  out  in  the  Crimean  War  of  1854,  it  was 
under  the  belief  that  the  French  had  delivered  a 
challenge  which  could  not  be  declined,  and  that 
Great  Britain  would  not  interfere ;  but  on  the 
revolt  of  Greece,  which  we  are  now  considering, 
it  was  content  to  send  a  very  small  force  under 


328  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  leadership  of  the  English  for  the  purpose  of 
watching  the  Turks,  and  in  1840  Russia,  though 
not  much  more  than  nominally,  joined  Great 
Britain,  Austria,  and  Prussia  in  their  campaign 
against  Mehemet  Ali. 

Thus  from  1815  to  1854 — a  period  of  nearly 
forty  years — the  memory  of  the  French-Eevolu- 
tion  War  had  sufficed  to  keep  the  Peace,  though 
not  without  troubles  with  which  the  Great  Powers 
had  to  deal  as  best  they  might.  The  indepen- 
dence of  Greece  being  achieved,  and  Turkey 
having  subsided  into  conformity  with  the  general 
policy  of  Europe,  the  Eastern  Question  was  more 
or  less  settled  for  a  time ;  and  the  subject  Chris- 
tian nations  were  familiarised  with  the  prospect 
of  gradual  enfranchisement,  with  or  without  the 
preservation  of  Turkish  suzerainty. 

Troubles  m  The  Peninsulas  of  Spain,  including  Portugal, 
suia.  and  of  Italy,  had  to  be  dealt  with  by  Canning's 
successors.  The  troubles  arose  partly  out  of  the 
action  of  the  Holy  Alliance  already  mentioned, 
and  partly  from  the  activity  of  the  growing  forces 
of  "  Constitutionalism."  Those  latter  forces  would 
have  probably  prevailed  in  the  long-run,  just  as 
they  had  in  the  case  of  England  itself  in  its  re- 
sistance to  the  Stuart  despotism,  arid  its  accept- 
ance of  William  III.  at  the  bloodless  English 
"  Revolution."  But  the  popular  fermentation 
which  was  working  in  Spain  and  Portugal  was 


AFTER   1827.  329 

greatly  encouraged  by  the  profound  sympathy 
of  the  mass  of  both  the  French  and  English 
people.  The  Second  French  Revolution  of  1830 
showed  that  the  Bourbon  reaction  had  spent  its 
force. 

This  new  Revolution  was  the  emphatic  protest 
of  the  French  people  against  the  blind  reactionary 
policy  of  the  restored  Bourbons ;  at  the  same 
time  the  English  rising  in  favour  of  the  Reform 
Bill  proclaimed  the  advent  of  political  reform  and 
the  close  of  the  Tory  era.  The  two  movements 
were  simultaneous.  The  cry  for  the  separation  Separation 

of  Belgium  and  Holland  was  the  first  result,  and  and  Hol- 
land. 

wras  speedily  effected  by  the  five  Great  Powers, 
acting  in  concert,  with  scarcely  any  bloodshed. 
Both  France  and  Great  Britain  found  their  ac- 
count in  this  new  arrangement  of  the  Low 
Countries,  which  was  indeed  a  monument  of 
political  good  sense.  The  French  were  glad  to 
get  rid  of  a  too  powerful  neighbour,  forced  upon 
them  in  a  time  of  weakness  ;  and  the  British 
hereditary  policy  of  keeping  the  opposite  shore 
of  the  Channel  in  friendly  hands  was  satisfied  by 
the  belief  that  the  barrier  she  required  against 
France  was  really  the  stronger  for  having  been 
divided  into  two  parts.  So  it  has  turned  out. 
The  monarchical  and  constitutional  principles 
were  in  this  case  happily  blended.  Holland  \\ 
left  to  be  governed  by  the  old  House  which 


330  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

had  so  often  fought  by  the  side  of  England ; 
Belgium  was  placed  under  the  excellent  Leopold 
of  Saxe  Coburg,  who  became  both  English  and 
French  by  his  marriage  with  the  Princess 
Charlotte  and  his  subsequent  marriage  with 
the  daughter  of  Louis  Philippe.  The  free- 
dom of  both  countries  had  been  insured  by 
the  liberal  Constitutions  which  had  now  be- 
come the  rule  in  Western  Europe ;  and  both 
peoples — too  far  different  in  race  and  religion 
to  be  voluntarily  one  nation — started  on  a  career 
which  has  been  on  the  whole  prosperous,  with 
very  little  interruption  from  external  sources. 
Final  ser-  Talleyrand  again  must  have  most  of  the  credit 

vices  of  . 

Taiiey-  due  to  the  actors  in  this  arrangement.  He  was 
the  coadjutor  of  Canning  till  his  death,  and  of 
Wellington  both  before  and  after  that  event. 
When  Lord  Londonderry  in  the  House  of  Lords 
attacked  the  veteran  ambassador  for  his  shifting 
politics,  the*  Duke  said  he  had  always  found  him 
as  loyal  and  honourable  towards  foreign  Powers 
as  he  was  steadfast  and  enlightened  with  regard 
to  the  interests  of  his  own  country. 

The  history  of  British  interference  in  the 
Spanish  Peninsula  was  of  a  different  kind.  The 
opposite  principles  which  agitated  Europe  and 
issued  in  the  independence  of  Greece,  the  Revolu- 
tion of  July  in  France,  and  the  separation  of 
Belgium  from  Holland,  were  in  both  Spain  and 


AFTER    1827.  331 

Portugal  represented  by  different  branches  of 
the  Eoyal  Family  in  each  country.  Was  this 
a  question  which  Europe  should  suffer  to  be 
fought  out  by  the  nations  themselves?  That 
was  no  doubt  the  logical  sequence  of  the  European 
policy  which  had  been  laid  down  at  the  settle- 
ment of  Europe  after  the  great  war.  The  Duke 
of  Wellington,  as  representing  the  great  settle- 
ment, understood  it  to  mean  that  and  nothing 
else.  But  he  had  himself  been  present  at  the 
Congress  of  Verona,  where  he  found  out  that  the 
"  Holy  Alliance "  was  still  in  full  force  ;  and  it 
became  plain  to  many  thoughtful  observers  that 
as  external  influence  had  been  used  in  one  direc- 
tion, that  of  Absolutism,  nothing  could  fairly  be 
said  against  the  application  of  external  influence 
on  the  side  of  the  Constitutionalists.  A  very 
large  proportion  of  the  British  people,  who  were 
so  deeply  engaged  in  the  same  struggle,  took 
the  side  of  the  latter,  and  their  representative  Paimerston 
in  Foreign  Policy  was  Lord  Paimerston.  Canning's 

J  policy. 

Paimerston  had  become  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  under  the  Reform  Ministry  of 
Lord  Grey  in  1830;  and  a  new  era  for  Great 
Britain  both  at  home  and  abroad  may  be  said 
to  have  begun  at  this  time,  under  the  new  king, 
William  IV.  The  sailor-king  was  favourable  to 
the  new  and  prevailing  opinions,  though  alarmed 
lest  they  should  take  the  form  of  revolution,— 


332  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

not,  in  short,  a  Radical,  a  term  which  came 
into  use  about  this  time,  but  a  Whig.  Pahner- 
ston  had  been  the  friend  of  Canning,  and  his 
fellow-worker.  His  foreign  policy  was  substan- 
tially the  same,  but  he  went  much  further,  and 
deliberately  set  himself  to  work  in  favour  of  the 
Liberal  cause  in  the  Peninsula,  It  might  well  be 
believed  that  Canning  would  have  done  so  if  he 
had  lived  a  little  longer,  and  been  more  free  to 
act.  But  how  to  interfere  without  once  more 
stirring  up  a  European  war  ?  That  was  the 
question. 

Question  of  The  policy  of  intervention  could  not  have  been 
tion.  carried  into  effect  if  the  tide  had  not  completely 
turned  in  France.  It  was  no  longer  possible  for 
French  kings,  even  if  they  had  wished  it,  to 
send  military  aid  to  the  Absolutist  party  in  the 
Peninsula.  The  Orleanist  dynasty,  the  Whigs 
of  France,  were  bound  to  favour  the  Liberal 
cause,  with  which  their  own  success  had  been 
identified ;  but  they  could  not  afford  a  war  for 
their  allies  any  more  than  could  Great  Bri- 
tain. Both  countries  therefore  resorted  to  the 
methods  by  which  Queen  Elizabeth  reaped,  in 
France  and  the  Low  Countries,  both  glory  and 
safety  in  her  own  perilous  times, — methods  which 
could  not  be  defended  by  strict  International 
Law,  but  which  were  justified  under  the  circum- 
stances, and  eventually  answered  their  purpose. 


AFTER    1827.  333 

A  Quadruple  Alliance  was  formed  in  1834  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  France,  Spain  and 
Portugal,  in  direct  opposition  to  Don  Carlos 
and  the  Legitimists  in  Spain,  and  Don  Miguel 
in  Portugal.  This  gave  at  once  a  decided  pre- 
ponderance to  the  Constitutionalist  party  in 
both  countries  ;  but  the  struggle  was  obstinate, 
and  it  was  agreed  that  permanent  assistance 
supplied  from  outside  the  Peninsula  should  take 
the  form  of  a  voluntary  "Legion"  from  France  The  Span- 
and  from  Great  Britain. 

In  both  countries  there  was  available  an 
abundance  of  skilled  officers  and  men,  as  well 
as  of  enthusiasm  for  the  two  young  Queens, 
Christina  of  Spain  and  Maria  of  Portugal. 
General  Sir  De  Lacy  Evans,  who  commanded 
the  British  Legion  in  Spain,  was  the  best  known 
of  these  officers,  and  his  old  Peninsular  experi- 
ences came  to  the  aid  of  his  advanced  Liberal- 
ism. The  services  of  the  Legion  were  conspicuous 
and  decisive  ;  but,  as  might  be  expected,  they 
were  not  performed  without  many  a  passage  of 
arms  between  the  officers  and  men  of  the  dif- 
ferent nationalities,  loosely  bound  together  in  the 
Legion.  Portugal  was  efficiently  aided  by  a 
volunteer  squadron  under  Sir  Charles  Napier ; 
and  the  struggle  upon  land  was  of  far  less  con- 
sequence than  in  Spain,  The  result  has  been 
that  both  countries,  like  Greece,  Belgium,  and 


334  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Holland,  have  been  unreservedly  admitted   into 
Triumph  of  the    fellowship    of    European    States,    and    the 

Constitu-  ipi  i'ii 

tionaiism.    marks  oi  the  cruel  processes  by  which  they  have 
marched  to  freedom  are   almost  obliterated. 

It  was  not  Palmerston's  fault  that  these 
countries  did  not  keep  step  with  the  British 
in  the  matter  of  slave-dealing ;  but  it  was  the 
persistent  influence  which  Great  Britain  had 
earned  a  right  to  use  which  at  last  wiped  out 
the  stain.  Brazil,  severed  by  the  Atlantic,  took 
a  longer  time  still  to  yield  to  the  growing  opinion 
of  the  European  public  on  this  point.  So  de- 
termined was  the  attitude  of  successive  British 

The  slave-   ministers  in  imposing  the  Abolition  of  the  Slave- 
trade  put 
down  at      trade,   by  all  means   short    oi    war,  upon    every 

last. 

nation  subject  to  its  influence,  that  it  may  pro- 
perly take  rank  as  one  of  the  leading  features  of 
British  Foreign  Policy  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
It  was  right  that  it  should  be  so.  Though  not 
the  first  offenders,  the  English  and  their  colonists 
had  been  most  eager  and  extensive  abettors  of  the 
iniquitous  traffic,  and  it  was  therefore  fitting  that 
they  should  take  the  lead  in  putting  it  down. 

There  was   one   European  country  which   had 

not    yet    been   able    to    follow   the    footsteps   of 

The  state    the  liberated  nations.     Italy  did  indeed  benefit 

of  Italy. 

largely  by  the  influence  and  goodwill  of  the  Brit- 
ish people,  but  the  British  Government  could 
not  take  the  lead,  as  it  had  in  the  liberations 


AFTER    1827.  335 

already  effected,  owing  to  the  attitude  of  the 
Great  Powers  which  had  concurred  with  the 
British  in  the  settlement  of  Europe.  These 
Powers,  finding  that  the  Holy  Alliance  had  virtu- 
ally come  to  an  end  by  the  death  of  Alexander 
I.  of  Russia  in  1825,  clung  the  more  closely  to 
the  system  of  popular  repression  both  in  the 
German  and  the  Italian  States.  They  were 
well  aware  that  the  spirit  of  Constitutionalism 
and  of  national  patriotism  had  been  let  loose, 
and  that  the  German  States  were  themselves 
greatly  affected  thereby.  While  there  was  time, 
they  would  stave  off  peril  at  home  by  vigorous 
action  in  the  country  which  had  now  for  many 
ages  been  under  German  influences.  Metternich, 
who  had  taken  so  great  a  part  in  the  European 
settlement,  represented  these  principles  with  the 
decision  and  ability  which  might  have  been  ex- 
pected from  his  past  career. 

The  famous  saying  of  that  statesman,  that 
"Italy"  was  only  a  "geographical  expression," 
was  founded  on  patent  historical  facts.  The 
great  struggle  for  Italian  dominion  between 
France  and  Germany,  which  the  French  began 
in  1494,  had  destroyed  the  political  vitality  of 
the  country.  Its  essential  feebleness  had  in- 
vited the  attack,  and  soon  left  it  a  prey  to  the 
foreigners.  Of  these,  Austria  came  to  be  the  Austrian 

~  111-1  -i  influence 

most  important  fetate,  and  had  in  the  eighteenth  in 


336  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

century  been  supported  by  Great  Britain  as  a 
counterpoise  to  the  French  influence  exercised 
over  the  "Two  Sicilies"  by  the  Spanish  Bour- 
bons. Nor,  whatever  might  be  desired,  could 
any  change  be  made  at  the  Congresses  which 
settled  Europe  after  the  great  war.  Family 
relationship  existed  between  the  Austrian  House 
and  many  of  the  petty  Italian  States.  Indeed, 
the  rule  of  Austria  virtually  extended  throughout 
the  Peninsula.  Savoy  had  caught  the  infection 
of  popular  repression,  and  its  restored  king  out- 
Bourboned  the  restored  Bourbons  of  France. 

But   Metternich,   and   the   German   Powers  in 
general,   failed,   in  the   righteous  enthusiasm    of 

o  '  o 

their  anti-Napoleonic  rising,  to  observe  that,  with 
all  the  palpable  faults  of  his  government,  the 
French  conqueror  had  ruled  the  enslaved  States 
of  Europe  in  a  spirit  of  justice,  order,  and  popu- 
lar sympathy,  or  at  least  with  a  parade  of  these 
qualities,  which  was  his  best  inheritance  from  the 
French  Revolution.  These  ideas  had  had  time 
to  take  root,  and  nothing  could  extinguish  them. 
Europe  was  in  great  need  of  some  such  sharp  and 
bitter  incitement  before  it  could  direct  its  course 
by  what  Heeren  called  the  "  bright  Polar  Star 
across  the  British  Channel."  Perhaps  the  lessons 
it  received  from  Napoleon  were,  after  all,  less 
terrible  than  the  long  periods  of  civil  war  which 
might  have  taken  their  place. 


AFTER   1827.  337 

As  the  influence  of  Austria  over  Italy  was  so 
powerful  and  ubiquitous,  the  movements  of  the 
patriots  were  necessarily  driven  into  channels 
which  were  objectionable  in  themselves,  and  gave 
handle  enough  to  their  enemies.  The  Secret  Secret  So- 
Societies  were  formed  and  flourished  :  while  the 
sufferings  of  men  like  Silvio  Pellico,  much  in  the 
same  way  as  those  of  Poerio  at  a  later  date,  in- 
flamed the  minds  of  the  British  people,  for  whom 
Byron  had  revived  the  touching  story  of  Bonivard, 
the  Prisoner  of  Chillon,  and  the  wrongs  he  had 
received  from  former  princes  of  Savoy.  The 
popular  enthusiasm  once  felt  for  the  Greeks  was 
transferred  to  Italy;  and  when  in  1846  Palmer- 
ston  became  Foreign  Secretary  for  the  third  time, 
he  knew  that  in  fostering  the  Liberationists  he 
had  the  British  people  at  his  back.  It  was  not, 
indeed,  till  that  year  that  any  real  progress  was 
made  in  the  liberation  of  Italy!  In  1830  the  The  Second 
Second  French  Revolution,  commonly  called  the  Revoiu- 
"  Revolution  of  July,"  blew  the  sparks  of  political 
agitation  into  a  momentary  flame,  but  Austria 
was  still  sufficiently  powerful  to  prevent  any 
general  conflagration.  The  principles  of  self- 
government,  though  in  the  most  violent  form, 
made  some  progress  under  the  auspices  of 
Mazzini,  whose  insurrectionary  efforts  found  sup- 
port both  in  and  out  of  Italy,  but  plainly  proved 
by  their  repeated  failure  that  the  liberation  of 


338  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

Italy  could  not  be  effected  without  the  interven- 
tion of  external  aid. 

What  seemed  almost  a  hopeless  cause  was 
guided  to  victory  by  means  which  the  wildest 
dreamers  could  never  have  guessed,  much  less 
expected.  But  those  agencies  could  have  attained 
no  permanent  success  unless  the  ground  had  been 
prepared  by  the  events  of  the  previous  half- 
century.  Every  one  of  the  premature  move- 
ments, every  cruel  stroke  of  repression,  had 
been  required  to  prevent  the  formation  of  feeble 
and  short-lived  establishments,  and  to  give  the 
character  of  moderation  and  permanency  to  the 
United  Italy  which  was  to  take  its  place  among 
the  nations  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of 
the  world.1  For  such  a  birth  no  previous  labour 
might  seem  too  great  or  too  prolonged.  These 
pio  Nono  agencies  were  found  in  two  persons,  in  Pio  Nono, 
the  newly -elected  Pope  of  1846,  and  in  Gari- 
baldi, an  adventurous  seaman  of  the  old  heroic 
type ;  but  the  final  success  could  not  have  been 
achieved  unless  the  little  kingdom  of  Sardinia 
had  been  gradually  prepared  for  its  future  by 
Cavour  and  his  king. 

The  popular  progress  must  have  been  extending 
widely  beneath  the  surface  when  a  Pope  deemed 

1  One  can  hardly  reckon  the  transient  governments  of  the  Early 
Middle  Ages  as  exceptions  to  this  statement. 


AFTER    1827.  339 

it  expedient  to  hoist  the  colours  of  Constitution- 
alism ;  and  when  he 

"  back  recoiled, 
E'en  at  the  sound  himself  had  made," 

he  discovered  that  he  had  gone  too  far,  and  that 
encouragement  of  this  sort  from  a  Pope  could 
not  be  as  if  it  had  never  been.  The  example  not 
only  affected  every  Italian  State,  but  gave  an 
impulse  to  the  rest  of  Europe  which  powerfully 
assisted  the  wide  movement  set  afoot  by  the  Third 
French  Revolution  in  1848.  The  smaller  States 
of  Italy  followed  suit,  and  not  far  behind  them 
marched  the  greater  States  in  the  north  and 
south,  Sardinia  and  the  two  Sicilies.  The  spread 
of  the  flame  to  Lombardy  warned  Austria  that 
she  must  interfere  by  arms  if  she  wished  to  save 
her  Italian  possessions;  and  in  1848  war  broke 
out  between  her  and  King  Charles  Albert  of 
Sardinia.  The  issue  went  at  first  against  Radetz- 
ky,  the  veteran  Austrian  general ;  but  he  soon 
recovered  his  position  by  the  victory  obtained 
under  Archduke  Albert  at  Custozza.  Yet  the 
hopes  of  Italy  still  survived  in  the  beaten  but 
-courageous,  and  now  steadfast,  friend  of  liberty, 
the  kingdom  of  Sardinia.  Victor  Emmanuel  had  victor 

Emmanuel. 

succeeded  his  father,  who  abdicated  after  his 
defeat  at  Novara  in  1849,  and  the  new  king 
inspired  a  confidence  which  was  fully  justified  in 


340  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

the  result ;  but  he  was  scarcely  Italian,  and  his 
time  had  not  yet  come.  He  had  to  wait  ten 
years. 

Two  other  forces  appeared  on  the  stage  in 
1848.  Rome,  during  the  absence  of  the  Pope, 
had  under  Garibaldi's  auspices  pronounced  for  a 
Republic,  and  his  romantic  and  reckless  valour 
began  to  point  him  out  as  the  active  agent 
round  whom  the  bolder  spirits  might  be  rallied, 
however  long  the  necessities  of  diplomacy  might 
Louis  Na-  hamper  Sardinia.  And  secondly,  Louis  Napoleon, 
the  first  President  of  the  new  French  Republic, 
correctly  interpreting  the  desire  of  the  French 
to  interpose  in  Italian  affairs  as  they  had  done 
time  out  of  mind,  sent  a  French  army  to  recover 
Rome  for  the  Pope,  and  eject  Garibaldi  and  the 
Republicans.  Thus  the  old  ambitions  which  had 
ruined  Italy  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages 
appeared  once  more  to  be  dominant.  Austria 
was,  it  is  true,  checked  for  the  moment  by  the 
intervention  of  France ;  but  the  liberation  of 
Italy  seemed  to  be  rather  farther  off  than  ever. 
Two  of  the  Great  Powers  were  crushing  it  in- 
stead of  one. 

A  third,  Great  Britain,  was  also  intervening 
in  Italian  affairs,  but  in  a  very  different  way. 
Lord  Palmerston,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  was 
using  his  lengthened  experience  of  British 
Foreign  Policy  in  the  direction  of  liberty  with 


AFTER   1827.  341 

a  skill  scarcely  acknowledged  at  the  time ;  while 
he  avoided  serious  offence  to  either  Austria  or 
France,  whose  place  in  the  European  polity  he 
was  far  from  wishing  to  disturb.  Lord  Minto 
was  the  agent  through  whom  he  advised  the 
Pope  at  Rome,  the  Court  of  Sardinia  at  Turin, 
and  that  of  Tuscany  at  Florence ;  while  he  plied 
every  argument  that  could  be  used  to  convince 
Austria  that  the  time  had  come  when  she  ought 
to  recognise  her  own  danger  in  defying  Italian 
opinion.  Cavour  was  now  coming  to  the  front,  Paimerston 
and  in  1852  found  himself  in  the  full  exercise 
of  his  wonderful  diplomatic  abilities  as  Victor 
Emmanuel's  Prime  Minister.  Never  were  pa- 
tience, good  sense,  and  foresight  more  required. 
The  general  policy  which  the  Sardinian  State 
began  to  pursue  was  struck  out  in  these  con- 
ferences with  the  British  envoys.  The  con- 
fidence of  the  Italian  patriots  was  gradually 
won,  and  the  little  kingdom  was  prepared  to 
take  advantage  of  every  favourable  wind  that 
blew. 

The  Russian  War  of  1854  gave  Cavour  an 
excellent  opportunity  of  strengthening  his  po- 
sition by  offering  to  act  with  Great  Britain 
and  France  in  the  Crimea.  The  acceptance  of 
his  offer,  and  the  good  service  of  the  Sardinian 
army,  had  the  effect  of  enlisting  both  the  French  French  in- 

v  +OOTTant;/\n 

and  British  people  on  the  Italian  side.     It  also 


tervention. 


342  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

opened  the  way  for  that  conflict  between  France 
and  Austria  which  had  been  long  impending. 
Nothing  short  of  force  could  remove  the  dead 
weight  of  the  Austrian  dominion,  which  how- 
ever, it  must  be  remembered,  had  been  sanc- 
tioned by  Europe  at  a  time  when  the  services 
of  Austria  against  Napoleon  had  been  invalu- 
able. In  1859  the  French  supplied  that  force, 
and  in  conjunction  with  Sardinia,  by  this  time 
strong  and  well-governed,  brought  Austria  to 
terms.  The  motives  of  Louis  Napoleon  in  form- 
ing this  alliance  were  so  complex  that  it  adds 
only  one  more  to  the  unexpected  order  of 
events  which  in  the  end  produced  equilibrium ; 
but  he  was  quite  aware  that  "war  for  an  idea" 
was  not  likely  to  satisfy  the  French  people. 
They  an-  The  annexation  of  Savoy  and  Nice  was  to  be 

nex  Savoy  .  . 

and  Nice,  the  condition  of  his  aid,  and  the  Austrians 
having  been  defeated  at  Magenta  and  Solferino, 
the  price  was  paid.  But  here  the  French  Em- 
peror stopped.  The  Peace  of  Villafranca  (1859) 
did  indeed  give  Lombardy  to  Sardinia,  but 
Austria  still  kept  Venetia  and  the  Quadri- 
lateral, as  well  as  her  old  position  in  Central 
Italy.  The  two  Sicilies  remained  as  before. 

This  was  by  no  means  a  united  Italy ;    and 

so,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  it  would  have  remained, 

—a   mere    "  geographical   expression."     That   it 

emerged  from  such  a  perilous  condition  was  the 


AFTER   1827.  343 

work  of  Garibaldi.  The  hero  of  the  Italian  Garibaldi 
patriots  astonished  Europe  by  bursting  into  andNapies. 
Sicily  with  a  handful  of  followers,  and  in  less 
than  four  months  he  had  virtually  conquered 
the  Bourbon  kingdom  on  both  sides  of  the 
Straits  of  Messina.  He  then  had  the  courage 
to  conquer  himself.  Finding  that  the  Sardinian 
army  had  begun  to  assert  dominion  over  Central 
Italy  and  the  Papal  forces,  and  was  marching 
upon  Gaeta  to  besiege  the  King  of  Naples,  whom 
Garibaldi  himself  had  driven  from  his  capital,  he 
resigned  all  claims  to  power,  and  handed  over 
the  work  to  the  one  sovereign  who  was  pre- 
pared to  complete  it.  In  1862  the  task  was 
completed,  and  Victor  Emmanuel  reaped  his  re-  victor 

.  ,  ,.  .      Emmanuel, 

ward  in  the  assembly  of  a  Parliament  at  Turin  "King of 
from  all  parts  of  Italy  except  Venetia  and 
Rome,  and  in  the  title  then  conferred  of  "  King 
of  Italy."  In  this  same  year  Garibaldi  and  his 
volunteers  emerged  once  more,  determined  to 
give  Italy  her  ancient  capital ;  but  the  royal 
forces  were,  in  consequence  of  the  complicated 
relations  of  the  Papal  power  with  European 
sovereigns,  under  the  melancholy  necessity  of 
putting  him  down.  His  work  was  done. 

The  kingdom  of  Italy  has  now  long  ranked 
among  the  Great  Powers.  When  Austria  suc- 
cumbed to  Prussia  in  1866,  Italy  acquired  Ven- 
etia ;  and  at  last,  in  1871,  Rome  became  its 


344  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

capital,  —  for  the  great  wars  of  that  year  left 
the  King  of  Italy  free  to  act.  The  plaintive 
lines  of  Byron, 

"  Italia  !  oh,  Italia  !  that  thou  wert 
Less  lovely  or  more  strong," 

were  at  last  exchanged  for  the  jubilant  phrase, 
"  Italy  is  free  from  the  Alps  to  the  Adriatic." 

The   best,   perhaps  the  only,   available  source 

from  which  a  just  idea  can  be  gained  of  the  part 

played  by  Great  Britain  in  this  half-century  of 

Italian  struggle  to  be  free,  is  to  be  found  in  the 

Paimerston  letters  and  despatches  of  Lord  Palmerston.     A 

Constitu-    sufficient  number  of  them   for  that  purpose  are 

tional  *        -1 

note<Kemub  (luo^e(^  by  Mr  Evelyn  Ashley,  the  biographer  of 
hjs  later  years.  We  have  seen  that  there  were 
overpowering  reasons  why  neither  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  nor  of  any  other  Great 
Power  could  deal  with  the  Italian  question  as 
they  had  with  those  of  Greece,  Spain,  and  Por- 
tugal. The  progress  of  the  various  movements 
above  noticed  was  therefore  all  the  more  anxiously 
watched  by  the  British ;  for  we  have  seen  how 
vital  to  British  interests  the  Mediterranean  had 
become,  and  how  much  of  the  British  warfare 
of  the  eighteenth  century  had  arisen  from  the 
conviction  that  Italy  must  not  be  allowed  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  hostile  Powers. 

Further,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  besides 


AFTER   1827.  345 

the  difficulties  connected  with  the  singular  position 
of  Austria,  the  spirit  which  Mazzini  represented 
was  more  feared  than  approved.  There  was  in- 
deed more  sympathy  with  the  object  than  was 
publicly  avowed;  but  the  wilder  revolutionists 
drew  from  the  movement  an  encouragement  to 
assassination,  and  that  excited  horror.  The  bitter 
anti-clerical  spirit  which  could  hardly  but  be  formed 
by  the  opponents  of  the  Papacy  and  of  its  princely 
and  Imperial  agents,  also  went  far  to  stifle  sym- 
pathy, even  amongst  Protestants.  Lord  Palmer- 
ston  felt  deeply  these  repellent  influences.  His 
efforts  were  in  all  cases  directed  towards  the 
attainment  of  constitutional  freedom,  not  of  re- 
publicanism ;  and  thus  it  was  that  he  fostered 
by  every  means  in  his  power  the  growth  and 
development  of  the  little  kingdom  in  north- 
western Italy,  which  alone  offered  a  prospect 
of  leadership  and  progress  towards  the  goal 
which  he  set  before  himself. 

It  may  be  well  to  consider  the  action  of  this 
influential  Minister  .a  little  further.  When  he 
became  Foreign  Secretary  in  1846  the  circum- 
stances invited,  as  we  have  seen,  the  co-opera- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  and  he  became  at  once 
the  adviser  and  guide  of  the  great  men  who 
brought  about  the  freedom  of  Italy.  His  in- 
structions to  Lord  Minto  directed  that  states- 
man to  encourage  the  different  States  which  had 


346  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

commenced  a  ' '  system  of  progressive  improve- 
ment," and  to  proclaim  publicly  the  British  dis- 
approval of  all  attempts  at  restraint  on  the  part 
of  Foreign  Governments.  His  agent  was  thus 
publicly  identified  with  the  cause  of  Italian 
independence ;  but  he  held  out  no  prospect  of 
direct  interposition  by  force  of  arms,  and  he 
remonstrated  as  time  went  on  in  the  strongest 
language  with  Austria  for  doing  so.  When  the 
general  movement  of  1848  swept  over  Italy 
Palmerston  went  further,  and  denied  the  right 
of  Austria  to  hold  any  portion  of  the  latter 
country.  Austria,  he  contended,  had  broken  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna  by  its  recent  seizure  of  Cracow 
(1846),  and  had  repudiated  its  engagement  to 
give  national  institutions  to  Poland.  He  tried, 
therefore,  to  persuade  her  to  give  up  Lombardy 
for  a  sum  of  money,  contenting  herself  with 
Venetia ;  and  he  joined  the  French  in  demand- 
ing from  Austria  an  armistice  when  Eadetsky 
had  conquered  Sardinia. 
Herepre-  In  all  this  he  fairly  represented  his  country, 


sented  Bri- 


tish For- "  as  was  sufficiently  proved  by  the  failure  of  ex- 
'  treme  politicians  on  both  sides  to  make  good 
any  charge  against  his  policy.  There  was  no 
disposition  in  England  to  proceed  as  far  as  war 
for  Italy ;  and  the  British  people  had  to  wait 
till  the  moral  influence  of  their  Government 
could  be  brought  to  bear.  France,  on  the  con- 


AFTER   1827.  34*7 

trary,  and  especially  her  Emperor,  had  her  own 
reasons  for  rushing  into  the  war  with  Austria, 
and  Palmerston  laboured  in  vain  to  prevent  it. 
No  one  could  then  foresee  that  out  of  the  clash 
of  French  and  Austrian  arms  was  to  come  the 
rise  of  a  German  empire  whose  interest  it  would 
be  to  keep  Italy  strong,  and  give  her  the  repose 
which  she  had  earned  by  the  discipline  of  pro- 
longed suffering,  by  the  political  wisdom  she  had 
displayed,  by  her  persistent  effort,  and  by  a 
patience  unequalled  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

This  rapid  sketch  of  Italian  affairs  has  been  Defence  of 

that  posi- 

necessary  in  order  to  show  the  true  bearing  oftion. 
British  Foreign  Policy  during  the  generations 
which  immediately  succeeded  the  great  French  - 
Revolution  War.  During  the  subsidence  of  the 
dangerous  elements  which  had  been  stirred  to 
fury  for  a  period  of  more  than  twenty  years, 
no  rash  experiments  were  to  be  made.  It  was 
the  business  of  the  nation  which  had  taken  the 
lead  in  the  stress  of  the  storm  to  adopt  a  system 
of  policy  which  might  utilise  for  the  benefit  of 
mankind  all  that  had  been  gained,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  impede,  if  it  was  not  possible  to 
prevent,  a  recurrence  of  the  dreadful  experience 
through  which  Europe  had  passed.  This  was 
not  to  be  effected  by  simply  declining  to  take 
notice  of  the  interference  of  the  Great  Powers 
in  concert  with  which  the  settlement  had  been 


348  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

made.  The  machine  would  not  work  without 
being  cleaned  from  time  to  time,  but  it  was 
not  to  be  taken  to  pieces,  with  everything  to 
begin  again.  It  was  to  be  a  policy  of  author- 
itative influence,  with  war  in  the  background 
as  the  last  resort,  but  only  as  the  last  resort. 
The  authoritative  influence,  the  counter-inter- 
ferences, if  such  should  be  necessary,  were  to 
be  regulated  on  the  principles  of  popular  free- 
dom and  self-government,  under  the  checks  and 
balances  of  recognised  constitutions.  Progress 
and  security  could  only  be  maintained  by  a 
middle  course  between  despotic  authority  and 
anarchical  revolution. 

Not  a  It  would  be  a  gross  error  to  suppose  that  even 

policy/0  the  most  benevolent  theory  of  Foreign  Policy 
could  support  the  doctrine  that  a  country  like 
Great  Britain,  suffering  under  the  debt  she  had 
incurred  both  for  her  own  safety  and  the  peace 
of  the  world,  and  without  any  considerable  army 
at  her  disposal,  should  rush  into  war  on  every 
occasion  when  her  influence  was  set  at  nought. 
We  rightly  call  such  a  policy  Quixotic.  The 
people  of  Great  Britain  have  always  demanded, 
and  had  a  right  to  demand,  that  such  wars  should 
only  be  undertaken  where  their  interests  were 
directly  concerned ;  and,  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
earlier  parts  of  this  review  of  Foreign  Policy, 
commerce  and  national  safety  have  been  the 


AFTER    1827.  349 

leading  features  of  those  interests.  Palmerston 
was  often  accused  of  encouraging  hopes  which  he 
knew  he  was  unable  to  aid  in  fulfilling,  and  it 
would  be  untrue  to  say  that  his  interferences  were 
always  wise  ;  but  they  were  always  justifiable, 
and  they  were  always  successful  in  the  end.  The  Poland, 
case  of  Poland  is  hardly  in  point.  The  British  bad.P 
people  were  vehemently  sympathetic  with  the 
Poles,  but  the  three  Great  Powers  which  had 
partitioned  it  unopposed  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury could  not  be  reached  in  the  nineteenth  either 
by  diplomacy  or  war,  and  nothing  could  be  done. 
It  was  different  with  Switzerland,  where  sound 
diplomatic  advice  took  effect ;  as  it  did  also  in 
Portugal,  when,  long  after  its  settlement  under 
Donna  Maria,  attempts  were  made  to  unite  it  to 
Spain  under  Republican  Government. 

With  France  herself  and  with  Russia  the  British 
relations  have  been  far  more  difficult.  With  the 
first,  war  has  been  more  than  once  imminent ; 
with  the  second,  it  actually  took  place.  Both 
affairs  arose  out  of  the  "  Eastern  Question."  We 
have  seen  that  the  course  of  events  had  deprived 
Russia  of  the  sole  "Protectorship"  of  Turkey, 
and  that  the  French  policy  under  Napoleon  I. 
was  openly  directed  towards  its  conquest.  "  Con- 
stantinople must  be  either  French  or  Cossack," 
said  Napoleon.  It  had  fallen  to  Great  Britain 
to  take  the  place  which  her  commercial  and 


350  BRITISH   FOREIGN    POLICY. 

political  interests  would  not  allow  to  be  taken 
by  either  Russia  or  France.  She  had  conquered 
the  Mediterranean  at  the  battle  of  the  Nile ;  and 
every  day  made  it  more  apparent  to  statesmen 
that  India  could  not  be  retained  if  a  hostile 
Power  occupied  the  Levant.  Each  year  also 
the  enormous  responsibility  which  the  possession 
of  India  involved  was  brought  more  and  more 
home  to  the  British  nation  by  dangerous  wars 
and  insurrections. 

The  ties  of  honour  were  stronger  still.     The 
victory  of  Navarino  had  imposed  a  correspond- 
ing duty  on  the  victors.     The  destruction  of  the 
Turkish  fleet  had  given  an  opportunity  for  the 
The  Egyp-  revolt  of  Egypt ;  and  Mehemet  Ali,  a  powerful 

tian  inva-  .    .  ..  .,.         . 

sion  of       and  ambitious  ruler,  knew  how  to  utilise  it.     He 

Turkey. 

had  been  encouraged  by  the  French,  who  also 
saw  their  opportunity.  Thus  it  was  high  time 
to  summon  Europe  to  council ;  for  Syria  had 
already  been  overrun,  and  the  Turkish  fleet, 
such  as  it  was,  had  been  bribed.  France  alone, 
under  the  guidance  of  M.  Thiers,  refused  to  join 
the  concert  of  Europe,  and  stood  aside.  It  was 
a  critical  moment ;  but  Palmerston  resolved  to 
run  the  risk  of  a  French  war,  and  without  much 
difficulty  the  British  Mediterranean  fleet  drove  the 
Egyptians  out  of  Syria,  and  established  Mehemet 
Ali's  dynasty  on  its  present  footing  in  relation  to 
Turkey.  The  experienced  Louis  Philippe  con- 


AFTER   1827.  351 

trolled  his  indignant  minister ;  and  when  he  had 
resigned,  the  French  perceived  that  war  on  such 
a  question  would  have  been  an  anachronism.  It 
was  an  essential  part  of  British  Foreign  Policy  Action  of 
that  the  entente  cordiale  between  the  two  nations  and  Br£c 
should  be  preserved,  and  no  small  part  in  the  pro- 
cess was  taken  by  the  Queen  and  Prince  Albert, 
in  relation  to  Louis  Philippe  and  Louis  Napoleon 
successively.  This  had  an  important  bearing  on 
affairs.  Much  was  said  about  revenge  for  Water- 
loo ;  but,  speaking  generally,  the  French  remem- 
bered that  the  contest  had  not  been  with  their 
nation,  but  with  Napoleon,  and  that  the  one  firm 
friend  they  had  at  the  settlement  of  Europe  was 
the  British  nation. 

These  friendly  feelings  prevailed  when  the 
other  great  test  of  British  Foreign  Policy,  the 
Crimean  War,  stained,  through  a  series  of  blun-  The  Cnm- 
ders,  the  history  of  Europe.  It  was  the  Eastern 
Question  again  ;  but  Palmerston  was  not  Prime 
Minister  nor  even  Foreign  Secretary  in  the 
Government  of  Lord  Aberdeen  which  took  office 
at  the  end  of  the  year  1852.  It  was  a  ministry 
of  divided  counsels,  and  he  was  Home  Secretary. 
Not  that  he  is  thus  relieved  from  a  share  of  re- 
sponsibility ;  and  he  would  have  been  wise  if  he 
had  disengaged  himself  from  it  earlier  than  he 
did.  The  difficulties  were  no  doubt  enormous, 
and  they  have  lately  been  presented  in  an  able 


352  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

manner  by  Sir  Arthur  Gordon,  now  Lord  Stan- 
more  ;  but  whatever  Lord  Aberdeen's  merits,  he 
was  not  the  man  for  the  crisis,  and  no  terms 
can  be  too  strong  to  express  the  disgrace  which 
rested  both  on  British  diplomacy  and  British 
administration.  The  country  called  on  Lord 
Palmerston  to  retrieve  its  credit,  and  found  him 
once  more  equal  to  the  situation. 

It  was  impossible  at  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in 
1856,  which  concluded  the  war,  to  effect  any 
decided  reform  of  the  relations  between  the  Otto- 
man Porte  and  its  Christian  subjects  ;  but  the 
public  opinion  of  Europe  has  been  ripening  on  the 
Present  subject  ever  since  ;  and  the  principles  of  Canning 

state  of  the  r      . 

Eastern      and   Palmerston    have    made    immense    progress 

Question. 

under  their  successors.  Many  Christian  States, 
once  conquered  and  enslaved,  are  now  substanti- 
ally free  ;  and  yet  the  Turkish  Power,  with  its 
centre  at  Constantinople,  has  not  been  broken  up. 
The  Eastern  Question  is  always  threatening,  but 
fc  time  is  gradually  solving  it. 

Later  It   is  no  part   of  the  present   undertaking  to 

Policy.  trace  in  detail  the  events  which  have  influenced 
British  Foreign  Policy  during  the  last  generation, 
nor  to  show  how,  after  some  tendency  to  vacilla- 
tion, it  has  reverted  to  a  patriotic  continuity ; 
nor  yet  to  examine  minutely  the  attitude  of  the 
Court  of  St  James's  to  each  Foreign  Power  and 
each  "burning  question"  throughout  the  world  ; 


AFTER   1827.  353 

still  less  to  forecast  the  future  and  attempt  to 
lay  down  the  lines  of  the  Foreign  Policy  which 
Great  Britain  will,  or  might,  or  should  adopt. 
These  questions,  though  a  natural  sequel  to  the 
subject  in  hand,  are  the  province  of  the  diplo- 
matist and  the  politician  rather  than  of  the 
historian.  The  briefest  summary  will  therefore 
suffice. 

The  later  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain, 
so  far  as  it  has  been  called,  into  activity,  has 
been  concerned  with  the  preservation  and  ex- 
tension of  her  empire  in  the  continents  of  Asia, 
Africa,  and  America.  In  dealing  with  the  great 
European  nations  and  with  the  United  States, 
it  has  been  one  of  absolute  non  -  interference, 
and  possesses,  therefore,  no  spark  of  the  vital 
interest  which  characterised  the  mighty  struggles 
through  which  our  path  has  been  traced  in  the 

preceding  pages.     This  policy  has  been  identical  Non-inter- 

•Ai/TL  A     *  r  &  j    t        P        i    -x    veuti°a»> 

with   that  of    former  times,    and   has   found   its  Europe 

proper  application  in  a  strict  adherence  to  the 
old  principle  of  strengthening,  as  the  times  in 
•each  case  seemed  to  require,  the  defences  of  the 
British  Isles  and  their  dependencies,  and  in  a 
scrupulous  vigilance  lest  British  interests  should 
be  endangered  by  the  changes  which  were  taking 
place  amongst  the  nations. 

In  the  war  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  Ami  in  the 
States  of  America   (1861-65)  the  temper  of  the  state*. 


354  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

British  people  was  sorely  tried  by  the  serious 
difficulties  which  could  not  but  affect  them.  The 
"Trent  affair"  fell  like  a  fiery  spark  upon 
inflammable  matter  ;  but  Palmerston's  prompt 
action,  accompanied  by  a  conciliatory  treatment 
of  the  question,  in  which  the  Queen  and  the 
Prince  Consort  took  a  beneficent  part,  brought 
out  the  good  sense  and  statesmanship  of  both 
Governments.  War  was  happily  averted,  and 
the  hard-won  triumph  of  the  Northern  States 
renewed  the  cordial  relations  of  the  kindred 
peoples  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

In  the  European  wars  which  led  up  to  the 
present  position  of  Germany  (1865-71)  the  tempta- 
tion to  interfere  was  not  nearly  so  great.  The 
strife  of  the  combatants  arose  out  of  mutual 
quarrels  and  ambitions  which  did  not  concern 
British  interests,  nor  lead  to  a  despotism  which 
required  a  forcible  readjustment  of  the  Balance 
of  Power.  Russia  indeed,  reckoning  on  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  British  policy  of  non-interference, 
took  advantage  of  these  wars  to  repudiate  the 
Treaty  of  Paris,  by  which  the  Crimean  War 
had  been  concluded  ;  but  her  invasion  of  Turkey 
in  1877,  which  ensued  upon  that  repudiation, 
was  rendered  harmless  and  even  beneficial  by 
LordBea-  the  interposition  at  the  critical  moment  of  Great 
Britain.  This  was  the  act  of  Lord  Beaconsfield, 


Question,    who  did  not  even  hesitate  to  summon  troops  from 


AFTER   1827.  355 

India  to  support  the  fleet  which  he  had  sent  to 
the  Bosphorus.  The  Berlin  Conference  of  1878, 
-the  last  great  event  of  the  kind — restrained 
Russia  from  assuming  the  "  Protectorate  "  of  the 
enfranchised  States  of  the  Ottoman  empire ;  and 
as  Lord  Beaconsfield  had  previously  bought  up 
the  greater  part  of  the  Suez  Canal  shares,  and 
obtained  Cyprus  for  a  British  station  in  the 
Levant,  he  left  his  mark  upon  the  "  Eastern 
Question  "  as  only  second  to  that  of  Palmerston. 

In  India  the  rivalry  of  Asiatic  Russia,  or  the  Russia  and 
fear  of  it,   has   directly  or   indirectlv  connected  Britain  m 

J  *  the  East. 

itself  with  nearly  all  the  little  wars  which  have 
been  waged  there  since  the  middle  of  the  century. 
As  in  Great  Britain  itself,  the  first  duty  has  been 
to  consolidate  the  power  of  the  British  rulers. 
The  Afghan,  Belooch  and  Sikh  wars,  the  various 
annexations,  the  measures  taken  after  the  Sepoy 
Mutiny,  the  Burmese,  and  the  recent  frontier 
wars,  have  each  contributed  to  the  building  up 
of  a  united  and  self-supporting  empire,  which 
might  be  dangerous  to  any  Power  that  should 
venture  to  attack  it.  Nor  has  the  same  feeling 
about  Asiatic  Russia  been  altogether  absent  from 
the  policy  pursued  by  Great  Britain  in  China  and 
Japan.  In  these  countries,  however,  the  effoi 
necessary  to  defend  British  commerce  have  mostly 
ruled  the  situation ;  and  though  it  has  been  some- 
times necessary  to  employ  force,  the  practical 


356  BRITISH   FOREIGN   POLICY. 

tutorship  of  able  men  such  as  Sir  Harry  Parkes, 
has  been  much  more  effectual  than  force.  Time 
will  show  whether  the  policy  of  isolation  from 
the  other  European  Powers  was  the  right  course 
to  pursue  when,  after  the  war  between  China 
and  Japan,  some  of  these  Powers  had  decided 
upon  intervention. 

Pacific  In  Africa  the  Foreign  Policy  of  Great  Britain, 

the  Powers  after  having  for  more  than  a  century  confined 
itself  to  the  development  of  British  Settlements, 
and  to  such  wars  in  their  behalf  as  those  of 
Abyssinia,  Ashantee,  and  South  Africa,  has  in 
recent  years  taken  the  direction  of  pacific  rivalry 
with  other  European  nations  in  building  up  vast 
territorial  acquisitions  on  the  basis  of  modern 
enterprise  and  discovery.  The  future  of  these 
various  empires  who  can  guess  ?  Every  resource 
of  modern  diplomacy,  mutual  consideration,  and 
arbitration  will  be  required  in  order  to  preserve 
harmony  and  co-operation.  They  at  least  open 
up  more  markets  for  the  countries  which  can 
make  use  of  them ;  but  they  offer  a  far  nobler 
prospect  in  the  civilisation  and  future  happiness 
of  races  whose  wrongs  lie  at  the  door  of  Europe 
and  America. 

British  To  speak  of  a  Foreign  Policy  in  reference  to 

the  numerous  and  important  Colonies  of  Great 
Britain  would  be  a  misuse  of  words.  Every  year 
is  adding  to  the  gathered  wisdom  acquired  by 


AFTER   1827.  357 

alternate  success  and  misfortune  with  respect  to 
their  treatment.  The  errors  of  the  last  century 
are  not  at  all  likely  to  recur ;  and  the  easy  rela- 
tions which  at  present  exist  between  them  and  the 
mother-country  still  retain  them  in  a  wholesome 
connection  which  the  first  whisper  of  European 
war  would  instantly  ripen  into  an  intimate  union 
for  offence  and  defence.  They  are  the  "  Greater 
Britain." 

Egypt  still  proves  the  truth  of  the  ancient  The  British 
view  which  refused  to  consider  it  a  country 
belonging  to  either  Europe,  Asia,  or  Africa. 
From  the  earliest  ages  it  has  occupied  a  separate 
position  of  its  own,  and  it  shares  with  Constanti- 
nople the  claim  to  hold  the  key  of  the  mysterious 
"  Eastern  Question."  It  is  only  necessary  to  say 
here  that  the  recent  interference  of  Great  Britain 
in  Egypt,  when  the  Khedive's  government  of  the 
country  had  been  overthrown  by  the  insurrection 
of  his  army  under  Arabi,  is  the  final  outcome  of 
a  Mediterranean  policy  which  has  been  in  prin- 
ciple continuous  for  a  century  and  a  half.  The 
lines  laid  down  on  this  and  all  other  points 
by  Pitt,  Canning,  Palmerston,  and  Beaconsfield 
—themselves  a  practical  continuation  of  the 
policy  of  former  ages — have  been,  and  are  still, 
those  upon  which  modern  British  Foreign  Policy 
has  been  built.  No  change  can  be  made  in 
it  without  the  greatest  danger  to  the  country. 


358  BRITISH    FOREIGN    POLICY. 

first    of  all   to    its    commerce,   next   to   the   sus- 
tenance   of   its    teeming    millions,    next    to    its 
possessions,  and  finally  to  the  safety  of  its  own 
shores. 
Conciu-          This  is  perfectly  understood  by  statesmen  of  all 

sion.  *  J 

parties,  and  is  perhaps  not  much  less  firmly 
founded  in  the  national  mind.  Education  has 
already  vastly  enlarged  the  sphere  of  popular 
knowledge  on  these  vital  points,  and  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  history  has  played  no  small  part 
in  the  process.  Its  study  is  no  longer  regarded  as 
a  mere  exploration  of  antiquaries  in  the  domain 
of  facts,  interesting  to  intelligent  persons,  but  of 
little  practical  value.  It  is  more  and  more  under- 
stood that  its  province  is  to  act  as  an  interpreter, 
as  a  light  to  illuminate  the  onward  path  of 
national  life,  and  to  point  out  by  the  examples 
of  the  past  what  future  course  is  most  free  from 
danger,  and  most  likely  to  lead  to  honourable 
peace  and  wholesome  prosperity. 


INDEX. 


Abercromby,  Sir  Ralph,  180  —  con- 
quers the  French  army  at  Alex- 
andria, 207. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  351. 

Abolition  Act,  250.  See  also  Slave- 
trade. 

Aboukir,  French  fleet  destroyed  at, 
199. 

Absolutists  in  Spain,  their  struggle 
with  the  Constitutionalists,  322. 

Abyssinian  war,  the,  356. 

Acre,  Sidney  Smith's  defence  of,  199 
— Napoleon's  designs  on  Constanti- 
nople frustrated  by  it,  ib. 

Act  of  Settlement,  47. 

Addington,  Henry,  afterwards  Lord 
Sidmouth,  212 — his  administration, 
218. 

Afghan  war,  the,  355. 

Africa,  239,  353— British  commerce 
with,  62 — attempts  to  colonise,  135 
— rivalry  of  the  Powers  in,  356 — 
negroes  imported  from,  248 — settle- 
ments in  South  Africa,  67 — war  in 
the  same,  356. 

Aix  la  Chapelle,  Peace  of,  105,  134. 

Albemarle,  Lord.     See  Monk,  George. 

Alberoni,  Cardinal,  Prime  Minister  of 
Spain,  64. 

Albert,  Archduke,  of  Austria,  his 
victory  at  Custozza,  339. 

Albert,  Prince  Consort  of  England, 
351,  354. 

Alexander  I.,  Czar  of  Russia,  208, 
255,  280,  300,  301,  318,  327,  335— 
Napoleon's  quarrel  with,  285. 

Alexandria,  227  —  French  army  de- 
feated at,  207. 


Algiers,  28. 

Allies,   the,   against    Napoleon,    305, 

— ,  concentrate  their  forces  at 
Frankfort,  291— dictate  terms  of 
peace,  294— cross  the  Rhine,  295— 
congresses  of,  296— France  in  the 
hands  of,  297 — moderation  of,  309. 

Alsace,  51. 

Amboyna,  26. 

America,  116,  118,  157,  182,  184,  239, 
241,  353. 

,  discovery  of,  10. 

,  American  British  colonies,  the, 

67,  70 — their  relations  to  the  coun- 
try, 68— attack  on  them,  133,  134 
— government  of,  140 — discontent 
with  the  Home  Government,  143 — 
European  allies  of,  145 — their  re- 
volt, 146,  173. 

,  the  French  in  America,  134- 

141. 

,  American  war  of  1812, 313— and 

its  causes,  314 — the  American  navy, 
315 — American  Government,  fore- 
sight of  the,  315—  war  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  States, 
353. 

America,  North,  66,  67, 131,  134. 

,  formation  of  forts  in  rear  of  the 

English  colonies,  76. 

,  settlers  of  North  American 

coasts,  78. 

America,  South,  247—  revolted  colonies 
in,  321. 

America,  Spanish,  264. 

Amherst,  General  Jeffrey,  Lord,  116, 


360 


INDEX. 


Amiens,  Peace  of,  201,  202,  204,  206, 
209, 216,  217,  234,  243,308— rupture 
of,  213. 

Angles,  the,  67. 

Anglo-Saxons,  the,  3. 

Anne,  Princess,  afterwards  Queen,  40, 
47,  61,  78,  79,  83, 107,  109, 122, 157, 

161,  268. 

Anson,  Lord,  113,  116,  127,  137. 
Antwerp,  warships  there  returned  to 

France,  309. 
Aquitaine,  4,  10. 
Arabi,  insurrection  of  the  Khedive's 

army  under,  357. 
Aragon,  7,  58,  269. 
Arcola,  battle  of,  206. 
Armada,  the,  15. 
Armed  neutrality,  the,  152-154,  157, 

162,  178,  187,  207,  208. 

Army,  the  English,  state  of,  116 — im- 
provement of,  180. 

Army  of  Liberation  (1813),  288. 

Ashantee  war,  the,  356. 

Asia,  Russia  and  Great  Britain  in,  355. 

Assiento,  the,  83,  84. 

Atlantic  Ocean,  the,  148. 

Atterbury,  Bishop  Francis,  102. 

Attila,  214. 

Augsburg,  the  League  of,  33. 

Austerlitz,  battle  of,  237,  242,  245,  253. 

Australia,  settlements  in,  67. 

Austria,  20,  24,  48,  119,  120,  158, 
187,  194,  197,  206,  236,  281,  287, 
288,  317,  321,  328,  337,  340,  342, 
343,  346. 

,  its  overthrow  at  Austerlitz,  245. 

— ,  the  Austrian  succession,  58. 
— ,  position  of  Austria  and  Prussia, 
281. 

Austria,  Emperor  of,  291,  301. 

Badajos,  capture  of,  283. 

Balance  of  Power,  policy  of,  6-17 — 
loses  its  dominant  religious  char- 
acter, 49 — its  usefulness,  52 — men- 
tioned, 109,  132,  138,  160,  173. 

Balearic  Isles,  the,  58. 

Baltic,  state  of  the  (1809),  259  — 
mentioned,  157,  207,  265. 

Bar,  France  secures  the  reversion  of, 
77. 

Barbary,  the  States  of,  58,  62,  71. 

,  Barbary  pirates,  immunity  en- 
joyed by,  in  16th  and  17th  cen- 
turies, 27 — intended  suppression  of 
their  piracy,  27. 


Barcelona,taken  by  Lord  Peterborough, 

59. 

Barnard,  Sir  John,  93,  97,  100. 
Bath,  Earl  of.    See  Pulteney,  William. 
Bautzen,  battle  of,  287. 
Bavaria,   20,  43,   49,   200— the   Elec- 
toral Prince  of,  43,  157. 
Bayonne,  evacuation  of,  294. 
Beachy  Head,  battle  of,  41. 
Beaconsfield,  Lord,  354,  355,  357. 
Beauharnais,  Eugene,  291,  297. 
Belfast,  Jacobin  Clubs  at,  184. 
Belgium,  51,  120,  302,  309,  333. 
,  the  Belgians,  304. 

— ,  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  troops, 

305. 

,  separation  of  Belgium  from  Hol- 
land, 329. 

Belooch  war,  the,  355. 
Benbow,  Admiral,  58,  79. 
Berlin  Conference,  the,  355. 
Berlin  Decree,  the  (Nov.  1806),  240, 

260. 
Bernadotte,   Marshal,   286,  287,  289, 

290,  295,  297. 
Berwick,  James,  Duke  of,  victory  of, 

61. 
Berwick,  the,  commanded  by  Hawke, 

117. 

Bettesworth,  Captain,  229. 
Bidassoa,  the  river,  293. 
Biscay,  the  Bay  of,  170. 
Blake,  Admiral,  26,  27,  30,  58,  69, 177, 

215. 

Blenheim,  battle  of,  56,  60. 
Bliicher,  Marshal.  287,  288,  289,  290, 

292,  295,  297,  304-306. 
Bolingbroke,  Earl  of,  61,  100. 
Bonaparte,  Joseph,  252. 
Bonaparte,  Napoleon.     See  Napoleon, 

Emperor. 

Bonn,  capture  of,  56. 
Bordeaux,    occupation     of,     by     the 

Allies,  294. 

Borodino,  battle  of  the,  284. 
Boscawen,  Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward, 

116,  127,  129. 
Bosphorus,    the,    troops    from    India 

sent  to  support  the  fleet  in,  354. 
Boulogne,  235,  236, — Napoleon  baffled 

on  the  coast  of,  260. 
Bourbon,  Philip  of.     See  Philip  V.  of 

Spain. 
Bourbons,  the,  76,  97,  113,  298,  303, 

318,  329,  343. 
Braddock,  General,  in  America,  116. 


INDEX. 


361 


Brandenburg,  Electorate  of.  52. 

Brazil,  334. 

Brest,  219,  220,  228,  230,  231  et  seq. 

Breton,  Cape,  island  of,  135. 

Bridport,  Admiral  Viscount,  177. 

Bristol  merchants,  78. 

Britain,  Great,  Allies  of,  51— with- 
draws from  Continental  affairs,  77 
—danger  besetting  it  and  its  col- 
onies, 111 — gloomy  prospects  for, 
121 — a  "nation  of  shopkeepers," 
130 — effects  of  the  war  upon,  150 
— its  relations  with  Turkey,  155 — 
strong  position  of,  before  the  war, 
163— summoned  to  administer  the 
International  Law  of  Europe,  164 
— union  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, 184  —  its  coalition  with 
Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  236 
— her  commercial  supremacy,  241 
— issues  Orders  in  Council  against 
neutrals,  262— protectorate  of,  326 
her  colonies  356 — mentioned,  328, 
329. 

,  the  British  Empire  founded  by 

the  aristocracy,  130. 

,  the  unity  of  the  British  Isles 

recovered,  37.  See  also  England. 

British,  the,  and  the  Barbary  pirates, 
27  —  the  French  attempts  to  ruin 
the  British,  29— outwitted  by  the 
French,  138. 

British  Allies,  the,  conquest  of,  by 
Napoleon,  194  —  subjugation  of, 
235. 

British  Channel.  See  English  Chan- 
nel. 

British  colonies,  the,  185. 

,  high  spirit  of  British  colonists, 

78. 

British  commerce,  57,  59,  238 — effect 
of  the  capture  of  Gibraltar  on,  62, 
63  —  Capt.  Mahan's  views  on,  239 
—British  credit,  175  —  complaints 
of  British  merchants,  91  —  British 
concentration  of  trade,  263. 

British  goods,  Continental  depots  for, 
241 — ordered  by  Napoleon  to  be 
burned,  265  —  British  goods  and 
subjects  excluded  from  the  Conti- 
nent, 243 — growth  of  British  manu- 
factories, 242. 

British  defence  on  shore,  21.".. 

British  Foreign  Policy,  the  principles 
of,  before  and  during  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth,  1-17— under  the  Stuarts 


and  Cromwell,  18-31  —  under 
William  III.,  32-52— in  the  earlier 
part  of  the  18th  century,  53-72— 
during  the  events  which  led  up  to 
the  war  with  Spain  (in  1739),  73- 
107— during  the  wars  which  found- 
ed the  Empire  (1739-1763),  108-141 
— from  1763-1789, 142-167— during 
the  French  Revolution  war  (1793- 
1800),  168-203— during  the  Napol- 
eonic war  (1798-1807),  204-244— 
(1807-1808),  245-271— (1808-1814), 
272-296— from  1814  to  1827,  297- 
324— after  1827,  325-358. 

British  Foreign  Policy,  attacks  on,  165 
— continuity  of,  311 — represented 
by  Lord  Palmerston,  346— not  a 
Quixotic  policy,  348— later  foreign 
policy,  352. 

British  Government,  the,  refuses  Na- 
poleon's offer  of  peace,  200. 

British  Mediterranean  fleet  drives  the 
Egyptians  out  of  Syria,  350. 

British  Orders  in  Council,  2«i_'. 

British  salt-fleet,  the,  90. 

British  ships,  capture  and  detention 
of,  by  the  Spaniards,  90,  92— Wal- 
pole's  conduct  concerning  the  same, 
93-101. 

British    strategy    against    Napoleon, 

Brittany,  4-7,  9. 

Broke,  Captain  Philip,  hia  victory  in 

the  Shannon,  316. 
Brooke,  Henry,  his  "  Gustavus  Vasa," 

100. 
Bruces,    the,    of    Scotland,    mischief 

caused  by,  in  Ireland,  38. 
Brunswick,  Dukes  of,  119. 
Buckingham,  George,  Duke  of,  23. 
Biilow,  General,  289,  295. 
Burgundy,  51. 
Burke,      Edmund,     his     statements 

against  Walpole  accounted  for,  104 

— his    'Thoughts    on    a    Regicide 

Peace,'  193. 
,  mentioned,  34,  72,  99,  100,  105, 

121,  144,  169,  172,  186,  213,  251, 

253,  301. 

Burmese  war,  the. 
Bute,  John,  Earl  ..f,  : 
Byng,  Admiral  J.-hn.  l'J7.  I'-"'.  138. 
Byron,  Lord,  238,  322,  32.:. 
tine,  Kinpii- 

Cabot,  Sebastian,  and  his  father,  66. 


362 


INDEX. 


Cadiz,  62,  225,  228,  231,  232,  235. 

Calais,  9. 

Calder,  Sir  Robert,  229  -  231  —  his 
action  against  Villeneuve,  230 — is 
tried  by  court-martial,  230. 

Calvin,  John,  15. 

Campbell,  Thomas,  the  poet,  208. 

Campeachy,  Bay  of,  90. 

Camperdown,  battle  of,  196. 

Canada,  67,  316— effects  of  the  Amer- 
ican war  upon,  151 — French  colony 
in,  135,  141. 

Cannes,  Napoleon  at,  303. 

Canning,  Rt.  Hon.  George,  213,  267, 
319,  320,  322,  324,  330,  352,  357. 

,  his  training  under  Pitt,  250 — 

his  policy  in  the  Peninsular  War, 
252-257  —  defence  of  the  policy, 
257-259  — seizes  the  Danish  fleet, 
256 — accepts  Napoleon's  challenge 
in  Spain,  267 — his  duel  with  Lord 
Castlereagh,  273  —  in  retirement. 
275  — his  return  to  office,  318  — 
deals  with  Spain  and  Portugal,  321, 
and  with  Greece,  322. 

Cape  Breton,  island  of,  its  fortifica- 
tions strengthened,  135. 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  247,  308. 

Caribbean  Seas,  Governor-Generals  of 
the,  79. 

Carlos,  Don,  333. 

Carteret,  John,  Lord  Granville,  88, 
100. 

Castile,  7,  58-60,  269. 

Castile  and  Aragon,  feud  between,  58. 

Castlereagh,  Lord  (1809),  273,  318— 
suicide  of,  323. 

Catalonia,  rebellion  of,  59. 

Cathcart,  Lord,  256. 

Catherine  of  Aragon,  12. 

Catherine  of  Braganza,  161. 

Catherine,  Empress  of  Russia,  152, 
155,  157,  207. 

,  plots  of,  and  Joseph  II.,  Em- 
peror, 157. 

Cavour,  Count  de,  338,  341. 

Ceylon,  210 — acquired  at  the  Peace 
of  Amiens,  308. 

Champagne,  295. 

Charles  I.,  of  England,  22,  23,  69— 
adopts  his  father's  mistaken  foreign 
policy,  23. 

Charles  II.,  of  England,  29,  30,  36, 
70,  82,  161. 

Charles  V.,  Emperor,  8,  11,  12,  296. 

Charles  VI.,  Emperor,  76. 


Charles  III.,  of  Spain,  5.8. 

Charles,  Archduke,  Electoral   Prince 

of  Bavaria,  43. 

Charles  the  Bold,  of  Burgundy,  51. 
Charles    Albert,    King    of    Sardinia, 

339. 

Charlotte,  Princess,  of  England,  330. 
Chatham,  Earl  of  (William  Pitt,  the 

elder),  54,  104,  113,  116-118,  120, 

122,   125-128,    130,   137,    143,   147, 

149,  152,  154-156. 
,  offers  to  exchange  Gibraltar  for 

Minorca,  65 — his  policy  touching  the 

navy,  125-130 — resumes  power,  138. 

See  also  Pitt,  William,  the  younger. 
Chatillon,  Congress  of,  295,  297. 
Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  296. 
Chesapeake,  the,  Broke 's  victory  over 

316. 

Chesterfield,  Lord,  123,  124. 
China,  355,  356. 

Christian  IV.,  King  of  Denmark,  23. 
Christina,  Queen  of  Spain,  333. 
Cinque  Ports,  fleet  of  the,  5. 

Volunteers,  215. 

Ciudad  Rodrigo,  capture  of,  283. 
Civil  War,  the  English,  or  Great  Re- 
bellion, 177. 
Clarendon,    Edward   Hyde,    Earl   of, 

29. 

Clarkson,  Thomas,  247. 
Claverhouse,  Lord,  40. 
Clive,  Lord,  116,  137. 
Codrington,  Christopher,  78,  249. 
Codrington,     Admiral     Sir    Edward, 

324. 
Collingwood,  Admiral  Lord,  177,  230- 

232. 

Constantinople,  197,  198,  352,  357. 
Constitutional  freedom  promoted  by 

Lord  Palmerston,  344. 
Constitutionalism,    328 — triumph   of, 

334. 
Constitutionalists     in     Spain,     their 

struggle  with  the  Absolutists,  322. 
Continent,  the,  state  of,  at  William 

III.'s  death,  47,  48. 
Continental  Powers,  English  alliances 

with,  necessity  of,  4. 
"  Continental  System,"  the,  and  Brit- 
ish commerce,  260-263. 
Coote,  Sir  Eyre,  116. 
Copenhagen,  the  battle  of,  207,  208. 
Cornwallis,  Charles,  Marquis  of,  118, 

147,  152,  184,  198,  219,  220,   223, 

228-230. 


INDEX. 


363 


Cortes,  Ferdinand,  67. 

Cracow,  seizure  of,  by  Austria,  346. 

1  Craftsman,'  the,  87. 

Crimean  war,  the,  158,  327,  341,  351, 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  24-27,  30,  69,  70, 
124,  161 — in  his  foreign  policy  sup- 
ports France  instead  of  Spain,  24 — 
the  "  Cromwellian  Settlement,"  38. 

Crown,  address  to  the  (1738),  98. 

Culloden,  battle  of,  122. 

Cumberland,  William  Augustus,  Duke 
of,  116. 

Curieux,  the  brig,  229. 

Custozza,  victory  under  Archduke 
Albert  at,  339. 

Cyprus,  obtained  for  a  British  station 
by  Lord  Beaconsfield,  355. 

Danube,  the,  55,  59. 
Darien  Expedition,  William  III.'s  dis- 
couragement of  the,  54. 
"Declaration  to. the  Nations,"  by  the 

French  Republic,  172. 
Demerara  bought  by  Great  Britain, 

808. 
Denmark,  3,  20,  55,  153,   158,   207, 

208,  209  note,  259,  286,  290— her 

navy,  225. 
,  seizure  of  the  Danish  fleet  by 

Canning  (1807),  256-258. 
D'Erlon,  General,  304. 
Dettingen,  battle  of,  117. 
Directory,  French  Government  of  the, 

198,  240. 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  15,  69,  215. 
Dresden,  the  Allies  defeated  at,  287- 

289. 

Dublin,  Jacobin  clubs  at,  184. 
Dunbar,     in     Scotland,      Cromwell's 

victory  of,  40. 
Duncan,  Adam,  Lord,  177. 
Duudas,  Henry,  Viscount,  229. 
Dunkirk,  24. 

Dupleix,  General,  135,  136,  1  J."i. 
Dupont,  General,  capture  of  his  army, 

266. 

Durell,  Captain  Thomas,  R.X.,  90. 
Dutch,  the.     See  Holland. 

East  India  Company,  the,  111,  145. 

Eastern  Question,  the,  327,  328,  349, 
351,  352,  355,  357— present  state  of, 
352— Lord  Beaconsfield  and,  354. 

Ecclesiastical  States,  the,  194. 

Edward  III.,  King,  6. 


Edward  VI.,  King,  12,  66. 

Egypt,  197  -  199,  207,  218,  220, 
227,  247,  350,  357— Napoleon's  de- 
scent on,  197,  235— the  British  in, 
357. 

Elba,  island  of,  211,  298,  302,  304. 

Elbe,  the  river,  241,  262,  286. 

Elizabeth,  Queen,  2,  8,  9,  11,  12,  18, 
20,  35,  37,  66,  67,  69,  109, 155,  312, 
332. 

,  adopts  the  policy  of  Balance  of 

Power,  11 — a  necessary  policy  for, 
13,  14 — her  motives  and  means  of 
action,  15 — effects  of  her  policy,  16 
— the  Stuarts  reverse  her  policy,  18 
— the  causes  of  this,  19. 

Elliott,  General,  Lord  Heathfield,  149. 

Emmet's  rebellion  in  Ireland,  211. 

England,  the  early  kings  Continental 
potentates,  4 — the  Flemish  alliance 
with,  6  —  the  first  consoli- 
dated State,  7— claims  the  sove- 
reignty of  the  Narrow  Seas,  25 — 
the  English  retain  the  "  honour  of 
the  flag"  in  the  Dutch  wars,  26  — 
abolishes  slavery,  249 — seizure  of 
the  Danish  fleet  by,  256-258.  Se« 
also  Britain,  Great. 

English  Channel,  the,  27,  157,  170, 
182,  193. 

Erfurt,  Congress  of  (1808),  270. 

Essequibo,  bought  by  Great  Britain, 
308. 

Eugene,  Prince  of  Savoy,  55,  61. 

Europe,  15 — the  "Concert  of  Europe," 
8 — condition  of,  under  Walpole,  80 
— scourged  by  Napoleon,  214 — her 
coasts  sealed  against  British  com- 
merce, 260 — general  rising  of,  285 
—Council  of,  296. 

,  condition  of  European  States, 

189  —  revival  of  European  spirit, 
276. 

Evans,  General  Sir  De  Lacy,  333. 

Eylau,  battle  of,  245. 

Falkland  Islands,  163. 
Faversham,  36. 
Ferdinand  I.,  Emperor,  13. 
FiM-din:uid.  Prince  of  Brunswick, 
F.MT-.I,  m,  229,  230. 
Finland,  156. 

Fitzgerald,  L  rd  IS 4. 

Fl.-m.l.Ts  .'.,  6,9,  10,  i2» 
Fleury,  Cardinal,  Fru  Mm, 

76. 


364 


INDEX. 


Flodden  Field,  battle  of,  40. 

Florence,  Court  of  Tuscany  at,  341. 

Floridas,  the,  given  up  to  France, 
211. 

Fouche,  Joseph,  300. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  156,  166,  167, 
186,  212,  248. 

,  failure  of  his  India  Bill,  152— 

Ministry  of  (1807),  246— death  of, 
250. 

France,  6-9,  11,  12,  14,  16,  20,  22-24, 
26,  28,  32,  38,  39,  46,  48,  49,  76, 
132,  161,  183,  189,  190,  192,  205, 
241,  242,  329,  332,  341,  342. 

France,  unification  of,  10 — Balance  of 
Power  held  by,  21, 22— the  Restored 
Stuarts  pensioned  by,  28  —  the 
French  attempts  to  ruin  the  Dutch 
and  British,  29-31  —  secret  treaty 
with,  73  —  France  under  Cardinal 
Fleury,  76 — secret  treaty  between 
France  and  Spain,  75,  76 — provoca- 
tion to  war  on  the  part  of  France, 
106 — assists  the  revolt  of  the  Ameri- 
can colonies,  130 — descents  upon, 
174 — military  eminence  of,  179 — 
effect  of  French  policy  on  the  Con- 
tinent, 263  —  exhausted  by  the 
drain  of  men  and  money,  278 — the 
South  French  campaign,  293  — 
Government  of  Louis  XVIII. 
formed,  299 — charter  of  Consti- 
tution, 300 — saved  by  Talleyrand, 
300 — Britain  and  Austria  prevent 
the  dismemberment  of  France,  301. 

,  Revolution- war,  181-203. 

,  the  House  of  Representatives 

and  the  Senate,  300. 

France,  Kings  of,  4— Regent  of,  120. 
See  also  French. 

France,  Isle  of,  308. 

Francis  I.,  King  of  France,  11,  49,  52. 

Frankfort,  the  Allies  concentrate  their 
forces  at,  291. 

Franks,  the,  4. 

Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia,  125, 
127,  154,  157 — his  extraordinary 
victories,  128. 

Frederick,  Prince  of  Wales,  his  death, 
126. 

French,  the,  gloomy  prospects  of,  278. 

,  action  of  the  French  and  British, 

351. 

French  and  British  strategy  compared, 
226. 

French  corsairs,  the,  238. 


French  navy,  the,  demoralisation  of, 

177. 
French  Revolution,  the,  164,  165,  179, 

183,  336—  Pitt's  views  on,  168. 

-  ,  the  second  French  Revolution, 
329,  330,  337. 

-  ,   the  third   French   Revolution, 
339. 

Frere,   Right    Hon.   John   Hookham, 

267. 
Friedland,  battle  of,  245. 

Gaeta,  Garibaldi  marches  upon,  343. 

Galicia,  West,  282. 

Galisoniere,  136. 

Gallican  liberties,  the,  48. 

Gal  way,  Lord,  61. 

Gambier,  Admiral  Lord,  256. 

Ganteaume,  Admiral,   223,   225,  226, 

228. 
Garibaldi,  General,  338—  in  Sicily  and 

Naples,  343. 
Gascony,  7,  67,  294. 
George  I.,  47  —  offers  to  restore  Gib- 

raltar, 63,  64. 
George  II.,  117,  125,  126. 
George  III.,  54,  142,  160—  his  views 

on  the  revolt  of  the  British  colonists 

in   America,   146  —  letter  to  Lord 

North,  147,  148. 
George  IV.,  319,  320. 
German  States  near  the  Rhine,  50. 
Germany,  7,  9,  10,  14,  20-22,  44,  56, 

126,   187,    268,    282—  National  As- 

semblies of,  189—  Protestant  powers 

of,  42,  49  —rising  of  the  West  Ger- 

mans, 290. 
Ghent,  Peace  of,  316. 
Gibraltar,  76,  84,  114,  131,  149,  151, 

i29. 

-  ,   capture    of,    60  —  its    import- 
ance,  60  —  its  loss  seriously  felt  by 
France  and  Spain,  61,  62  —  George 
III.  offers  to  restore  it,  64  —  Span- 
ish siege  of,  65  —  expense  of,  65. 

,  Straits  of,  227,  232. 


Glover,  Richard,    100—  his   ballad   of 

"Hosier's  Ghost,"  75. 
Gondomar,   Spanish  ambassador,    20, 

22—  reports  that  the  English  are  a 

nation  of  shopkeepers,  20. 
Gordon,  Sir  Arthur,  afterwards  Lord 

Stanmore,  352. 

Granville,  Lord.     See  Carteret. 
Grattan's  Parliament,  39. 
Gravma,  Admiral,  232. 


INDEX. 


365 


Great  Britain.     See  Britain. 

"  Greater  Britain,"  357. 

Greece,  67,  271,  333. 
,  the  ancient  States  of,  7. 

,  is  oppressed  by  Turkey,  319. 

— ,  Greek  insurrection  against  Tur- 
key, 322,  323,  327— its  independ- 
ence, 328. 

Grenville,  George,  143. 

,  William,  Lord,  246,  248. 

Grey,  Earl,  the  Reform  Ministry  of, 
331. 

Gross-Beeren,  battle  of,  289. 

Grotius,  Hugo,  79. 

Grouchy,  Marshal,  304,  306. 

Guipuscoa,  province  of,  43. 

Guise  family,  the,  29. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  King  of  Sweden, 
23. 

Gustavus  IV.,  King  of  Sweden,  259. 

Halifax,  colony  of,  136. 

Hamburg,  218,  242. 

Hanover,  55,  119,  125,  132,  141,  218, 

312— its  relation  to  Holland,  119, 

120. 

Hause  Towns.  218. 
Harden  berg,  Charles  Augustus,  Prince 

of,  282. 
Hawke,  Edward,  Lord,  113,  116,  117, 

127,  128,  177,  215,  220,  222,  237. 
Hawkins,  Sir  John,  15,  69. 
Heligoland,  265,  308. 
Henri   IV.,  King  of  France,  16,  20, 

21,    49 — his   position    towards   the 

Balance  of  Power,  20,  21. 
Henry  II.  of  England,  37. 
Henry  VII.,  8-11,  14,66— his  daughter 

Margaret,  39 — adopts  the  policy  of 

Balance  of  Power,  9-11. 
Henry  VI II.,  2,  8,  12,  14,  66— policy 

of  Balance  of  Power  adopted   by, 

11. 
Herbert,  Admiral,   Lord   Torrington, 

41. 

Hesse,  55. 

Highlands,  Scottish,  122. 
Hohenlinden,  battle  of,  200,  206,  208. 
Holland,  20,  21,  24,  32,  42,  44,  47,  51, 

55,  77,  120,  130,  145,  152,  153,  157, 

161,  170,  173,  183,  187,  195,  211, 

224,  241,  290,  302,  309,  334. 

,  the  Dutch,  30,  31,  70,  134,  304. 

,  the  Dutch  wars  an  episode,  25 

— the  French  attempts  to  ruin  the 

Dutch,  29,  30 — Holland  ceases  to 


be    a    great    Power,    31  —  I'.i 

alliance  with,  118— its  relation  to 

Hanover,  119 — failures  in  Holland, 

178— Dutch  fleet,  196. 
Holland,  the  Dutch  garrisons,  46. 
,  the  Dutch  war,  29,  30.    See  also 

United  Provinces. 
Holland,  King  of,  309. 
"Holy  Alliance,"  the,  317,  318,  323, 

326,  328,  331,  334. 
Home  policy,  basis  of  foreign,  53. 
Hood,  Admiral  Lord,  177. 
Hosier,  Admiral,  74,  75 — catastrophe 

of  his  fleet,  75. 

Howe,  Earl,  113,  127,  176,  215,  239. 
Huguenots,  the,  23,  49. 
Hungary,  55. 
Huy,  56. 

Illyria,  defended  by  Beauharnais,  291. 

"  Imperial  Federation,"  185. 

India,  134,  151,  184,  197,  198,  239, 
247,  272,  308,  350,  354,  355. 

,  the  three  presidencies  of,  111 — 

French  attack  on  the  colonists  in, 
135 — effects  of  the  war  upon,  1  .">  1 
organisation  of,  185 — safety  of,  246. 

Indian  Ocean,  the,  134. 

International  Law,  8,  132,  159,  160, 
164. 

Intervention,  policy  of,  332. 

Ionian  Islands,  218. 

Ireland,  2,  7,  13,  17,  37-39,  45,  54, 
123,  124,  201,  211,  220. 

,  historical  relations  with  Eng- 
land, 37 — its  state  under  Lord  Ches- 
terfield, 123— condition  of,  182— 
torn  by  factions,  183 — Rebellion  of, 
184— Orange  lodges,  184. 

Italy,  8,  9,  20,  28,  43,  50,  55,  5^. 
ihl,  197,200,  207,  286,  291,  297, 
302,  310,  311,  334,  337,  338,  343. 

,  British  commerce  with,  62. 

,  oppressed  by  Austria,  319. 

,  the  state  of,  334— Austrian  in- 
fluence in,  335— Liberation  of,  339- 
347. 

Jacobites,  the,  46. 
Jacobitism,  176,  182. 
Jamaica,  75,  90. 

,  capture  of,  69. 

James  I.,  King  of  England,  21-23,  25, 

38,  39,  67,  69. 
,  (as  Jamea  VI.,  King  of  Sooto), 

18,  19. 


366 


INDEX. 


James  II.,  29,  33,  34,  36-38,  45,  54, 
124— as  Duke  of  York,  30— his  son 
James  Edward,  45 — his  daughter 
Mary,  32. 

James  IV. ,  King  of  Scotland,  his  mar- 
riage, 39. 

Japan,  355,  356. 

Jenkins,  Captain,  72,  73,  81. 

Jesuits,  the,  35,  48. 

,  expelled  from  Portugal,  162. 

— ,  Jesuit  missionaries,  the,  137. 

Jonquiere,  M.,  136. 

Joseph  II.,  Emperor,  157,  293. 

Josephine,  Empress,  281. 

Junot,  Marshal,  army  of,  261. 

Jutes,  the,  67. 

Kainardji,  Peace  of,  156,  326. 

Katzbach,  battle  of,  289. 

Keen,  Benjamin,  British  ambassador 

in  Spain,  89. 

Keppel,  Viscount,  Admiral,  113,  127. 
Khedive,  the,   and  Arabi's  rebellion, 

357. 

Kremlin,  the,  at  Moscow,  284. 
Kutusoff,  General,  retreat  of  his  army, 

284. 

La  Harpe,  John  Francis  de,  301. 
Lally,  Count  de,  136. 
Landen,  battle  of,  42. 
Lay  bach,  Congress  of,  321. 
Leake,  Admiral  Sir  John,  60. 
Legitimists  in  Spain,  the,  333. 
Leipsic,  the  battle  of,  289,  290,  294. 

,  the  fair  of,  280. 

Leopold  of  Saxe  Coburg,  Prince,  330. 
Leslie,    Alexander,    Earl    of    Leven. 

Cromwell's  victory  over  him  (1653), 

40. 

Lestock,  Admiral,  113. 
Levant,    the,    109,    211,    326,    350  — 

British  commerce  with,  62,  131. 
Liege,  capture  of,  56. 
Ligny,  Prussians  beaten  at,  305,  306. 
Liuibourg,  capture  of,  56. 
Lisbon,  59,  161,   307— earthquake  at, 

162. 

Liverpool,  Earl  of,  273. 
Livonia,  21,  52. 
Lodi,  victory  of,  206. 
Lombardy,  43,  342,  346. 
London,  the  people's  ovation  to  the 

French  minister  in,  243. 
London  merchants,  78. 
Londonderry,  Marquess  of,  330. 


Lorraine,  50,  51,  121 — France  secures 
the  reversion  of,  77. 

Louis  VIII.,  5. 

Louis  XIV.,  King,  24,  28-30,  32-34, 
41,  42,  44-46,  48,  49,  55-57,  70,  77, 
109,  134,  191,  211,  245,  251,  296. 

• ,  grasps  at  the  Spanish  and  British 

Empires,  45,  46 — and  thereby  ruins 
France,  46 — makes  Toulon  a  forti- 
fied naval  arsenal,  62. 

Louis  XV.,  134. 

Louis  XVII I. ,  forced  to  accept  a 
charter,  299. 

Louis  Napoleon,  Emperor  of  the 
French,  340,  342,  351. 

Louis  Philippe.  King  of  France,  330, 
350. 

Louisbourg,  135. 

Louisiana,  135 — given  up  to  France, 
211. 

Low  Countries,  5,  6,  10,  16,  116,  118, 
170,  194,  197,  202,  254,  272.  309, 
310,  329,  332.  See  Netherlands 
and  Holland. 

Lowe,  Sir  Hudson,  307. 

Lune"ville.  Treaty  of,  206. 

Liitzen,  battle  of,  287. 

Luxemburg,  51. 

Lyons,  Gulf  of,  170. 

Macaulay,  Lord,  180,  212. 

Macdonald,  Marshal,  288,  289. 

Maddalena  Islands,  221. 

Madrid,  92,  283,  292,  293. 

Magenta,  battle  of,  342. 

Mahan,  Captain  (on  Sea-Power),   41, 

115,   209  note,  217,  219,  221,  223, 

236,  239,  241,  259  note,  314. 
Mahratta  princes,  the,  197. 
Malacca,  308. 
Malmesbury,  Earl  of.  257. 
Malta,    114,  151,  201,  207,  209  note 

210,  211  ,265,  308. 
Malta,  Knights  of,  28. 
Manufactories,     growth     of     British, 

242. 

Marengo,  victory  at,  200,  206. 
Margaret,    daughter  of   Henry  VII., 

wife  to  James  IV.  of  Scotland,  39. 
Maria,  Queen  of  Portugal,  333,  349. 
Maria  Theresa,  Empress,  139. 
Marlborough,  Duke  of,  45-47,  54,  55, 

59,  64,  104,  116. 
,  at  the  head   of  the  Allies,   53, 

119 — success  of  his  campaigns,   56 

— his  victories,  61. 


INDEX. 


367 


Marmont,  Marshal,  284. 

Martinique,  island  of,  £>"•— Villeneuve 

at,  2-7. 
Mary    Stuart,    wife    of    Francis    II., 

King  of  France,  afterwards  Queen 

of  Scots,  13,  28,  29. 
Mary  I..  (Jueen  of  England,  12. 
Mary  II.,  daughter  of  James  II.,  32. 
Massi'ua,  Marshal,  276. 
Mathews,    Admiral,    105,    113  —  his 

battle  off  Toulon,  117. 
Maximilian,  Emperor,  7,  11. 
Max/ini,  337,  345. 
Mediterranean,  the,  10,   28,  43,  109, 

113,  114,   121,   131,  134,  138,  141, 
158,  160,  174,  197,  201,  207,  220, 
227,   229,  231,  232,  239,  264,  308, 
325,  344. 

,  English  commerce  in,  57,  59 — 

defence  of,  59 — its  control,  65 — 
attempt  to  close  it,  138 — effects 
of  the  war  upon,  151  —  British 
supremacy  in,  ib. 

Mehemet  Ali,  of  Egypt,  328,  350. 

Messina,  Straits  of,  343. 

Methuen  Treaty  (Portugal),  161,  162. 

M.'tt  enrich,  Prince,  239,  289,  335, 
336. 

Mexico,  248— the  Gulf  of,  66,  68,  75, 
79. 

Middleton,  Sir  Charles,  Lord  Barham, 
First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  229. 

Miguel,  Don,  333. 

Milan  Decree,  the,  240,  260. 

Militia,  the,  organisation  of,  124. 

Mini.stry,  the  Fox  and  Grenville,  246, 
247. 

Minorca,   island  of,  60,   65,   76,   84, 

114,  131— loss  of,  151. 
Minto,  Gilbert,  Earl  of,  341,  345. 
Mirabeau,  299. 

Mississippi,  the,  135. 

Monk,  George,   Duke   of  Albemarle, 

26,  30,  40,  137,  177. 
Monmouth,  Duke  of,  rebellion  of,  34. 
Montagu,  Earl  of  Sandwich,  Admiral. 

26,  30. 

Montmartre,  storming  of,  298. 
Moore,  General  Sir  John,  180,  274— 

in  Sweden,  259. 
Moors,  the,  in  Spain   and   Portugal, 

10,  161. 
Morea,  218. 
Moreau,  General,  200,  206— the  victor 

of  Hohenlinden,  288. 
Mornington,  Earl  of,  198. 


Moscow  281,  284,  301. 
Munster,  Treaty  of,  70. 
Murat,  Prince,  291. 
Muscovy,  21. 

Namur,  victory  of,  !-j. 

Napier,  Admiral  Sir  Charles,  333. 

Napier's  'Peninsular  War,'  267. 

Naples,  76,  153,  187,  210,  343. 

Napoleon  I.,  Emperor  of  the  French, 
166,  171,  180,  181,  194,  196,  198, 
228,  232,  235,  240,  274,  307,  313, 
336,  342,  349. 

Napoleon,  his  descent  on  Egypt,  197 
— his  coup  d'dtat,  199 -turns  on 
Austria  and  Russia,  200 — becomes 
First  Consul,  205  —  reforms  and 
victories  of,  206 — his  acts  during 
Peace  of  Amiens,  210— prepares  to 
invade  England,  211— his  strategy, 
217— plans  to  invade  England,  218, 
222-225— motives  of  his  policy,  235 

—  forces   Britain   to  continue   the 
war,  243  — the  struggle  with  Na- 
poleon, not  with  the  French  people. 
244 — Fox  negotiates  with  hiin. 

— attempts  to  conquer  Spain,  251 
— concludes  with  Russia  the  Peace 
of  Tilsit,  256 -hopes  by  the  new 
Continental  system  to  ruin  Briti-h 
commerce,  260,  261,  314— unable 
to  prevent  organised  smuggling, 
262— orders  all  British  goods  to  be 
burned,  265 — he  seixe.*  Spain,  266 — 
his  ovrrtures  to  Canning.  270— re- 
.-"lv<>s  to  fight  Russia  before  di  i 
the  British  out  of  Spain,  277— finds 
ditlk'tilty  in  obtaining  soldiers,  278 

—  his    exactions     in     Spain,     ib. 
—incorporates  Holland.  279— mixed 
nationalities  of  hU  army,  282 — his 
fatal  march  to  Moscow,   284— the 
cause  of  his  quarrel  with  the  Czar, 
285  —  general     rising     in 
against  him,  ib. — defeats  Allies  at 
Dresden,     288  —  is     defeated     at 
Leipxic,  289— Allies  press  their  ad- 
vantage on,  291— he  abdicate*. 
295— escapes  from  Elba,   302— ad- 
vances from  (  -defeated 
at  Waterloo,  305,  306— final  abdi- 

ion   of,    307  —  banished   to    St 

H.-l.-na.  :i08. 
Narborough,    Admiral   Sir   John,  27, 

58. 
Narrow  Seas,  the,  79,  80. 


368 


INDEX. 


National  Debt,  the,  144,  165,  175. 

Navarino,  battle  of,  324,  326,  350. 

Navy,  the  Royal,  necessity  of  a 
standing  navy,  4 — the  "  Royal  Navy 
of  the  Cinque  Ports,"  5 — better 
than  that  of  other  nations,  ib. — 
deplorable  state  of,  112  —  reform 
of  the  Navy  the  keystone  of  the 
national  success,  113 — Pitt's  policy 
concerning  the  Navy,  127 — suprem- 
acy of,  130,  141,  173— at  its  height 
of  efficiency,  176 — mutinies  in,  195 
— efficiency  of  naval  defence,  215 — 
disposition  of  the  British  fleets 
against  Napoleon,  219. 

Negroes,  African,  84.  See  also 
Slavery. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  Lord,  111,  116,  177, 
196,  198,  207,  208,  215,  216,  218- 
222,  225-230,  237,  238,  243,  273. 

,  and  the  Nile,  199,  201,  350— his 

fleet  off  Toulon,  220— his  blockade 
of  Toulon,  221 — pursues  Villeneuve, 
228— his  foresight,  229 — his  strat- 
egy, 232. 

,  see  Trafalgar. 

Netherlands,  the,  32,  43,  55,  114,  120, 
157,  170,  192,  193,  309. 

New  England  States,  the,  316. 

New  Orleans,  defence  of,  317. 

Ney,  Marshal,  289,  304. 

Nicholas  I.,  Czar,  327. 

Niemen,  the  river,  256. 

Nimeguen,  Peace  of,  211. 

Nive,  the  battle  of,  294. 

Nivelle,  the  battle  of,  294. 

Nootka  Sound,  163. 

Nore,  Mutiny  of  the,  195. 

Norman  Conquest,  the,  25,  191. 

Normandy  and  the  Normans,  2-7. 

North,  Lord,  144,  147,  148. 

Norway,  258,  290. 

Novara,  battle  of,  339. 

Nova  Scotia,  the  French  in,  136,  137. 

Oczakoff,  capture  of,  156. 
Oldenburg,  seizure  of,  280. 
Onslow,  Speaker,  98. 
"Orange  Lodges  "  formed  by  the  Irish 

Protestants,  184. 
Orleanists,  the,  332. 
Orthez,  battle  of,  294. 
Otranto,  peninsula  of,  218. 
Ottoman  Empire,  the,  49,  52,  326,  355. 

See  also  Turkey. 
-Oudinot,  Marshal,  289. 


Palatine,  the  Elector  and  the  Electress, 
22. 

Palmerston,  Lord,  332,  334,  340,  347, 
349,  350,  354,  357— pursues  Can- 
ning's policy,  331 — becomes  Foreign 
Secretary,  337  —  Palmerston  and 
Cavour,  341  —  promotes  constitu- 
tional freedom,  344. 

Pampelona,  surrender  of,  293. 

Panama,  the  Fair  of,  86. 

Papacy,  the,  18,  19,  22,  182. 

Papal  States,  the,  7,  194. 

Pardo,  Convention  of,  99,  104. 

Paris,  56,  297,  303,  307. 

Paris,  Treaties  of,  131,  142,  153,  309, 
310,  354. 

Parker,  Admiral  Sir  Hyde,  207. 

Parkes,  Sir  Harry,  356. 

Parliament,  petitions  to,  on  the  seizure 
of  British  ships,  92  —  the  Long 
Parliament,  161  —  the  "Pension 
Parliament,"  29. 

Parliamentary  debates,  quoted,  91,  95, 
97,  98. 

Partition  Treaties,  the,  58 — made  for 
the  sake  of  the  Mediterranean  policy, 
42,  43. 

"  Patriots,"  the,  91. 

Paul,  Czar  of  Russia,  201,  207,  208. 

Peace,  policy  of,  under  James  L,  18, 
19,  69. 

Pelham,  Thomas,  Duke  of  Newcastle, 
Administration  of,  137-139. 

Pellico,  Silvio,  337. 

Penal  laws  against  Papists,  182. 

Peninsular  war,  the,  266-304— later 
troubles  in  Spain  and  Portugal,  328- 
334. 

Perceval,  Spencer,  assassinated  (1812), 
273. 

Persia,  58. 

Peter  the  Great,  Emperor  of  Russia, 
51,  154. 

Peterborough,  Lord,  59,  61. 

Pett,  family  of,  shipbuilders,  26. 

Philip  II.,  King  of  Spain,  13,  20,  55, 
58,  66,  245,  296. 

Philip  V.  of  Spain,  44,  45,  57,  83,  84. 

Picardy,  5. 

Pilnitz,  Treaty  of,  168. 

Pitt,  William,  the  elder.  See  Chat- 
ham, Earl  of. 

Pitt,  William,  the  younger,  162-165, 
170,  172,  182,  186,  194,  201,  210 
212-216,  229,  237,  238,  253,  275, 
357. 


Pitt,  William,  the  younger,  his  success- 
ful policy,  158 — general  view  of  hi- 
foreign  polity,  159,  160 — unfair  lit- 
erary treatment  of  his  war  measures, 
180— his  India  Bill,  152,  184— his 
allies,  187  —  his  efforts  to  make 
peace,  192 — resumes  office,  216 — 
his  peace  administration,  242 — his 
death  (1806),  243  —  Ministry  of, 
246 — failure  of  his  successors,  247 
— Canning's  training  under  him, 
250  — foresaw  the  Peninsular  war, 
254  note  —  his  spirit  as  seen  in 
Canning,  270. 

Pius  IX.  (Pio  Nono),  Pope,  338. 

Pizarro,  Francis,  67. 

Plantageuets,  the,  6,  25. 

Plumer,  Mr,  97. 

Pocock,  Admiral  Sir  George,  113,  117, 
127. 

Poerio,  Carlo,  337. 

Poland,  21,  156,  169,  282,  310,  346— 
partition  of,  155 — its  oppression  by 
Prussia,  319  —  British  sympathy 
with,  349. 

,  the  Poles,  52. 

Pombal,  Marquis  de,  162. 

Pomerania,  exchange  of,  for  Norway, 
290. 

Popes,  the,  7,  20,  35,  54,  341. 

Porte,  the,  155,  156,  325,  326,  352. 

Portland,  William,  third  Duke  of,  186, 
260. 

Port  Maliou  harbour,  60,  62,  138. 

Porto  Bello,  harbour  of,  100— block- 
ade and  capture  of,  74,  87. 

Portugal,  25,  58,  66,  129,  134,  153, 
161,  187,  255,  269,  349— its  friendly 
relations  with  Great  Britain,  160, 
161  —is  seized  by  the  French,  260. 

Portuguese  colonies  in  America,  67. 

Pragmatic  Sanction,  the,  139. 

,  the  French  charter  providing 
for  liberty  of  the,  299. 

Pretender,  the  (James  Edward  Stuart), 
45. 

Pretender,  the  Young,  107?  125, 

Protestantism,  British  defence  of, 
132. 

"Protestant  Ascendancy  "  in  Ireland, 
54. 

Protestants  of  Europe,  14. 

of  Germany  ami  France,  20. 

Provence,  7. 

Prussia,  21,  51,  55,  105,  127,  128, 
141,  152,  154,  187,  194,  197,  207, 

2 


•:,  281,  282,  286,  289,  290,  317, 
318,  321,  328,  343— Prussian  troops 
beaten  at  Austerlitz,  245. 

Pulteney,  William,  Karl  of  Bath,  93, 
97,  100. 

Pyrenees,  the,  251,  293,  294. 

Quadruple  Alliance  of  1718,  the,  64. 

,  1834,  the,  333. 

Quiberon,  battle  of,  128,  220. 

Radetzky,  Marshal,  339,  346. 

Rebellion,  the  Great,  18,  23,  40,  105, 
122,  123,  125,  184. 

Reform  Bill,  the,  a  political  and  liter- 
ary period,  166,  329. 

Reformation,  the,  8,  12,  19,  48,  50. 

Renaissance,  the,  11. 

Restoration,  the,  25,  28,  68. 

Revolution,  the  English,  68,  110,  112, 
167,  169,  181,  328. 

Revolution,  French.  See  under  France. 

Rhenish  Confederation,  51,  246,  289. 

Rhine,  the,  50,  59,  194,  290,  291, 
297,  302— the  Allies  cross  it,  295. 

Richard  II.,  his  reign,  5. 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  22,  24,  49. 

Right  of  Search,  the  British,  153, 178, 
316— the  Spanish  exercise  of,  70, 
71,  80,  99. 

Roberts,  Lord,  his  estimate  of  Na- 
poleon and  Wellington,  307. 

Rochefort,  127,  228. 

Rochelle,  23. 

Rodney,  Admiral  Lord,  127,  148, 
149,  176,  215. 

Roman  Catholic  Emancipation,  210. 

Roman  Catholic  Powers  in  the  18th 
century,  the,  48. 

Romanism,  18. 

Rome,  49,  210,  340,  341,  343. 

Rome,  Empire  of,  3,  7,  50,  67. 

Rooke,  Admiral  Sir  George,  60. 

Rosilly,  Admiral,  232. 

Rousseau,  157. 

Kup'-rt,  Prince,  30. 

KuiTinonde,  capture  of ,  56. 

Russell,  Admiral.  Lord  Orford,   H. 

.  170,  187,  201,  206,  236, 
265,  26H. 
821,  :;•-':!,  326-328,:: 

becomes  a  great  po\\ 

Balti.,     1."  J  —  protectorate    over 
Christian      provinces     of     Turkey 
abolished.    1 59  —  Convention    be- 
ll usaia  and    Great    Britain 


370 


INDEX. 


(1801),  209  note  — is  defeated  at 
Eylau  and  Friedland,  245 — revolts 
from  the  French  alliance,  278 — 
Napoleon's  invasion  of,  282 — Rus- 
sian strategy,  284 — forward  march 
of  the  Russians,  286 — the  Crimean 
war  against,  341,  351. 

Russia,  the  Czars,  245,  279,  280. 
See  also  Alexander  I. ,  Nicholas  I. , 
Paul,  Peter  the  Great. 

Ryswick,  Peace  of,  42. 

St  Helena,  Napoleon  at,  307. 

St  Lawrence,  the  river,  134,  135. 

St  Lucia,  island  of,  308. 

St  Vincent,  battle  of,  196. 

St  Vincent,  Admiral  Earl,  177,  218, 

221. 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  284,  292. 
Sal  Tortugas,  island  of,  90. 
San  Sebastian,  storming  of,  293. 
Saragossa,  siege  of,  266. 
Sardinia,  island  of,  187,  221,  233,  338, 

339,  342,    346— army  and  court  of, 

341,  343. 
Sarpi,  Fra,  48. 

Saunders,  Admiral  Sir  Charles,  113. 
Savoy,  Duchy  of,  20— princes  of,  337. 
Savoy  and  Nice  annexed  by  France, 

342. 

Saxe,  Marshal,  107. 
Saxons,  the,  67. 
Saxony,  286,  310. 
Scharnhorst,  282. 
Schwartzenberg,    Prince,    290,   295 — 

his  army,  287. 
Scotland,  7,  17,  40,  54 — its  union  with 

England,    39,   40,   122,   186  —  the 

Scottish  rebellion,  124. 
"Sea-Power,"  doctrine  of,  115. 
"Seas,   sovereignty   of   the,"   25,  27, 

99. 

Sebastiani,    General,    agent    of    Na- 
poleon, 211. 
Secret  Societies,  337. 
Sepoy  mutiny,  the,  355. 
Seven  Years'  War,  the,  113,  118, 129- 

131,  139,  156,  187,  222. 
,    Treaties   concluding   the,    131 

—its  effects,  141. 
Seville,  Treaty  of,  93,  94. 
Shannon,    the,    Broke's  victory  over 

the  Chesapeake  in,  316. 
Ship-money  of  Charles  I.,  26. 
Ships,  colonies,  and  commerce,  British 

policy  with  regard  to,   110,   126 — 


the  English  ships  superior  to  the 
Dutch,  26. 

Shovel,  Admiral  Sir  Cloudesley,  58. 

Sicily  and  the  Sicilies,  7,  134,  151, 
336,  339,  342,  343. 

Sikh  war,  the,  355. 

Slavery,  responsibilities  of  the  Eng- 
lish for,  248-250. 

Slave-trade,  abolition  of  the,  247, 
250,  257,  334— the  Abolition  Act, 
250. 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  198,  199,  219. 

Smolensk,  storming  of,  284,  301. 

Smuggling,  69,  81,  82,  88--licensed 
by  Napoleon,  264. 

Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the 
Gospel,  249. 

Solferino,  battle  of,  342. 

Soult,  Marshal,  293,  294,  304. 

South  Sea  Company,  the  English, 
84. 

Spain,  6,  7,  9-12,  15-17,  19,  20,  23- 
26,  28,  38,  43-45,  66,  76,  120,  130, 
132,  160-164,  183,  187,  194,  195, 
197,  211,  302. 

Spain,  Spaniards  in  Ireland,  17 — fail- 
ure of  the  Allies  in,  59— capture  of 
Gibraltar  from,  60 — attitude  as  to 
British  commerce,  69 — secret  treaty 
between  France  and  Spain,  75 — 
Spanish  insults  to  the  English,  87 
— Napoleon  attempts  to  conquer 
Spain,  251— the  "Spanish  ulcer," 
252 — interference  of  France  in,  319 
— invaded  by  the  French,  323. 

Spain,  Queen  of,  wife  of  Philip  V., 
64. 

Spanish  Bourbons,  the,  336. 

Spanish  colonies  and  colonists  in 
America,  67,  71,  82,  85,  248. 

Spanish  treatment  of  British  claims 
in  West  Indies,  66-108. 

Spanish  ships  in  Villeneuve's  fleet, 
223,  224. 

Spanish  Legion,  the,  333. 

Spanish  peninsula,  the,  320,  322, 
330. 

Spanish  prisons,  81. 

Spanish  Succession,  the  war  of,  57, 
268. 

Spanish  Treaties  of  1667  and  1670, 
82. 

Spithead,  Mutiny  of,  195 — the  fleet 
at,  described  by  Metternich,  239. 

Stair,  John,  second  Earl  of,  116. 

Stamp  Act,  the  American,  146. 


371 


Stanhope,   K;iH,  f.l,  64. 

Stein,  Huron  von,  2>2,  2'.«2. 

Steinkirk,  battle  of,  42. 

<  MI  ..f  Nations,"  the  (1813),  188. 

Stuarts,  the,  2,  10,  18,  48, 109,  119— 
pensioned  by  France  after  the  Res- 
toration, 28,  29. 

Subsidies,  discussion  of  the  policy  of, 
188— system  of  subsidies  broken  up, 

Suchet,  Marshal,  294. 

Suez   Canal   shares,    bought    up    by 

Lord  Beaconsfield,  355. 
Sully,  Duke  of,  21,  159— his  doctrine 

of  the  Balance  of  Power,  20,  159. 
Sweden,  20,  153,  155,  207,  209  note, 

.  259,  286. 
Swiss    and   Lorrainers,  the,   conquer 

Charles  the  Bold,  51. 
Switzerland,   20,    51,  200,   211,   295, 

302,  349. 
Sybel,  Von,  his  '  French  Revolution,' 

quoted,  166. 
Syria,  Egyptians  driven  out  of,  350. 

Tagus,  the,  260,  261. 

T.ilavera,  battle  of,  274. 

Talleyrand,  254  note,  299,  330. 

Tartars,  the,  52,  156. 

Tencin,  Cardinal,  Prime  Minister  of 
France,  107. 

Teneriffe,  Spanish  commerce  inter- 
rupted by  Blake  at,  69. 

Thios,  Louis  Adolphe,  350. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  the,  24. 

Tippoo  Sultan,  198. 

Tobago,  island  of,  308. 

Toplitz,  Treaty  of,  289. 

Torres  Vedras,  276,  283. 

Toulon,  62,  10'.,  129,  138,  215,  228— 
Mathew.s'  battle  off,  117— Nelson's 
fleet  off,  220. 

Toulouse,  battle  of,  294,  307. 

Tourville,  Admiral  de,  41. 

Townshend,     Charles,     Secretar 
State,  143. 

Trade,  West  Indian,  change  from 
quasi  -  free  to  restricted  I'.riti.-h 
trade,  83  —  working  of  the  new 
system,  85— hopelessness  of  its  im- 
provement, 86. 

Trafalgar,  battle   of,    111.    216, 

242, 

Transylvania,  21. 

Trent  affair,  the  (United  State*  . 


Hie,  Uloudir,  Admiral,  221,222. 

Trinidad,    island    ••!'.    2 In, 

quired  at  the  Peace  :J08. 

Tripoli,  28. 

Troppau,  Congress  of,  321. 

Tudor  foreign  policy,  the,  2,  3,  11, 
12,  16,  18,  29,  32,  54. 

Tudors,  the,  25,  29,  38,  109. 

Tunis,  28. 

Turin,  Lord  M  in  to  at,  341. 

Turkey,  58,  155,  158,  159,  197,  211, 
247,  328,  350  — its  relations  with 
Great  Britain,  155,  156 — is  saved 
by  Pitt,  159  — Greek  insurrection 
against,  323  — tyranny  of,  323  — 
Egyptian  invasion  of,  350  —  *'  ! 
tectorship  "  of,  349. 

Turkey  merchants,  !"•.".. 

Turkish  fleet,  destruction  of,  350. 

Turks,  the,  11,  49,  322,  325. 

Tuscany,  187 — court  of,  341. 

United  Provinces.     See  Holland. 

United  States,  151,  152,  175,  240- 
establishment  of  their  indepen- 
dence, 148,  151 — causes  of  the  war 
with,  in  1812,  244— resent  the  Brit- 
ish Orders  in  Council,  262  — Gov- 
ernment of,  314 — non-intervention 
in  the,  353. 

Utrecht,  Peace  of,  22,  52,  60,  61,  83, 
84,  87,  106,  119,  136,  137,  161,  248, 
311. 

Venddme,  Marshal,  victory  of,  61. 

Venetia,  342,  343,  346. 

Venice,  11,20,  48. 

Venloo,  capture  of,  56. 

Yernon,  Admiral,  74,  100,  105. 

Verona,  Congress  of,  323,  I 

Versailles,  Peace  of,  149,  151,  154. 

Victor  Emmanuel,  King  of  Italy,  839, 
Ml,  343. 

i  ia,  Queen,  351,  354. 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  302,  308— Treat- 
ies of,  77,  120,  197,  203,  204,  296, 
310,  346. 

Villitfranca.  Peace  of,  342. 

Villeneuve.  Adi:  ^7.— 

escapes  from    N 

.  293. 

Wager,  Ad-  irl«->.  112. 

Wain  -'16. 


372 


INDEX. 


Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  72,  73,  75-77,  93, 
102,  103,  124,  126,  138. 

,  his  timid  policy,  91 — his  con- 
duct on  the  seizure  of  British  ships 
by  the  Spaniards,  93-101 — is  attack- 
ed on  all  sides,  96 — his  final  blun- 
der, 99— resigns  103— his  fall  (1739), 
120,  121 — imbecility  of  his  foreign 
policy,  139. 

War,  declaration  of,  issued  by  Wal- 
pole, 102. 

War  of  Liberation,  the  (1813),  286, 
288. 

Warbeck,  Perkin,  38. 

Warren,  Admiral  Sir  Peter,  113,  117. 

Washington,  capture  of,  317. 

Washington,  George,  118,  148. 

Waterloo,  battle  of,  306,  307,  351. 

Wellesley,  Sir  Arthur,  afterwards 
Duke  of  Wellington,  118,  180,  191, 
246,  272,  292,  293,  302-307,  310, 
324,  327,  330,  331. 

,  Secretary  for  Ireland  (1807), 

250 — the  "Iron  Duke,"  268— early 
training  in  India,  272  —  succeeds 
Canning  as  the  national  represen- 
tative, 273 — first  victories  in  Spain, 
274 — bears  the  whole  responsibility 
of  the  Peninsular  War,  275 — ad- 
vances against  Napoleon,  283 — cor- 
respondence of  his  victories  with  the 
movements  of  the  Allies,  292.  See 
Waterloo. 

Wellesley,  the  Marquess,  254,  272— 
his  rule  in  India,  246 — superior  to 
Canning  as  to  Spanish  policy,  270. 


Wellington,  Duke  of.  See  Wellesley, 
Sir  Arthur. 

Weser,  the  river,  241,  262. 

West  Indies,  the,  24,  65,  66,  68,  77, 
137,  145,  152,  153,  211,  223,  228, 
232,  239,  248,  249,  308. 

,  Spain  and  Great  Britain  in,  66, 

— trade  of,  70 — settlement  of  Eng- 
lish, French,  and  Dutch  in,  79 — 
British  right  of  trade  in,  90  — 
petition  from  West  India  mer- 
chants, 92. 

Westphalia,  Peace  of,  22,  40. 

Wexford,  rising  in,  184. 

Whigs,  the,  the  service  done  by,  33 
— their  patriotism,  186,  250. 

Whitworth,  Lord,  211. 

Wight,  Isle  of,  239. 

Wilberforce,  William,  194,  247,  257. 

William  III.,  King,  51,  53,  58,  78,  79, 
104,  107,  109,  118,  121,  124,  328. 
— ,  "the  Deliverer"  of  England,  34 
— establishes  unity  with  Scotland, 
39 — secures  the  Channel,  40 — his 
military  headship  of  the  Allies,  42 
— unpopularity  of,  44. 

William  IV.,  King,  331. 

Wolfe,  General,  116,  127,  129,  141, 
149,  151,  237. 

Wolsey,  Cardinal,  12. 

Wyndham,  Sir  William,  93,  96,  97, 100. 

York,  Frederick,  Duke  of,  118,  180, 
272. 

Yorktown,  Lord  Cornwallis  surren- 
ders at,  118. 


THE    END. 


PRINTED   BY   WILLIAM   BLACKWOOD   AND  SONS. 


HISTORICAL  WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR, 


CONSTITUTIONAL   PROGRESS  (MURRAY),  Second  Edition,  1872. 

WORTHIES    OF    ALL    SOULS;    FOUR   CENTURIES    OF    ENGLISH 
HISTORY  ILLUSTRATED  FROM  THE  COLLEGE  ARCHIVKS  (.MACMILLAN),  1874. 

PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  CHURCH   OF  ENGLAND  (SEELEY), 
1875. 

IMPERIAL  ENGLAND  (CASSELL  &  Co.),  1880. 

OXFORD    UNIVERSITY    DURING    THE    COMMONWEALTH 
(VISITORS'  REGISTER,  CAMDEN  SOCIETY),  1881. 

LIFE   OF  ADMIRAL   LORD   HAWKE  (ALLEN),  1883. 
WICLIF'S   PLACE  IN   HISTORY  (ISBISTER),  New  Edition,  1884. 

THE     FAMILY     OF     BROCAS      OF      BEAUREPAIRE      AND 
ROCHE  COURT  (LONGMANS),  1886  (now  sold  by  QUARITCH). 

MEMOIR  OF  WILLIAM  GROCYN,  THE  "FATHER  OF  Till; 
NEW  LEARN  ING  "(OXFORD  HISTORICAL  SOCIKTY,  No.  XVI.),  1890. 

HISTORY    OF    THE    CINQUE    PORTS,  with  Maps  (HISTORICAL 

TOWNS  SERIES,  LONGMANS),  Third  Edition,  1892. 

COMMENTARIES    ON    THE    HISTORY    OF    ENGLAND  PROM 

THK  KAKUKM-  TI.MI:S  TO  18U5  (WM.  BLACKWOOD  &  SONS),  1893. 


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